

UWD 972006
Am 1-2 Date 6/1/65

This document consists of 2 pages

Copy No. 1 of Series B

August 19, 1952

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MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Raymond B. Allen,
Director,
Psychological Strategy Board.

SUBJECT: First Report of Panel "L"

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Transmitted herewith is the first report of Ad Hoc Panel "L" appointed by the Psychological Strategy Board to formulate a policy for the political and psychological exploitation in the United States national interest of thermonuclear developments, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union. This first report addresses itself primarily to the task of making recommendations with respect to the desirability, timing and manner of publicly reporting the thermonuclear test scheduled for the Autumn of 1952.

With respect to a second task assigned the Panel: "To formulate contingency guidance to minimize the political and psychological disadvantages which might accrue from Soviet thermonuclear developmental successes", the Panel has not made definite recommendations but feels that the various contingencies that might arise in this regard should be the subject of continuing study by the Panel and should be reported to the Board as feasible.

With respect to the third task, namely "To formulate recommendations as feasible concerning the public reporting of thermonuclear developments subsequent to the Fall test", the Panel recommends that it continue to study this problem and make recommendations thereon as feasible at a subsequent date.

The PSB member of the Panel has suggested that the Panel's activities should be extended to include psychological matters connected

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CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
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BY AUTHORITY OF Class - 3-24-65
BY Clarby DATE 3-24-66

Received in Office of Chairman
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: 05/24/05	1. DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
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2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>8/19/52</u>	4. COORDINATE WITH: <u>Sec. CIA</u>
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with thermonuclear developments beyond those presently dealt with in the Panel's first report. The other members of the Panel, including its Chairman, feel that an enlargement of the Panel's scope of activity can and should occur only at the direction of the PSB. Unless otherwise directed by the PSB, "L" Panel will continue to address itself only to the three tasks set forth in II (a), (b), and (c) of the attached report.

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/s/R. Gordon Arneson
Chairman, Panel "L"

Attachment:

Report of Panel "L" with
Appendices A, B, and C,
and Annexes I and II.

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Copy No. 1 of 2 series
August 19, 1952

OA-CII-22-1A

REPORT OF AD HOC PANEL "L"
ON THE POLICY TO BE ADOPTED FOR THE
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION IN
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST OF THERMONUCLEAR
DEVELOPMENTS, BOTH UNITED STATES AND SOVIET

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I. THE PROBLEM

To formulate a policy for the political and psychological exploitation in the United States national interest of thermonuclear developments, both United States and Soviet.

II. TASKS

- a. To make recommendations with respect to the desirability, timing and manner of publicly reporting the thermonuclear test scheduled for the Autumn of 1952.
- b. To formulate contingency guidance to minimize the political and psychological disadvantages which might accrue from Soviet thermonuclear developmental successes.
- c. To formulate recommendations, as feasible, concerning the public reporting of thermonuclear developments subsequent to the Fall test.

III. The above tasks will be accomplished in the light of United States foreign policy and defense considerations, and current and developing intelligence.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

- 1. With respect to II (a) For Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion see Annex I.

It is concluded that the public announcement on the thermonuclear test should be factual but general, should indicate progress in the field of understanding of thermonuclear reactions, and should be geared somewhat below the true significance of the event rather than over-emphasizing its significance.

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In this connection, it would also be very desirable to make the announcement in the context of a series of tests being conducted, rather than make an announcement about a particular test.

It is possible, but unlikely, that the Soviets might choose to make an announcement concerning the first of the tests in the series of such a character that this Government might find it necessary to counter with its own statement before the conclusion of the series.

2. With respect to II (b) For Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion see Annex II.

The circumstances and context in which Soviet announcement or action in the thermonuclear field might occur and the content of such Soviet announcement cannot be foreseen at this time. The Discussion in annex II develops some of the contingencies that might occur and suggests, tentatively, the manner in which these contingencies might be dealt with. It is concluded that the circumstances prevailing at the time, if it comes, of Soviet thermonuclear tests and/or announcement thereof will dictate the action to be taken.

3. With respect to II (c)

The Panel has no conclusions to offer, at this time, concerning the public reporting of thermonuclear developments subsequent to the Fall test. It recognizes that this aspect of its terms of reference should be the subject of continuing study by the Panel and should be reported on as feasible.

