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PATTERN OF WAR IN THE ATOMIC WARFARE AGE

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ASB 508
Advanced Study Branch
Plans Group, P&O Division, GSUSA

PATTERN OF WAR IN THE ATOMIC WARFARE AGE

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16 December 1948 *

PATTERN OF WAR IN THE ATOMIC WARFARE AGE



1. This study is not a war plan in any sense. Its purpose is not to advocate a specific degree of preparedness. It is not to promote one military activity or the other, and it is not to advocate a military budget. Rather, its primary purpose is to stimulate further study and to give cause for reflection on the long-range implications of current policies. Responsible authorities may be able to derive some long-range guidance from the concepts set forth herein and thus be in position to develop current policies, plans and programs with some degree of assurance that they will sustain the future national security of the United States. As more is known, and more and more studies are made, the future pattern will become more clear. It is expected that further studies will change materially the pattern of possible future warfare as set forth herein.

2. No pattern of a future war could be adequate without a clear concept of national policy on national security, including the appropriate objectives which the military may have to sustain in war. As of the present writing, there does not exist an authoritative determination of such national policy. It is hoped that studies such as this one may encourage the formulation of this policy.

3. Proposed concepts on national objectives have been evolved. They were based on a companion study of objectives that the U. S. should adopt in order to achieve national security. These proposed concepts have been used as guidance for this study of the pattern of warfare. The concepts of objectives will be reflected in this study and specific portions thereof will be referred to as may be appropriate. Appendix "A" hereto is a brief memorandum entitled, "Concepts on Objectives", which sets forth the basic principles. In order to be able to evaluate fully the influence of the objectives on the pattern of warfare developed in this study, it is necessary to consider the basic study on "Objectives" which is available in the files of the Advanced Study Branch, Plans Group, Plans and Operations Division, GSUSA.

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4. It is with some reluctance that the pattern of a possible future war is presented because of the possible misinterpretations of the motives of the study. This does not constitute a prediction that there will be such a war. In fact, the concept on national objectives utilized as a basis of this study, if adopted by the U. S., may make war less probable than it is today, and it appears to offer great opportunities to avoid such a war. The severity of an atomic war as visualized herein may be of value in creating a perspective on national policy which may tend towards the universal abolition of war as an instrument of national policy. This nation is faced with the problem of riding two horses; one heading towards peace and human progress, and the second heading towards preparation for a possible future war. The requirements of these two programs will often be conflicting. The concepts on national objectives reflect this dilemma. One concept advocates the abolition of competitive national armaments. A second concept defines the condition of military preparations that must be maintained in peace. The latter requires that pending the abolition of competitive national armaments, the U. S. should maintain in peace a military posture just adequate to permit the U. S., by itself, to impose on any military aggressor a stalemate condition which would preclude successful exploitation of wartime gains. The military pattern of warfare set forth herein is an attempt to furnish a background for the determination of the military posture needed when the atomic warfare age arrives.

5. A time frame of reference is necessary for this pattern of warfare. This is derived from the definition of the atomic warfare age. For the purpose of this study, it is defined as the time period when two or more nations have available a significant quantity of atomic weapons, together with suitable means of delivery. A significant number is further defined to mean at least that quantity of weapons which, if utilized in war, may have a potential decisive effect on the initial phases of such a war. This does not mean a quantity which would probably be sufficient to end the war itself. Rather, it means that an enemy would have a quantity that would permit him to launch an initial massive attack which may have a decisive effect on the ability of this nation to continue production of vital end items for a year or more or which might prevent a large expeditionary force from being launched by the United States. Thus, when that time has arrived, the United States might find itself directly in the arena of war and heavily committed from the first day. It will then be faced with the same problems which have been faced by France and Germany for the past few centuries, and which the United Kingdom has more recently faced, the threat of immediate military hurt which would have dire consequences.

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6. It is necessary to predict quantities and dates in order to tie together the various portions of this study. Intelligence as to atomic capabilities of foreign nations is meager. Evaluations of the vulnerability of the U. S. to atomic attack are inconclusive. However, the following predictions appear adequate for the purposes of this study. If, at the beginning of a war, a potential enemy was able to deliver on targets of a critical industrial nature, in the U. S., in a matter of a week or so, some 15 to 30 atomic bombs of the Nagasaki type, this would probably have a decisive effect on the initial phases of the war. Such a blow might limit materially the production of certain end items such as airplane engines and atomic bombs. Without a continuing assurance of supply of such items, it would be difficult for the U. S. to undertake the launching of a large scale expeditionary force or to increase materially within a year or so the air effort needed for success. How many atomic weapons would a potential enemy have to stockpile to have this capability? Allowances should be made for those that may be expended without being delivered on targets and for those atomic weapons which would be used against military targets, against bases overseas, against possible Allied countries and for the reserves that a potential enemy would undoubtedly desire to maintain for future attack. It seems likely, therefore, that a potential enemy would have to stockpile in advance 100 to 200 atomic bombs or more before he could be considered realistically capable of this decisive initial attack. These are arbitrary assumptions. Further studies will permit closer definition. It will take considerable time, possibly 10 to 20 years for a foreign power to acquire such a stockpile. This is based upon the present state of our knowledge, although it is by no means impossible that this could be achieved at an earlier date. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the year 1964 has been selected as the year during which it is assumed that a war begins. It is desired to re-emphasize here that no prediction whatsoever is implied herein that a war is likely in 1964 or thereabouts.

SIGNIFICANT MAJOR TRENDS WHICH WILL AFFECT
MATERIALLY THE CHARACTER OF A FUTURE WAR

7. Before considering a pattern of an atomic war in some detail, there are several significant major trends which should be analyzed because of their probable material affect on the character of a future war.

8. Perhaps the most significant of these major trends stems from the democratic forces which are at work in the world today. There is a widespread insistence for more and more democracy in every aspect of control of human life. Extension of political democracy is most notable in

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the former colonial empires. Expansion of economic democracy is evidenced by the communistic efforts in the Far East and much of Eastern Europe, by the socialistic efforts within the U. K. and Western Europe, and even by the significant changes in the relationship between labor and management in the United States. There has been a consequent awakened interest in the field of study of human relations. This interest should grow and constantly expand. The effect of this trend should be to make governments throughout the world more responsive to the masses. Empires will dwindle while states will tend to coalesce. The development of the responsibility of governments to the masses in all aspects of life will mean that in the conduct of the war the governments concerned will exhibit a greater appreciation and understanding of the problems of human relations. They will attempt to play on these relations and utilize them for the prevention of war and in the conduct of war. The expansion of democratic movements across national borders will result in the development of more opposition to the attack of masses as a logical target in war. It will tend to develop the view that the masses of the peoples are no longer considered enemies by the opposing forces. These trends may restrain considerably the military activities of the antagonistic nations. National hatreds will be less and less influential. Class hatreds will likewise be less important than in the past.

9. The second major trend concerns the approach towards a formal world community, a supra-national government of sorts. The U. N. is an evidence of this. A considerable extension of regional alliances is a companion trend. The freedom of nations for uni-lateral international political expansion is constantly being restricted. More and more the basic conflicts are receiving open and widespread discussion. The issues are tending to devolve on a popular basis throughout the world. The world forum is now available in which both sides to a conflict are aired. A more rational approach to war should result. The trend to reason may reduce arbitrariness. The extended utilization of reason, even in application to war, should have a material affect on the conduct of war. Less and less emphasis will be placed on the use of force to achieve fundamental objectives and more and more emphasis will be placed on non-forceful persuasion and other peaceful instruments of national policy. It is possible, and it is hoped, that the United Nations could and would be maintained during any war with full participation by all antagonists and neutrals. Thus, there would exist a responsible world forum in which representatives of the opposing powers and neutrals could meet together constantly for discussion of the conflict. This should make armistice terms more easy to achieve. It would result in a more rational approach to war, to the matter of armistice terms and to the peace terms which would follow. This again

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should result in less consideration being given to the use of military force and more to peaceful means of resolving conflicts.

10. The minor powers are tending more and more towards neutrality in conflicts between the major powers which might result in war. The increasing totality and destructiveness of war is a major cause. Weaker nations will strive to the best of their ability to emulate the example of little Switzerland. The opposing major powers may very well encourage neutrality wherever it appears beneficial. Defensively, a major power may desire to put neutral areas between itself and the enemy in order to restrict the latter offensively. Air power now permits one nation to reach over and into another without the necessity of going through a third nation on the surface. Although such neutral nations may not have the military power to stop such air operations, their insistence on neutrality will limit operations. Fear of the consequences of violation of neutrality should cause neutral nations to bring pressure to bear on the antagonistic powers to avoid or to stop a war.

11. The next significant trend concerns war objectives. The effect of war destruction and consequent instability on future peace will be given more consideration. The failure in past world wars to achieve lasting changes in ideologies and political systems will effect the future political objectives of war. The use of war as an instrument of national policy to attain political ends will be lessened. The growth of expanding alliances and the increasing costs of war make it less probable that one group of nations could achieve such military superiority as to force unconditional surrender or complete subjugation on an enemy group. Antagonists will be more content with limited objectives in war. The emphasis will be on objectives which will provide relative military security in order that the long-range political objectives can be attained gradually in the post war period by non-military means.

12. The next significant trend concerns governmental control in the U. S. during war. It stems out of the increased totality and destructiveness of war and the growing awareness of human relations and their effects on international and national policies. In past wars in which the U. S. has been involved, the military strategy was the primary consideration and military leaders had the dominant voice in the conduct of war. In a future war, the dominance of the military will tend to decrease proportionately as the political, social and economic strategies become more effective instruments of national policy, and as the problems

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of the civil economy, the civil defense and reconstruction, abroad and at home, place greater burdens on the national economy. The National Military Establishment will tend towards a subordinate role from the point of view of control, although probably the major role from the point of view of the national effort.

13. The trend of military 'hardware' will cause greater and greater power to be concentrated in smaller and smaller packages. This is evidenced by the development of atomic bombs and biological and chemical weapons. A nation, prior to a war, will be able to store in protected stockpiles more offensive military power, and the relative cost of this stockpiled offensive power may be considerably less than prior to past wars. Thus, the initial phases of the war become more violent and more important. It will require greater defensive expenditures. It will mean that greater and greater efforts must be expended against the military forces that are in being. It will mean that a nation could no longer be satisfied to plan on hitting the industrial target of an enemy nation, as a means to prevent him from crippling its own economy. The force that could be stockpiled by an enemy may be sufficient to cause a stalemate or loss of a war if it is not countered immediately. This calls for a counter-offensive as well as an active and passive defense. Therefore, this constitutes a return to the old concept of "battle" between the opposing major military forces in the initial stages of war, although the tendency will be to an air battle rather than land or naval battles.

14. The last significant trend to be considered concerns the ever-increasing vulnerability of the logistic support of military operations. As greater power is developed in smaller packages and the range and speed of weapons increase, the military bases, the storage and launching sites, assembly sites, the lines of communication, etc., become increasingly vulnerable. At the same time, the increase of range of the offensive weapons requires ever larger bases. As a consequence, greater effort will be devoted to the defense of means of logistic support for friendly forces and to offensive capabilities against the logistic support means of the enemy.

ASSUMPTIONS WITH REGARD TO A WAR
IN 1964

15. It is necessary to provide some political, social, economic and military assumptions and predictions in order to provide a background for the pattern of future war. This does not imply that a war of this character is considered inevitable or highly likely or that the assumptions made are those which

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are considered most probable. Because the USSR has the greatest war potential in the world, outside of the U. S., and because of the current international conflicts between the U. S. and the USSR, the latter has been assumed as the enemy for the purposes of this study.

