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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Operation Order  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

*Return of Form 1-3  
from CTO 12-170-10-1*

- Chart References:
- a. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 5415, North Pacific Ocean, MARSHALL ISLANDS.
  - b. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6033, North Pacific Ocean, MARSHALL ISLANDS, ENIWETOK ATOLL.
  - c. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6032, North Pacific Ocean, MARSHALL ISLANDS - Northern Part - BIKINI ATOLL

Task Organization

- a. Task Group 7.1 (Scientific) Dr. William E. Ogle, LASL
- b. Task Group 7.2 (Army) Col. Frank J. Sackton, USA
- c. Task Group 7.3 (Navy) CAPT James R. Pahl, USN (Actg)
- d. Task Group 7.4 (Air Force) Col. Edward M. Gavin, USAF (Actg)
- e. Task Group 7.5 (AEC Base Facilities) Mr. James E. Reeves, AEC

1. General

a. Scope of Instructions

(1) This operation order covers the activities of Joint Task Force SEVEN during the CASTLE buildup phase. Subsequent instructions will cover on-site activities during the CASTLE operational phase, which commences with the arrival of task groups in the forward area.

(2) "Forward Area", as the term is used in this operation order, is defined as that area encompassing the MARSHALL ISLANDS.

(3) "ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area", as the term is used in this operation order, is that area encompassing ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS and bounded by the meridians 160°35' - 166°28' east longitude, and by the parallels 10°16' - 12°45' north latitude; an area of 150 miles by 350 miles.

(4) "Closed Area", as the term is used in this operation order,

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Folder Operation Order -

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*J. D. King 9/12/99*

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is defined as including the land areas of ENIWETOK ATOLL and BIKINI ATOLL and the water areas of the respective lagoons within three (3) miles to the seaward side of the periphery of the respective land areas.

(5) This operation order supplements the instructions contained in CJTF 132 Operation Order No. 4-52, dated 17 November 1952, which remains in effect.

b. General Situation

(1) By authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Task Force 132 (JTF 132) was activated on 9 July 1951 for the purpose of conducting Operation IVY at ENIWETOK ATOLL during 1952. On 21 May 1952 the JCS designated the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to continue as Executive Agent for a subsequent overseas atomic test (Operation CASTLE) and broadened the missions of CJTF 132 to include the execution of CASTLE.

(2) Operation IVY was completed on 21 November 1952.

(3) On 1 February 1953, Joint Task Force 132 was administratively redesignated as Joint Task Force SEVEN (JTF SEVEN) with no change in the previously assigned mission of conducting Operation CASTLE.

(4) Task groups of the Joint Task Force were activated as follows:

<u>TASK GROUP</u>	<u>DATE ACTIVATED</u>	<u>TASK GROUP HEADQUARTERS</u>
Scientific Task Group (TG 7.1)	2 Jan 52	Los Alamos, New Mexico
Army Task Group (TG 7.2)	1 Aug 51	Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands
Naval Task Group (TG 7.3)	8 Feb 52	Washington 25, D. C.

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<u>TASK GROUP</u>	<u>DATE ACTIVATED</u>	<u>TASK GROUP HEADQUARTERS</u>
Air Force Task Group (TG 7.4)	1 Jan 53	Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico
AEC Base Facilities Task Group (TG 7.5)	4 Mar 53 (Activated after Operation IVY)	Santa Fe Operations Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico

(5) By authority of the JCS, the Commander, Joint Task Force, currently exercises operational control of the task groups (other than TG 7.2) for planning and coordination only (defined in Annex A) with full operational control of all task groups to be assumed by CJTF SEVEN upon arrival of task groups at the test site.

(6) By authority of the JCS, CJTF SEVEN exercises administrative control of task groups (defined in Annex A) on certain matters pertaining to CASTLE.

(7) On 17 February 1953, CJTF SEVEN submitted a report to the JCS which outlined the organization for the Joint Task Force, participation by the armed forces and basic operational plans and policies for the conduct of Operation CASTLE. This operation order is based on the plan submitted to the JCS, and approved by the JCS on 14 April.

(8) Security, Intelligence and Public Information - Annex C.

2. Mission. The immediate missions of JTF SEVEN are:

- a. To prepare for the conduct of Operation CASTLE, the operational phase of which is scheduled to commence in January, 1954.
- b. To prepare for the conduct of experimental and technical measurements proposed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) as approved by their respective agencies.
- c. To provide for the security of the Joint Task Force and ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

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3. Tasks for Subordinate Units

a. Scientific Task Group (TG 7.1) will perform the missions outlined below. See Annex D for summary of ultimate tasks and list of military personnel and services to be made available to the Commander, Task Group 7.1 (CTG 7.1).

(1) Prepare to conduct tests of the experimental devices.

X (2) Prepare to conduct the technical and measurement programs as finally approved.

(3) Prepare to conduct the radiological safety program as set forth in Annex I.

(4) Prepare to conduct documentary film operations.

(5) Inform CJTF of the technical requirements for JTF SEVEN test aircraft and surface craft.

(6) In liaison with the Commander, Task Group 7.5 (CTG 7.5), establish requirements for base and test facilities and inform the CJTF SEVEN of significant requirements affecting his overall mission.

(7) Through early definitive planning, provide CJTF SEVEN with details of scientific programs involving military participation.

b. Army Task Group (TG 7.2) will perform the missions outlined below. See Annex E for summary of ultimate tasks and list of the military forces to be made available to the Commander, Task Group 7.2 (CTG 7.2).

(1) Continue to discharge the responsibilities of the CJTF as Atoll Commander, ENIWETOK (ATCOM, ENIWETOK) and the execution of detailed instructions contained in CJTF 132 Operation Order No. 4-52, dated 17 November 1952.

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(2) Maintain a mobile defense force for the ground security of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

(3) Operate port, base and military communications facilities at ENIWETOK and certain military installations at BIKINI in accordance with existing AEC-DOD agreements.

(4) Operate inter-island and inter-atoll air and surface lift systems to support preparatory operations in the forward area during the CASTLE buildup phase.

(5) Prepare to provide the overall military communications system for the Joint Task Force during the operational phase.

(6) Maintain the Army Task Group in a state of training and readiness to perform its current missions and ultimate tasks.

(7) Discharge, within the capability of forces made available, the responsibilities of ATCOM, ENIWETOK, for off-shore and air security of ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

c. Naval Task Group (TG 7.3) will perform the missions outlined below. See Annex F for summary of ultimate tasks and list of the naval forces to be made available to the Commander, Task Group 7.3 (CTG 7.3).

(1) By liaison with appropriate parent commands, assure the proper training, equipping and timely reporting of elements to the Naval Task Group.

(2) As directed by CJTF, provide CTG 7.2 with forces to operate a boat pool element at ENIWETOK and an inter-atoll surface lift system to support JTF elements in the forward area during the CASTLE buildup phase. Be prepared to assume operational control

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of these activities upon commencement of the operational phase, as directed by CJTF.

(3) Prepare to provide an inter-island airlift system at BIKINI.

(4) Assure that naval aircraft and vessels are prepared to conduct the technical missions assigned.

(5) Plan for the execution of CASTLE missions to include delivery of significant device components to the forward area and between atolls, extended shipboard operations of the JTF while at BIKINI and control of drone vessels.

(6) Supervise design of moor for deep water shot and position moor for rehearsal in late summer.

d. Air Force Task Group (TG 7.4) will perform the missions outlined below. See Annex G for summary of ultimate tasks and list of Air Force personnel, services and equipment to be made available to the Commander, Task Group 7.4 (CTG 7.4).

(1) By liaison with appropriate parent commands assure the proper training, equipping and timely reporting of elements to the Air Force Task Group.

(2) Integrate reporting elements into the Air Force Task Group and conduct specialized training for the accomplishment of ultimate missions.

(3) As directed by CJTF, provide CTG 7.2 with forces to operate an inter-island airlift system at ENIWETOK and an inter-atoll airlift system to support JTF elements in the forward area during the CASTLE buildup phase. Be prepared to assume operational control of these activities upon commencement of the operational phase.

(4) ~~Through liaison with [REDACTED]~~, Assure that aircraft of the Air Force Task Group are prepared to conduct the technical missions assigned.

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(5) Plan for the execution of CASTLE missions to include delivery of significant device components to the forward area and between atolls, cloud sampling, aircraft effects tests, search and rescue, weather service, MATS terminal operations and official observer flights.

e. AEC Base Facilities Task Group (TG 7.5) will perform the missions outlined below. See Annex H for summary of ultimate tasks.

(1) Continue the execution of missions assigned by the Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office (SFOO) in accordance with current AEC policies.

(2) Plan, construct, operate and maintain certain specific installations and facilities at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS in accordance with existing agreements with CTG 7.1 and between the AEC and DOD (See Annex K for existing AEC-DOD agreements).

(3) Provide necessary base facilities and logistic support for military personnel at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS in accordance with existing agreements.

(4) Provide base and test facilities to meet the scientific requirements and inform the Commander, JTF SEVEN, of significant developments affecting his overall mission.

X. (1) By liaison with appropriate parent agencies and commands, task group commanders will assure the early initiation of security clearances for participating personnel. Commanders will require all participating personnel to undergo comprehensive training in the responsibility of the individual toward security.

(2) All military personnel to be stationed on ENIWETOK and

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BIKINI ATOLLS will, to the extent practicable, be familiarized with appropriate individual weapons prior to departure from the Zone of Interior (ZI).

(3) Commanders will assure that due emphasis is placed on radiological safety training, operations in tropical climate and other matters peculiar to an operation of this nature.

(4) Commanders will require definitive planning to assure the economical utilization of military forces made available for this operation and maximum economy of funds.

(5) Detailed records of task group activities will be maintained. Reports will be submitted in accordance with current JTF directives. Task group operation plans and orders covering the CASTLE buildup phase will be prepared and forwarded to CJTF.

(6) Task group commanders will keep CJTF SEVEN fully informed as to the progress of task group development, requesting assistance where required in effecting agreements with participating agencies and commands.

(7) Task group commanders will take cognizance of the ultimate tasks indicated in this order and will direct the efforts of the task groups toward the capability for their execution.

(8) Commander's Concept of Operations - Annex B.

4. Administrative and Logistical Matters - Annex K.

5. Command and Signal Matters

a. Command Relationships - Annex A applies. Also, see CJTF 132 letter, subject: "Exercise of Command", dated 8 February 1952.



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b. Command Posts (Prior to movement to forward area).

CJTF SEVEN	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
CTG 7.1	LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY, LOS ALAMOS, N.M.
CTG 7.2	ENIWETOK ISLAND, MARSHALL ISLANDS
CTG 7.3	WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
CTG 7.4	KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO
CTG 7.5	SANTA FE OPERATIONS OFFICE, ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.

c. Communications facilities of CTG 7.2 will be augmented as required to meet increased traffic conditions in the forward area, and will continue to operate in accordance with Annex H to CJTF 132 Operation Order No. 4-52. Units of JTF SEVEN at stations other than ENIWETOK and BIKINI will utilize existing communications facilities at their base stations.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

Annexes

A. Organization and Command Relationships

Appendix:

I - Organization for Operation CASTLE (Prior to on-site phase)

B. Commander's Concept of Operations (to be issued separately)

Appendix:

I - Map of Eniwetok Atoll  
II - Map of Bikini Atoll

C. Security, Intelligence and Public Information

D. Scientific Task Group, Summary of Tasks

E. Army Task Group, Summary of Tasks

F. Naval Task Group, Summary of Tasks

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Annexes

- G. Air Force Task Group, Summary of Tasks
- H. AEC Base Facilities Task Group, Summary of Tasks
- I. Radiological Safety
  - Appendix:
    - I - Radiological Safety Regulations
- J. Weather Plan
  - Appendix:
    - I - Location Chart of Weather Stations
    - II - Weather Organization Chart, JTF SEVEN
- K. Administrative and Logistics.
- L. Communications

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex A to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. On 31 March 1953, the JCS established JTF SEVEN (formerly JTF 132) as a permanent Joint Task Force for the purpose of conducting overseas atomic tests. Accordingly, it is contemplated that certain command relationship principles previously established by the CJTF under JCS-AEC authority will continue to obtain. Under this command relationship concept:
  - a. The Commander, JTF SEVEN, exercises full operational control of the Army Task Group at all times.
  - b. The Commander, JTF SEVEN, during the period between on-site operational phases, exercises operational control of all other task groups for planning and coordination. "Operational control for planning and coordination" is defined as that authoritative direction in planning and preparation necessary to insure successful accomplishment of the Joint Task Force mission.
  - c. The Commander, JTF SEVEN, assumes full operational control of each task group upon its arrival in the forward area. The on-site operational phase commences with the arrival of major elements of task groups in the forward area. During the on-site phase the AEC designates the Commander, JTF SEVEN, as its overall representative in the forward area, thereby giving the Task Force Commander complete control of the military and scientific aspects of the operation.
  - d. The Commander, JTF SEVEN, exercises administrative control of task groups at all times. This administrative control is defined as that control exercised for the purpose of establishing communications channels and coordinating reports, movements and fiscal

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DOE-MA-225, 3/28/90

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Organization and Command Relationships  
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matters, exclusive of those pertaining to the AEC's administration of its proving ground and contractors.

2. The Commander, Joint Task Force, will coordinate the activities of the Scientific Task Group and the AEC Base Facilities Task Group through his Scientific Deputy in accordance with existing AEC-CJTF policy agreements.
3. In the absence of the Task Force Commander from the ENIWETOK area, the senior Task Force officer present will discharge the responsibilities of CJTF as ATCOM, ENIWETOK. Except in unusual circumstances, the senior Task Force officer present will be CTG 7.2.
4. The senior Task Force officer at KNAJALEIN will coordinate matters involving JTF activities (except movement control) at that station.
5. See Appendix to this annex for organization for Operation CASTLE prior to the on-site phase.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

Appendix:

I - Organization for Operation CASTLE (Prior to on-site phase)

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
OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
 Washington 25, D. C.  
 1 May 1953, 1600 R

Appendix to Annex A  
 Organization and Command Relationships, CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

ORGANIZATION FOR OPERATION CASTLE (Prior to on-site phase)



LEGEND:  
 — Operational Control  
 - - - Liaison  
 ..... AEC Policy

NOTE: By decision of the JCS on 13 April 1951, the Commander, Joint Task Force, will report to the appropriate commander under the JCS (CINCPAC) for movement control, logistic support and for the purpose of general security with respect to the Task Force and Eniwetok Atoll (later broadened to include Bikini Atoll). In the absence of the Task Force Commander from the Eniwetok area, the senior Task Force officer present will, as Atoll Commander, report to CINCPAC for these purposes.