-V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. With respect to II (a)

The Panel recommends that:

- A. The general operating plan for the public reporting of the IVY tests, assuming that there is no

real or fake USSR announcement of its own thermo-nuclear tests before the first IVY shot, be as follows:

(1) In the period before the first detonation:

(a) In the late Summer make a terse announcement by the Department of Defense and the AEC stating that Joint Task Force 132 will conduct a series of weapons developmental tests in the Autumn months of 1952 (Appendix A).

(b) Make no other announcement having any possible relation to the tests during this period unless it appears strongly likely that Soviet propagandists will make their own announcement and interpretation regarding the tests.

(c) In the case that it does appear likely that Soviet propaganda will speak out on the subject, make our own announcement, putting the fact of the tests in the light which offers the best promise of undercutting the effects of the probable Soviet propaganda announcement.

(d) In the case that without advance knowledge on our part a Soviet propaganda attack on the tests is unleashed, what the United States should say can be determined with finality only at the time and in the light of the nature and circumstances of such Soviet attack. The Panel should continue to give consideration to this contingency.

(2) In the period after the first detonation:

(a) In the case that visible or otherwise detectable phenomena have become widely known and news stories and comment of a speculative sort are being published, issue a statement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission

immediately after the detonation of general content such as that in Appendix B.*

(b) In the case that the phenomena or activities are not widely detected and there are few or no speculative news accounts, hold announcement until the conclusion of the test series. At that time issue announcement by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of general content such as that in Appendix C.*

(c) There should be no Washington press conference for the task force Commander and other DOD and AEC officials; the press announcement and news conference for purposes of distributing credit and kudos to the various elements of the task force should be sited at Honolulu.

(d) The several interested Government Agencies and Departments should take steps to ensure that official comment on the test results does not go beyond what is issued by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Appendix A and B or C).

2. With respect to II (b)

The Panel recommends that:

A. The Panel continue to study the manner in which Soviet announcement and/or activity in the thermonuclear field should be handled; and

B. The Panel hold itself in readiness to recommend the line of action to be followed in the event of Soviet announcement and/or activity in this field.

* In the event that the thermonuclear test is partially or wholly unsuccessful the statement in Appendix B would presumably not be necessary but the statement in Appendix C should be used.

3. With respect to II (c)

The Panel recommends that:

A. The Panel continue to consider the problem of public reporting of thermonuclear developments, both United States and Soviet, subsequent to the Fall test.

B. The Panel make recommendations thereon, as feasible.

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JOINT RELEASE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission today announced Joint Task Force 132 will conduct a series of tests in the autumn months of this year looking toward the development of atomic weapons. The tests will be held at the Commission's Pacific Proving Grounds on Eniwetok Atoll of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific. They will be conducted under full security provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. No further details regarding them will be issued prior to the tests. Only official observers of the United States Government and members of the task force will be present at the tests. The organization of Joint Task Force 132 under the command of Maj. General Percy W. Clarkson was announced February 18, 1952.

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APPENDIX "B"

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In recent days Joint Task Force 132, operating for the Department of Defense and the United States Atomic Energy Commission has detonated an experimental device at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This detonation was one in our 1952 series which, like the 1951 series, looks toward further development of various types of weapons releasing the energy resulting from fission of heavy elements or fusion of light elements. The tests are being conducted under the full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act and no further facts on them will be issued.

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In the presence of threats to the peace of the world and in the absence of effective and enforceable arrangements for the control of armaments, the United States Government must continue its studies looking toward the development of these vast energies for the defense of the free world. At the same time, this Government is pushing with wide and growing success its studies directed toward utilizing these energies for the productive purposes of mankind.

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APPENDIX "C"

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Joint Task Force 132, operating for the Department of Defense and the United States Atomic Energy Commission has concluded the third series of weapons development tests at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. This series was carried on under the code name IVY. Like the GREENHOUSE series 1951, it was designed to further the development of various types of weapons releasing the energy resulting from the fission of heavy elements and the fusion of light elements. Unlike GREENHOUSE the IVY series contained no experiments relating to effects of the detonations on structures, equipment or experimental animals.