16. It is assumed that the U. S. together with Allies (hereinafter called the Allies) and the USSR and her Allies (hereinafter called the Soviet Bloc) go to war against each other in the year 1964 and that there will have been peace in general throughout the world up until that date. Some progress towards lasting world peace is supposed to have been made during the period from 1950 to 1958 and that thereafter the situation gradually deteriorated. It will be further assumed that a conflict developed between the U. S. and the Soviet government over the efforts of the latter to preclude further military alignments against her, and over Soviet efforts to extend international communism, and that the conflict becomes a fundamental issue on which neither the USSR nor the U. S. would give way. This conflict is assumed to have developed over a period of years and to have come to a head with regard to the activities of U. S. and the USSR and a third nation.

17. Suppose that Iran had been successful in maintaining a rather neutral attitude between the U. S. and USSR and playing one against the other. Suppose further, that Iran had been supplying the USSR with a sizeable portion of her oil resources and at the same time was also supplying the Allies. A communistic movement is assumed to develop in Iran which took over the control of the government and that this government then began to expropriate the U. S. controlled interests in Iran ostensibly for its own purposes, but in actuality in the interests of the USSR. The U. S. is supposed to have claimed that the overthrow of the Iranian government was inspired and forced internally by the USSR through covert means. Suppose further that the U. S. had taken this matter up in the United Nations, that the majority of the Security Council had favored sanctions and, possibly, the use of military force against the USSR, but that the latter actions were vetoed by the USSR. It is assumed that the U. S., under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, had secured Allied issuance of an ultimatum requiring the USSR to get out or accept war. This is the situation in which it is assumed that the war started.

18. There would be no strategic surprise in the initiation of such a war. It takes at least two nations to start a war. Each nation would have been making demands of one sort or the other on the opposing nation for some time in an

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attempt to achieve certain objectives by means short of war. These demands and the mounting intransigence of both powers, as the conflict begins to reach a point where both contending powers have placed themselves in positions from which neither power considers it can retreat, would herald a probable war. This would be accompanied by increased armament and preparedness measures, perhaps measures comparable to declarations of emergency and full mobilization on the part of both contending powers. Hence, the warning would exist probably for six to twelve months or longer in advance. These signs should be readily apprehensible and, if acted upon, would provide time for appropriate readiness measures. This does not mean that the U. S. will ever be prepared for war! No military man would ever admit to that, regardless of the degree of preparation. There would always be many additional measures that would be desirable.

19. There may, however, be tactical surprise similar to that in the Pearl Harbor attack. That condition, however, rests partially with the U. S. authorities. They would know well in advance that an attack was probable, although they may never know until enemy forces are enroute and committed irrevocably that the attack is certain. This is true because there is always a chance that one contending power or the other would accede to a last minute ultimatum or would make a last ditch attempt to employ another strategy to achieve its objective by means short of war. Initiation of war will be extremely unpopular. In the atomic age, a ruthless dictator in absolute control of a nation would try all other means first. He would dread the results and he would probably rely on similar fear in the opposing leaders to gain results by means short of war. Hence, what has to be guarded against primarily is not strategic surprise, but tactical surprise - the Pearl Harbor concept. There are many measures that the U. S. may take before a war would start to limit the efficacy of such an enemy attempt.

20. Appendix "B" hereto includes a number of more detailed predictions and assumptions with regard to the political economic, social and military conditions which existed throughout the world just prior to the supposed war. This is simply an attempt to set forth a background in which the general concepts on the pattern of war might be considered.

WAR OBJECTIVES OF THE OPPOSING POWERS

21. Allied War Objectives. The U. S. war objectives are assumed to be as developed in the companion study on objectives. (Refer to Appendix A, "Concepts on Objectives", in particular par. 5 and 6). It is envisaged that these national objectives

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would have been adopted by the US in 1953 and that the U. S. would have succeeded in obtaining the agreement and support of her Allies by 1958 to these objectives. The world in general and the Soviet Bloc in particular would have been informed of these objectives in 1960, and recent emphasis would have highlighted what the Allies would do in the event of a war. In light of the foregoing, the immediate war objectives of the Allies would be to force the Soviet Bloc to stop the war and accept the following armistice terms:

- a. Cessation of hostilities.
- b. Agreement to the determination of a peace settlement by the UN, with full participation by all members of the Soviet Bloc, but without the privilege of veto power by the USSR.
- c. Withdrawal of enemy forces from all territories occupied subsequent to the date that war started.
- d. Minimum military provisions, including the destruction or neutralization, with Allied inspection, of all atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and all strategic bombers and submarines. Allied inspection forces to be granted access to the USSR in order to observe compliance with the foregoing terms. Inspection forces are to be guaranteed against attack.

22. Soviet Bloc War Objectives. It is assumed that the minimum war objectives of the Soviet Bloc would be:

- a. To force Germany and the Western Union governments, except for the UK, to adopt either communistic governments or governments which would be convincingly sympathetic to the USSR, and which would withdraw from the war and support the Soviet Bloc.
- b. To eliminate the Allied domination of the Near East.
- c. After achievement of the above conditions, to create a military superiority or at least a stalemate condition in the war which would cause recognition by the UN of the new Western European governments which support the Soviet Bloc.
- d. Create conditions which would allow, without forcing communism on the U. S. or UK, the USSR to exploit in her interests Western Europe, Africa and the Near East and thus probably cause the U. S. and UK to conform ultimately to the Soviet concept of world order.

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e. The cessation of hostilities.

23. Analysis of the assumed objectives indicates radical changes from the objectives of the opposing powers in World War II. It is significant to note that:

a. The Allies would intend only to convince the Soviet Bloc that war is futile by means of reducing the Soviet Bloc military power and preventing exploitation of war gains. These terms, if realistically approached, should be much more attractive to the Soviet Bloc than the unconditional surrender terms demanded of the Germans in World War II. Relatively, they should be much easier to achieve.

b. The objectives of the Soviet Bloc, too, would differ materially from those of Hitler. The immediate territorial ambitions of Hitler in World War II, which included Western Europe, the Balkans, a portion of Russia, and part of North Africa, together with colonies, were much more extensive than those forecast herein. Politically, also, Hitler sought much more. He demanded acceptance of the supremacy of the German race and of his leadership as well as his concept of government, whereas the terms stated above demand acceptance only of the Soviet concept of government and acceptance of Soviet leadership to a great extent, but they do not insist on acknowledgement of a racial supremacy. To the masses of people, in view of their nationalistic feelings and of social unrest, these Soviet terms might be more attractive than were those of Hitler.

CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY
CAUSE ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS

24. It is necessary to translate the armistice terms into the probable military, political and economic conditions which would have to be attained before the terms, or comparable terms, might be accepted. This translation is not easy and predictions thereon may be subject to large error. However, the problem must be faced as the war campaigns themselves must be designed to create certain conditions.

25. Conditions for Allied Victory. It would be necessary to reduce the Soviet Bloc offensive capabilities down to the point where only militarily insignificant destructive attacks could be launched against the Allied nations home territory. At the same time, the Soviet defensive capabilities would have to be so reduced that the Allied strategic air forces could penetrate successfully the Soviet air defense without undue loss and attack any critical

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military and industrial complex within the Soviet Bloc. This would include reduction to the extent necessary to allow the Allies to transport by air, adequate surface forces to attack targets relatively invulnerable to air attack. Politically, it would be essential that the majority of the neutral nations would be supporting an armistice on the U. S. terms and, also, that the Soviet Bloc would have been unable to set up popularly supported governments throughout captured territory. Economically, it would be essential that the Soviet Bloc economy be so reduced as to preclude its ability to redevelop an air offensive against the Allies, to increase materially its air defensive or to regain the military initiative. At the same time, the Soviet Bloc must not be gaining any substantial war support from captured territory. It is considered probable, although by no means certain, that the Soviet Bloc would accept the terms by the time the foregoing conditions were realized.

26. Conditions for Soviet Bloc Victory. These are most difficult to foresee because it is rare that any serious study is given to this matter and such thinking is repugnant. However, in order to visualize how the Soviet Bloc might fight such a war, the condition that the Soviet Bloc might expect to achieve should be considered. It is estimated that the Soviet Bloc would expect Allied accedance to their terms when the military condition would be such that all Allied forces were out of the European Continent, the Near East and Asia. It would be further necessary to neutralize the UK as an effective Allied military base and that the air offensive potential of the Soviet Bloc as compared to the Allies is in favor of the Soviets and is constantly increasing in that direction. Politically, it would be essential that relatively strong governments with at least moderate popular support be established in Western Europe, that dissident political forces were becoming increasingly prominent in the U. S. and UK, and that the neutral nations were imploring the Allies to compromise. Economically, the Soviet Bloc would have to be obtaining considerable war support from Western Europe, whereas, the UK would be reduced to a starvation economy and U. S. industry would be so destroyed or dislocated that at least two years free of destructive air attack would be required before the air offensive might again be undertaken with the necessary degree of air supremacy. The Soviets might expect that the Allies would accede

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if these conditions were achieved.

27. Stalemate. Conditions somewhere between those forecast for Allied or Soviet victory might induce a stalemate when and if the entire potential for war or both sides had been fully committed. This is particularly apt to happen if the Allies should lose air supremacy over Soviet Bloc territory, while at the same time, they would just be able to maintain defensive air supremacy sufficient to sustain the air defensive without sufficient surplus to warrant major offensives for a long time in the future. In the event of such a stalemate, the war might last for years with extensive periods of relative inactivity alternating with all-out offensive efforts to catch the enemy off guard.

THE GENERAL PATTERN OF WAR

28. Analysis of the terms and conditions suggests a general pattern that an atomic war might follow. The Soviet Bloc would extend by force or threat of force throughout Western Europe and the Near East in order to eliminate surface threats, to prevent use of these areas by the Allies for air bases, to drive some of the Allies out of the war, and to gain the advantages of the European and Near Eastern war potentials. Meantime, the Soviet Bloc would be doing everything in her power to defeat the Allied air offensive with particular emphasis being directed against the U. S. ABC* Air Offensive and the industry supporting it. Her submarine effort would be directed against shipping that might sustain Allied offensive forces. There would be an extensive political, psychological and subversive campaign to support the foregoing military operations and to undermine the popular support of the Allied governments.

29. On the other hand, the Allies, in order to create the conditions essential for acceptance of their terms by the enemy and with due consideration to the strategy the enemy might employ, would probably decide on the following basic undertakings in the war:

*ABC - Atomic, biological, chemical and whatever comparable means that might have been developed by then.

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a. First Undertaking - Neutralize the enemy's offensive capabilities against the U. S. and Allied countries and to develop air supremacy adequate to sustain a major air offensive. This would be primarily an air battle.

b. Second Undertaking - A political, social and economic warfare campaign, coordinated with the military strategy, in order to convince the enemy to accept the armistice terms.

c. Third Undertaking - Prevent any successful exploitation of territorial gains of the Soviet Bloc. This would take the form of defending areas to the extent practicable and of engaging in highly selective operations in occupied countries with the mission of making occupation costs of the enemy exceed his occupation gains.

d. Fourth Undertaking - An aerial offensive, supported by all arms, with the objective of reducing the Soviet capabilities for attacking the Allies and for defense of enemy territory in order to achieve the military posture and the necessary degree of aerial supremacy that would probably cause the enemy to accept the Allied armistice terms.

e. Fifth Undertaking - If the enemy should not accept the armistice terms after the above four undertakings have been achieved, it would be necessary to undertake a campaign to maintain an ever-increasing military, political, social and economic pressure on the enemy until he accepts.