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INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT REFERENCE SHEET

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Enclosures missing Annex B w/Appendix

Attachments missing \_\_\_\_\_ I + II

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Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex C to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

- Chart References:
- a. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 5203, North Pacific Ocean, Marshall Islands.
  - b. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6032, North Pacific Ocean, Marshall Islands - Northern Part, Bikini Atoll.
  - c. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6033, Marshall Islands, Eniwetok Atoll.
  - d. U.S. Navy Hydrographic Chart No. 6709, Great Circle Distances and Azimuths from Eniwetok Atoll.

PART I - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. Summary of Enemy Situation (subject to continual revision).

a. The world political situation as of 1 May 1953 shows a general

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED \* picture of widespread political unrest in the following areas:

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(1) The undeclared war in Korea between the Red Chinese and the

UN forces continues in a stabilized position and for some time has consisted of limited objective attacks. Peace talks have been resumed with the Red Chinese government. The process of exchanging prisoners of war, for a long time the stumbling block for a peace settlement, has commenced. Since the death of Stalin, the USSR has adopted an outwardly more conciliatory attitude toward the western world.

(2) In Indochina, the Viet Minh battalions are increasing their warfare against the French government forces.

(3) The government in Iran has continued with a growing anti-American and anti-British attitude and shows less ability to cope with the situation. This country is susceptible to further infiltration by Communists.

(4) In Argentina, the government is faced by increasing tension as evidenced by bombings and acts of terrorism. The struggle in this area is Peron or anti-Peron rather than Communists.

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(5) The government of Guatemala is still dominated by Communists and is plagued by continuing minor uprisings.

(6) In Europe, the progress of a united political unit and a united army continue with uncertain progress.

b. Strictly speaking, the world is at peace but it is actually in an indefinable state known as "cold war" in which the forces of the East (communistic) are lined up against those of the West (anti-Communist) and oppose each other openly by every means short of a declaration of war. In maintaining this state of cold war the scientific discovery and application of atomic energy has played an important part in restraining the USSR. The fear of the destructive force of atomic weapons has undoubtedly proved a deterrent to the aggressive attitude of the Soviet government. The USSR is striving by every possible means to increase their technical knowledge and application of atomic energy and thereby increase their potential military force.

The policy of the Communists (and the USSR) is well known in continuing their efforts for world domination, namely, to apply continued military and political pressure against all noncommunistic governments, relaxing only when the attack is futile and transferring the pressure to another area.

c. Joint Task Force SEVEN should encounter no open enemy in carrying out its mission. Overt action could take place only in case of:

(1) A sudden declaration of war and attack in force by an enemy power;

(2) Hostile action by air or sea on a small scale for the purpose of interfering with the experiment or to gain technical knowledge.

d. It may be expected that the USSR and other nations will make a

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determined and continuing effort to gain knowledge of Operation CASTLE and the atomic experiments and to interfere with them by every means possible, short of operations which would precipitate open hostilities.

e. In addition to the danger from espionage, Operation CASTLE is subject to the leak of sensitive information by careless and thoughtless personnel and to leaks through the press and through the mail.

f. The nonexistence of an open enemy precludes the need of activity for the purpose of gaining information of the activity of the enemy. At the same time it emphasizes the need for the maximum effort to maintain security. Any effort of the enemy to reconnoiter in the area must be countered by all means at the disposal of the Joint Task Force and by requests for information from neighboring commands in Japan and Hawaii.

g. The principal intelligence effort must be concentrated in maintaining security. The measures to insure security consist of security drill and training to prevent inadvertent disclosure of information and in preventing unauthorized persons having access to the area as well as the supervision of information which is released to the press.

2. Summary of Enemy Capabilities

a. It is considered that interference with the mission or compromise of its activities could be effected by:

(1) Espionage. Espionage could be accomplished by the penetration of personnel into the Task Force or the defection of personnel within the Task Force. In addition, espionage could be accomplished by photographic means from ship, aircraft or submarine with the latter two being most plausible. Submarine approach within 1,500 yards or less of important islands of the atoll or overflight by enemy aircraft

are possible. By such means periodic photography and observation could record and interpret the progress, process of preparation, types of construction and the approximate time of important operations from the activities within the atoll.

(2) Sabotage. Sabotage could be accomplished by the penetration of personnel into the Task Force, the defection of personnel within the Task Force or, more remotely, by a raiding party landed from the sea. Subversive action by these means could run along the lines of the destruction of communications and technical installation facilities within the atoll.

(3) Overt Action by Vessel or Aircraft. Overt action by vessel or aircraft could take the form of attack by bomb, gunfire or assault.

(4) Raids. Raids could be conducted by aggressive or surreptitious methods under the cover of darkness from combatant ships and submarines. The landing and recovery of raiders by submarine could be accomplished under the conditions of darkness and the confusion resulting from their activities.

(5) Observation. By overt observation of activities in the area from a vessel immediately outside the three mile limit, a determined ship commander could, in part, compromise the operations.

(6) Unauthorized Instrumentation. Interference with the mission could be accomplished by electronic countermeasures by a vessel or aircraft operating some distance from the area. Compromise could be effected by the surreptitious "planting" of instruments by a landing party and recovered in the same manner after completion of the operation.

(7) Failure of JTF SEVEN Personnel to Observe Security Precautions. Failure of JTF SEVEN personnel to observe security precautions could easily compromise the mission by their talking or writing indiscrimi-

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nately about classified information during the planning and operational stages. A lapse in communication security could also reveal vital information. A lackadaisical attitude toward personnel security regulations could ultimately cause physical penetration within the JTF.

b. It is also considered that interference with the mission would be caused by the declaration or outbreak of war. In this event the position and security of the mission could become untenable and logistically impossible.

c. It is considered that an unfriendly power having an interest in the JTF SEVEN mission would more probably manifest such interest in a covert manner by attempting personnel infiltration or personnel corruption for espionage or sabotage purposes, or by submarine observation for the purpose of obtaining information. It is believed that information as to the operations of JTF SEVEN and the results thereof would be of more practical value to an unfriendly power than hindering or impeding the operation. Overt action involving the use of force, an attack, or direct open observation from a point well in the Danger Area would involve a risk of consequence out of proportion to the value of the results to be obtained from such action.

(1) The country having the greatest capability of executing the above actions, its apparent unfriendly attitude and its interest in the atomic program of the United States is the SOVIET UNION.

(2) Soviet military capabilities in relation to operations of JTF SEVEN are contained in Appendix I to this annex.

3. Area of Operations


a. Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls are a part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, placed under the United States as the administering authority by the Security Council of the United Nations.

They are, therefore, subject to the full powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction of the United States. The trusteeship agreement for the Trust Territory permits the United States to close any of the areas for security reasons.

b. On 2 December 1947, by notification to the United Nations, the U.S. closed the area of the entire Eniwetok Atoll and the territorial waters adjacent thereto. On 2 April 1953, Bikini Atoll was also closed by notification to the United Nations. Territorial waters are defined as those within a three mile limit on the ocean side of the islands of an atoll and all waters inside an atoll.

c. The State Department, on 13 December 1948, concurred in the establishment for an indefinite period of a danger zone around Eniwetok Atoll. Danger area notices were published in air and marine navigational notices and in the press. The State Department notified all foreign governments. It is expected that Bikini Atoll will be similarly affected on or about 1 July 1953.

d. The Danger Area for the operation is shown on the following diagram:



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PART II - SECURITY

4. Security. The security policy of CJTF SEVEN is set forth in memorandums, letters and other forms of instructions published by this headquarters and instructions that may be issued by CINCPAC in relation to Bikini Atoll.

a. Personnel Clearances. The following will be processed for clearances in accordance with JTF SEVEN Security Letter No. 7:

(1) "Q" Clearances

- (a) Headquarters, JTF SEVEN personnel.
- (b) Headquarters, Task Group 7.1 personnel.
- (c) Headquarters, Task Group 7.5 personnel.
- (d) Commander of each task group.
- (e) Key staff, each task group.
- (f) All communications personnel.
- (g) All security personnel based on Eniwetok and Bikini.
- (h) All air police based on Kwajalein.
- (i) Fifty (50) percent of Marine guards on Kwajalein.
- (j) CIC personnel.
- (k) OSI personnel.
- (l) Captain and certain key personnel of each ship as directed by CTG 7.3.
- (m) All others that may require access to Restricted Data from personnel of TG 7.1.

(2) National Agency Check (NAC) Clearances. All other personnel in JTF SEVEN not included in (1) above will have a NAC clearance as a minimum requirement.

b. Censorship. There will be no censorship of personal mail.

c. Classification Criteria.

- (1) Existence of JTF SEVEN, the Commander and key staff, the

designation of task groups and their commanders and key staffs - UN-CLASSIFIED.

(2) General statement of mission (i.e., to conduct tests at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) - SECRET, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(3) Proposed exact time (i.e., month and day of year of tests) - SECRET, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(4) Number of devices to be tested - SECRET, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(5) Type of weapons (including any description) - SECRET, SECURITY INFORMATION (RESTRICTED DATA).

(6) The DMA-AEC codeword CASTLE when used alone - RESTRICTED, SECURITY INFORMATION; when used in conjunction with JTF SEVEN letterhead or in any way that identifies it as an operation, i.e., Operation CASTLE - CONFIDENTIAL, SECURITY INFORMATION; when used in connection with its full meaning - SECRET, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(7) The directive to the Commander, JTF SEVEN - SECRET, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(8) Detailed organization and composition of JTF SEVEN - CONFIDENTIAL, SECURITY INFORMATION. Outline of organization not revealing units or missions - RESTRICTED, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(9) Personnel assignment orders - RESTRICTED, SECURITY INFORMATION.

(10) A detailed classification guide will be published.

d. Photography. Only official photography is authorized at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls. The possession of personal cameras, film and other photographic equipment at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls is prohibited. All official photography will be classified in accordance with AEC and Service security regulations but in no case with a lower classification than RESTRICTED.

e. Contraband. Individuals ordered to the forward area should have been advised of the prohibition of contraband items listed herein

and, if possible, the transfer or travel orders should include a statement of this prohibition. All types of the following items are considered contraband: Cameras, film photo laboratory equipment, binoculars, privately owned firearms, signaling devices (signaling guns, shielded flashlights, flares and similar devices), radio transmitters, all weapons (except small pocket knives), fireworks, intoxicants and narcotics.

(1) Items of contraband will be confiscated on arrival in the forward area unless personnel are duly authorized such items in the execution of their duties.

(2) Exposed film found in possession of an individual will be confiscated and forwarded to TG 7.1 for processing and classification in conformance with existing AEC regulations.

f. Security Inspections. Inspections will be conducted upon arrival of personnel and periodically thereafter to detect security violations and contraband items and to insure use of proper identification credentials and proper safeguarding of classified matter.

g. Security Training and Instructions. Organization commanders are responsible for thorough training, instruction and drill of members of their commands in the existing security regulations that apply to them (Army, Navy, Air Force or civilian) as well as in the existing security regulations that are issued from time to time by Headquarters, JTF SEVEN. Visitors will be thoroughly instructed in security regulations that apply to them before being permitted to enter the area of operations.

h. Communication Security. Communications, its security and monitoring will be accomplished by and under the direction of the ACofS, J-5 in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, Hqs, JTF SEVEN.

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i. Security Violations - Compromise of Classified Matter. Upon the discovery of a violation of security regulations, a suspicion or allegation of a violation or the compromise of classified matter, the task group commander most closely associated with the incident will initiate an investigation. The Commander, JTF SEVEN will make available, upon request from task group commanders, qualified investigators to conduct such investigations. Task group commanders will be responsible for the proper utilization of investigative personnel during the course of investigation and for the submission of preliminary and periodic reports to CJTF SEVEN until the case is closed.

j. Security Sweeps.

(1) Ground. Security sweeps of all islands of Eniwetok Atoll, except CTG 7.1 areas of responsibility, will be made by CTG 7.2. Security sweeps of Bikini Atoll will be in accordance with instructions to be issued by CJTF SEVEN.

(2) Air. Security observation flights will be conducted by TG 7.4 at the request of CTG 7.2.

(3) Interval. Ground sweeps will be conducted once every four (4) days or as directed by CJTF SEVEN. Air observation flights will be made over all islands daily, or as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

k. Travel Security Control.

(1) CINCPAC Serial 020, dated 1 April 1952, outlines the requirements to secure authority for personnel to enter Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls.

(2) The Commander, Task Group 7.2 is responsible that individuals arriving at Eniwetok, who have not been cleared for entry under CINCPAC Serial 020, are restricted to Eniwetok Island pending proper clearance.

(3) The Commander, TG 7.2 will establish an inter-island travel security control system as specified by CJTF SEVEN.

(4) Inter-atoll (Kwajalein-Eniwetok-Bikini). All JTF personnel assigned to Kwajalein will be cleared under CINCPAC Serial 020 for



entrance to Eniwetok and Bikini. Thereafter, CTG 7.2 and CTG 7.4 are authorized to admit or clear personnel without recourse to CINCPAC.

(5) Official observers will be controlled and escorted as directed by CJTF SEVEN.

l. Exclusion Areas.

(1) Exclusion areas will be established by CJTF SEVEN at the request of CTG 7.5.

(2) The Commander, TG 7.2 will secure exclusion areas, admitting only those persons so authorized by CJTF SEVEN.

(3) The internal security of an exclusion area is the responsibility of CTG 7.5.

m. Counterintelligence.

(1) The CJTF SEVEN has operational control of all counterintelligence units, unless otherwise delegated.

(2) At Kwajalein, CTG 7.4 will be responsible for counterintelligence coverage within the task group.

n. Essential Elements of Information. Information will be reported:

(1) Which casts doubt on the loyalty and character of JTF SEVEN personnel or indicates that such personnel are not considered good security risks.

(2) Which indicates any possibility of sabotage of JTF SEVEN materiel or equipment either locally, in the ZI or in transit.

(3) Which indicates espionage which affects the Task Force in the forward area, zone of communications or in the ZI.

(4) Which concerns the interference or possible interference of Task Force activities by unfriendly or hostile forces, to include capabilities, possible intentions and actions.

o. Reports

(1) Immediate reports concerning the items mentioned under

"Essential Elements of Information" will be submitted direct to CJTF SEVEN.

(2) A weekly report will be made to CJTF SEVEN by task group commanders covering matters of intelligence and counterintelligence interest. Negative reports will be submitted.

(3) These reports are exempt from requirements of Reports Control Symbol procedure.