Scientific executives for the tests have expressed satisfaction with the results. The leaders and members of the military and civilian components of the Task Force have accomplished a remarkable feat of precision in planning and operations and have the commendation of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. General Clarkson, the Commander, and Dr. Graves, the scientific Deputy Commander, will soon issue a public statement commenting in more detail on the contributions of the various components of the Task Force.

The tests were conducted under full security restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act and no further facts concerning them will be issued publicly.

In the presence of threats to the peace of the world and in the absence of effective and enforceable arrangements for the control of armaments, the United States Government must continue its studies looking toward the development of these vast energies for the defense of the free world. At the same time, this Government is pushing with wide and growing success its studies directed toward utilizing these energies for the productive purposes of mankind.

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ANNEX I

To make recommendations with respect to the desirability, timing and manner of publicly reporting the thermonuclear test scheduled for the Autumn of 1952.

A. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The United States has scheduled a large-scale test of the feasibility of the thermonuclear reaction at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds for November 1, 1952, or as soon thereafter as weather and technical preparations permit. This will not be a weapons test. The device will weigh in the neighborhood of 80 tons. Should the thermonuclear feasibility test be successful, the United States could be in a position to introduce thermonuclear weapons into the stockpile, but only after approximately an 18-month delay. The expected yield is in the neighborhood of 5 megatons with an uncertainty of about a factor of 4. A large yield fission test, which may yield 1/2 megaton, is scheduled to follow the thermonuclear test within about one week.

2. On January 31, 1950 the President publicly directed the Atomic Energy Commission "to continue to work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb." This decision meant that the United States Atomic Energy Commission was to determine the feasibility of the thermonuclear reaction. The rate and scale of effort in this field was, by separate classified Presidential directive, to be determined jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

3. On May 25, 1951, a press release by the United States Atomic Energy Commission on the GREENHOUSE tests had the following to say regarding thermonuclear developments: "In furtherance of the President's announcement of January 31, 1950, the test program included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research." On June 16, 1952, Chairman Dean of the Atomic Energy Commission, in response to a question before the House Appropriations Committee, stated "The primary effort now is in the developmental phase, rather than the production phase."

4. Every public announcement concerning tests at the Nevada Proving Grounds has indicated that the Atomic Energy Commission was retaining the Eniwetok Proving Grounds for possible tests. On February 18, 1952, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission announced "that preparations for a new series of tests

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at the Commission's Eniwetok Proving Ground are being carried out by Joint Task Force 132." Nothing was said concerning the nature of these tests.

5. In a recent speech, Chairman McMahon of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy urged that the United States acquire a stockpile of thousands of thermonuclear weapons thus implying that such weapons were feasible and practical.

6. A number of newspaper articles and columns (Alsop, Pearson and Allen) have indicated that the United States will test a thermonuclear weapon in the Fall of 1952. Baldwin has written about a "thermonuclear device."

7. The general impression exists that there are no possible non-military uses for thermonuclear reactions. However, the Atomic Energy Commission is investigating the possibilities of controlled thermonuclear reactions, which open up the possibilities of other than weapons use for these reactions. Although this activity is classified, there has been some speculation in the public press about the possibility of non-military uses of thermonuclear reactions.

B. DISCUSSION

Three possible methods of dealing with the forthcoming series of tests at Eniwetok can usefully be considered:

1. Make no announcement about the tests.
2. Exploit the tests in such a way as to leave the impression that the United States has thermonuclear weapons in being.
3. Make a factual but general public announcement.

In considering each of the above, full account must be taken of the desired reactions and impressions we should like to create domestically, on our friends and allies abroad, on neutrals, and on the Soviet Union.

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1. Make no announcement about the tests.

