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Department of Energy
Pacific Area Support Office
P.O. Box 29939
Honolulu, Hawaii 96820

NOV 15 1979

REPOSITORY DOE/PASO
COLLECTION DOE/NV
BOX No. 1236
FOLDER BNL FOLDER #3
FY 1979
MEDICAL PROGRAM

Personal for Mr. Gates

Mahlon E. Gates, Manager
Nevada Operations Office, NV

PASO SUPPORT OF THE BROOKHAVEN MEDICAL PROGRAM

This letter confirms our discussions of this subject on November 8, 1979, and is submitted to you formally in accordance with your request.

Since June, 1975, when I became the Director, PASO, no program has created more continuing nor more abrasive problems requiring PASO solution than support of the Brookhaven Medical Program.

PASO has no responsibility for management of this program, only the responsibility for supporting it, logistically. Notwithstanding the lack of assigned program management responsibility, PASO has been drawn in by circumstances, time and time again, into situations requiring some diplomatic skill and tact to extricate the BNL medical staff from relationship situations which the BNL staff created by either their inability or unwillingness to accept KMR's management role at Kwajalein. Naturally, PASO had the option of refusing to become involved, but this would have been irresponsible since on at least two instances this course would have resulted in the expulsion of the BNL Doctor (Kotrady) from Kwajalein and at least temporary cessation of medical help to the Marshallese people. Thus, PASO was morally obligated to intervene and did so, with the full knowledge and consent of BNL medical management (Dr. Conard). Fortunately we were able to mitigate the problems.

On at least two occasions the Director, PASO, has been the target of abusive, down-talking harangues by a BNL physician (Dr. Grant) as a result of the Doctor's unwillingness or inability to utilize established procurement procedures for medical supplies. In these instances I chose to ignore abuse, however irritating and distressing and instead worked with Dr. Grant and the DOE/DNA coordinator at KMR and H&N/PTD to solve a procurement problem. This we did, successfully.

Late last fall, PASO was tasked by NV and DOE/HQ to procure and equip a vessel which would support both the BNL medical survey (first voyage scheduled for late January, 1979, as well as the other DOE programs in the Marshalls

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whole body counting, nursery projects at Enewetak and Bikini, radiological surveillance, etc.). Through a series of near heroic actions by H&N/PTD, U.S. Oceanography, PASO and NV, the vessel was procured, fitted out, sailed to Kwajalein in the worst weather in recorded Pacific Ocean history. The Liktanur II sailed from Kwajalein only one week late in spite of a month of totally impossible weather in the Pacific.

Since that time Liktanur II has performed every task assigned to her, on schedule, with competence and occasionally with distinction. Every Principal Investigator of a DOE program in the Marshall Islands that has utilized Liktanur II will attest to that statement - except Dr. Pratt.

Dr. Pratt began a campaign before Liktanur II sailed from San Diego in December, 1978, to disqualify the U.S. Oceanography contractor from contract renewal. It is clear from item B, Enclosure 1, that early on he had developed strong negative feelings about Charles Otterman, President of U.S. Oceanography.

From that point forward to the present date, Dr. Pratt has deluged PASO with a never ending flow of complaints about the alleged inadequacies of Liktanur II. In the main, the complaints have not involved PASO support of the medical program, but have dealt with matters involving contractual issues, navigational methods, crew qualification, crew documentation, safety, rigging of the vessel, etc. The only thing that the complaints had in common, collectively, is that all were derogatory to U.S. Oceanography and/or Liktanur II.