PART III - PUBLIC INFORMATION

5. Public Information. The JTF SEVEN public information policy is set forth in SOP 190-1, this headquarters, dated 7 November 1951. Specific plans for the release of information on CASTLE operations will be coordinated with interested government agencies.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander.

Appendix

Intelligence Estimate, 1 May 1953

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Appendix to Annex C  
Intelligence, Security and Public Information, CJTF SEVEN Operation Order  
No. 1-53

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

1. General Situation. The atmosphere of tension existing between the U.S. and its allies and the USSR and its satellites stands little chance of diminishing during the next six months. There is a possibility that it may increase as the result of possible further Soviet inspired actions against nations on the geographical fringe of the Soviet bloc.

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General Soviet Capabilities. The armed forces of the USSR are maintained in an advanced state of military readiness. As a result, the Soviets can undertake military aggression with little or no advance warning.

3. Soviet Capabilities as Applied to JTF SEVEN.

a. Naval Capabilities. The Soviets have 21 ocean patrol and 37 medium range type submarines in the Pacific Ocean area. Because of endurance limitations of the medium range type, it is believed that the ocean patrol type would be the better for operations in the Eniwetok and Bikini areas. It is estimated that at least four to six ocean patrol submarines could be maintained on station in the Eniwetok-Bikini area indefinitely and for short periods this number could be increased.

b. Air Capabilities.

(1) Aerial photo and radiological reconnaissance of the Eniwetok - Bikini area from Far East bases (Sakhalin or the Kuriles) is within Soviet capabilities. Without refueling, the TU-4, modified for long range reconnaissance, could remain in the target area for only a brief period, making necessary prior Soviet access to CASTLE plans to permit proper timing of reconnaissance flights. Assuming that the

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Intelligence Estimate  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

the Soviets have developed refueling techniques equal to the U.S., one outbound refueling would extend the time over the target area to over 4 hours. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviets have developed refueling capabilities. The Third Long Range Air Force, stationed in the Far East, is presently reequipping with TU-4s. It is estimated that its current TO/E strength for TU-4s is approximately 100. No TU-4s are known to be modified for long range reconnaissance.

(2) The only Soviet aircraft known to have greater range potentialities than the TU-4 is the Type 31 prototype heavy bomber which was observed in flight for the first and only time to date in the July 1951 Aviation Day air show in Moscow. If equipped with the JU-022 turboprop engine, the Type 31 would have a combat radius of about 3,500 nautical miles and considerably in excess of this if the combat load were replaced with fuel. There is no evidence yet that either this aircraft or the JU-022 engines are in series production and present estimates are that a heavy bomber will not appear in Soviet operational units prior to 1953. It is entirely possible, however, that the Soviets might equip an early model of the Type 31 for photo and radiological reconnaissance if a sufficiently high priority exists for this requirement.

4. Effect of Capabilities on JTF SEVEN. The capabilities listed in paragraph 3 above make it possible for the Soviets to take the following action against Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls.

- a. Submarine reconnaissance.
- b. Air reconnaissance.
- c. Ground reconnaissance or sabotage by landing parties from submarines.
- d. Raids from submarines or surface ships.
- e. Raids by airplanes.

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Intelligence Estimate  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

5. Conclusions. Capability a is considered the most likely to occur under conditions existing today. Capability b is a possibility but is less likely and capabilities c, d and e could possibly take place in the event of open hostilities between the U.S. and the USSR.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

Incl

Chart, Soviet Military Capabilities  
of Interference with JTF SEVEN.


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Intelligence, Security and Public Information, CJTF SEVEN Operation Order  
No. 1-53  
Intelligence Estimate, 1 May 1953



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Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex D to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

SCIENTIFIC TASK GROUP, SUMMARY OF TASKS

1. The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Scientific Task Group in preparation for the ultimate CASTLE missions assigned to CTG 7.1:
  - a. In liaison with appropriate agencies and military commands, provide CJTF with details of scientific programs involving military participation.
  - b. Integrate within the Scientific Task Group a unit representing the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) which will conduct measurement programs on behalf of the Department of Defense (DOD).
  - c. To the extent practicable, and in coordination with the Chief, AFSWP, integrate the AEC and DOD scientific projects to the end that economy of funds, personnel and military support is achieved.
  - d. Through coordination with CTG 7.5, continue technical direction of AEC contracts undertaken for the accomplishment of CASTLE objectives.
  - e. Provide CJTF with planned peak strengths, forward area phasing, on-site location and inter-atoll movements of Scientific Task Group elements.
  - f. Provide CJTF SEVEN, at the earliest date, with the following information and subsequent changes which may occur thereto: Concept of scientific operations, to include location and description of shot and instrumentation sites, timing and firing methods, proposed detonation hours, check-outs and rehearsals required, number of personnel and time involved in each data recovery operation, estimated sample return requirements and other factors bearing on CJTF's

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*J. Dina* 7/23/96  
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\* LTR DNA SWISHER TO  
DOE MA-225, 3/28/90

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Scientific Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

overall operational concept.

g. Prepare to conduct documentary film operations, utilizing the services of the Air Force Lookout Mountain Laboratory. In this connection, prepare an outline of the CASTLE documentary film in accordance with principles to be established by CJTF in a separate communication.

h. As soon as practicable, inform CJTF SEVEN of the estimated dates of readiness of the experimental devices and make appropriate recommendations on dates of movement to the forward area.

i. Provide CTG 7.5 with such technical assistance as may be necessary in effecting the movement of device components to the forward area.

2. In accomplishment of his ultimate tasks during the operational phase, CTG 7.1 will:

a. Provide technical assistance during leading, inter-atoll movement and placing of the experimental devices.

b. Complete the installation and calibration of the devices and all instruments and test apparatus.

c. Be responsible for the removal of all TG 7.1 personnel and necessary equipment from the danger area.

d. When directed by CJTF, evacuate TG 7.1 from BIKINI ATOLL.

e. Be prepared, upon directive from CJTF, to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation of TG 7.1 personnel from ENIWETOK ATOLL.

f. Arm and detonate the devices.

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g. Conduct the technical and measurement programs.

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Scientific Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

- h. Provide documentary film coverage.
- i. Prepare appropriate technical reports at the conclusion of each shot and the overall operation.
3. The following military personnel will be made available to the Scientific Task Group for Operation CASTLE. Figures do not include all Service personnel assigned to the Air Force Lookout Mountain Laboratory nor the self-contained radiological safety unit of TG 7.1:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Army	21	32
Navy	14	15
Air Force	<u>19</u>	<u>32</u>
TOTAL	54	79

See Annexes E, F and G for overall military forces to be made available by the Services as approved by the JCS for use during Operation CASTLE.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

OFFICIAL:

DNA

WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

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Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex E to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

ARMY TASK GROUP, SUMMARY OF TASKS

1. The following is a summary of continuing tasks to be accomplished by the Army Task Group during both the CASTLE buildup phase and the on-site operational phase. The Commander, Task Group 7.2, will:
  - a. Continue to discharge the responsibilities of CJTF as ATCOM, ENIWETOK with respect to entry into the ENIWETOK/BIKINI area and ground defense of these atolls.
  - b. With means available, be prepared to deploy elements of the Atoll Security Force to reinforce the BIKINI garrison in the event of emergency.
  - c. Continue to operate all base facilities at ENIWETOK ISLAND, except those specifically allocated to CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.5, in accordance with existing agreements.
  - d. Provide communications facilities at BIKINI ATOLL as necessary to support AEC operations at that atoll.
  - e. Conduct port and stevedoring operations at ENIWETOK ATOLL with stevedoring assistance made available by CTG 7.5 in accordance with existing agreements.
  - f. Take measures to prevent unauthorized entry into exclusion areas, coordinating this activity with CTG 7.5
  - g. Operate and maintain a TG 7.2 boat pool at ENIWETOK, taking cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated boat pool operations set forth in paragraph 7, Annex B.

2. During the CASTLE buildup phase, CTG 7.2 will:

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Army Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

- a. With capabilities provided by CTG 7.3, operate a TG 7.2 boat pool at ENIWETOK and an inter-atoll surface lift system within the forward area. Be prepared to relinquish operational control of the inter-atoll surface lift system upon commencement of the operational phase, as directed by CJTF.
  - b. With capabilities provided by CTG 7.4, operate an inter-island airlift system at ENIWETOK ATOLL and an inter-atoll airlift system to support JTF elements in the forward area and operate minimum airstrip facilities at BIKINI ATOLL as necessary to support AEC operations at that atoll. Be prepared to relinquish operational control of these activities upon commencement of the operational phase, as directed by CJTF.
  - c. Maintain local search and rescue capabilities within the cognizance of the SAR Area Commander.
  - d. Prepare to support CTG 7.1 monitor and decontamination activities.
  - e. Conduct liaison with CTG 7.5 to the end that support requirements for the preparation of ENIWETOK and the development of BIKINI are met.
3. In the accomplishment of his ultimate tasks during the operational phase, CTG 7.2 will:
- a. Provide the overall military communications system for the Joint Task Force.
  - b. Provide support services for Hq, JTF SEVEN as required.
  - c. Be prepared upon directive from CJTF to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation from ENIWETOK ATOLL of all personnel based on ENIWETOK ISLAND.

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Army Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTTF SEVEN No. 1-53

4. The following is a tabulation of military personnel and units to be made available to the Army Task Group. See Annexes F and G for Navy and Air Force elements to be provided to ATCOM, ENIWETOK, during the CASTLE buildup phase.

<u>MAJOR COMPONENT</u>	<u>PEAK STRENGTH</u>		<u>REMARKS</u>
	<u>Officer</u>	<u>EM</u>	
7126th Army Unit (T/D)	52	550	Communications elements of 7126th AU to be at full strength by 1 Dec 1953.
516 MP Detachment	6	159	
511th Trans. Port Co., Type A	5	160	
4th Trans. Truck Co.	5	115	Requirement for DUKW operators to support TG 7.5 operations at Bikini not anticipated.
18th Military Police CID	1	4	
Provisional CIC Detachment	8	0	
Communications Security Det. #1, 8607th AU	4	31	This or similar unit to be on site approximately 1 Jan 1954, or with arrival of the AGC.
*3 Army H-13 Helicopters	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	To go under operational control of CTG 7.4 during operational phase.
TOTAL	81	1019	

\* This strength is included in 7126th AU figures and is therefore not included in the grand total.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

OFFICIAL:

**DNA**

WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex F to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

NAVAL TASK GROUP, SUMMARY OF TASKS

1. The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Naval Task Group in preparation for the ultimate CASTLE missions assigned to CTG 7.3.
  - a. Organize, equip and train a boat pool capable of augmenting the existing inter-island transportation at BIKINI during the operational phase.
  - b. As directed, provide necessary transportation for the establishment of outlying weather stations.
  - c. As directed, transport certain significant device components from the West Coast to the forward area via the USS CURTISS (AV-4). Arrange with CINCPACFLT for routing and suitable escort for the USS CURTISS when transporting device components.
  - d. Transport certain TG 7.4 aircraft from the West Coast to the forward area as directed.
2. In accomplishment of his ultimate tasks in the forward area, CTG 7.3 will:
  - a. Provide for the security of the ENIWETOK/BIKINI Danger Area in accordance with separate instructions from CJTF.
  - b. Provide a capability for rapid surface movement of ground defense forces between ENIWETOK and BIKINI in the event of emergency.
  - c. At BIKINI, operate a boat pool, taking cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated boat pool operations set forth in paragraph 7, Annex B. Be prepared to operate the boat pool

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CTR DNA SWISHER TO  
DOE MA-225, 3/28/90

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Naval Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

from other Task Force ships when LSD is engaged in transportation of experimental devices.

d. Upon commencement of the operational phase, assume responsibility for providing an inter-atoll surface transportation system to support JTF elements in the forward area.

e. Assist in cargo handling operations at BIKINI as required.

f. Control harbor facilities at ENIWETOK and BIKINI.

g. Detail two (2) PBMs and required personnel to CTG 7.4 who will operate a limited inter-atoll amphibious airlift <sup>service</sup> between ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS.

h. By means of amphibious aircraft and such other shipping as is available, provide transportation for limited resupply of weather stations, coordinating with CO, NAVSTA KWAJALEIN, as necessary.

i. Provide shipboard assembly facilities for the experimental devices.

j. As directed, transport the experimental devices and the necessary barges between and within ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS. Conduct rehearsals of this activity as required.

k. Provide suitable escort when transporting experimental devices between atolls.

l. Operate a ship-to-shore and inter-island helicopter lift system at BIKINI to support pre-shot operations and to include post-shot flights for damage survey and recovery of scientific data. Be prepared to assist CTG 7.4 in the conduct of this activity at ENIWETOK upon conclusion of BIKINI operations. In this connection,

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Naval Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

take cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated airlift operations set forth in Paragraph 5, Annex B.

m. Provide space on the CVE for a mobile radiological laboratory and associated operations of the radiological safety unit of TG 7.1.

n. Provide decontamination facilities for aircraft aboard the CVE.

o. Provide limited shipboard facilities for radio-chemistry techniques, fall-out studies and photo-desimetry work.

p. Provide shipboard command, control and communications facilities for CJTF and staff; also provide administrative space for Hq, TG 7.1 and Hq, TG 7.5.

q. Provide shipboard facilities to house the JTF while afloat at BIKINI during those shots requiring pre-shot evacuation of personnel from the atoll.

r. Provide capability for emergency post-shot evacuation of personnel (for less than 48 hours) in those instances where pre-shot evacuation has not been conducted. Be prepared to provide and operate emergency command and administrative communications for the JTF.

s. Direct the movement of personnel between ship and shore during evacuation and reentry periods.

t. Provide for radiological safety of embarked Task Force personnel during periods the JTF is afloat.

u. Provide facilities aboard the AGC for the Joint Task Force Weather Central, and communications security monitoring personnel aboard the AGC.

v. When directed, before each shot, patrol the significant sector out to 600 miles to detect any surface shipping.

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Naval Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
GJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

- w. Be prepared to assist in conducting sample return operations by ferrying samples from BIKINI to ENIWETOK as required.
- x. Position and moor barge for the first BIKINI shot. Assist in positioning and mooring other barges involved in the scientific program as required.
- y. Direct the movement of drone vessels during shot periods. Be prepared to assist in large scale decontamination of drone vessels and effects aircraft loaded thereon.
- z. Conduct operations involving the placing and recovery of floating devices for pressure and fall-out measurements.
- aa. Assist CTG 7.4 in search and rescue operations as required.
3. It is anticipated that the Chief of Naval Operations will provide the naval elements and necessary personnel indicated below and such services necessary for the support of Operation CASTLE.