An analysis of the facts bearing on the problem reveals that, even if it were desirable to do so, it would be impossible not to make some announcement on the forthcoming tests. The public expects the United States to test a thermonuclear weapon this fall. It will be almost two years since the President publicly directed the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed with the development of such a weapon. There has been considerable speculation in the press and elsewhere which, although never officially confirmed, has left the general impression that something important in the thermonuclear field will happen shortly. There are a considerable number of individuals, including, for example, certain members of the Congress and the members of Joint Task Force 132, who will know what has happened. Moreover, the test itself, even if only partially successful, may, under certain atmospheric conditions, have external characteristics, such as blast, light, local fall-out, and other effects (which may require evacuation of people from neighboring islands) which would make it almost certain to be detected at distances some hundreds of miles from Eniwetok. Not making some public announcement, therefore, would not withhold the fact of the test from our own people, from our friends and allies abroad, or from the Soviet Union. If the test were fully successful, certain other countries, including the Soviet Union, would be able, by long range scientific detection, to determine that a large nuclear explosion took place. Saying nothing would put the United States Government in the position of withholding vital information from its own people. It would make it almost impossible to off-set the inevitable speculation that would arise in the press.

Speculation in the press might conceivably be directed toward the possibility that the United States has not been successful in this field and that the program is a fumbling one. Such speculation would have serious domestic repercussions. It would also be cause for serious concern on the part of our friends abroad who rely in general upon the technological superiority of the West, and of the United States in particular, as their principal source of strength.

Not to make any public announcement would put the United States in a most undesirable position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in two respects. First, the Soviet Union might itself make some announcement or leak information concerning the fact that a thermonuclear

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weapon had been tested by the United States, but that for some reason or other the United States had not seen fit to make any statement concerning it. The unfortunate consequences of such action on their part in these circumstances are only too obvious. In addition, should the Soviet Union either test a thermonuclear weapon itself or announce that it had made such a test, the United States would again be in an untenable position and would be forced to acknowledge the fact that it had had a similar test but had not made any announcement concerning it. Such a statement might be disbelieved, and it would certainly have unfortunate repercussions domestically and with our friends and allies mentioned above.

In view of the above, it is concluded that the policy of making no public announcement regarding the tests is neither desirable nor feasible.

2. Exploit the tests in such a way as to leave the impression that the United States has thermonuclear weapons in being.

It is possible to argue that the United States might exploit the forthcoming tests vigorously. If the thermonuclear test proves to be successful, it would be no mean scientific and developmental achievement. It would be a great step forward, not only in the field of scientific understanding of thermonuclear phenomena, but should also result in the eventual addition of a formidable weapon in the United States arsenal. A United States capability in the thermonuclear field might reassure our friends and our own public and might give pause to the Soviet Union.

It is also conceivable that by public announcement creating or heightening the impression in the Soviet Union that the United States is in possession of considerable additional power might permit the United States to obtain a number of settlements with the Soviet Union, or to force changes and modifications in the plans and intentions of the Soviet Union. Even if we assume the Soviet Union would not know the true state of affairs, such a course could be most dangerous. Such a course would be a policy of bluff, which we would be unprepared and unable to back up if the bluff were called.

In any event we cannot assume that the Kremlin will not be aware of the true state of affairs. There are a considerable number of individuals in the United States who will know that the test is one

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of the feasibility of a thermonuclear reaction and that the United States would not have any thermonuclear weapons in being nor would it have any deliverable thermonuclear weapons for a considerable period of time. We could not be certain that such information would not become known. In addition, it is generally assumed that a successful test of a prototype in any field is not followed by immediate production. These facts, plus other methods the Soviets may have of acquiring information on the true state of affairs, would argue against adoption of such a policy. The Soviet Union could also take advantage of such a policy on the part of the United States by claiming that here was additional proof of the aggressive, warmongering intentions of the United States. If we couple with this the fact that the Soviet Union will also know that United States capabilities are not in accord with the public announcement, the Kremlin may consider this as a proof of United States weakness at that time and the Kremlin may therefore take certain actions to move into areas or attempt to achieve other objectives prior to a fuller build-up of the strength of the free world.

