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DECLASSIFTED E.O. 12008, Sec. 3.6 SEOTE

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NW:972006B By DM F12 Date 8/9/05

Agenda Plan. Mr. Fields reported that letters to the press on Session 3/30/56 the observer program for Operation REDWING would be dispatched on Monday. Mr. Libby referred to the discussion at the meeting the previous day concerning the possible need to declassify the

approximate yield of some of the devices at Operation REDWING Mr. Fields said that it might be possible, within the terms of the present declassification guide, to state to the press observers a range for the yield of the detonation they would Mr. Libby pointed out that the yield of devices detonated on the ground could be calculated easily and observed that since the information would be compromised it would not be necessary to keep these yields highly classified. However, he said the yield of air bursts should not be disclosed since The Commissioners this might compromise sensitive information. and General Manager then discussed at length the sensitivity and extent of knowledge about thermonuclear weapons developments in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the comparative level of achievement in the field. During this discussion the following points were made: REPOSITORY NARA - Colle

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a. Mr. Libby said he believed it was necessary to be cautious about releasing information on thermonuclear weapons because of the need to protect certain principles used by the U.S. in these weapons. He referred to the Commission's decision not to join with the DOD in determing that thermonuclear weapons information could be transmitted to the U.K.

b. Mr. Vance said he believed that eventually the information would have to be provided the U.K. because of the DOD desire to be able to integrate

U.S., U.K. and Canadian military forces in the event of war. He pointed out that the MLC had indicated that the DOD would seek legislation to do so.

c. Mr. Fields said that from intelligence information on the latest Soviet tests, it appeared that they were already using certain of the principles the Commission regarded as being highly sensitive. He observed that after Operation CASTLE, certain information on the U.S. developments had probably been compromised through the cancellation research on means of using deuterium.