<u>MAJOR FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE DATE REQUIRED IN FORWARD AREA</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1 AGG (with helicopter platform)	1 Feb 54	For command and control facilities.
1 AV (USS CURTISS AV-4)	1 Jan 54 (On West Coast)	Transportation and assembly of devices; administrative and laboratory facilities for CTG 7.1.
1 LSD	15 Jan 54	Mother ship for TG 7.3 boat pool at Bikini and transportation of barge-loaded devices and dewars.
1 LST	Now in Fwd Area	Lift between Eniwetok and Bikini and alternate tender for TG 7.3 boat pool at Bikini.
1 LST	1 Dec 53	Logistic support of weather islands.

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Naval Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

<u>MAJOR FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE DATE REQUIRED IN FORWARD AREA</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
3 ATF	1 Feb 54	Scientific projects and towing missions. One ATF to accompany drone vessels from West Coast on 1 Nov 1953.
Additional vessels as required to support Dan Buoy project	1 Feb 54	To be requested by CJTF as necessary.
1 AN	15 Jan 54	To be requested by CJTF for "tuna can" project.
1 P2V	1 Feb 54	To be requested for "tuna can" telemetering mission, as necessary.
1 P2V	27 Jan 54	For control of drone vessels
2 Liberty ships	27 Jan 54	Drone vessels for scientific project.
1 CVE (with 6 HRS helicopters and 4 TEM)	1 Jan 54 (On West Coast)	Rapid post-shot reentry missions and sample ferrying missions, with CVE performing corollary security mission.
2 PEM-5A	15 Jan 54	For SAR and inter-atoll lift. Two additional PEM-5A assigned to CO, NAVSTA KWAJALEIN, available for resupply of weather islands.
TG 7.3 Boat Pool	15 Jan 54	Inter-island lift at Bikini, unless otherwise indicated.
21 LCM		Two (2) LCM for CTG 7.2 now at Eniwetok.
4 LCP(L)		One (1) LCP(L) for CTG 7.2 now at Eniwetok.
5 LCU		
1 YCV	1 Feb 54	Helicopter landing platform.
2 AVR		For SAR. One (1) AVR not at Eniwetok. Second AVR due at Bikini by 1 June 1953.

4. It is anticipated that CINCPACFLT will provide the following vessels, aircraft and units for security missions:

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Naval Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

<u>MAJOR FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT</u>	<u>DATE FULLY OPERATIONAL IN FORWARD AREA</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
4 DDE	15 Jan 54	Escort and security patrol of Danger Area.
4 F4U		Fighter aircraft for security of Danger Area.
9 P2V		Patrol of Danger Area.
Underwater Detection Unit		Anti-submarine.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

OFFICIAL:

**DNA**

WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex G to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

AIR FORCE TASK GROUP, SUMMARY OF TASKS

1. The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the Air Force Task Group in preparation for the ultimate missions assigned to CTG 7.4:
  - a. Augment inter-island airlift at ENIETOK and BIKINI commensurate with increased forward area activities.
  - b. Conduct liaison with CTG 7.1 to the end that necessary equipment modifications are accomplished and other technical requirements in support of the scientific program are met.
  - c. As directed by CJTF, establish and operate JTF Weather stations at BIKAR, RONGERIK, MAJURO and KUSAIE.
  - d. As directed by CJTF, transport certain device components from the ZI to the forward area.
  - e. As directed by CJTF, prepare certain TG 7.4 aircraft for movement to the forward area aboard the CVE.
  
2. In accomplishment of his ultimate tasks in the forward area, CTG 7.4 will:
  - a. Provide, maintain and operate aircraft in support of the following scientific missions:
    - (1) Cloud sampling and cloud tracking.
    - (2) Measurement of blast, gust and thermal effects against aircraft.
    - (3) Light attenuation measurement.
    - (4) Documentary photography.
    - (5) Airborne direction of sampling aircraft and such other aircraft as may be specified.

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Air Force Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
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- b. Conduct weather reconnaissance flights to provide JTF Weather Central with required data.
- c. Operate an inter-atoll air transportation system between ENIWETOK and BIKINI, to include C-47 flights to KWAJALEIN and other atolls as required.
- d. Utilizing liaison aircraft and helicopters, operate an inter-island airlift system at ENIWETOK ATOLL, taking cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated airlift operations as set forth in paragraph 5, Annex B.
- e. As required, detail helicopters and personnel to CTG 7.3 who will operate an inter-island airlift system at BIKINI from aboard the CVE. In this connection, take cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated airlift operations set forth in paragraph 5, Annex B.
- f. Conduct administrative flights in connection with the JTF mission and the maintenance of flying proficiency of rated JTF personnel.
- g. Provide search and rescue coverage in the forward area, with assistance by CTG 7.3 and within the cognizance of the SAR Area Commander.
- h. Conduct flights for official observers as required by CJTF.
- i. Provide personnel for the JTF Weather Central, ~~aboard the command ship.~~
- j. Install, operate and maintain an air operations control center on ENIWETOK ISLAND and provide supervisory personnel for the Air Operations Center aboard the command ship, during shot periods at BIKINI.

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Air Force Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

- k. Provide and operate complete terminal facilities for MATS transport operations at ENIWETOK, coordinating this activity with CTG 7.2.
  - l. Provide Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) as required in support of JTF operations.
  - m. Operate all facilities on ENIWETOK ISLAND and BIKINI as relate to the operation of aircraft.
  - n. Provide CTG 7.2 with personnel augmentation as necessary to support TG 7.4 at ENIWETOK ISLAND.
  - o. Conduct decontamination operations on TG 7.4 aircraft and facilities as necessary.
3. It is anticipated that the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, will provide personnel and equipment to perform the missions indicated below and necessary services to support Operation CASTLE.

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**HEADQUARTERS  
TASK GROUP 7.4**  
35 Officers      61 Airmen

**TEST SUPPORT UNIT**  
4930 AB Group  
4931 AB Squad.  
4932 AB Squad.  
Bikini Detachment  
67 Off.    543 Amn

Airbase Operations  
Inter-island Airlift  
  
Inter-atoll Airlift  
Administrative and  
MIT Aircraft  
Augmentation to CTG  
7.2

**AIRCRAFT**

7 H-19A Helicopters\*  
3 H-19 Helicopters\*  
(Army)  
4 G-47\*  
1 G-54 (CJTF)  
1 B-25 (CTG 7.4)

\* 3 Army Helicopters,  
4 G-47 aircraft and  
3 H-19 Helicopters  
under operational  
control of CTG 7.2  
during CASTLE build-  
up phase.

**TEST AIRCRAFT UNIT**  
Sample and Control  
Detachment  
Effects & Director  
Detachment  
100 Off.    296 Amn

Cloud Sampling  
Blast and Thermal  
Measurements  
Sampling Direction

**AIRCRAFT**

15 F-84G Samplers  
1 B-36 Director  
1 B-36 Effects  
1 B-36 High Altitude  
sampler with  
possible B-57  
augmentation

**TEST SERVICES UNIT**  
MATS Aircraft  
and Services  
115 Off.    517 Amn

Weather Reconnaissance  
Weather Forecasting  
Cloud Tracking  
Communications  
Search and Rescue  
MATS Terminal Operations  
Documentary Photography

**AIRCRAFT**

10 WB-29  
2 SA-16  
1 RB-50 for Documentary  
Photography  
3 C-54 or C-119 for  
Documentary  
Photography

**DNA**

**P. W. CLARKSON**  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

**OFFICIAL:**

**WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.**  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex H to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

AEC BASE FACILITIES TASK GROUP, SUMMARY OF TASKS

1. The following is a summary of tasks to be accomplished by the AEC Base Facilities Task Group in preparation for the ultimate CASTLE missions assigned to CTG 7.5:
  - a. Continue to engineer and construct all base and test facilities at the Pacific Proving Ground to support the Joint Task Force and the AEC and its contractors in the conduct of test operations. Continue to operate and maintain certain of these base facilities in accordance with existing agreements and local arrangements with CTG 7.1 and ATCOM, ENIWE TOK.
  - b. Provide CJTF SEVEN with planned peak strengths, forward area phasing, on-site locations and inter-atoll movements of TG 7.5 elements.
  - c. As soon as practicable, submit to CJTF SEVEN recommendations on means of movement of device components to the forward area.
  - d. At the appropriate time for delivery to the forward area, assume technical responsibility and supervise all physical movement of the device components.
2. In accomplishment of his ultimate tasks in the forward area, CTG 7.5 will:
  - a. Be responsible for and supervise physical movement of device components in the forward area.
  - b. Conduct necessary liaison with CTG 7.2 to enable him to discharge his responsibilities toward traffic control and preventing unauthorized entry into exclusion areas.

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AEC Base Facilities Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

c. Operate, manage and direct camp facilities at BIKINI and on all islands of ENIWETOK ATOLL, except ENIWETOK ISLAND, to include the following:

(1) Provide subsistence, quarters, laundry, medical, recreational and other camp services on all islands, except ENIWETOK ISLAND where these services are provided by CTG 7.2.

(2) Operate land transportation service at BIKINI and on all islands of ENIWETOK ATOLL, except ENIWETOK ISLAND and except in those circumstances where the use of vehicles assigned to military units is appropriate.

(3) Operate all utilities on all islands excepting the POL farm on ENIWETOK ISLAND and certain military communications facilities on ENIWETOK ISLAND and BIKINI ATOLL:

d. Operate and maintain local communications systems at BIKINI and in certain areas at ENIWETOK, coordinating this activity with CTG 7.2.

e. Assist CTG 7.2 in the conduct of port and stevedoring operations at ENIWETOK in accordance with existing agreements.

f. Conduct port and stevedoring operations at BIKINI.

g. Operate and maintain a TG 7.5 boat pool at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS, taking cognizance of the Task Force Commander's concept of coordinated boat pool operations set forth in paragraph 7, Annex B.

h. Be responsible for removal of TG 7.5 personnel (and supporting military personnel) from BIKINI ATOLL.

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i. When directed by CJTF, evacuate TG 7.5 personnel (and supporting



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AEC Base Facilities Task Group, Summary of Tasks  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

military personnel) from BIKINI ATOLL.

j. Be prepared, upon directive from CJTF, to conduct emergency post-shot evacuation of TG 7.5 personnel ~~(and supporting military personnel)~~ from ENIWETOK ATOLL.

k. Conduct decontamination of AEC facilities and equipment as necessary.

l. Augment the shipboard housekeeping personnel of CTG 7.3 with such personnel as necessary to support TG 7.1 and TG 7.5 elements afloat.

m. Provide support services for Hq, JTF SEVEN as required.

3. Under existing AEC-DOD agreement, military personnel will not be assigned to the AEC Base Facilities Task Group. See Annexes E, F and G for overall military forces to be made available by the Services as approved by the JCS for use during Operation CASTLE.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

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OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3 (Operations)

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Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953

Annex I to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

1. Radiological safety of all task force military and civilian personnel is a command responsibility and radiological safety activities will be performed through normal command channels.
2. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN will:
  - a. Specify the measures necessary to insure the radiological safety of Task Force personnel and furnish technical advisory assistance to task group radiological safety officers.
  - b. Inform the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) of radiological hazards which may exist in areas outside of task force responsibility.
  - c. Maintain an information center (Radsafe Office) with displays of current air and surface radexes, radiological situation maps of atoll and peripheral aerial and surface areas and such other allied data as may be appropriate.
3. Prior to the on-site operational phase, task group commanders will:
  - a. Organize radiological safety units or elements within their task groups.
  - b. Require radiological safety personnel to review radiological safety procedures employed on previous operations and become thoroughly acquainted with existing training measures through attendance at appropriate Service schools.
  - c. Require radiological safety personnel to become qualified in the calibration and testing of standard RADIAC equipment.
  - d. Determine those civilian personnel who will be required to undergo radiological physical examinations as outlined in Appendix I.
  - e. Procure complete allowances of RADIAC equipment and special clothing. The requirements of CTG 7.5 will be included in the allowances for CTG 7.1 for necessary issue to TG 7.5 personnel during the operational phase and for subsequent loan or sale to CTG 7.5 for post operational use at the PPG.
4. The Commander, Task Group 7.1, having the major technical radiological safety unit, will prepare to perform the following radiological safety services:
  - a. All ground monitoring services associated with scientific missions, except those in conjunction with sample removal from sampling aircraft.
  - b. Laboratory services and technical assistance to all task groups to include:

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- (1) Procurement of film badges and specified supplementary items of personnel radiological safety equipment.
  - (2) Laboratory services to develop and interpret film badges.
  - (3) Records of exposures from film badges. (Duplicates will be furnished task group commanders.)
  - (4) Laboratory services for the radiochemical analysis of water samples.
  - (5) Provision of primary facilities at Parry Island radiological safety building for calibration, repair and maintenance of instruments, and storage of spare parts of RADIAC equipment. Similar limited facilities will be maintained at Bikini during the operational phase at that atoll.
  - (6) Monitoring the removal and packaging of radioactive sources and samples, except as indicated in paragraph 5a above.
- c. Provision of radiological safety surface situation maps after shot times to the Task Force Commander and the task groups requiring the information.
  - d. Procurement and issuing of special high density goggles to specified personnel of JTF SEVEN.
  - e. Procurement of radiological safety clothing as necessary for TG 7.1, TG 7.5 and specified recovery personnel.
  - f. Provision of technical personnel to inspect radiologically contaminated items for all task groups and certify destruction, disposal or unserviceability of such items as required.
  - g. Provision of personnel decontamination facilities.
  - h. Limited fall-out studies within the PPG for radiological safety documentation only.
  - i. Assumption of radiological safety responsibilities of TG 7.5 during the overseas phase of the operation.
  - j. The integration within TG 7.1 of key radiological safety personnel made available by CTG 7.5. Such personnel will assist CTG 7.1 during the operational phase and will be assigned duties amenable to training in the fundamental radiological safety services to be assumed by CTG 7.5 upon completion of the overseas phase of the operation.
5. The Commander, Task Group 7.2 will prepare to perform the following:
    - a. All ground monitoring services associated with Eniwetok Island except in those areas or activities assigned to other task groups.
    - b. Provision and training of own radiological safety monitors, 50 of which will be "Q" cleared for emergency monitor support of TG 7.1 if required

Radiological Safety  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

- d. Provision of own RADIAC equipment and protective clothing.
  - e. Provision of own repair, spare parts and calibration facilities for RADIAC equipment.
  - f. Provision of limited contaminated clothing laundry facilities.
6. The Commander, Task Group 7.3 will prepare to:
- a. Provide and train own radiological safety monitors, including one airborne monitor for each multi-engine aircraft crew assigned to TG 7.3.
  - b. Provide own RADIAC equipment and protective clothing.
  - c. Provide monitors and decontamination crews aboard each ship within the task group.
  - d. Provide own repair, spare parts and calibration facilities for RADIAC equipment.
  - e. While task force is embarked, provide laboratory space and facilities for limited radiochemistry techniques and complete photodosimetry operations for use by TG 7.1 radiological safety unit.
  - f. Provide decontamination facilities for own aircraft. Limited assistance will be furnished by CTG 7.4 if required.
  - g. Provide necessary helicopter air service for radiological surveys and post shot recovery operations (monitors furnished by TG 7.1).
  - h. Collect lagoon water samples.
7. The Commander, Task Group 7.4 will prepare to:
- a. Provide and train own radiological safety monitors, including one airborne monitor for each multi-engine aircraft crew assigned to TG 7.4.
  - b. Provide own RADIAC equipment and protective clothing.
  - c. Provide own repair, spare parts and calibration facilities for RADIAC equipment.
  - d. Provide primary decontamination crews and facilities for aircraft at Eniwetok Island and limited crews and facilities at the Bikini air strip.
  - e. Assist TG 7.3 in aircraft decontamination with TG 7.4 equipment if required.
  - f. Provide necessary helicopter and liaison air service for radiological surveys and post shot recovery operations (monitors furnished by TG 7.1).
  - g. Provide monitoring services for the removal and packaging of radioactive samples collected by sampling aircraft.