A policy of "bulling our stock" will in all probability have an undesirable effect on our friends or neutrals abroad. Our allies, if they did believe that the United States had acquired a large additional increment to its arsenal, might relax their efforts to build up their individual and collective strength. They might also fear that the advent of thermonuclear weapons would make their own efforts to build up strength futile and, therefore, cause them to adopt a defeatist attitude. This latter point could be played up rather strongly, especially among neutralists, who would have held before them a picture of the United States as a country that willingly or unwillingly is creating a situation, together with weapons, whereby the civilization of the world might be destroyed. If they too acquired information from other sources that the United States has overplayed its achievements in this field, a further element of confusion would be added and additional doubts as to United States intentions and integrity would arise. The same confusion and disadvantages would also arise domestically with more powerful and immediate reactions from the United States public, who would not understand why the United States Government was attempting to practice deception.

It is therefore concluded that the policy of exaggerating the significance of the forthcoming event is neither desirable nor feasible.

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3. Make a factual but general public announcement.

A factual but general public announcement has the elemental virtue of being more in correspondence with the facts than the other two approaches. It would be in line with the over-all policy of this Government that, to the extent consistent with the national security, the United States public must be informed of matters that affect the security of the United States. It would permit the Government to off-set speculation and correct misinterpretation wherever it may arise. It would retain the pattern of previous announcements about United States atomic weapons tests. It runs less risk of deceiving or confusing either the United States public or our friends abroad, and would thus avoid the two extremes of un-reasoning fear of the destructive power of modern weapons or of a relaxation of the necessary build-up of the strength of the free world. Such an announcement would not impel people who know the facts, to correct, consciously or unconsciously, what they might consider an inaccurate emphasis. It would also give diminished opportunity for the Soviet Union to make propaganda headway.

It is suggested that an announcement be made along the lines of previous announcements concerning United States atomic weapons tests, indicating progress in all fields of development of atomic weapons, including thermonuclear. It would be desirable to create the impression, both at home and abroad, that the concept of the family of atomic weapons now being accepted by the public will have added to it an additional member. It would be desirable to avoid the impression, which may well be incorrect, that a whole new order of magnitude has been added to the destructive power of weapons to be included in the United States arsenal.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that research is presently going forward into the possibility of developing controlled thermonuclear reactions which may turn out to have non-military applications. This is not a new idea. Some thought was given to this problem at Los Alamos as early as 1942. It is known that the British have been working on these lines for some years.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

It would be possible, without revealing classified information as to processes and techniques, to state publicly at an appropriate time that work was being done on this aspect of thermonuclear phenomena. To do so would help to create the impression that the United States was devoting effort to develop both the military and non-military

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applications of these phenomena and would help to ward off the Soviet charge--certain to be made again when the test takes place this Fall--that the United States is preoccupied only with the development of weapons of mass destruction. Care should be taken that this aspect of thermonuclear phenomena is not overplayed, for to do so would run the risk of serious distortion in speculative comment which could only redound to our disadvantage. While there would be considerable psychological advantage to be had in making mention of this aspect of thermonuclear reactions, it appears, for the present at least, that the possibilities are too nebulous to warrant any official comment.

If the thermonuclear test is not fully successful, a general factual announcement should still be made and should, in fact, be similar to the one that would be made were the test fully successful. The kilotonnage yield of the test would still be very substantial even if there were no thermonuclear reaction. If the test were only partially successful, or if it should fail, considerable knowledge of the feasibility of such reactions would be acquired.

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To formulate contingency guidance to minimize the political and psychological disadvantages which might accrue from Soviet thermonuclear developmental successes.

A. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. The United States has made a public announcement of every Soviet atomic test detected.

3. The Soviet Union never officially confirmed that it tested its first atomic weapon in 1949. Stalin's self-interview last fall and the subsequent reiteration in the Soviet press of the information contained therein is the only official Soviet announcement concerning Soviet tests of atomic weapons.

4. If the Soviet Union tests a large-scale thermonuclear weapon or device, it is believed almost certain that the United States will have detected an explosion within a short period of time after its occurrence, but whether the United States will be able to determine that the explosion involved a large-scale thermonuclear reaction is less certain and, in any event, it will take longer to determine this fact than the fact of a nuclear explosion. The details of the United States capability in this regard must not be revealed.

B. DISCUSSION

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] it is believed unlikely that the Soviet Union will test one before the United States does. Nevertheless,

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consideration must be given to, and recommendations arrived at, for the following contingencies:

1. The Soviet Union tests a thermonuclear weapon or device before the United States does, and announces the test prior to its detection by the United States.