30. Military men are prone to accept as an axiom that the purpose of military forces in war is to destroy the will of the enemy to resist. Although there is a lot of truth in that concept, acceptance of it as a guiding principle is not in conformity with the purposes of war. Basically, all that should be sought militarily is the acceptance by the enemy of the Allied armistice terms, whatever they may be. This means that the military purpose in war would be to seek to create in the mind of the enemy the idea that he will accept the terms that the Allies propose. This concept is a positive approach. Destruction would no doubt have a major role in creating the idea in the mind of the enemy, but it should be utilized only to the extent that it would contribute to the efforts to create that idea in the minds of the enemy leaders.

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Military force would thus be considered as only a contributory and not the primary instrument of national policy, even in war. The most valuable weapons in war would be the ideas themselves. This suggests that the ideal weapon, even in war, is persuasion without coercion, as contrasted to the absolute weapon which is discussed so frequently. Military force would be used only to back up, to sustain, and to remove objections to the acceptance of these ideas. The great campaigns of the war would be the political, social and economic campaigns, and although these may not require the commitment of national resources to as great an extent as the military campaigns, they would be the primary campaigns of the war.

31. It has been pointed out that strategic surprise would never be a factor in such a war, but that tactical surprise could be expected and would be a very definite and difficult problem. It is desired to emphasize this concept. It applies to timing, to the choice of specific military strategies, to defense, to the utilization of weapons, to the selection of targets, to areas of combat, etc. It should be realized that military intelligence historically has been much less reliable than comparable political intelligence. Examples of British experience in World War II illustrate this point admirably. The British were always well aware of the probability of war, of the probable alignment of powers, and of the political actions that each nation might take. On the other hand, they had little knowledge in regard to the actual military operations that an enemy might undertake. The German attack on Norway is a notable example. Prior to the German attack, the British had evinced an intensive interest in Norway. They were studying the problem in great detail at the cabinet level and were planning for certain military operations of their own in Norway. The British were completely surprised, however, when the Germans initiated their battle for Norway. In U. S. history, the Pearl Harbor attack illustrated a failure of military intelligence although the political intelligence was sound. One lesson to be derived from such historical examples is that this nation needs the most efficient military intelligence that it can possibly attain. However, an even more important lesson to be gained is that, regardless of the efficiency of intelligence systems, military planners must realize that they cannot anticipate exactly what would happen and that they must develop flexible plans accordingly. This would be particularly true of the initial attack of the war. If it were to be assumed that the U. S. could achieve, in 15 years, an intelligence organization equal in efficiency

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to that of the British in World War II, this would constitute great progress. One might even hope that this level might be surpassed by 50% or better, Intelligence will never work miracles. Minds must be kept open with regard to all possibilities. This nation must be prepared to meet many variations of possible enemy strategies. The above should be borne in mind when considering the specific enemy strategies that are forecast hereinafter. The actual methods that an enemy might use in a war may vary considerably from those set forth herein.

32. The major undertakings, described above were listed as distinct undertakings in such a war. In a restricted sense they would be distinct. However, they would be underway simultaneously in many respects. Except for the position of the second major undertaking which covers the political, social and economic strategies, they have been listed in their probable order of importance, which happens also to be in chronological order. The political, social and economic strategies would be extensions of peacetime programs which would have started well before the war and would be carried on long after the war. The war would merely increase the tempo and influence the character of the various actions. Neutralization of the enemy's offensive capabilities was listed as the first undertaking for the reason that if such a war should start, this would be the threat that must be met successfully at all costs and it would be the one that would be paramount in everyone's mind at the start of the war.

FIRST UNDERTAKING - NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE

33. The enemy would probably make the first move that precipitates armed conflict. This initial action would probably be a tactical surprise. His main initial effort would be for the purpose of stopping or neutralizing the Allied ABC offensive that might come his way promptly. This would probably consist of an air bombardment, paratroop raids, submarine attack, sabotage, etc., in an attempt to destroy the Allied air power in being. His targets would include many in the U. S. and abroad. Military bases of all sorts would be subject to such attack, in particular bomber or guided missile bases. The enemy would attack storage areas and certain critical production facilities by an air bombardment. Those installations which he would consider invulnerable to air attack may be the target of limited airborne attacks combined with sabotage operations.

34. The action of the enemy might be something like this. He would know or think he knew the location of Allied

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bombing and missile bases and the storage areas of critical materials, such as atomic bombs. His intelligence would have estimated which of them were relatively invulnerable to air attack and against these installations he would employ airborne and/or sabotage forces. His objective would probably not be to seize and hold, but rather to neutralize or destroy. It is doubtful that he would compute the cost of such attack in normal military values. Suicide forces probably would be utilized without any hesitation. He would be apt to use A-bombs against any airbases where huge Allied bombers were stored above ground and for which only a few runways were available. He may attack bomber and assembly crews by ABC personnel weapons, subversively or from the air. This sort of attack might be expected against defended fields such as exist in the UK and the Far East today. Isolated bases, such as Eileson Field in Alaska or Goose Bay in Labrador are today, without adequate ground defense, he may seize by vertical envelopment, destroy and then withdraw. Guided missile bases and assembly facilities above ground would be similarly attacked. He would attempt to seize temporarily, underground launching facilities for aircraft or missiles even in the U. S. by subversion or vertical envelopment and destroy them if he could not knock them out from the air. He would make a similar attack against underground stockpiles of ABC weapons, particularly A-bombs. He may even use an A-bomb set in place by hand in the vertical envelopment operations to destroy critical underground installations. He would certainly use denial weapons, radioactive, BW or CW, to make the places difficult for the Allies to re-enter or re-occupy. Any aircraft carriers capable of participating in the Allied ABC offensive would be earmarked by the enemy for destruction or neutralization long before the war. He would undoubtedly position submarines, capable of launching torpedoes or guided missiles, or land-based air so as to attack such carriers on the opening day. Any critical industrial facilities, comparable in importance to what the atomic, ethyl lead and aircraft engine industries are to the U. S. war potential today, he would strike at also by bombardment, sabotage, or if necessary, limited vertical envelopment. He would probably use some form of ABC attack, subversively or by air bombardment, against the U. S. and UK centers of government in order to disrupt Allied control. He may attack the Allied communications, the warning screen, radars, radio, key centers, etc. to further disrupt control. Small paratroop forces, a squad or so, or missiles might be so employed. The enemy would leave no stone unturned, regardless of cost, to get through and neutralize the Allied ABC air potential.

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35. In this initial phase, it is doubtful that the enemy would attempt an all-out attack on either the industry as a whole or the population of the Allies. Resources available to him would probably not support such attack in addition to his attempt to knock out the Allied airpower in being. The enemy would, however, use psychological and political means, together with subversion and sabotage in an endeavor to weaken the support of the Allied war effort. He would undoubtedly try to convince the peoples of the Allied nations and of the world in general, that he was only opposing the aggressive use of Allied force against him and in this manner endeavor to undermine the popular support of the Allied war effort. There would be a similar pattern of enemy effort which will be keyed to his offensive in Europe and the Near East. This will be discussed later in connection with the third major undertaking.

36. The initial strategy of the Allies should be considered in the light of the probable enemy attack outlined above. A counter-offensive to cripple the enemy offensive means, and an active and passive defense will be required. This will be followed by a gradual extension of Allied air supremacy to the point where the fourth undertaking, the air battle to destroy the Soviet Bloc air offensive and defensive capabilities, can be undertaken.

37. Discussed first will be the probable Allied counter-offensive against the Soviet Bloc initial offensive. Speed, power and surprise would give a tremendous advantage to the enemy in his initial attack. The most reliable way to counter the enemy offensive is to strike swiftly at the source. The objective would be to neutralize or destroy the actual military means that the enemy has in being to sustain his offensive. For example, the Allies should attack the aircraft and missile bases, the storage areas, certain critical transportation and communication facilities and possibly one or two isolated industrial targets which directly contribute to the enemy air offensive. Weapons would be utilized which would both destroy such offensive facility as well as deny access to it for some period of time, perhaps for as long as it would take the enemy to rebuild the facility. The ABC weapons would be employed in force against this class of targets. It may be worth five to fifty or more Allied atomic bombs to prevent one Soviet atomic bomb from landing on Allied territory. Allied intelligence would have been directed for a long time towards gaining full knowledge concerning the above-mentioned targets. The U. S. and Allies undoubtedly would have had to

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utilize subversive intelligence to a major extent to achieve the degree of knowledge necessary to make this attack successful. It might be practicable also to utilize such intelligence agents for guidance in connection with attack on these targets. At this stage of the war, sabotage operations would be of very doubtful value, inasmuch as the Allies would have had little opportunity to set up the sabotage means without the attendant danger of being exposed and thus disrupting peaceful efforts to solve the basic conflicts before the war started.

38. There will be undoubtedly some targets in the Soviet Bloc which would be relatively invulnerable to air attack. What might be considered suicide raids by special, highly trained, small airborne units transported in aircraft of comparable characteristics to the strategic bombers may have to be utilized against this type of target. The philosophy of the Allies in driving home this attack must be similar to that described for the Soviet Bloc in attacking similar targets in the U. S. It is vital that the enemy ABC offensive against the U. S. and her Allies be stopped by all means practicable at the earliest time, regardless of cost. Attack on the enemy communications might similarly be very profitable. Airborne raids or missile attacks on individual stations or facilities might prove very devastating against the enemy communication net.

39. In essence, the Allies must be prepared to carry out a counter-offensive similar to that described for the initial attack of the enemy in par. 34 above. The tactics described should be used against similar vital targets. The enemy ABC offensive must be stopped at all costs without regard to the present ideas of conventional military cost. This counter-offensive would be a must and nothing should be allowed to interfere with it. This will be a return to the old concept of battle between opposing forces. This time the real initial battle would be an air battle rather than the land battle that the Allies faced in Europe in 1939-40 or the naval battle that the U. S. faced in the Pacific in 1941-42. It would be greater than any battle in history.

40. The counter-offensive must be supplemented by an effective defense. The national economy and the difficulty of defending against so many possible methods of attack would prevent anywhere near a 100% defense of the Allies or of the U. S. However, certain parts of the Allied economy and military forces must be given as close to 100%

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protection as may be possible. A degree of active defense must be provided for the remainder, supplemented by an effective utilization of all practicable passive defense measures.

41. The military forces which would engage in the Allied counter-offensive, their stockpiles, weapons and equipment and the vital industry essential for their support must be given as nearly 100% defense against enemy attack as is possible. It may be necessary to set up what might be termed a "military offensive complex" (MOC) completely separate from the ordinary peacetime civil economy. It should have its own defensive forces which could not be diverted for other military missions, but which would be committed solely to the protection of these offensive means. Passive defense by dispersion of bases and facilities within the base should be utilized to a major extent in developing the components of the MOC. It would be necessary also to develop considerable protected stockpiles of all weapons essential to the conduct of the initial phase of the war, e.g. in the case of atomic weapons, perhaps the non-fissionable parts for ten times the number of atomic bombs expected to be employed would be stockpiled and stored according to a carefully worked out plan for dispersion. The missiles and/or planes themselves would be dispersed likewise. The ideal base might be a base completely under a mountain and absolutely invulnerable to any kind of an atomic attack. Fighter defense, AA defense, ground defense, defense against subversive attack should be concentrated on the defense of the MOC. Separate and independent communications may even be required.

42. In addition to the protection of the MOC, some degree of overall protection would have to be given to the industries as a whole and the population of the Allies. In the case of the U. S., it would probably be necessary to protect the industrial northeast with military force sufficient to limit materially the success of any major enemy attack against industry in the area. However, the requirements for overall defense should not limit in any way the protection of the MOC. Passive defense would play a major role. Dispersion of critical industries should be accomplished to the extent that the present bottlenecks in the fuel, atomic and aircraft engine industries are eliminated. Further bottlenecks in industries vital to the support of military operations in the initial phases of the war should be avoided. Those industries which are producing absolutely necessary end items, which cannot be stockpiled adequately for one reason or the other should probably be placed underground and provided with the maximum amount of protection. Civil

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defense measures should be designed to limit the dislocation of industry that might result from the initial enemy attack. The Allied peoples should be psychologically conditioned to withstand ABC types of attack and should be afforded reasonable protection from such attack.