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Radiological Safety  
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- h. Provide and schedule monitors and couriers to accompany radioactive and special cargo shipments on sample return aircraft and monitor the loading and unloading of such cargo.
  - i. Provide cloud tracking aircraft for post-shot radiological safety "situation data" up to radius of 500 miles in the significant quadrant for period of 48 hours after detonation.
  - j. Preparation of the Air RADEX.
8. The Commander, Task Group 7.5 will prepare to:
- a. Develop a schedule of requirements for radiological safety services required from CTG 7.1.
  - b. Provide and train key radiological personnel for integration into, and training with, the radiological safety organization of TG 7.1 during the overseas phase of the operation. The total number and qualifications of such personnel will be as determined necessary by CTG 7.5 commensurate with the assumption of responsibilities indicated in 8c below.
  - c. Assume residual task force radiological safety functions at the PPG upon completion of the overseas phase of the operation. Required equipment and supplies will be made available at that time to CTG 7.5 on a loan or sale basis from stocks provided by CTG 7.1.
9. Training. The inclusion of radiological safety organizations throughout the Task Force will require two general levels of training; basic indoctrination and technical training. The scope of instruction within each of these levels will vary in accordance with the requirements of different operational and staff levels. Basic indoctrination will include primary, non-technical instruction in radiological safety measures and techniques. This must be imparted to all personnel of the Task Force to enable them to perform their assigned duties efficiently within the allowable low exposures, regardless of the presence of radioactive contaminants. Technical training will include the training of the majority of the personnel who will be required to staff the Task Force radiological safety organizations and perform the technical operations involved. This will be accomplished through the utilization of existing Service courses and establishment of suitable courses at task group level. This instruction will be designed to train radiological defense monitors, decontamination personnel and radiological instrument repairmen.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

Appendix:  
1. Radiological Safety

OFFICIAL:

W. S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Assistant Chief of Staff, [REDACTED]

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Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953

APPENDIX to Annex I  
Radiological Safety, CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY REGULATIONS

1. The Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) for personnel involved in this operation is 3.9 roentgens, gamma only, unless reduced because of previous or anticipated future exposure. All exposures to external gamma radiation will be regarded as total body irradiation. A special MPE of 20 roentgens, gamma only, is authorized for crew members of air sampling aircraft. The maximum permissible exposures as stated above are applicable to a field experimental test of nuclear devices in peacetime, wherein numbers of personnel engaged in these tests have been previously exposed, or will be continuously exposed to potential radiation hazards. It may become necessary from a study of personnel records to reduce the MPE for certain individuals who have participated recently in other atomic tests. Under a military tactical situation or emergency the maximum permissible exposures above do not apply.
2. Special physical examination for radiological purposes will not be required for personnel of JTF SEVEN except for civilians when prescribed by the agency to which such personnel are permanently assigned.
3. All atoll land and lagoon areas, in or near which a detonation takes place, will be considered contaminated until cleared for operations by the Task Force Commander. Entry to and exit from contaminated areas will be via RadSafe check points only.
4. The contamination levels listed hereon are to be regarded as advisory limits for control of contamination under average conditions. All readings of surface contamination are to be made with geiger counters, with tube walls not substantially in excess of 30 mg/cm<sup>2</sup> with shield open. The surface of the probe should be held one (1) inch to two (2) inches from the surface that is under observation unless otherwise specified. In all cases other than emergencies, or tactical situations the ultimate criteria will be limited by the authorized MPE's for personnel, with measurements made using standard equipment and techniques for such exposure. Special instances may arise after shot time such as in the case of an air-sea rescue within the atoll lagoon and inside the surface RADEX in which rescue operations will be carried out without regard to the radiological hazard. Monitors aboard rescue craft shall be required to determine the extent of actual radiation hazard experienced in order that appropriate medical tests may be initiated. For emergency operations, the criteria prescribed for tactical situations (par 15 below) will be used as a guide. For operational purposes the MPE's presented below will not be considered applicable to spotty contamination provided such areas can be effectively isolated from personnel.

a. Personnel and clothing MPE's are as follows:

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(1) Skin readings should not be more than 1 mr/hr. Complete decontamination by bathing will be utilized for readings in excess of this level. Beta radiation exposure to the hands should not exceed 1.0 rep/week.

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(2) Underclothing and body equipment such as the internal surfaces of respirators, should be reduced to 2 mr/hr.

(3) Outer clothing should be reduced to 7 mr/hr.

b. Ship and boat MPE's:

(1) Operational clearances, implying that contamination exists and special procedures are required, will normally be granted by commanding officers on the technical advice of radiological defense staff members. In peacetime, a maximum fixed contamination level of 300 mr/week ordinarily will not be exceeded except for "Operational necessity". For this operation an MPE of 600 mr/week will be used as the upper limit for "operational necessity" unless otherwise specifically raised or lowered. Fixed alpha contamination should not exceed 500 cpm per 150 cm<sup>2</sup> of area.

(2) For ships and boats operating in contaminated waters, reasonable allowances will be made to differentiate between the relative contribution to the total flux from fixed contamination and that due to "shine" from contaminated waters. For this operation, it will be assumed that not more than ten percent of the radiation flux entering the vessel through the sides is due to contamination which will remain fixed on the vessel upon re-entry to uncontaminated waters. Ships and boats encountering levels of contamination greater than determined by the above will request special instructions.

(3) Final clearances, normally granted by commanding officers will be given upon completion of the operation provided no point of contamination is greater than 15 mr/day (beta and gamma) and no detectable alpha exists.

(4) In general, boats operating in waters near shot island after shot times may become contaminated. Monitors shall be aboard all boats operating after shot time, either as passengers or members of the boat crew, until such time as radiological restrictions are lifted.

(5) No ships with personnel shall be permitted inside the 1.5 p. s. i. line unless specifically directed otherwise. Bearings of danger from immediate radioactive fall-out for ship operations will be established by CJTF 7 on the basis of forecast wind directions at the intended time of detonation. This danger section will be designated as surface RADEX. All ships of the Task Force shall be required to remain outside the surface RADEX - danger bearings, radial limitation and time restriction. However, if ships are directed tactically into the surface RADEX, movement of ships shall be governed by tactical exposure guides.

(6) Individuals on board ships of the Task Force shall be protected collectively from hazards of blast, heat and radioactivity by movement of the ships.

(7) It is desired to point out that the employment of the ships and units in Task Group 7.3, insofar as radiological safety is concerned, is not considered routine useage within the purview of Nav Med P-1325, "Radiological Safety Regulations." Current revision of Nav Med P-1325 indicates that its provisions will not apply for

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special operations such as field tests and that for such operations, naval personnel will operate under regulations set forth by the test commander. The regulations set forth herein have been designed as a reasonable and safe compromise considering the international import of the tests, the cost aspects of the shot delays chargeable to excessive radiological precautions and conservation of personnel exposures.

d. Aircraft MPE's:

(1) The interior surfaces of occupied sections of aircraft should be reduced to 7 mr/hr.

(2) No aircraft in the air at H-hour will be at slant ranges from GZ less than as determined by the following effects unless specifically directed otherwise. (Based on maximum predicted yield and 20 mile visibility)

Blast (at predicted shock arrival): 0.5 p.s.i.  
Thermal (H-Hour): (a) Fabric control surfaces: 1.0 cal/cm<sup>2</sup>  
(b) Metal control surfaces: 6.0 cal/cm<sup>2</sup>

After detonation no aircraft shall operate inside the air RADEX or closer than 10 nautical miles from the rising or visible cloud unless specifically directed otherwise. If a tactical or emergency situation arises where aircraft must enter the air RADEX, tactical exposure allowance shall apply.

(3) All multi-engine Task Force aircraft in the air at H-hour within 100 miles of the detonation point shall carry a person designated as radiological safety monitor equipped with suitable RADAC equipment and a RADEX plot. This monitor shall be capable of calculating allowable exposures under both tactical and operational conditions.

(4) All persons in aircraft at shot time, or at subsequent times when engaged in operations in or near the cloud or RADEX track, shall wear film badges.

(5) Pilots and copilots of aircraft in the air at shot time shall use modified all-purpose .1 density filter goggles. Copilots should, as an extra precaution, cover their eyes with forearm at zero hours.

e. In air and water the following continuous levels of radioactivity are considered safe from the viewpoint of personnel breathing and drinking:

	<u>Beta or Gamma Emitter</u>	<u>Long Lived Alpha Emitters</u>
(1) Water	$5 \times 10^{-3}$ uc/cc (at H / 3 days)	$10^{-7}$ uc/cc
(2) Air	$10^{-6}$ uc/cc	$5 \times 10^{-12}$ uc/cc

(Note: In air for any 24 hour period after a shot,  $10^{-4}$  uc/cc of which particles less than 5u shall not exceed  $10^{-6}$  uc/cc).

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5. Contaminated land areas of intensities greater than 100 mr/hr will be delineated as such; personnel entering these areas must be accomplished by a monitor and will be subject to clearances by the Radsafe Officer,

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- TG 7.1. RadSafe clothing and equipment will be issued to the personnel.
6. Contaminated land areas of intensities less than 100 mr/hr and greater than 10 mr/hr will be controlled areas; personnel entering these areas will be subject to clearance by the RadSafe Officer, TG 7.1. Monitors will not be required for entry into these controlled areas.
  7. Contaminated land areas of intensities less than 10 mr/hr will be considered unrestricted from a RadSafe standpoint. Areas coming within this limitation will be designated specifically by the CJTF 7 prior to unrestricted entry.
  8. RadSafe monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas, or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. The recovery party leader is expected to accept this advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the member of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.
  9. Film badges, dosimeters, and protective clothing (coveralls, booties, caps, gloves, dust respirators, etc) as deemed necessary will be issued to personnel entering contaminated areas by appropriate task group RadSafe Supply sections.
  10. All personnel within viewing distance of an atomic detonation who are not supplied with protective goggles will turn away from the detonation point and close their eyes during the time of burst. At least 10 seconds should be allowed before looking directly at the burst.
  11. The arrival and proposed use of radioactive sources at Pacific Proving Grounds will be reported to the Task Force Radiological Safety Officer.
  12. All samples of radioactive material which are couriered in aircraft will be packaged and loaded so as to reduce radiation to a minimum. The RadSafe Officer of TG 7.4 will have a survey made of the package to determine if adequate precautions have been taken. The following criteria will determine space and packaging requirements:
    - a. Prior exposure of aircraft and courier personnel.
    - b. Anticipated future exposures on trip.
    - c. Length of time of exposure on trip.
    - d. In all cases, crew members will be limited to exposure rates of less than 20 mr/hr.
  14. All air and surface vehicles used in contaminated areas will be checked through the appropriate Task Group decontamination section upon return from such areas.
  15. All radiological safety operations for Operation CASTLE will be considered as routine and will comply with permissible radiological exposures for routine work, except "special operations", which must

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be specifically designated by the CJTF 7. In tactical situations the military commander must make the decision regarding allowable exposures. As military personnel are normally subject to only random exposure, health hazards are at a minimum. Current Department of Defense information on exposure to gamma radiation in tactical situations is indicated below:

- a. Uniform acute (immediate) exposure of 50 roentgens to a group of armed forces personnel will not appreciably affect their efficiency as a fighting unit.
  - b. Uniform acute exposure of 100 roentgens will produce in occasional individuals nausea and vomiting, but not to an extent that will render armed forces personnel ineffective as fighting units. Personnel receiving an acute radiation exposure of 100 or more roentgens should be given a period of rest and individual evaluation as soon as possible.
  - c. Uniform acute exposure of approximately 150 roentgens, or greater, can be expected to render armed forces personnel ineffective as troops within a few hours through a substantial incidence of nausea, vomiting, weakness and prostration. Mortality produced by an acute exposure of 150 roentgens will be very low and eventual recovery of physical fitness may be expected.
  - d. Field commanders should, therefore, assume that if substantial numbers of their men receive acute radiation exposures substantially above 100 roentgens, there is a grave risk that their commands will rapidly become ineffective as fighting units.
  - e. Internal radiation hazards caused by entry of radioactive substances through the mouth, through the lungs, or through cuts or wounds do not exist after an air burst. Internal hazards following a contaminating surface explosion may be avoided if ordinary precautions are taken. Only under unusual circumstances will there be an internal hazard from residual contamination. This eliminates the necessity for making and consequent reduction of tactical efficiency.
16. This appendix has been designed for reduced security classification in order to facilitate wide dissemination.

**DNA**

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commander

OFFICIAL:

W. S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

I-I-5

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.

Annex J to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

WEATHER PLAN

1. Organization and Mission of Weather Element of JTF SEVEN

a. The Commander, Task Group 7.4 will organize, man, train, administer, and logistically support:

- (1) A Task Force Weather Central.
- (2) A Ground Weather Observation Network (Outlying Weather Stations).
- (3) An Aircraft Weather Reconnaissance Unit.

The Ground Weather Observation Unit and the Aircraft Weather Reconnaissance Unit will be under the operational control of the Commander, Task Group 7.4, while the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN will retain operational control of the Task Force Weather Central.

b. Weather Central

(1) The Task Force Weather Central will be located on Eniwetok Island until such time as CJTF SEVEN transfers his command post to the Command Ship. At that time the Task Force Weather Central will be established aboard the AGC.