2. The Soviet Union tests a thermonuclear weapon or device before the United States does, does not announce the test, and the United States has detected it.

3. The Soviet Union claims, or inspires rumors to the effect, that it has tested a thermonuclear weapon or device but the United States has no evidence to substantiate these claims or rumors.

4. The Soviet Union tests a thermonuclear weapon or device after the United States does, with or without announcing it.

1. The Soviet Union tests a thermonuclear weapon or device before the United States does and announces the test prior to its detection by the United States.

The above contingency would place the United States in a difficult position vis-a-vis the United States public, our friends and allies abroad, and neutrals. It may be a week or ten days after the test before the United States will be certain that a nuclear event had taken place in the Soviet Union, and even longer to determine whether or not there was any large-scale thermonuclear reaction associated with it. During this period, the United States would literally be in a position of being unable either to confirm or to deny Soviet claims. Because of this fact, the United States would be considerably handicapped in deciding how to minimize the political and psychological disadvantages, both at home and abroad, of such a Soviet announcement. If the United States were to remind the public of its own progress in this field prior to certain knowledge that the Soviets had in fact tested a thermonuclear weapon or device, the impression might be created that the Soviet announcement was an accurate one. Nevertheless, it is suggested that this may be the only course open to us. Then, if the United States is able to determine that a Soviet test involved a thermonuclear reaction, the groundwork would have been laid for indicating that the United States is not behind the Soviet Union in

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this field. If on the other hand the United States can determine that the Soviet announcement was not accurate, we would then be in a position to deflate Soviet claims to our subsequent advantage.

2. The Soviet Union tests a thermonuclear weapon or device before the United States does, does not announce the test, and the United States has detected it.

In this contingency the United States must weigh carefully the effect of a United States announcement both at home and abroad. On the one hand, such an announcement could raise serious doubts at home and abroad as to whether the United States is in fact ahead of the Soviet Union in the entire field of nuclear development. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how an event of such importance could deliberately be withheld from the United States public. The Government could with great justification be accused of withholding information from the United States public--information which is certainly known to the Soviet Union--which has such a direct bearing on the national security. It would be contrary to the often repeated policy of this Government that, to the extent consistent with the national security, the United States public must be informed of matters that affect their security.

Furthermore, the United States will not know from day to day whether the Soviet Union might not make an announcement concerning its test. Such an announcement would force some statement out of the United States, at which time it would be revealed that the United States Government was in possession of information of vital interest to the United States public but had not chosen to inform the people.

It is therefore suggested that in this contingency the United States make a public announcement concerning the Soviet test and that, as in the case of the first contingency, the United States public and our friends and allies abroad be reminded of United States progress in this field in order to minimize the impression that the Soviet Union is ahead of the United States.

3. The Soviet Union claims, or inspires rumors to the effect, that it has tested a thermonuclear weapon or device but the United States has no evidence to substantiate these claims or rumors.

Prior to the first Soviet atomic explosion in 1949, and to a lesser extent prior to a second and third in the fall of 1951, there were many rumors and reports to the effect that the Soviet Union had tested or was about to test an atomic weapon. Some of these reports are believed to have been Soviet-inspired. It is possible that such reports may appear prior to the United States test. The recent reports of Italian experimentation in the thermonuclear field

may give impetus to such reports whether or not Soviet-inspired.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

If sufficient speculation arises and credence is being given to such reports, it may become necessary for the United States to issue some statement. In view of the fact that, should the Soviet Union have a successful large-scale thermonuclear test, the United States would be almost certain to know that some nuclear event had taken place within the Soviet Union, it is suggested that, in keeping with previous invariable practice, a Presidential announcement should be made to the effect that the United States has had no evidence of a nuclear detonation in the USSR since October 3, 1951 advising the American people that it is believed that these reports are untrue. Care should be taken, however, not to reveal on what basis the United States is able to make such a denial.

4. The Soviet Union tests a thermonuclear weapon or device after the United States does, with or without announcing it.

This contingency is the most likely of the various contingencies considered. It is suggested that specific recommendations not be arrived at at this time on this contingency.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 5.3

NND: 972006
By DM LTR Date 6/1/05

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