43. This first undertaking would be quite a lengthy affair. It would probably be a matter of three months to a year or longer. It would certainly not be an overnight job. Allied operations, if successful, would gradually change in character as the attacks on the enemy offensive power go deeper and deeper into the territory of the enemy. This phase of the war thus would gradually fade into the fourth major undertaking of the war, the great air offensive.

SECOND UNDERTAKING - THE POLITICAL,
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CAMPAIGNS OF THE WAR

44. This would be the major undertaking of the war. It would be a continuation of an extensive peacetime campaign which would have been organized and carried on prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The war would cause significant changes in the emphasis on various aspects and the general intensification of the overall campaign. Significantly, the campaigns would then be able to utilize the military campaigns of the war as an integral part of the political, social and economic campaigns. Demonstrated and threatened military force would be used as tools in the campaign.

45. The campaigns themselves will be the accommodation of words to acts and vice versa. They will not constitute simply a psychological campaign as is currently indicated by the term "psychological warfare". In many cases, the acts themselves will speak much louder than words and will do more than anything that could be said to get an idea accepted by the enemy people. The objective of this undertaking, of course, is simply to convince the enemy to accept the armistice terms. These would have been previously set forth to the world during a considerable period of time. Further, as tensions develop immediately prior to the war, there would be an extensive campaign to demand a peaceful solution of the conflict which might cause the war, together with the rejection of all ideas of using force to solve this conflict. The point would be emphasized that if they should resort to the use of military force or coercive means supported by military force to solve the conflict, the U. S. and its Allies would then use the necessary military means to

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eliminate the use of military force and thus make it possible to resort to peaceful solution of the basic conflict.

46. The Allied political, social and economic campaigns would be developed upon the basis of the Allied armistice terms and peace proposals to be negotiated within the UN. Emphasis would be placed on the rejection of force, on the need for an effective supra-national government, on the principle that each nation should decide on the type of government best suited to its own conditions, and on rejection of exploitation of nations by other nations. Social unrest in the world would not be exploited by the Allies, except to the extent that this social unrest may be utilized to convince the enemy that social conditions can be improved without the use of military force or to cause the enemy to accept the Allied terms. Democracy in all its aspects, political, economic and social would be emphasized. The Allies would insist that the principles of democracy must be applied to any given situation, regardless of the form of the government. They should contend that they are not promoting any particular type of civil liberty democracy or any particular type of economic democracy. They should insist that the spirit of democracy be utilized in the solution of the problems of the world whereas the forms that democracy may take is not critical. Throughout the war, it would be emphasized that the armistice terms and the peace terms proposed are an effort to achieve the solution of the present conflicts which have caused the war by peaceful and democratic methods rather than by the use of military force.

47. A basic theme of the campaigns would be to convince the enemy and the rest of the world that the Allies are actually acting for the UN and not for themselves, and that the Allies seek no material gain in the war. They only seek individual and collective security that would accrue from universal acceptance of the idea that military force should not be used as an instrument of national policy to resolve conflicts, but that conflicts should be resolved peacefully and democratically by agreement within the framework of the UN. Concerted effort would be made to sustain the UN during the war. Every means available would be utilized to keep both enemy nations and neutral nations within the UN as active UN participants. The Allies should promote discussions within the UN which would lead to a rational solution of the conflict. Armistice terms and peace terms should be proposed and discussed early in the war in an effort to seek agreement on these matters within the UN and with the enemy.

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48. The campaigns would have to treat world communism and the major socialistic movements in the world with great care. It would be necessary to emphasize that the Allies are not fighting against world communism per se or against socialism. They should emphasize that they have no intention of using any type of force against any ideology, and that they have no objection to any nation in the world having any government that it desires providing that it learns to exist peacefully with the rest of the world. They should contend that democracy, as practiced by the Allies, could and would exist peacefully and progressively in the world with communism or socialism or any other type of government providing that the conflicts that would arise between national governments could be solved peacefully without resort to military force and without any nation attempting to exploit the resources and peoples of another nation.

49. The theme that the Soviet Bloc cannot win militarily should be developed. It should be demonstrated that the Allies have the force and the will to get agreement to their armistice terms. Any destruction that would be detrimental to the masses of the enemy people should be stressed as unavoidable and only incidental to knocking out military power, and thus preventing that power from being used by the enemy leaders. The Allies should emphasize that the people, the industry, and the economy are not the targets of the war, and that the Allies desire to end the war with strong and stable nations, economically and politically, in being within the Soviet Bloc. The Allies should emphasize that they will do everything in their power to avoid unnecessary destruction and that they utilize methods of warfare which are as humane as is practicable under the circumstances. They should point out the humane aspects of the particular types of weapons that they plan to utilize. The Allies should endeavor to condition psychologically the enemy masses to the acceptance of the idea that such weapons are humane, regardless of previous ideas, and that they will be directed only against vital targets of a military character which threaten the very existence of the Allies.

50. Another phase of the campaigns should be devoted to neutral nations. The responsibilities of the UN and the role of the neutrals in the determination of the armistice terms and the peace settlement should be emphasized, together with the long-range interests of the neutrals in the war conflicts. Efforts should be made to convince the neutrals that the Allies have the force to implement their

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armistice terms and neutrals should be encouraged to exert pressure on the Soviet Bloc to trust the Allies and to withdraw from the war and accept the armistice terms. The neutrals should be encouraged to provide assurances to the Soviet Bloc that the Allied nations would not be allowed to dictate the peace terms and that the UN would act in the true spirit of democracy when the armistice terms have been accepted.

51. An important phase of the campaigns would be in direct support of the resistance to the enemy in occupied countries. Resistance forces should be encouraged to obstruct and oppose all efforts to achieve popularly supported governments sympathetic to the Soviet Bloc. Occupied peoples should be prepared and encouraged to accept great sacrifices in order to prevent the resources of their areas from being utilized to the strategic advantage of the Soviet Bloc. The Soviet Bloc should be forced to expend more of its own resources in occupation than they could gain from indigenous resources of the occupied countries. Allied efforts should strive to cause the enemy strategic position in the occupied territories to deteriorate continuously. The occupied peoples should be conditioned psychologically to support selective military or subversive operations which would be designed to prevent the enemy from exploiting resources and basic industries such as coal or steel that might be critical in the support of the Soviet economy. The peoples should be informed that destruction would be kept to a minimum and that weapons with denial characteristics would be employed to the maximum extent practicable in order to leave the resources and industries in the best condition possible at the end of the war. This phase of the campaigns would have to be coordinated very closely with the military operations in these areas.

52. Prior to the war, the U. S. should seek agreement with its Allies for equality in the sharing of war costs. Equality should be based on the principles that aid will be granted during and after the war by those Allies less affected by the war to the more affected Allies until the condition is reached after the war when the relative standards of living and economic conditions amongst the Allies are comparable to the relative pre-war status of the Allies in these respects. It is assumed that the Allies agreed to such a policy before the war. The political, social, and economic campaigns would emphasize greatly this policy in sustaining the resistance of the Allies threatened with occupation and in creating support for the Allied objectives within territories occupied by the enemy. Further, this policy should provide the basis for a great psychological campaign designed to create

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support of the Allies by neutral nations and to discourage support of the Soviet Bloc.

53. Another essential part of these campaigns would be aimed at the masses of the enemy people. The Allies would be careful to exclude any indication that the particular form of government that existed within the Soviet Bloc countries was a target for attack or that governments would be changed or eliminated by Allied forces. The emphasis would be placed simply upon the undesirability of utilizing military force. The people would be encouraged to bring pressure to bear in order to convince the enemy leaders that their military force is not getting results, and that it would be less detrimental to the progress of their country, as a whole, to accept the proposed armistice terms. Such indigenous pressures for changes in government as would make acceptance of the Allied terms more likely should be encouraged.

54. The enemy elites would be the objective of another phase of these campaigns. Efforts would be made, both covertly and overtly, to convince the leaders of the futility of utilizing force to impress them with the Allied military capabilities, to deceive them where necessary for security as to Allied military intentions, and to cause them to trust the Allies to adhere to the terms offered. Covert means might be utilized to bring into power indigenous elements of the elite who would reject the idea of utilizing military force and who would be content to accept the armistice terms. Whatever the changes in government that might result, the campaigns should be directed towards sustaining a strong government in power which would be capable of directing the efforts of the enemy nations and of exercising control over the military forces that would exist at the time of acceptance of the armistice terms. It would be undesirable to bring into power a weak government which could not control the peoples and the military forces which might result in such anarchic conditions within the country, accompanied by destruction and disorder, which would make post-war objectives difficult to achieve. Subversion may play a strong part in this particular campaign. Ideas and certain types of "hardware" weapons should be combined in this field. Means probably could be developed whereby selective attack could be used against individuals or groups of individuals blocking the acceptance of the Allied objectives. These could vary all the way from covert weapons which might be lethal for an individual to those which would debilitate an enemy leader in some respect and thus make him more amenable to acceptance of the Allied terms or less virulent and aggressive in opposing the Allies.

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55. A major portion of the Allied effort in the political, social and economic campaigns would be employed in direct support of military operations. Deception as to objectives of specific Allied operations would be encouraged. Enemy resistance to Allied military power should be weakened. The enemy military should be encouraged to surrender or to rebel. The enemy military would be taught to fear Allied weapons. The story of invincibility of the Allied military might must be built up in enemy military circles as well as civilian circles. The invincibility and overwhelming superiority of Allied air power would have to be given especial emphasis. Once Allied air superiority had been achieved, the enemy must be convinced that he can never regain air superiority and that without air superiority, his land forces cannot get him any place or seize any initiative. The enemy would have to be convinced of his military hopelessness.

56. A significant portion of these campaigns would be devoted to the Allied homefronts in order to counter enemy campaigns and to develop and secure the essential support for the Allies within their own areas. It would be necessary to keep the Allied peoples confident that they could and would achieve their objectives. These peoples also should be conditioned psychologically against fear of enemy weapons that might be used against them. Emphasis should be given to the facts that war will not destroy civilization and that, in the long run, the Allies will be able to achieve victory and limit war if the people buckle down, absorb the enemy blows, and do everything in their power to support the Allied war effort.

57. It would be Allied policy to install popularly supported indigenous governments in all areas that the Allies occupy for military operations. No efforts would be made to stifle such indigenous governments. On the contrary, they would be given their head to the maximum extent possible. An attempt would be made to demonstrate to the world the Allied concept of not utilizing force to achieve changes in the methods of government in these areas during the war. By disseminating information concerning these governments, the Allies would prove to the world that the Allies were sincere in the objectives of their armistice and proposed peace terms. The trust and confidence of the rest of the world in the Allies and their intentions would depend greatly on the manner in which the Allies handled the foreign areas that they had to occupy for military operations. To a major extent, the trust of the enemy in the

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Allies which might encourage the enemy leaders to accept Allied terms would depend on how the Allies treated occupied territories.