(2) The Task Force Weather Central is responsible for:

- (a) The collection, evaluation and presentation of basic weather information.
- (b) The preparation of weather and upper air forecasts for the Task Force Commander.
- (c) Providing operational forecasts, flight clearances and such other weather information and services in the area as may be appropriate.
- (d) Coordinating the operational effort of the outlying weather stations and the weather reconnaissance aircraft.

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*J. Diaz* 7/23/90  
REVIEWED BY DATE  
\* CTR DNA SWISHER TO  
DOE MA-225, 3/28/90

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Annex J to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

c. Outlying Weather Stations

(1) In addition to the existing weather network in the Pacific Ocean area, observation stations will be established at KUSAIE, RONGERIK, MAJURO and BIKAR for the purpose of providing surface and upper air data necessary to meet the peculiar demands of the operation.

(2) Outlying stations will be responsible for taking surface and upper air observations in accordance with current procedures and for the transmission of observations to the Task Force Weather Central.

d. Aircraft Weather Reconnaissance Unit

The Aircraft Weather Reconnaissance Unit will be based on ENIWETOK and will be responsible for obtaining in-flight weather observations in accordance with current procedures along tracks and at times requested by the Task Force Weather Central.

2. Weather Services Required of JTF SEVEN Weather Units

a. Weather Central. The Task Force Weather Central will:

(1) Collect, plot, analyze and display weather information covering the Pacific Ocean area, with emphasis on the Central Pacific and MARSHALL ISLANDS.

(2) Prepare briefing charts and forecasts for use in the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(3) Issue operational forecasts to JTF SEVEN subordinate commands as required.

(4) Coordinate the aircraft weather reconnaissance effort with respect to tracks to be flown.

(5) Coordinate the operational effort of the outlying land stations.

(6) Assume overall responsibility for informing participating units in Operation CASTLE of tropical storms and typhoons in accordance with existing area directives. All observations, advisories and warnings transmitted will contain information addressees as follows: CINCPAC,

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plus cognizant Navy and Air Force Weather Centrals in the Pacific Ocean area.

(7) Establish full scale operations on or before Shot No. 1 minus thirty-five (35) days.

(8) Plan to remain fully operational for a period of 120 days.

b. Outlying Stations

Completely self-contained weather reporting stations capable of taking comprehensive surface and upper air observations will be established at RONGERIK, MAJURO, BIKAR and KUSAIE. Personnel and equipment will be assembled by Shot No. 1 minus ninety (90) days, for an on-site operation of one hundred twenty (120) days. All stations will be in place and fully operational on or before Shot No. 1 minus thirty-five (35) days.

c. Aircraft Weather Reconnaissance Unit. The aircraft weather reconnaissance Unit must have the capability of fulfilling the following requirements: for an on-site operational period of approximately 100 days:

(1) Two (2) weather missions each day, of approximately twelve (12) hours duration, commencing on first shot minus twenty (2) days.

(2) Three (3) weather missions each day, of approximately twelve (12) hours duration, commencing on shot minus four (4) days.

(3) Post-shot missions in connection with radiological safety, consisting of two (2) missions each day, of approximately twelve (12) hours duration, from shot day until shot plus two (2) days.

(4) Be prepared for possible delays in the operation which may extend the requirements listed in c(2) above, for an additional three (3) days.

(5) Beginning on 25 January 1954, assume typhoon reconnaissance responsibility in the area bounded by the Equator, latitude 25° N, the meridian of 180°, and longitude of 157° 31' E. The Joint Task Force Weather Central will coordinate this effort. **DNA**

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Annex J to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

d. Weather Units Afloat

(1) Weather units afloat comply with existing weather directives in the Pacific Ocean area when operating outside a fifty (50) mile radius of the Task Force flagship.

(2) Command Ship Aerological personnel will be assigned to duty in the Task Force Weather Central, afloat,

(3) The Commander, Task Group 7.3 will be expected to make additional special weather observations when requested. The aerological units aboard ships assigned to his group can fulfill this requirement.

e. Anti-submarine Aircraft

Anti-submarine patrol aircraft under the operational control of CTG 7.3 will transmit special weather observations every half hour, using a special code. Amplifying instructions and training will be provided prior to commencement of overseas operations.

f. Instructions of General Application

(1) Warnings and advisories for typhoons or other storms will be assigned "EMERGENCY" (O) precedence.

(2) For purposes of standardization, typhoon readiness conditions are defined in the Pacific Ocean area as follows:

Condition III. Typhoon winds or winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within forty-eight (48) hours.

Condition II. Typhoon winds or winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within twenty-four hours.

Condition I. Typhoon winds or winds of fifty (50) knots or more are anticipated within twelve (12) hours.

g. Relay of Weather Reports

The Chief, Task Force Weather Central, will insure that all weather reports from outlying stations and weather reconnaissance aircraft are delivered promptly to AACS, ENIWETOK, for transmission

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Annex J to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-53

on the Pacific Ocean area weather broadcast network.

3. a. Weather Communications Available to this Force:

(1) CW - Net circuit between the Weather Central and outlying islands. Circuits for intercept of Pacific weather broadcasts and aircraft reports in the Weather Central. Point to Point circuit between Weather Central, and Marcus and Wak communications detachments.

(2) RTTY - Intercept of Pacific broadcasts, in the Weather Central.

(3) Voice - Circuit between the Weather Central and WB-29 aircraft (available at specified times only).

(4) Radio Facsimile - Standard receiving equipment in the Weather Central.

b. General

Times, frequencies and contents of the Pacific Ocean area weather broadcasts are available in current Navy and Air Force publications.

4. Weather Reconnaissance Tracks

Tracks to be flown will be established by separate directive prior to commencement of overseas operations.

5. Special Weather Codes

Special weather codes for either land stations or reconnaissance aircraft will be established as necessary by separate directive prior to commencement of overseas operation.

Appendix:

- I-Location Chart of Weather Stations
- II-Weather Organization Chart, JTF SEVEN


P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commander

**DNA**

OFFICIAL:

W. S. COWART, JR.  
Colonel, USAF  
Assistant Chief of Staff, [REDACTED]

LOCATION CHART OF WEATHER UNITS  
OVERSEAS OPERATIONS






HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN  
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

APPENDIX TO ANNEX <sup>10</sup>  
 WEATHER PLAN, CJTF 7, OPERATION PLAN 1-53

WEATHER ORGANIZATION CHART, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN



HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953

Annex K to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order 1-53

Administrative and Logistics

1. General. Administrative instructions not covered herein are published in Joint Task Force SOPs.
2. Personnel Administration.
  - a. JTF 7. Military personnel of headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN will be administered by the unit to which assigned, or attached for administration. Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN will be responsible for the issuance of orders and such processing as may be necessary for movement of all personnel of the headquarters within US and to the forward area and return.
  - b. TG 7.1. Military personnel of TG 7.1 will be administered by the unit to which assigned, or attached for administration. Civilian personnel will be administered by directives and regulations of the University of California, and Santa Fe Operations Office Atomic Energy Commission, whichever is applicable. CTG 7.1 will be responsible for the issuance of orders and such processing as may be necessary for movement of all personnel of the Task Group within the US and to the forward area and return. Matters which cannot be handled through the unit to which personnel are assigned or attached for administration will be referred to this headquarters.
  - c. (1) TG 7.2. Personnel of TG 7.2 will be administered by the Commander, TG 7.2 in accordance with current directives and policies of the Department of the Army, subject to the provisions of this order and subsequent directives issued by CJTF SEVEN. Elements of other services forming part of TG 7.2 will be administered in accordance with directives and regulations of their particular service and augmented by this order and subsequent directives issued by CJTF SEVEN. Administrative correspondence and reports will be

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forwarded through Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN for transmittal to appropriate services, unless otherwise prescribed by CJTF SEVEN.

(2) The Commander, TG 7.2 is authorized to issue local administrative orders embracing all of the services under the jurisdiction of CTG 7.2 as may be necessary in the accomplishment of his mission.

(3) The Commander, TG 7.2, may be called upon to furnish special administrative assistance to all military personnel while on duty in the forward area. Such assistance will cover such matters as those pertaining to courts-martial, boards of officers, investigations casualty and accident reports and reports of survey.

(4) The Commander, TG 7.2 will assure that the personnel records of which he is custodian are maintained in strict accordance with existing directives, and will cause periodic inspections and audits to be made to insure compliance with these directives. Particular attention will be given to proper personnel classification and utilization of all military personnel.

d. TG 7.3. Personnel of TG 7.3 will be administered in accordance with regulations of the Department of the Navy, augmented by this plan and directives issued by CTG 7.3.

e. TG 7.4. Personnel of TG 7.4 will be administered by regulations of the Department of the Air Force, augmented by this plan and directives issued by CTG 7.4 and appropriate parent organizations.

f. TG 7.5. Personnel of TG 7.5 will be administered by regulations and directives issued by CTG 7.5, Santa Fe Operations Office Atomic Energy Commission.

g. Detailed instructions for preparation and submission of personnel reports are contained in current service directives, augmented by standing operating procedures published by this headquarters.

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3. Mailing Addresses:

a. Official

(1) Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN during interim and operational phases:

Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.

During the operational phase for correspondence intended for the forward area:

Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

(2) Headquarters, Task Group 7.1 (ZI)

Commander, Task Group 7.1  
P. O. Box 1663  
Los Alamos, New Mexico

During the operational phase for correspondence intended for the forward area:

Commander, Task Group 7.1  
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

(3) Headquarters, Task Group 7.2:

Commander, Task Group 7.2  
APO 187, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

(4) Headquarters, Task Group 7.3: (ZI)

Commander, Task Group 7.3  
U. S. Naval Gun Factory  
Building 126  
Washington 25, D. C.

During the operational phase for correspondence intended for the forward area:

Commander, Task Group 7.3  
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

(5) Headquarters, Task Group 7.4 (ZI):

Commander, Task Group 7.4  
Kirtland Air Force Base  
Albuquerque, New Mexico

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During the operational phase for correspondence intended  
for the forward area:

Commander, Task Group 7.4  
APO 187, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

(6) Headquarters, Task Group 7.5 (ZI);

Commander, Task Group 7.5  
Santa Fe Operations Office  
Albuquerque, New Mexico

During the operational phase for correspondence intended  
for the forward area:

Commander, Task Group 7.5  
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

b. Units or individuals, military and civilian:

(1) Stationed on Eniwetok Island:

Name  
Company, Unit (c/o H&N) (AEC or other  
designation)  
APO 187, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

(2) Stationed on Parry Island and islands north of Parry,  
and Bikini:

Name  
Company, Unit (c/o H&N) (AEC or other  
designation)  
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

4. Air Mail Routing. Air mail designated for APO 187 will be transhipped  
by PACDIVMATS or will be carried by through flights of MATS bound  
for the area.

5. Personal Telegrams.

a. The Signal Officer, TG 7.2 will arrange with the Signal Officer,  
Hq, USARPAC for the transmission of personal emergency and EFM mes-  
sages over the Signal Corps channels from Eniwetok, M.I. to Hq,  
USARPAC for commercial refile to the ZI. This service will be  
available to all personnel on duty at Eniwetok Atoll. **DNA**

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- b. These messages will be filed on a collect basis only. A deposit may be required from whomever is responsible for cost if the message is not accepted by the addressee.
- c. EFM messages will be filed prepaid. Due to the quantity of traffic anticipated, national holiday traffic (Easter, Mother's Day, etc.,) will be filed with the Signal Officer, TG 7.2 five days in advance. This traffic will be transmitted in bulk, with monies, via air mail courier to USARPAC for refile with commercial companies.
- d. Task Group 7.4 will arrange with CNOB, Kwajalein for the handling of personal messages for Task Force personnel stationed at Kwajalein.
- e. Incoming prepaid personal telegrams addressed to APO 187 and APO will be transmitted by commercial radio and cable companies to Communications Center, USARPAC, Honolulu, T.H., for retransmission by electrical channels to Eniwetok Atoll and Kwajalein respectively.
- f. Instructions for telegrams apply to all personnel, civilian and military, under the jurisdiction of CTG 7.2. These facilities will be made available only when air mail will not suffice.

6. Casualty Reporting.

Military casualty reports will be submitted direct to the services listed below in accordance with regulations cited herein and these instructions. An information copy will be furnished the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN.

a. Army

References: AR 600-400  
SR 600-400-10  
AR 600-140  
SR 600-140-1  
SR 605-570-1

Dept of the Army  
(Casualty Sec AGO)

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b. Navy & Marine Corps

Reference: BuPers Manual, Part C, chapter 9,  
Section 8, Art. C-9801.

Sec of Navy

Administrative and Logistics  
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- c. Air Force  
References: AFR 30-11, 25 Jan 1952  
AFR 35-67, 12 Dec 1951
- Chief of Staff, USAF  
ATTN: Casualty Branch,  
AAG (Info copy to  
parent organization)

- d. Civilians  
Casualty reporting for Government civilian employees will be in accordance with directives of the department with which employed.

References: Civilian Personnel Regulations: C-1 of 13 May 1952  
and Civilian Personnel Regulations S-1 of July 1952.

Civilian personnel of the University of California and Holmes and Narver will be reported in accordance with existing directives.

7. Distribution of Orders.

- a. Task Groups will furnish this headquarters with two (2) copies of general, special, letter and movement orders in addition to other publications issued by or pertaining to the command which may be of interest to this headquarters.
- b. TDY orders will be issued to all military personnel in accordance with instructions contained in SOP issued by this headquarters.
- c. Information to be included in orders is contained in SR 310-110-1.

8. Legal Matters.

- a. Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Army personnel are attached to the Military District of Washington for general, special and summary courts-martial.  
Air Force personnel are attached to the 1130th USAF Special Activities Wing, Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia, for general, special and summary courts-martial.

Naval personnel are attached to the Commandant, Potomac River Naval Command for general courts-martial. They are attached to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Receiving Station, Washington, D. C. for special and summary courts-martial.

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- b. Task Group 7.1.  
Army personnel are attached to 8452nd AAU, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico for general, special and summary courts-martial.

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Naval personnel are attached to the Commandant of the Eighth Naval District, New Orleans, Louisiana for general courts-martial. They are attached to Naval Administrative Unit, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico for special and summary courts-martial.

Air Force personnel are attached to the 1090th Special Reporting Group, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico for general, special and summary courts-martial.

c. Task Group 7.2.

Army personnel are attached to Commanding General, USARPAC for general courts-martial. They are attached to the Commander, Task Group 7.2 for special and summary courts-martial.