At a meeting of Liktanur II Users at Livermore, CA, on February 22, 1979, just after BNL's first medical survey trip in January/February 1979, Dr. Pratt took the position that BNL would not thereafter utilize Liktanur II for BNL medical surveys. Since BNL was and is the major user of Liktanur II, their withdrawal from the program would create serious problems as to where other program participants would get vessel support since clearly DOE would not pay for two vessels. After a very long and very candid discussion by Dr. Pratt, Roger Ray and the writer, Dr. Pratt agreed that if the corrections were made in the vessel that he had recommended (most had already been accomplished as a routine shakedown cruise procedure) BNL would agree to use the vessel through FY 1980, but only if Charles Otterman, did not accompany the BNL medical survey trips. PASO agreed to try to get Otterman to agree but pointed out to Pratt that Otterman owned the vessel and we could not enforce Dr. Pratt's request if Otterman was not agreeable.

a later users meeting on July 24,
At ~~the February 22, 1978,~~ meeting at Livermore Dr. Pratt provided to selected members of the Liktanur II Users group, a series of schematic drawings of a proposed CMS (Carr Marine Services) vessel which Mel Carr, a present Global employee at KMR, had prepared. (Mel Carr was the former 1st mate on Liktanur I and is a close associate of Dr. Pratt). Since the

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Carr vessel would be in competition with U.S. Oceanography and any other proposers when the procurement takes place for a vessel for FY 1981, Dr. Pratt has placed himself in a position of appearing to be in ~~an~~ ~~appearance~~ of a conflict of interest. He also was ~~also~~ directly injecting himself into PASO's assigned mission responsibility.

After the May/June BNL Survey (which Mr. Otterman did not accompany on his own volition) Dr. Pratt reported "outstanding support by the Liktanur II crew and Mr. Munk" (The H&N/PTD contract representative for us), however Dr. Pratt repeated his litany of complaints concerning the inadequacy of the Liktanur II to support the BNL mission. Space limitation was the major problem cited.

After the third BNL survey in September/October 1979, Dr. Pratt's vendetta took on a new dimension. The attack was in writing and was distributed to the entire DOE world. His attack now turned to the PASO staff and escalated to a scathing personal attack on Harry Brown. The attack is unfair, unbalanced, unwarranted and to a significant degree untruthful. This last incident was not totally unexpected by PASO, as Dr. Pratt told me on his last trip through Honolulu that there was "too close an affinity between Harry Brown and U.S. Oceanography" - that "Harry got a lot of 'Perks' that others did not get while on board the Liktanur II". The only intelligence that my strong response evoked ("that is a very serious allegation, Hugh. Can you prove it?") was that Harry did not sleep in the hold of the Liktanur with the rest of the contingent, but elsewhere on the vessel.

In addition to the attack on Harry Brown, Dr. Pratt has now directly and formally intervened with the U.S. Coast Guard in Honolulu on the matter of the proper classification of the Liktanur II. (See his letter dated October 29, 1979, Enclosure 2). This is a matter which was being formally handled by PASO. Again, Dr. Pratt is interfering with PASO's assigned mission.

In addition to all of the foregoing, PASO was recently criticized by Dr. Wachholz for not being present at Majuro - and to possibly prevent - but at least to audit Dr. Pratt's sessions with the CBS News Team - 60 Minutes, and interview with the President of the Marshall Islands, Amata Kabua.


This is an absolutely impossible situation and something must be done to correct it. I now have a very serious morale problem with a most valued employee - Harry Brown. I have also received serious complaints from Holmes & Narver management about Dr. Pratt's interrelationships with H&N/PTD employee while accompanying him on BNL voyages. The problem is still further complicated by the fact that the DOE and/or the H&N/PTD representatives on the first and third voyages were the recipients of complaints about Dr. Pratt from his own recruited medical team. I do

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not plan to pursue this issue in any fashion because it is clearly not PASO business - but it surely is DOE business and someone must care.

So, in summary, I believe I have a clear and unavoidable obligation to do something about this situation. I believe "that something" is that NV should bring this matter to the personal attention of the ASEV and force the issue one way or the other. It may be that the only solution is to let BNL charter their own vessel and be entirely responsible for the medical program. The only thing that is entirely unacceptable is continuation of the present arrangement.



W. J. Stanley
Director

OP-773

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Enclosures (3):

1. Chronology of Dr. Pratt's Complaints concerning Liktanur II, USO, Charles Otterman, Harry Brown and Bill Stanley
2. Dr. Pratt's letter dtd 10/29/79 to the U.S. Coast Guard
3. Harry Brown's Ltr to Director, PASO on Dr. Pratt's Trip Report, BNL Medical Survey, Sept/Oct 1979

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