58. The character of the political, social and economic campaigns would gradually change as the Allied military efforts progressed. Increasing stress would be given to the futility of continued resistance to the acceptance of Allied terms. The abhorrence of destruction theme would be played upon in ascending tempo. Needless continuance of the conflict that would necessitate ever-deepening attacks into the Soviet Bloc would be a theme. It would be pointed out that in order to force withdrawal of the enemy from whatever territories he may have occupied, the Allies must necessarily strike deeper and deeper into the economy of the Soviet Bloc in order to prevent them from sustaining the aggressive forces which are occupying Allied territories. It should be shown that although the destructive aspects of these attacks are highly undesirable to the Allies, it is inevitable that the masses will suffer more and more as the Allies are required to go deeper and deeper. The ever-increasing ratio of Allied power to that of the Soviet power should be highlighted with particular emphasis on air power. The idea should be reiterated that enemy failure to surrender in the face of the less destructive weapons must necessarily cause a transition to utilization of more destructive weapons. All the military operations would be utilized as an integral part of this essential psychological campaign to cause acceptance of the armistice terms.

59. As has been previously suggested, after the Allied military operations had succeeded to the point where a commanding air superiority over the enemy had been achieved, the major problem would be to convince the enemy leaders to trust the Allies to carry out only the terms that the Allies had proposed. At first glance, this problem looks insurmountable in view of the personal power position of the Soviet leaders, the communist ideology, and the communist belief that the end justifies the means. A great deal would depend on the pre-war and war conduct of the Allied leaders and the propaganda campaigns built around their conduct. The position of Allied land forces vis-a-vis the enemy land forces would also be a major factor. If the enemy felt that he was in position to defeat any land occupation in spite of Allied air superiority, he might place trust in the Allies provided that he had assurances of Allied abolition of armaments in the UN peace settlement after the surrender. Otherwise, he may fight on and on with whatever force he had available. Major emphasis on the fact that the Allies did not intend to

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force a change of government, to control the government, or to bring war criminals to trial before Allied courts should help create trust by the enemy. The neutrals of the world would play a powerful role in creating this trust, and the Allies would have to devote considerable attention to encouraging the neutrals to use their influence in support of the Allied proposals and intentions.

60. As the end of the war became more and more probable a campaign must be undertaken to insure the safety of occupation inspectors who would later enter Soviet Bloc territory to observe the compliance with the armistice terms. This part of the campaign would explain that these few Allied people were coming, not as conquerors but rather, simply as inspectors whose presence was to insure against the reopening of hostilities. The fact that the Allies would leave the enemy armies intact, together with many other elements of military force, would be the Soviet Bloc's guarantee that the Allies had no intention of conquering the peoples themselves or of forcing Allied ideas of government and social changes upon them. Emphasis would be given to ultimate abolition of all competitive national armaments under UN control. It would be pointed out that although the Allies did not have the forces available to conquer the enemy peoples, if the enemy should violate the armistice terms or attack the armistice inspectors, that the Allies would strike devastating air blows immediately in retaliation. Continuous Allied air surveillance of the enemy area would be used to demonstrate the reality of this capability. Accelerated emphasis would be given to the proposed peace terms to prepare the ground for their acceptance by the governments in power within the Soviet Bloc. Efforts would be made to condition psychologically the enemy peoples for the rejection from their basic philosophy of the concept that military force should be an instrument of national policy.

61. This outlines the essential elements of the political, social, and economic campaigns. No attempt was made herein to portray the particular roles that political, psychology, economic warfare, sabotage, subversion or other social weapons might play in the war. Within the U. S., the progress of studies in these fields has not been sufficient to warrant a forecast as to the precise roles which each aspect of this type of warfare might play. However, it is hoped that the purposes which must be achieved are sufficiently outlined herein to suggest the studies that are needed in these fields in order to develop techniques for carrying out this type of undertaking in a future war.

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THIRD UNDERTAKING
PREVENT EXPLOITATION OF ENEMY TERRITORIAL GAINS

62. Although it is possible, it is very improbable that the Soviet Bloc would accept the armistice terms as long as they are able to successfully exploit substantial territory gained in the war even if the Allies had been very successful in their initial two undertakings. It would be a real victory in the war if the Soviet Bloc could force a military stalemate on the Allies after the Soviet Bloc had Western Europe and the Near East under control. Until it could be demonstrated to the enemy that he could not gain from territorial expansion and that his strategic position in occupied areas was deteriorating continuously, there would probably always exist a justifiable hope in the minds of the Soviet Bloc leaders that they could absorb or counter Allied military power, expand their control in Eurasia and ultimately win the war by causing at least a stalemate while they remained in control of these key areas. Hence, this third undertaking is vital and is one that must be achieved at all costs.

63. Prevention of enemy exploitation of territorial gains could be done by two methods. The first and most obvious method is to prevent the enemy from occupying strategic areas. The second method consists of conducting a number of operations, both internal and external, against the areas that the enemy succeeds in occupying in order to prevent him from obtaining any substantial war benefit from this occupation and to cause his strategic position in these areas to deteriorate. These military operations would have to be closely tied into the political, social and economic campaigns previously described in the second undertaking. Allied or neutral nations which had been occupied by the enemy must never be allowed to believe that the Allies have given them up as lost or beyond the realm of active support.

64. The defense of Western Europe will be discussed first. This is highly important not only from a military point of view, but from the effect that a successful defense of such areas would have on the political, social and economic campaigns of the war. It is expected that during the next 15 years, if peaceful, the war potential of the Soviet Bloc will probably increase relative to that of the Allies. It is doubtful that Western Europe, even with U. S. economic and military aid, would be able to exceed the relative gain that the Soviet might expect.

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A unified Germany with military forces aligned to the Allies might influence the balance materially, although the unrest and increase of communist influence notably in France and Italy which would be a consequence of such German resurgence would probably more than offset any military gain. Moreover, it is probably unrealistic to consider a re-armed Germany in a war in 1964 because, if Germany is re-armed, war is likely to occur much earlier, and, hence, the assumptions on which this study of war is based would not hold. One aspect should be noted. At the beginning of the war, there might be no forces of either side in Germany. Thus, the USSR would have no direct access to Western Union territory, except by means of violation of German neutrality. It is not probable that sizeable U. S. forces would be positioned in Europe at the start of the war. Therefore, the Allies in Europe would probably have to face an initial military superiority of the Soviet Bloc.

65. The initial efforts of the Soviet Bloc would probably be directed towards internal overthrow of the governments of the Western European nations, with particular emphasis on France, Germany and Italy. Political crises in those countries may be expected before the war and just as the war starts. There would be a great effort made to make these countries withdraw from the Allies and stay out of the war. However, it is to be hoped and generally expected that this condition would not exist and that the enemy would be forced to undertake a great land and air campaign to overrun these countries. The enemy would probably violate German neutrality and undertake a campaign across Germany directed towards the elimination of the Allied military forces on the continent.

66. The Allies would probably move to the Rhine and attempt to hold a line southwest to Switzerland and possibly to the Italian-French border. The Soviets would have superiority in land forces and initial air superiority based in part on ABC type weapons. The defense would be very difficult. The Soviet attack would be coordinated with a strong submarine effort in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to block off any support of the Allies from outside of the continent.

67. The role of the Allied air power in connection with the defense of Western Europe is most important. The primary task of long-range strategic bombardment forces in this stage of the war would be the counter-offensive to

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prevent the Soviet Bloc ABC air offensive from crippling the Allied war effort which was described in the first undertaking. However, the next task of strategic bombardment should be to check enemy progress in the battle for Western Europe. In these operations, the Allies would probably utilize, to a major extent, destruction and denial weapons to interfere with the enemy LOC and to break up and disrupt Soviet concentrations, supply depots, etc. that are out of range of the tactical air force, but which are in direct support of the Soviet ground forces. A-bombs would be used against key transportation targets or wherever enemy troops or supplies are sufficiently concentrated. Tactical aircraft and shorter-range strategic bombardment aircraft would be used against similar targets within range. It should be possible without destroying cities to reduce the logistic support of the enemy to the point below which he cannot engage in major offensives.

68. The importance of conducting an air battle to achieve Allied air superiority in Western Europe cannot be over-emphasized. The Allies would probably start out with fewer aircraft positioned for battle than the enemy. However, by 1964 the Allies should have quantitative and qualitative superiority in ABC weapons, which if properly employed, would give the Allies the capability of eliminating rapidly the numerical superiority of the enemy and a reasonable prospect of achieving air superiority in Western Europe in the event that the Allies have great superiority in quantities of A-weapons. The Allies would probably have good intelligence as to the location of air bases that the enemy would use to support the land battle in Europe. If the Allies utilized A-bombs (exploding on or near the surface) against every airfield that the enemy was using within tactical support range of the land battle, it is probable that the enemy airpower could be completely neutralized over the battle area. Trans-sonic bombers, or perhaps even super-sonic bombers, from the U.K. or Allied continental bases, drones, or guided missiles, could be used successfully. They would be most difficult for the enemy to intercept or to counter by other means. Great quantities of enemy aircraft could be destroyed on the ground. Bases could be made unusable for long periods. These bases could be hit with A-bombs without causing extensive destruction or casualties in civilian areas. An all-out campaign such as this should be able to eliminate rapidly the enemy numerical superiority in aircraft. Short-range guided missiles of the enemy which utilize mobile launching devices would be more difficult to

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neutralize. However, this type of weapon would probably not have the pin-point accuracy needed to be decisive in the land battle for Europe. The Allies, of course, must be prepared for similar use of enemy weapons against the Allied air bases. However, here the potential Allied quantitative superiority in A-weapons is significant. The enemy might not have the quantity of A-bombs needed to sustain successfully this type of attack and it would be difficult to achieve with HE or non-atomic weapons. The Allied superiority in naval power would also come into play. Carrier borne aircraft could be utilized successfully in this attack. Also, if the Allies developed high speed bombing aircraft which could utilize the myriad of indestructible water bases which abound around the Atlantic littoral, they would have a great initial advantage. The Allies should be able, therefore, to neutralize effectively the enemy air power over the area of the land battle for Western Europe. All the Allied aircraft which could be spared from the initial counter-offensive, home defense, and possibly a similar operation in the Near East, should be committed to this campaign to neutralize enemy air power. The Allies should maintain aircraft, bases and weapons of this type in order to be able to continue the attack as additional enemy aircraft are brought into the area. It is feasible for the Allies to develop this capability for the early achievement of air superiority over the battle area of Western Europe on peacetime budgets by 1964 if the Allies exploit their A-bomb potential and their short-range, high speed bomber aircraft potential.

69. It should be pointed out that the air battle described in the preceding paragraph would be a major contribution to the success of the battle for overall air superiority which will be described in the fourth undertaking. Here in Europe, under conditions of geography, terrain, range and intelligence favorable to the Allies, the Allies could force the enemy to commit a great portion of his aircraft that might be used for defense of his homeland. A major portion of his aircraft in being might thus be sucked into this favorable air battle area and defeated. Not only would this reduce the enemy's home defense, but it would place a great strain on his industry and communications that supports his airpower. This strain would make Allied attacks against the enemy air power support much more profitable than they would be otherwise. Here would be the great opportunity to defeat, under conditions favorable to the Allies, most of the enemy air power in being, which would have to be done before the air superiority necessary for Allied victory could be achieved.

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70. Even with the good prospect of early elimination of enemy air superiority over the land battle area, the Allies may face a tremendous problem in ground defense of Allied territory. The war would be apt to start under such conditions of enemy land superiority that he may be in position to make considerable initial progress on the ground before the Allied ground defense and air power could stop him. The Allies should, however, have extensive stocks of ABC anti-personnel weapons which could be utilized against the enemy land forces and which, when combined with an aggressive defense and decreasing enemy air superiority, should permit the Allies to stabilize the land battle well before they are driven back to the Atlantic Coast.