Naval Personnel are attached to the Commanding Officer, Naval Station Kwajalein for general, special and summary courts-martial.

Air Force personnel are attached to the Commanding General, 1500th Transport Wing, PACDIVMATS, Headquarters, Hickam Air Force Base, for general and special courts-martial. They are attached to the 4930th Test Support Squadron for summary courts-martial.

d. Task Group 7.3.

Enlisted personnel while in Washington, D. C. are attached to the Commandant, Potomac River Naval Command for general courts-martial. They are attached to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Receiving Station, Washington, D.C. for special and summary courts-martial. Officers are attached to the Commandant, PRNC for general and special courts-martial. Those personnel of TG 7.3 not in Washington, D. C. are attached to their respective fleet commands for military justice.

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e. Task Group 7.4.

Air Force personnel are attached to Commanding General, Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico for general, special and summary courts-martial.

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Administrative and Logistics  
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- f. All military personnel of Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN Task Groups 7.1, 7.4, while in the forward area will come under the units listed under Task Group 7.2 for general, special and summary courts-martial.
- g. All enlisted personnel of Task Group 7.3, while in the forward area, will be attached to the Commanding Officer, Naval Station, Kwajalein for general, special and summary courts-martial for those Naval personnel not included in normal fleet organizations. Officers are attached only for general and special courts-martial.
9. Civil and Criminal Law Enforcement. The Department of Interior (DI) is charged with civil and criminal law enforcement in Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The DI has agreed to deputize two (2) Holmes and Narver (AEC Contract) employees as Deputy Marshals, with station on Eniwetok Atoll. The High Commissioner, Office of Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Honolulu, T.H., will administer civil and criminal law enforcement on the atoll, and the Atoll Commander will render assistance as required.
10. Prisoners. If deemed advisable by CTG 7.2, Army and Air Force prisoners may be evacuated to Oahu, T.H., or the mainland via air as provided in SR 600-330-1 (AFR 125-33) dated 8 May 1951, and change 1 dated 13 May 1952, and SR 600-435-1 (AFR 30-13) dated 25 May 1951. Navy prisoners may be evacuated to the nearest available naval shore establishment. Such evacuation may be accomplished as soon as the trial is completed and prior to review, where appropriate.
11. Release, Rotation and Replacement of Personnel.
- a. Request for release of personnel for other than rotation purposes will be forwarded to the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN for processing.

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Administrative and Logistics  
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b. A policy of one (1) year tour of duty at Eniwetok has been established by the Department of the Army.

(1) An extension of foreign service tour, not to exceed six months, may be granted enlisted personnel by the Commander, TG 7.2, where necessary in the furtherance of the mission. Where an extension is desired which will cause the enlisted individual to remain on a tour of duty in excess of eighteen months, it will be forwarded to the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN for final approval and forwarding indorsement will outline cogent reasons for recommending approval.

(2) Requests for extension of tours of duty for officer personnel on Eniwetok Atoll, beyond the initial twelve months period will be forwarded to the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN for approval.

(3) Requisitions for Army enlisted personnel will be prepared in accordance with SR 615-60-10 and submitted so as to reach this headquarters not later than the 10th of each month. Requisitions for Army officer personnel for the Task Force will be prepared in accordance with SR 605-60-25 and submitted so as to reach this headquarters not later than the 25th of each month.

c. Replacement of naval personnel of the Eniwetok Garrison Force will be furnished by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

d. Replacement of Air Force personnel of the Eniwetok Garrison Force will be furnished by the Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

12. Finance. The Army Finance Disbursing Office, TG 7.2, will furnish financial service to Army and Air Force personnel on the atoll and to Naval personnel when Navy facilities are not available. A disbursing office will be established on Parry Island during the operational phase, see SOP this headquarters, cs.

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13. Non-appropriated Funds.

a. General. The Atoll Commander will adopt such portions of the policies and procedures prescribed by AR 210-50 and SR 210-50-1 as are applicable for the administering of non-appropriated funds. In cases not covered by regulations, appropriate policies, procedures and control will be established by him. For this purpose the Atoll Commander is considered as commander of a major command outside the continental limits of the United States.

b. Audits. See Annex L.

14. Leaves of Absence.

a. Task Group 7.2 Personnel. Leaves of absence during overseas tour will, in general, be authorized in emergencies only, and in accordance with appropriate service directives. If desirable, personnel granted leaves of absence for emergency reasons may be recommended for relief from further duty with Joint Task Force, SEVEN, and reported to the appropriate command for reassignment. Personnel released from duty with Joint Task Force SEVEN other than for inefficiency or disciplinary reasons, may be granted not to exceed 30 days of absence or delay, if accrued, enroute to the replacement center for new assignment.

b. Delay Enroute While in a TDY Status. Delay enroute, chargeable as leave, may be granted to members of TG 7.2 by the Commander, TG 7.2 when such delay does not interfere with the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

15. Personal Affairs. See SOP, this headquarters, CS.

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LOGISTICS

16. General. Logistical support of Task Force elements prior to arrival in the forward area will be provided in accordance with the following:
- a. The respective Services, through the appropriate field commanders, will provide logistical support for normal functioning of military elements of the Task Force.
  - b. The AEC will provide logistical support for the normal functioning of the AEC elements of the Task Force.
  - c. Logistical support beyond that contemplated by a and b above will be arranged by Task Force Headquarters in coordination with the military Services and/or the AEC.
17. Requirements for Materiel and Services
- a. Task group commanders are responsible for the determination and submission of requirements for materiel and services for their respective task groups.
  - b. Requirements for which the parent Service or department of a task group has procurement and supply responsibility will be requisitioned in accordance with existing instructions of that Service or department.
  - c. Requirements for which the parent Service or department of a task group does not have procurement and supply responsibility will be processed as follows:
    - (1) Requirements for military materiel and services will be submitted to Task Force Headquarters.
    - (2) Requirements of a scientific nature will be submitted to the Commander, Scientific Task Group. Military elements of the Task Force will route such requirements through Task Force Headquarters.
  - d. Requirements will be submitted promptly to afford supporting agencies the maximum possible lead time. "On-site" requirements, to the extent foreseeable, will be submitted at least 6 months prior

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to required date.

18. Procurement of Materiel and Services

- a. Task group commanders are authorized to procure commercially, within the limitations of available funds, essential materiel and services which are not available from military or AEC sources.
- b. Procurement will be accomplished through existing procurement agencies of the Department of Defense and/or the AEC.
- c. Procurement with Task Force funds will be in accordance with current Armed Forces procurement regulations.
- d. Procurement problems which cannot be resolved by the task groups will be referred to the Task Force Commander.

19. Property Control

- a. Task group commanders are responsible for adequate measures to maintain, safeguard and account for all property issued to or otherwise acquired by their task groups.
- b. Except as otherwise indicated below, property in custody of the Task Force will be accounted for in accordance with established procedures of the using activity.
- c. Property which is lost, damaged or destroyed while in custody of the Task Force will be accounted for in accordance with established procedures of the owning agency.
- d. Where the loan of property to the Task Force is conditioned upon specific terms, task group commanders are responsible for strict adherence to such terms.
- e. Task group commanders will designate one or more qualified individuals as accountable officers to account for and supervise the care and use of military property entrusted to their respective task groups. The names of such individuals will be furnished to Task Force Headquarters.
- f. The lending of property between the military and the AEC elements

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of the Task Force is authorized and encouraged where such action will result in an economy of funds.

20. Transportation

a. Movement Control. This headquarters is responsible for movement control of all Task Force personnel and cargo and is the consolidating agency for all requirements, for shipping space, for personnel and cargo via air and/or water transportation to the forward area(s) and return.

b. Areas of Operation

(1) Outbound

(a) U.S. to OAHU, T.H., KWAJALEIN ISLAND, M.I., BIKINI ATOLL, M.I. and ENIWETOK ISLAND, M.I.

(b) OAHU, T.H. to KWAJALEIN, BIKINI and ENIWETOK.

(c) KWAJALEIN to BIKINI and ENIWETOK.

(2) Inbound

(a) ENIWETOK to BIKINI, KWAJALEIN, OAHU, T.H. and U.S.

(b) KWAJALEIN to OAHU, T.H. and U.S.

(c) OAHU, T.H. to U.S.

c. Ports of Embarkation/Debarcation (ZI)

(1) Water

(a) Cargo: Naval Supply Center (NSC), Oakland, California.  
Domestic Address:  
Freight Terminal Department  
Naval Supply Center  
Oakland, California

San Francisco Port of Embarkation (SFPE),  
Oakland Army Base, California.

Domestic Address  
Port Transportation Officer  
San Francisco Port of Embarkation  
Oakland, California

(b) Personnel: Navy Pier 7, San Francisco, California.

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Fort  
Mason, California.

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(c) Ammunition and Explosives: Naval Magazine, Port Chicago, California.  
Domestic Address:  
Receiving Officer  
U.S. Naval Magazine  
Port Chicago, California

For :  
Freight Terminal Department  
Naval Supply Center  
Oakland, California

(2) Air

Personnel and Cargo: Travis Air Force Base, California  
Domestic Address:  
Air Freight Officer  
Travis Air Force Base, California

d. Requirements

(1) Air

(a) The determination of passenger and cargo requirements for air transportation will be governed by the provisions of SOP 76-3, dated 13 March 1953. The submission of requirements will be in accordance with SOP 172-403, dated 16 January 1952. Task Force Headquarters will retain sole control over all tonnage allocations assigned to JTF SEVEN and in cases of emergency will direct the utilization of such allocations as the necessity requires.

(b) The scheduling of airlift will be governed by the provisions of SOP 76-2, dated 21 December 1951.

(c) All air traffic must meet the eligibility requirements specified by pertinent Army, Navy and Air Force publications.

(2) Water

(a) The determination of passenger and cargo requirements for surface transportation will be in accordance with SOP 75-2A, dated 3 March 1952. The submission of requirements will be in accordance with SOP 172-407, dated 7 January 1952.

e. Marking and Shipment of Supplies and Equipment. Marking and shipment of supplies and equipment to the forward area(s) will be

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in accordance with SOP 75-1 (as amended), dated 17 March 1952.

f. Bookings. To insure availability of suitable passenger space (both air and water) and to permit firm bookings, task group commanders will comply with the provisions of SOP 172-406, dated 5 January 1952.

g. Liaison Officers - Transportation (Movement Control)

(1) Task Force liaison officers and/or movement control agencies (JTF LNO or MCA) are located at NSC, Oakland, California; Travis Air Force Base, California; Hickam Air Force Base, T.H. and Kwajalein, M.I.

(2) Liaison officers are local representatives of Headquarters, JTF SEVEN in all matters concerning the Task Force. Movement control agencies represent the Task Force on matters pertaining to movement of Task Force personnel and cargo through both water and aerial ports.

(3) Liaison and movement control officers are responsible for the coordination of the expeditious movement of Task Force personnel and cargo through both the water and aerial ports to which they are assigned.

(4) Task group commanders will assign additional liaison officers and enlisted personnel as required to the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California; Travis Air Force Base, California; Hickam Air Force Base, T.H. and Kwajalein, M.I. Task group liaison personnel will report to and their activities will be coordinated by the JTF SEVEN liaison officers. Task group liaison personnel will coordinate and expedite the movement of cargo and personnel of their respective task groups through water and aerial ports of embarkation and/or debarkation and may represent their task group commanders in other areas of responsibility as directed by the task group commander.

h. Security Clearances

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(1) Air. In all cases of personnel movements to Eniwetok Atoll



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via military aircraft, the task group commander concerned will originate a message to CINCPAC, with information to ATCOM, ENIWETOK, COMPACDIVMATS, CO NAVSTA KWAJALEIN (JTF MCA, KWAJALEIN) and JTF SEVEN liaison officers at NSC, Oakland, California; Travis Air Force Base, California and Hickam Air Force Base, T.H. This message will be dispatched prior to departure of personnel from home stations and will contain the following:

- (a) Full name of each individual concerned.
- (b) Rank or rate.
- (c) Whether permanent change of station or, if temporary duty, duration of such duty.
- (d) A statement that the originator considers the individual a good security risk in accordance with CINCPAC Serial 020.

(2) Water. In the case of personnel movements to ENIWETOK ATOLL by water, the task group commander concerned will originate a similar message to the JTF SEVEN Liaison Officer at NSC, Oakland, California. This message will be dispatched prior to departure of personnel from home station and will contain the information required in subparagraphs 5h(1)(a) to (d) inclusive. The Liaison Officer, NSC, Oakland, California will then comply with CINCPAC security instructions and procedures as published in CINCPAC Serial 020 (Confidential), dated 1 April 1952.

(3) The Commander, Task Group 7.2 will comply with CINCPAC Serial 020 as it pertains to personnel permanently assigned to TG 7.2. Commanding officers of organizations departing from home stations for ENIWETOK ATOLL as members of TG 7.2 will comply with the provisions of subparagraphs 5h(1) and (2) above, as pertinent. JTF SEVEN liaison officers located at Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California and Travis Air Force Base, California will comply with

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Administrative and Logistics  
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CINCPAC Serial 020 as it pertains to replacement personnel for TG 7.2 departing from continental United States.

FINANCIAL

21. Budgeting. Joint Task Force SEVEN operations during the period covered by this operation order will be funded in the same manner as during Operation IVY. The division of funding responsibilities within the Department of Defense will be according to the concepts in the "Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, dated 9 March 1953, attached as Appendix I to this annex. The agreement between the DOD and the AEC for support of operations has been revised as of 1 January 1953 and is attached as Appendix II. Budget estimates submitted to the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN will take into account the responsibilities of the three military Services and of the AEC for support of the Task Force to the end that Task Force funds are not requested for purposes other than those intended. Budget estimates will be submitted as directed in specific letters of instruction issued by the Commander, JTF SEVEN. Additional unforeseen fund requirements may be submitted with proper justification by task group commanders at any time.
22. Fiscal. Fiscal accounting and reporting procedures will be those prescribed for the Department of the Army in Army and Special Regulations of the 35 series. For the purpose of these regulations, task groups will be considered at installation level and Headquarters, JTF SEVEN at the operating agency level.
23. Finance.
  - a. The CTG 7.2 will be responsible for provision of disbursing service for all Army, Navy and Air Force military and civilian personnel of the Task Force at ENIWETOK and BIKINI ATOLLS and at the weather stations. To facilitate accomplishment of this mission, the TG 7.2

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disbursing office will be augmented by assignment of Air Force enlisted personnel. Disbursing service for Task Force naval personnel afloat will be the responsibility of the CTG 7.3. Disbursing service as referred to herein will include maintenance of military pay accounts, payment of travel claims of military and DOD civilian personnel, cashing of authorized negotiable instruments and exchange of checks or Disbursing Officer's Military Payment Orders for cash to individuals or nonappropriated funds.

b. Reports of surveys on lost, damaged or destroyed government property will be prepared and processed in accordance with existing Service regulations. For the purposes of Army and Air Force regulations, the task group commanders are considered installation level commanders and the CJTF SEVEN the reviewing authority. All concerned are enjoined to comply with the provisions of Service regulations governing prompt initiation of reports of survey where required upon discovery of loss, damage or destruction of government property.