71. Withdrawal from the Rhine in the event of overpowering Soviet Bloc superiority may be likely. If Allied forces withdraw, they should do so to previously prepared positions which would insure that a strong European continental base remained available for the Allies. The base should include an extensive area of the coast of France and the English Channel. If the Allies should undertake an air battle as visualized, the Allied ground forces should be able to defend at least the major portion of France and Belgium, possibly withdrawing no further than the Meuse. Such a base would be needed for vital military purposes. This base would be necessary in order to sustain the resistance movements within the enemy occupied areas and to support the campaign to prevent exploitation of areas already occupied by the Soviets. The Soviets could be expected to use captured bases in Western Europe for an attempted air battle against the UK in which the Soviet Bloc would attempt to neutralize the UK as an Allied offensive air base. It would be essential to have an Allied base on the continent to support offensively this defense of the UK. At the same time, agricultural areas might be used to absorb a considerable part of the destructive attack that the enemy might otherwise employ against the industrial area of the UK. The Allies must also reduce the submarine menace in the Atlantic. If the Allies hold the Atlantic and Channel coasts, they should be able to limit substantially the use of any European coastal facilities in support of the enemy submarine effort. Allied air forces would also need this base in order to continue the reduction of the enemy air power.

72. In the event that the U. S. had not already furnished an expeditionary force to the Allies before the start of the war, a U. S. expeditionary force consisting

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of several army divisions, together with elements of air and naval strength should immediately be committed to the defense of Europe, preferably in the defense of the Rhine and certainly in the defense of the withdrawal base on the continent. It would be absolutely essential that throughout the war elements of U. S. military forces be in Europe in order to sustain the resistance movements in the areas which the enemy might have occupied. This demonstration of good faith on the part of the U. S. in its ability and determination to support its Allies is vital from a psychological and moral viewpoint.

73. Prior to any withdrawal that might be necessary, resistance movements should be fully organized, subversive and intelligence agents should be planted, and detailed arrangements should be made for supply of these forces and for communication with them. These resistance movements should be directed through the Allied base on continental Europe.

74. The execution of the plan for the prevention of enemy exploitation of occupied areas should also start well before any withdrawal. Instead of the "scorched earth" policy that has been used in past wars, the Allies should develop ABC weapons or other types of "hardware" which could neutralize but would not destroy the utility of essential resources and industrial capacity in territory that may be occupied by the enemy. For example, radioactive materials might be used in certain mines to preclude their being worked for a predetermined time. Sufficient resources should be left unharmed to sustain the civil populations in such areas. A supplementary offensive against transportation should prevent un-neutralized resources from being converted to any substantial benefit to the enemy. This denial offensive would undoubtedly require subsequent attacks of a selective nature by bombardment aircraft, and airborne raids in order to maintain the neutralization of these resources. Resistance forces would be provided with especial weapons, including ABC types, for employment by subversive or sabotage techniques.

75. A threat of a "break out" from the Allied continental base should be maintained continuously in order to require the expenditure of the maximum of military resources by the Soviet Bloc, and, in particular, to attract as great a portion as possible of his airpower into close range of Allied air power based on the continent and the UK. This "break out" threat should also demand a major concentration of defensive forces in the area which would provide remunerative targets for later Allied tactical air offensives. This should be coordinated with offensive missions by resistance forces within the occupied territory which

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would be making continuous attacks against the enemy LOC, industrial support and occupation forces.

76. The peoples in the occupied territories should be kept fully informed of the military operations that the Allies are conducting in those areas. They should be given to understand that great land campaigns are not being undertaken because of the Allied air effort against the enemy and the desire to avoid the extensive destruction which would accompany such land campaigns. They should be informed that the Allies intend to force the Soviets to withdraw by gaining overall air supremacy and by preventing successful support of occupation forces. The importance of sustaining the resistance movements in the Allied occupied countries and the implacable determination of all Allies not to support the Soviet war effort in any way cannot be over emphasized. The winning of the war and the stability of the peace thereafter and the achievement of international objectives will require that these people be kept convinced that the U. S. and the Allies are fighting for them and for the rejection of military force as a means of settling conflicts.

77. Occupied Allied territories should be liberated ultimately by an overrunning type of campaign that should occur just prior to the Soviets surrender. Land campaigns similar to the forced German withdrawal in Brittany and South France in World War II should be expected. Exhaustive land campaigns against determined enemy resistance such as occurred in the Normandy and Central European campaigns of "Overlord" should not be necessary.

78. Prevention of enemy exploitation of the Near East would be a related problem. It would be essential that the enemy be denied successful support from those areas. Undoubtedly, the enemy would foresee the need of preventing the utilization of the Near East by the Allies. He would want to prevent Allied exploitation of the Near East oil and Allied utilization of air bases in that area. The enemy would bring great pressure to bear on the Near East countries to stay out of the war, to provide no sustenance of any sort to the Allies and to submit to the occupation of certain strategic areas by Soviet troops. This strategy might be successful in both Iran and Iraq, but not in Egypt or Turkey. The USSR might even by-pass Turkey and take a chance on Turkey remaining neutral and thus unavailable for use by the Allies in their aerial offensive. Under such conditions the Soviets should be able to readily obtain control of the oil areas around the Arabian Gulf. The enemy might then undertake a campaign against Egypt with the objective of occupying portions thereof and preventing utilization of such by the

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Allies. In any event, he would probably plan air operations to neutralize any Allied bases in Egypt.

79. The Allies could hardly be expected to be in position to defend any of the Near East area from enemy occupation with the possible exception of Egypt. Allied forces might not be permitted in Egypt before the war or before the enemy might undertake an offensive against Egypt. If the Allies are able to establish a moderate ground defense and considerable air and naval strength in Egypt before the enemy attacks the area, the Allies should be able to defend Egypt by relying primarily on an atomic air attack against the enemy air forces, similar to that described in the battle for defense of Western Europe. Defense of areas closer to Russia than Egypt may not be feasible. If the Allies do not have the military forces in position in Egypt before the enemy attacks, they would have to undertake the kind of land base battle which will be described later in the fourth undertaking in order to use this area as a base for air operations.

80. The Allies main problem with respect to the Middle East oil would be to prevent the enemy from exploiting the oil resources in the area. Air attack with destruction and denial weapons on the oil production facilities and transportation means should prevent the enemy from getting much oil out of the area. Sabotage and air-borne raids would also be used in conjunction with the attack. The Allied air attacks could be based on naval craft or East Africa, if Egyptian bases are not available.

81. Allied seizure of the oil areas of the Middle East in order to utilize the oil resources of that area would probably not be worthwhile, solely from an oil point of view. The enemy would be capable of destroying or neutralizing Allied oil production utilizing methods similar to those suggested for the Allies. Until the Soviet air power could be substantially reduced in the Central Russian area and an overwhelming air superiority developed by the Allies in the Near East, the capture and defense of the oil area would probably cost the Allies more oil than they could produce from the area. Towards the end of the war, this condition of air superiority might be met and, then, if the Allies required the oil, such an operation might be worthwhile.

82. Soviet exploitation of the resources of the Far East should not be a major concern of the Allies. Allied air attacks should be able to neutralize production and

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transportation in this area. The primary Soviet objective in the area would be to prevent or interfere with Allied air offensives passing over Far East territory. The Soviet course of action would probably be to insist that the Chinese resist by force any attempt by the Allies to use the air over China for military operations. While this defense would interfere with Allied air operations, there is little that the Allies could do except to attack the enemy air bases and means of logistic support. Any enemy submarine bases might be similarly attacked. It is highly doubtful that the enemy would attempt to seize Japan in face of Allied air and naval superiority in the area. He may, however, attempt to neutralize Allied air operations that might be based in Japan. The Allies should be able to hold Australia.

FOURTH UNDERTAKING
AERIAL SUPREMACY OVER THE ENEMY

83. There is a possibility that the war might end if the Allies succeeded in their first three undertakings. This would mean that the enemy initial air offensive had been successfully blocked without undue Allied losses, that his land offensives had been stopped, that he was gaining nothing from the areas which he had occupied, and that the political and social forces of the world had been mobilized against him and were insisting that the Soviet Bloc stop the war and accept the favorable armistice terms which the Allies were proposing. However, in view of the forceful nature of the Soviet elite, it is not probable that they would accept the Allied terms as long as they would feel that they have a chance to rebuild their offensive capabilities and regain the initiative. The key to this initiative would be air power. Without air superiority, at least locally, the enemy would be unable to seize the initiative on any substantial front. Therefore, the Allied objective in the fourth undertaking should be to achieve aerial superiority throughout the Soviet Bloc territory to such an extent that the enemy air defense would deteriorate continuously and he would be unable to produce aircraft or missiles in significant quantities. This would be a continuation of the air battles in the first and third undertakings. However, it might be as much as two years, depending upon the effectiveness of the initial destructive attack and the Allied success in Europe before the Allies could devote their major effort towards the attainment of this aerial supremacy over the enemy territory.

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84. The objective of this undertaking would be Soviet air power; the forces in being, the air warning and air defense, the bases and storage areas and the vital communications and industry in direct support of Soviet air power and the weapons used. By the time this undertaking was in full swing, the Soviets undoubtedly would have developed a highly effective air defense utilizing high speed fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guided missiles. The initial stages of this battle for air supremacy might find that the Allied delivery means rather vulnerable to the Soviet Bloc defensive means over its own territory. It may be necessary, therefore, to attack extensively the defensive means of the Soviets.

85. Range would be a major consideration in this undertaking. The Allies would undoubtedly have available by that time planes and missiles with a range capable of some degree of sustained attack from the Western Hemisphere. However, the effectiveness of such an attack is open to question. Air attack from that range would require a very high degree of intelligence which probably could not be achieved. The Allies would need to hit precise targets such as air bases, specific factories, etc. in order to achieve aerial supremacy. Accuracy at long ranges would be questionable. Slower and more vulnerable types of planes would have to be used at longer ranges. Intercontinental missiles would not have the accuracy for attack on precision targets. Bases within 2,500 miles of the essential industrial and military targets of the Soviet Bloc territory would probably be required before the necessary degree of air supremacy could be achieved. Also, the closer the bases from which air power is being exerted, the greater the psychological effect the attack would have on the enemy peoples, especially the elites. Thus, it appears that bases on the continent and in the UK and the Middle East would be essential as well as Pacific bases before the undertaking could be counted upon to achieve its objective. These bases would be available if the Allies succeeded in their first three undertakings, except perhaps the Near East bases. Outlying bases would absorb a large portion of the enemy air attack that would otherwise be concentrated on the U. S.

86. Consideration should be given to the character of air bases that would be needed in order to launch strategic bombers or guided missiles. The requirements for range and high-speed of both aircraft and missiles will make them quite heavy and consequently require extensive bases which

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might be highly vulnerable to attack, in particular to enemy atomic attack. It would be necessary to reduce this vulnerability. The Allies would need either surplus bases, physically invulnerable bases or almost complete air supremacy over the base area. Aerial supremacy over the Allied air bases would probably not be adequate to make the bases invulnerable to atomic attack in the initial stages. Bases physically invulnerable to atomic attack would have to be well underground or be so located that aircraft and the strips or launching devices are widely scattered and easy to prepare.

87. Several interesting developments appear possible in order to reduce the physical vulnerability of aircraft bases to atomic attack. It appears possible to utilize aircraft launched from the water bases, in extension of the current concepts of seaplanes. A water surface base would be highly invulnerable to any kind of attack because of dispersal area available and the fact that the surface cannot be destroyed or neutralized for use. They would be readily available for utilization as soon as the adjacent land areas were occupied. Sacrifice in speed and range might be compensated for by the decrease in the vulnerability of the base itself. Ice or packed snow areas such as exists on the Greenland Ice Cap would have similar advantages, although they would be much more difficult to prepare, operate and supply than water bases.

88. Vulnerability would be reduced if advanced bases were used primarily only for aircraft staging. The aircraft themselves might very well be based in the Western Hemisphere or in some areas well outside of dangerous range of enemy attack. Advance base units might be limited to defensive forces and limited service forces for refueling, minor repairs and possibly some provisioning. Such a streamlining of facilities would reduce the normal vulnerability of the area.

89. Wherever it would be necessary to seize a base in enemy occupied territory or in an area where the enemy had air superiority, the military operations to take, develop and defend the base would be complicated and difficult. Such bases may be needed in order to bring bombardment aircraft or missiles into areas with shorter range to critical targets, they may be necessary for supporting the penetration of fighter aircraft, and they may be needed for emergency landings of aircraft based further to the rear. For example, assume that the enemy should have occupied successfully an area in Egypt well within the range of strong,

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supporting air power and that this area was needed as an Allied air base. The pattern of this effort would be substantially as follows: The first requirement would be to reduce the enemy air supremacy. This would probably take the form of an attack directed against the enemy's supporting air bases and their means of communication and supply. Destruction and denial weapons, such as surface exploded atomic bombs, perhaps combined with radioactive material, biological or chemical weapons would be utilized to attack those air bases, thereby destroying the planes thereon, and preventing enemy use of these supporting air bases for a long period. This type of attack would go far enough towards the interior of the Soviet Bloc territory in order to insure that no effective degree of air supremacy could be achieved over the target area by the enemy. The bases selected for Allied use should be fairly close to sea LOC. As the enemy air power is driven back, Allied naval units employing naval aircraft would be able to close and assist longer range tactical and fighter land based craft to achieve a degree of air supremacy over the area selected. When this condition had been achieved, there would be launched a destructive and lethal attack against the occupying forces using ABC weapons or any other means at our command except that the launching strips or sites to be used by the Allies would not be destroyed. Allied troops should be protected and immunized as may be necessary from the effects of the Allied ABC weapons so employed.

90. After local air supremacy became adequate and the defense had been softened up by air attack, a lightning para-troop attack, using fast aircraft initially, would be used to drive out the last remnants of enemy opposition in the landing areas. Slower aircraft bearing air transported forces or amphibious forces where feasible would follow immediately when landing areas become available. The fighter and antiaircraft defense in the area would then be built up rapidly. It would be necessary to prepare for return attacks by the enemy employing ABC weapons, suicide raids or other tactics. The defense of the area against surface attack would require highly specialized troops capable of employing weapons with extensive fire power and utilizing fully the denial aspects of all the ABC type of weapons. Reliance would be placed upon weapons which can destroy communication or transportation facilities and block off given areas, thus reducing the area that must be defended. Tactical air support would employ conventional and ABC type weapons to disperse or destroy surface forces counter-attacking the base.

91. In order to provide adequate logistic support, such bases should be located near sea LOC in order that

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naval craft may be used. As long as the enemy has ABC weapons and high speed aircraft, it would be most difficult to maintain by air or ground a large combat force at a distance of more than 150 to 200 miles from a sea LOC base except for very limited periods of perhaps two to three weeks. The enemy would be able to interfere materially with air or ground logistic support by ABC or other attack on the supply airfields or by similar destruction and denial attack on road or rail LOC. Ranges of bombardment aircraft or missiles should permit selection of suitable bases close to sea LOC. Air, naval and land power could then be combined for attack, defense and operation of such bases.

92. It may be practicable to develop bombing, fighter and tactical aircraft utilizing water bases which would provide the opportunity to support them logistically by naval craft and to provide bases relatively invulnerable to enemy attack. These considerations suggest a highly mobile type of base built around naval craft with land forces seizing the adjacent land masses to prevent surface attack against the base. The bombing sea-planes would be based well to the rear and only staged through for missions. The chief requirement of the base itself would be to furnish sufficient air, land and naval power to defend and to provide minimum servicing for the bomber missions. The logistic support could very well be completely mobile and based upon naval craft of special types. This might be the ultimate in the use of unified forces.

93. In the build-up of Allied air supremacy, the Allies would undoubtedly have the capability of sending planes over any given area of Russia throughout the war. The problem, however, would be to reduce the enemy defenses to the point where the Allied aircraft could be used economically without undue losses. To what extent losses must be reduced is hard to foresee at this time. However, it is highly probable that the defenses initially would be such that it would be uneconomical for the Allied air forces to conduct sustained operations throughout the enemy territory until after a considerable softening up campaign had been successful. This campaign would probably take the form of clearing progressively areas in the air into the heart of the Soviet Bloc territory. The paths to be cleared would extend out from the various advanced Allied air bases by successive and ever-widening penetration of the enemy's air defense. Attacks would be made against the enemy defensive, air bases, his fighter aircraft in existence and in production, and other elements of his defensive complex. The objective would be the destruction of the enemy air

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force while concentrating, at the same time, on the industrial complex and the logistic means which are supporting this air effort. Once the enemy air defense began to deteriorate perceptibly, it should degenerate rapidly just as did the air defense of Germany in World War II following the climax of the air battle in Western Europe in the spring of 1944.

94. Allied air bases should be located so as to maintain a threat of attack against the entire Soviet Bloc territory from every quarter of the compass. Not only would this spread the enemy defense, but it should also produce a marked psychological effect on the enemy people and leaders.

95. The Army would have an important role in the air attack on the enemy territory. There would undoubtedly be vital installations invulnerable to air bombardment which would have to be destroyed or neutralized. Vertical envelopment of such targets by small, highly specialized airborne forces would be necessary. Provision should be made for rapid withdrawal, although there might be targets against which suicide forces would be employed. These airborne forces should be transported in aircraft with characteristics comparable to strategic bombers in order to get through to the target area.

96. It might take four to five years or longer to obtain the degree of air supremacy implied in the conditions set forth for probable acceptance by the enemy of the Allied terms. This timing would depend greatly upon the destruction and dislocation suffered by the Allies from the initial air attacks of the enemy and the success of the air battle for Western Europe. The enemy success in those battles would affect materially the ability of the Allies to recuperate and to develop the means to sustain an extensive air campaign of the type described herein.

FIFTH UNDERTAKING
PRESSURE AFTER AIR SUPREMACY IS WON

97. The successful prosecution of the above four undertakings would probably cause acceptance of the Allied terms. However, the Allies would have to be prepared to carry on if the stubbornness of the enemy should preclude acceptance of the armistice terms. In general, three alternative courses of action would be available. The first would be simply to maintain the military status quo.

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The air offensive would not be stepped up in destructiveness but simply kept ranging throughout the enemy territory to prevent effective rebuilding of the offense or defense of the enemy. At the same time, ever-increasing psychological, political and economic pressures would be applied to secure acceptance of the armistice terms. The second alternative would be to increase the weight of attack against enemy facilities that would support the rejuvenation of Soviet air capabilities, defensive and offensive, and to extend it further so as to reduce the enemy economy beyond the point necessary to sustain the civilian population. At the same time, the political, social and economic campaigns would be stepped up to encourage acceptance of the armistice terms. The third alternative would be to undertake relatively large land campaigns with a view towards capturing key portions of enemy territory and cutting off enemy forces that still may be occupying Allied or neutral areas. This campaign would be for the purpose of forcing acceptance of Allied terms by exerting physical pressure on the Soviets while, at the same time, increasing the intensity of the political, social and economic campaigns.

98. As has been indicated previously, the main problem that would remain would be to convince the enemy leaders to trust the Allies to enforce only the armistice terms that they had proposed. Therefore, development of trust of the Allies in the minds of the enemy leaders should be given great weight in the selection of the course of action to be followed by the Allies in this undertaking. The other main factors which should be considered in the selection of a course of action are: the internal conditions within the affected nations which would foster peace and supra-national security after the war; the military capabilities of the Allies vis-a-vis the enemy; and the costs in men and resources.

99. The first course of action available, that of maintaining the military status quo, might be the most economical and the most desirable in the long run. It would be the course most apt to convince the enemy to trust the Allies. The enemy would be less apt to fear an invasion and occupation by land forces in order to impose additional Allied terms. Destruction of the enemy economy and social and economic dislocation in both Allied and enemy nations would be less. It appears reasonable that, if properly planned, such a status quo could be sustained for as long as five, ten, fifteen or twenty years if necessary without prohibitive cost. It would require, however,

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the maintenance of strong forces in the advanced Allied bases for their protection and for the conduct of continuous air surveillance backed up by routine attacks by our air forces. It would have some disadvantages in that when the military effort decreases, a corresponding deterioration in quality and the support by the Allied peoples might be expected.

100. The second alternative, the intensification of the air battle should not require too great an economic effort. Once air supremacy had been achieved, the matter of attacking the industrial economy and the civil economy of the enemy should be relatively easy. The "power in small package" trend would make for an ability to do this quite economically. This course of action would be less apt to cause the enemy leaders to trust the Allies. Another undesirable aspect would be the great increase in destruction which would exist after the war and the deep seated dissatisfaction of masses of people without adequate economic support. Such a condition would not sustain the international objectives which the Allies would be seeking.

101. The land battle would probably be the most expensive means available to terminate the war under these conditions. As Allied forces moved closer and closer to enemy territory, the enemy leaders would be much less apt to trust the Allies. The enemy leaders would fear the ability of the Allies to impose additional terms by using these occupation forces. It would require a considerable diversion of manpower, resources, and industry from the air battle to the land battle. It would require an increase of naval and logistic support forces. Further, the cost in Allied lives of such a campaign would make it of doubtful military acceptability. The enemy would be likely to enjoy at least local superiority in such a land campaign which might well encourage him to think that ultimately he could win the war in much the same fashion that the Russians defeated Napoleon and staved off the German attack in World War II. Those land campaigns would cause extensive destruction and dislocation in the enemy and some Allied nations.

102. Consideration of the above three courses of action indicates that the best Allied course of action would be the first: to maintain the required degree of air supremacy without increasing the intensity of attack or extending the offensive to include the civil economy of the Soviet Bloc, while intensifying the political,

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social and economic campaigns against the Soviets. It would be necessary, however, to continue the selective attack on the portion of the enemy air force and air defense. The political, social and economic campaigns would have to be increased materially however. Every conceivable means should be used to develop trust of the Allies within the minds of the enemy leaders.

103. Liberation of some Allied territories may require Allied attention during this phase, in the event that all Allied territories had not been evacuated by the enemy as a consequence of the second Allied undertaking - the prevention of exploitation of captured territory. It might be possible for several important areas, such as the Rhineland, to remain in enemy hands. Air campaigns against LOC's and selective industries supporting the enemy occupation forces would be considerably intensified in addition to heavy direct air attacks on the occupation forces. Increased support should be given to resistance forces. These operations should develop a military condition wherein the areas could be liberated by the Allies by "over-running" types of campaigns. It is not expected that such liberation campaigns would have to be fought under the conditions that the Allies experienced in Normandy or on the Franco-German border in World War II. Such operations would be much more of the character of the operations in Brittany in the summer and fall of 1944 when it was a question of clearing out the Germans who had been left behind in key areas after their main armies had decided to withdraw. Great support was received from the resistance forces in that campaign. The landing in Southern France also typifies the character of fighting that might be expected. These campaigns would call for highly trained and mobile units backed up by fast moving air power, but it probably would not require a huge army organization such as was used by the Allies in "Overlord".

104. Continuation of the strategies and the undertakings described above should lead to the ultimate surrender by the enemy and the acceptance of the armistice terms as previously set forth.