24. Audits. Audits of military property accounts will be accomplished by representatives of the Auditor General of the Air Force and the Chief of the USARPAC Audit Agency in the case of Air Force and Army accounts, respectively. Audit schedules will be as provided by Service regulations, modified as requested by CJTF SEVEN. Specific instructions are provided in CJTF SEVEN SOP 175-1 and SOP 175-2. Navy accounts will be inspected as provided by Navy directives.

25. Cost Accounting and Reporting. Procedures for accumulating and reporting cost data are prescribed in SOP 171-1.

26. Reports Control. Recurring and one-time controlled reports are governed by the provision of SOPs of the 172 series.

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Appendix:

I - Memo, Ass't SecDef (Compt)  
dtd 9 Mar 1953

II - DOD-AEC Agreement, 1 Jan 53.

OFFICIAL:

etc.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commander

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INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT REFERENCE SHEET

The archive copy of this document is incomplete.

Pages missing \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures missing \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments missing Appendix I - Memo, Asst Sec Def  
(Compt) dated 9 Mar 1953; Appendix II - DOD-REC  
Agreement, 1 Jan 53.

Other \_\_\_\_\_

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Karen Beachley  
signature

December 31, 1990  
date

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HEADQUARTERS, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
Washington 25, D. C.  
1 May 1953, 1600 R

Annex L to CJTF SEVEN Operation Order 1-53

COMMUNICATIONS

1. General Concept of Communications Operations:

- a. One permanent relay-crypto center at Eniwetok to be installed operated, and maintained by TG 7.2. Tributary stations serviced by this relay center will include: Hqs, JTF SEVEN, TG 7.2, TG 7.3, (USS ESTES, other ships as required (i.e., CURTISS, CVE, LSD)), and TG 7.4. Hqs JTF SEVEN Communications Center will protect for TG 7.1, TG 7.5, TG 7.3 (ashore) and H & N.
- b. Crypto-Center, Eniwetok will be crypto-guard for all above mentioned tributary stations except TG 7.3 (afloat). For handling of teletype traffic, up to and including SECRET, between major forward and rear echelon Task Force elements the following radio teletype circuits will be operated "ON-LINE" using SIGTOT with SAMSON (synchronous mixer):

<u>Circuit</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Operational date (Tentative) for SIGTOT- SAMSON Operation</u>
a. Eniwetok - Oahu (UHP)	Full Dux (1)	September 1953
b. " - Bikini	" " (1)	June 1953
c. " - Kwajalein	" " (2)	October 1953
d. " - Los Alamos	" " (1)	August 1953
e. " - AGC(USS ESTES)"	" " (1)	January 1954

Traffic not capable of being handled over On-Line facilities will be enciphered off-line prior to transmission. ALL TOP SECRET AND RESTRICTED DATA traffic will be enciphered off-line. This is necessary to meet AEC requirements and, in addition, terminal communications personnel are not, in all instances, TS or Q cleared.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED \*  
BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/OC  
*J. Dias* 7/23/90  
REVIEWED BY DATE  
\*TR DNA SWISHER TO  
DOE MA-225, 3/28/90

RG 374 DEFENSE NUCLEAR  
AGENCY

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c. With SIGTOT-SAMSON at telecon room (Parry Island) on-line conferencing will be available to the below listed points:

- (1) Los Alamos
- (2) Bikini
- (3) Kwajalein
- (4) USARPAC
- (5) CINCPAC
- (6) AF Telecon Room (Washington, D.C.)

Off-Line telecon facilities are available to DEPTAR, Washington, D.C.

d. Wire telephone facilities cleared for conversations up to and including SECRET will be available at:

- (1) Eniwetok Island (400 line dial exchange) with connecting service to other islands).
- (2) Bikini Atoll (connecting service between necessary islands).
- (3) Parry Island (220 line manual with connecting service to other islands).
- (4) Ship-shore buoy cables at Eniwetok, Parry and Bikini. AN/TRC radio not so cleared will be used as a back-up for these facilities.

e. Voice radio facilities will be available on a closely controlled basis between the following points:

- (1) Eniwetok-Bikini (HF)
- (2) Eniwetok-Kwajalein (TG 7.4 controlled) (HF)
- (3) Enyu (Firing Party) - USS ESTES (AGC) (VHF)
- (4) Between Ships (UHF or VHF)
- (5) Ship-Shore (VHF)

Provision of long-haul and inter-atoll voice and RATT facilities will be a military responsibility.

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2. Mission, Headquarters, JTF SEVEN

- a. Prepare a communications and electronics plan for Operation CASTLE to include engineering of the overall JTF communications system.
- b. Assign and control all radio frequencies, call signs, address groups, and routing indicators.
- c. Establish liaison with Task Group Communications Officers relative to communications planning.
- d. Coordinate and monitor requirements for communications equipment and material. Task action to provide special communications equipment not normally available through individual service supply.
- e. Provide and maintain operational control of the communications security monitoring unit. Prepare periodic reports for CJTF concerning status of Task Force communications security.
- f. Monitor communications training of subordinate Task Groups.
- g. Provide and control communications center and crypto facilities for Headquarters, JTF SEVEN, Washington 25, D. C.
- h. Coordinate utilization of teleconferencing facilities.
- i. Prepare Headquarters, JTF SEVEN telephone directory.
- j. Prepare and distribute COI's (Communications Operations instructions).
- k. Provide for installation and maintenance of terminal VHF ciphony facilities (Enyu-USS ESTES).
- l. Provide for procurement and distribution of SIGTOT heads, OTT and SAMSON equipment required for on-line SIGTOT-SAMSON operations.
- m. Establish:
  - (1) A transmission security training program for all intended users of voice radio facilities.
  - (2) A message drafter improvement program to insure most efficient use of limited operational communications facilities.

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3. Communications Missions of Subordinate Task Groups:

a. Scientific Task Group (TG 7.1)

(1) Procure, install, operate, and maintain special electronic equipment required by the Scientific Task Group.

(2) Provide:

(a) A delivery service to Hqs, JTF Comm Center for out-going teletype traffic.

(b) Both pick-up and delivery service to and from Hq JTF SEVEN Comm Center for TS and RD traffic.

(c) Reproduction facilities for received teletype traffic.

(3) Provide voice-time broadcast for all elements of the Task Force.

(4) Provide program and facilities, except radio transmitting equipment, for time signal broadcast used in conjunction with long range detection program.

b. Army Task Group (TG 7.2)

(1) Install, operate, and maintain relay center, Eniwetok for Joint Task Force SEVEN. Insure a complete operator knowledge of on-line SIGTOT operations.

(2) Operate and maintain Comm Centers for Hq, JTF SEVEN (Parry Island), HQ, TG 7.2 (Eniwetok), and in support of AEC operations at Bikini (Eninman)

(3) Provide Crypto-Guard facilities for Hq, JTF SEVEN, 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5 and for Hq, TG 7.3 when ashore.

(4) Install, operate, and maintain all land-based communications facilities required at Eniwetok Atoll except:

(a) TG 7.4 internal communications.

(b) Telephone plant on islands other than Eniwetok.

(c) Inter-island and buoy cable systems.

(d) Special facilities required by TG 7.1.

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- (5) Install, operate and maintain back-up facilities for:
  - (a) The Eniwetok-Parry submarine cable circuits.
  - (b) The Eninman-Enyu submarine cable keying circuits.
  - (c) Buoy Cable circuits at Eniwetok and Bikini.
- (6) Install, operate and maintain Bikini terminal facilities to include:
  - (a) AN/TRC equipment for use on Enyu-USS ESTES ciphony link.
  - (b) HF transmitting and receiving equipment (Enyu) for use on Eniwetok-Bikini RATT duplex circuit.
- (7) Install, operate and maintain theater facilities at Eniwetok Island; install and maintain theater facilities at Parry Island and Bikini Island
- (8) Provide facilities for maintenance and repair of all communications equipment used by Hq, JTF SEVEN and TG 7.2. Assist other Task Groups in the maintenance of tactical radio equipment.
- (9) Operate a Signal Warehouse for storage and issue of communications equipment and supplies.
- (10) Operate a crystal grinding facility for emergency production of crystals for all elements of the Task Force.
- (11) Furnish emergency power for communications facilities provided by TG 7.2 to include the Joint Transmitter Building.
- (12) Operate a battery charging plant for the maintenance of storage batteries.
- (13) Provide maintenance for Special Service Radio Broadcast Station WXLE and Special Service Radio Receivers.
- (14) Provide personnel and equipment to operate and maintain HQ, JTF SEVEN teleconferencing facilities on Parry Island.
- (15) Provide such other electronic facilities, the operation and maintenance of which are normally considered a responsibility

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of the Signal Corps, and which are within the capabilities of personnel and equipment available.

(16) Provide standard teletype equipment for back-up of on-line SIGTOT-SAMSON facilities at Relay Center Eniwetok and Comm Center, Bikini.

(17) Install, operate, and maintain facilities control of circuits terminating in Relay Center, Eniwetok.

(18) Provide a send only circuit from Hq's JTF SEVEN Comm Center (Parry Island) to central receiving point in Bldg 208-209, Parry Island, for delivery of teletype traffic for T<sup>U</sup> 7.1, TG 7.5, and H & N.

c. Navy Task Group (TG 7.3)

(1) Provide internal Task Group communications to include relay facilities from USS ESTES and/or CVE to Task Group ships at sea.

(2) Provide space aboard USS ESTES for housing and operation of Communications Security Monitoring Detachment (Approx: 1 Off; 10 EM).

(3) Provide communications between CTG 7.3 and the Navy Department and with naval operating forces not directly concerned with Operation CASTLE, for transmission of traffic of an administrative nature only.

(4) Operate and maintain shipboard command, control and communications facilities for CJTF and staff afloat. Insure complete operator knowledge of on-line SIGTOT operation on ship(s) utilizing SIGTOT-SAMSON equipment.

(5) Provide radio teletype facilities to major relay stations at Oahu (UHP) and Kwajalein (JHK) in case of emergency evacuation of Eniwetok Atoll.

(6) Activate Hydrophones to control against possible undesirable surface and underwater activity within the Eniwetok Area.

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Communications  
CJTF SEVEN No. 1-53

(7) Provide communications facilities required by the Joint Task Force Weather Central aboard the AGC.

(8) Procure and maintain communications equipment and supplies to meet requirements of the Navy Task Group.

(9) Provide standard teletype back-up for ships using on-line SIGTOT-SAMSON facilities.

(10) Render Assistance as may be required for operation of Comm Center, Parry Island during peak operational periods.

d. Air Task Group (TG 7.4)

(1) Install, operate and maintain internal Task Group communications to include weather, aircraft movement, air-ground, air-air navigational communications and communications center (less code room), serving as a tributary of Relay Center, Eniwetok. Telephone service on Eniwetok will be provided by TG 7.2. Telephone service on Kwajalein will be provided by CNOB, Kwajalein.

(2) Provide two channels of Eniwetok-Kwajalein MUX circuit to Hq, JTF SEVEN for termination in Relay Center, Eniwetok.

(3) Render assistance as may be required for operations and maintenance of Relay-Crypto Center, Eniwetok, during peak operational periods.

(4) Procure necessary communications and electronics equipment and supplies to meet requirements of TG 7.4.

(5) Install, operate and maintain communications facilities for AOC on Eniwetok Island and provide communications personnel as required for AOC aboard the command ship.

(6) Provide communications personnel as required for operation of Task Force Weather Central aboard the command ship.

(7) Provide messenger service to TG 7.2 Crypto room on Eniwetok for receipt and delivery of TG 7.4 TS and RD traffic.

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e. AEC Base Facilities, Task Group (TG 7.5)

(1) Install, operate and maintain telephone system, except on Eniwetok Island, at Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls.

(2) Provide and maintain wire circuits in the Eniwetok and Bikini inter-island and buoy cable systems to meet timing and tele-metering requirements of the scientific programs and to meet operational and administrative communications requirements of Hq, JTF SEVEN.

(3) Operate and maintain the Los Alamos terminal of the Eniwetok-Los Alamos RATT circuit.

(4) Provide alternate ZI relay facilities from communications center Los Alamos for forward area Task Force traffic, during operational periods.

(5) Install, operate and maintain, with the assistance of TG &.2, tactical radio equipment required for use by scientific contractors.

(6) Install, operate and maintain TG 7.5 boat pool communications facilities.

(7) Procure, install and maintain special electronic equipment required by the Scientific Task Group.

(8) Operate theater facilities at Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls (Not to include those on Eniwetok Island).

(9) Prepare a consolidated atoll telephone directory.

(10) Provide a central receiving point for traffic (except TS and RD) for TG 7.1, 7.5 and Holmes and Narver from the JTF SEVEN Communications Center.

(11) Same as 3a (a).

f. All Task Groups

(1) Prepare a Task Group Communications and Electronics Plan and submit to Hq, JTF SEVEN by 1 August 1953.

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(2) Submit requirements for frequencies, call signs, routing indicators and address groups to Hq, JTF SEVEN prior to 1 September 1953.

(3) Prepare Task Group telephone directory in quantity to be designated by consolidating agency (TG 7.5).

(4) Establish:

(a) A transmission security training program for all intended users of voice radio facilities.

(b) A message drafter improvement program to insure most efficient use of limited operational communications facilities.

4. General

a. The Army Task Group Signal Detachment will be brought up to its authorized operational phase strength and be prepared to perform its missions by 1 December 1953.

b. Construction, rehabilitation and installation and service checking of military communications facilities in support of Operation CASTLE will be completed by 1 December 1953.

c. Signal Officer, TG 7.2 will operate a crystal grinding facility to provide emergency production of crystals for all elements of the Task Force. Task Group Communications Officers will make every effort to procure all required crystals through their established supply channels prior to commencement of the operational phase.

d. Communications Operation Instructions published by Hq, JTF 132 will be revised as necessary by Hq, JTF SEVEN to include a list of approved radio and wire circuits, radio call signs and frequencies, and uniform Task Force Communications Operating Procedure.

P. W. CLARKSON  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commander

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