POST SURRENDER OPERATIONS

105. After the enemy had accepted the proposed armistice terms, the post-war operations would differ materially from those that existed subsequent to World

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War I and World War II. The main military ~~problem~~ would be to provide adequate inspection to insure observance of the armistice terms. Military government of the enemy territories, dictation of policies, re-education of the conquered people, etc. would not be necessary. To insure against enemy preparation for re-opening hostilities should not be too difficult. Inspectors could be located strategically near the centers of enemy military power. The elimination of the enemy ABC potential, his strategic bombers and his submarines may be somewhat more difficult, but should not require extensive forces. Enemy forces could be used to do the work. Allies need only inspect the execution. Inspection of critical areas would be made continually. Contacts with Allied subversive agents and with friendly elements of the enemy people should be able to provide adequate intelligence. Liaison would be maintained with the enemy governments to insure their sincerity, to get intelligence as to the location of their military forces, and to exchange ideas between the governments concerned.

106. Security of the inspection forces and their access to the key areas would be vital in these operations. Success would depend largely upon the organization of inspection forces and the external support given to them. The advanced Allied bases would be within a range of not more than 2,500 miles of any point in enemy territory. Under agreements with the enemy or with neutral nations these bases might be located much closer, provided they would be in areas not subject to major land attack by the remaining enemy forces. Selected air fields within the interior of the Soviet Bloc territory would be designated as primary inspection bases. The inspecting forces would be flown into these air bases and maintained there by air support. The air bases should be provided with defensive forces capable of defending the base against any Soviet ground or air effort that might be directed against it, until evacuation of the inspecting personnel by air could be effected or additional defensive forces could be flown in. Air transport may have to be available at all times on the base to accomplish emergency evacuation. The inspection forces should be highly mobile. Individual protection should be provided for all inspectors who would leave the base in order to observe the compliance of the terms and visit various governments industrial, or military facilities. It may be necessary to make specific arrangements with the enemy governments to withdraw their own military forces from the vicinity of the

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air bases used by the Allies.

107. Allied air bases in enemy territory should be located in the vicinity of centers of government, the remaining aircraft and missile production plants, ABC agent production plants, submarine naval bases, and near such subordinate military commanders who might have a considerable force capable of violating the armistice terms. It is probable that these inspection forces would remain in enemy territory until such time as the UN has determined that they may be taken out. In fact, the Allied forces might very well form the nucleus of UN inspection forces which might later be assigned in order to insure compliance of the UN peace terms.

108. The success of the post surrender operations and of the inspecting forces and the security of the bases and personnel would depend primarily upon the immediate availability of overwhelming Allied air power located on external protected bases and held in continuous readiness for attack. It would be necessary to conduct frequent surveillance flights over the entire enemy territory in order to impress the enemy elite with the ability of the Allies to react immediately with terrific consequences to any resistance to the armistice terms or interference with the Allied inspectors. Airborne army units capable of reinforcing threatened inspection forces or of lightning attack on critical areas in emergency should likewise be held in readiness on external bases.

109. The second important mission during the post-war operation period would be assistance in the rehabilitation of Allied territories. In Allied territories where communists governments had been installed forcibly by the enemy, it may be necessary to provide supplies and military assistance to indigenous and popularly supported governments while they were establishing a stable government and economic stability. The destruction throughout such a war might be more universal than existed in World War II. Prior to the war, the Allies would probably have agreed to equality in the sharing of the costs of war. Those Allies less affected by the war would grant economic aid to the more affected Allies until the condition would be reached wherein the relative standards of living and economic conditions amongst the Allies was comparable to the relative pre-war status of these factors. Thus, the Western Hemisphere Allies may be involved considerably in the economic rehabilitation of the Allied areas in Eurasia.

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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

110. It is necessary to return briefly to the subject of national policy, war objectives, and in particular, to armistice terms. The concepts upon which this study has been based will undoubtedly be challenged, and rightly so, by those responsible for the political, social and economic aspects of national security. However, it has been necessary to delve into their fields in order to discuss war adequately. When national policy on objectives in such a war are determined, they may very well differ materially and might be far more restrictive on an enemy than those that were used in this study. The purpose of this study is not to advocate the adoption of the concepts presented herein. The political, social and economic concepts utilized are untested. They need exhaustive study and evaluation along with all other possible solutions.

111. In the event that national policy should ultimately call for Allied imposition of an armistice which would require acceptance of a material and non-indigenous change in the enemy's form of government, a rejection of an ideology, a political separation of large areas of enemy territory, or military government of the enemy, then the role of the military in war and the conduct of war would change drastically. The first four undertakings - the initial defensive and counter-offensive campaigns; the political, social and economic campaigns; the prevention of exploitation of territory; and the campaigns for air supremacy - would be generally along the lines that have been presented herein. However, these probably would not be sufficient to achieve victory. The resistance of the enemy to such restrictive terms would be so great, the Allies would probably have to conduct great land campaigns, more difficult than "Overlord" in order to seize and hold large areas. It would be necessary to enforce the Allied will on the enemy by occupation. Those would be campaigns which should be contemplated with great reluctance. Whether or not this nation and its Allies, the recipients of destruction ABC attacks, could recuperate enough to support such great effort is highly questionable. The consequences of such campaigns on the American institutions and the American way of life would be dreadful. However, if it must be done, the soldier, adequately supported by the sailor and airman, might be able to do the job ultimately. It would be a long, long war and the Army would have to be holding large enemy areas in the end.

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ENCLOSURE

CONCEPTS ON OBJECTIVES

1. International security and national security are indivisible, and national objectives must stem from appropriate concepts of international security objectives.

2. International security can be achieved only by adequate control of conflicts. Adequate control should be obtained by reducing the area of conflicts by means of achieving universal acceptance of a satisfactory set of individual aims and goals, and by transferring the arena of conflict between nations from an international organization in which nationalistic military powers play a predominant role into a world governmental structure which would have the essential sovereignty and would itself have in being sufficient power to prevent successful armed aggression and thus would tend to sustain peaceful means for resolution of conflicts between nations.

3. International security objectives essential to achieve adequate control of conflict should include:

a. Universal acceptance of individual aims and goals which would provide for:

- (1) An ever-increasing standard of living.
- (2) A classless society with equality of opportunity for individuals.
- (3) Security of the individual.
- (4) Civil liberties comparable to those extant in the U. S.

b. International acceptance of a federal world government structure which would:

- (1) Have the sole power and means to maintain armed forces, other than civil police, and to regulate trade and communication between nations.

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(2) Have the means to sustain individual rights and to settle peacefully disputes between nations.

(3) Be a representative government.

4. National security objectives essential to achieve such international security should include:

a. Promulgation of policies on the state international security objectives and the maintenance of an extensive program of enlightenment thereon for the United States and the world.

b. Gradual evolution of the U. S. way of life, as may be necessary to achieve the universally acceptable aims and goals.

c. Promotion of the evolution of the United Nations into the above described federal world government structure and the transfer of relative power into the hands of the United Nations by means of:

(1) Approach to abolition of national armaments accompanied by adequate inspection; enforcement to be achieved by establishing a UN military force having the limited capability to seize, destroy or otherwise neutralize armament production facilities when violations occur.

(2) Gradual delegation to the UN of jurisdiction over international trade, communications and individual rights.

d. Pending abolition of national armaments, the peacetime maintenance of a military posture just adequate to permit the U. S., by itself, to impose on any military aggressor a stalemate condition which would preclude successful exploitation of any war gains.

e. Adoption of international agreements designed to eliminate or reduce the basic economic and social tensions between nations such as restrictions with regard to access to natural resources, transportation, immigration, etc. Such agreements should be phased with appropriate shifts of balance of power.

f. Promotion, through international cooperation, of a thriving and expanding world economy.

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5. The stated national security objectives are applicable to peace and war. However, in the event of war, the United States should not use armed force to achieve those long range political, social or economic objectives to attain which this nation is not willing to use an overt threat of war during peace. U. S. armed forces in war should be utilized only to achieve the limited war objective of forcing the enemy to desist from the use of war or threat of war to solve basic conflicts and to submit to peaceful resolution of the conflicts by appropriate United Nations procedure.

6. Although specific armistice terms designed to achieve this limited objective might not be formulated until initiation of such a war, the terms should be limited to these provisions:

- a. Cessation of hostilities.
- b. Agreement to the determination of peace terms by the United Nations with enemy participation, but without enemy veto power.
- c. Enemy withdrawal from territories occupied during the war,
- d. Minimum military provisions essential to reduce adequately the risk of re-opening major hostilities or of major armed opposition to peace terms by the enemy.

NOTE: Revised as of 3 December 1948.

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APPENDIX "B"

Background Assumptions - The Situation in 1964 Just Prior to War.

1. Although one of the primary purposes of this paper is to encourage further study of international and national policies which in themselves will influence materially the validity of the basic assumptions used herein. It is deemed necessary to set forth certain assumptions and/or predictions as to the situation in 1964 and the intervening years which will permit evaluation of the background thinking upon which the pattern of warfare has been developed. Set forth below are the major political, social, economic and military assumptions or predictions which have influenced the pattern of warfare as presented.

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

2. There will have been no large scale war involving the major powers before 1964.
3. No effectual international control or limitations on national armaments would have been in effect.
4. The UN would not have a military force of its own, although a moderate sized police force would be in existence.
5. The North Atlantic Alliance would have moderate strength in Europe. However, the political, social and economic ties between these nations would be quite limited. Conflicts of national interest between members of the Alliance occur frequently. Germany would not be included in the North Atlantic Alliance. Turkey, Iran, Spain, Iraq, Egypt and Israel would not be members of that Alliance, although they would be tied in closely through other formal or informal arrangements. The governments of the European countries of the North Atlantic Alliance would be generally socialistic in character. The European war potential of the alliance would approximate the sum of the war potential of these nations in 1938.
6. The countries of Eastern Europe, exclusive of Germany, would have communistic governments. Their economies would have been strengthened to approximately 40% in excess of their 1948 war potential. Their governments would be sympathetic to the USSR. They would be bound to the USSR by strong multi-lateral military alliances against aggression.

7. Germany is assumed to have been unified in 1953. The government of Germany would be socialistic. Germany would have no armaments except internal police forces. The economy of Germany would be equivalent to that of 1938. No effective control would be exercised over Germany because of failure of the Soviet and Western Blocs to agree. Germany would be striving earnestly to be strictly neutral. The position of Austria is quite similar.

8. The Near East would have doubled the petroleum production of 1948. The USSR, by virtue of trade agreements with Iran and with the other Near Eastern nations, would be receiving approximately 40% of the oil production from those areas. Within the Arab League, there would be a strong nationalistic bloc which would play the Soviet Bloc and the Western power bloc, one against the other. The League would be neutral or have alliances both ways. Egypt would be a strong supporter of the Arab League in this respect. Turkey and the USSR would have developed and maintained for a period of ten or more years, friendly relations. Turkey would not have a communist government, but would have rejected all alliances offered by the western powers.

9. Pakistan and India would have been united into a single state. This state would be in a period of industrial development. The government would have a strong, socialistic basis. She would maintain a strictly neutral attitude to the West and to the USSR.

10. In the Far East, China would have a communistic government, although not strictly dominated by the USSR. It would be opposed to any imperialistic tendencies of the Western Powers and would be somewhat sympathetic to the USSR. Korea would have a communistic government. Japan would have a socialistic government which would be dealing effectively with China, and the USSR. The Japanese and Koreans would give strong support to China in her efforts to prevent domination either by the Soviets or by the U. S. Bloc.

11. Canadian and U. S. interests would have been integrated rather closely. The remainder of the Western Hemisphere would be generally sympathetic to the U. S. interests and would be willing to support her in the event of an aggressive war initiated by the USSR.

12. Exploitation of Africa by the colonial powers would have been diminishing gradually in view of the strong nationalistic tendencies being developed by the natives

and the local colonial peoples. However, other than the provision of raw materials, most notably uranium, no increase in the war potential of Africa would be notable. No government dominating Africa would exist.

13. Greece would be a communistic nation and would be included with the satellite ring.

14. The situation in the Western and Northern Mediterranean would not have changed materially since 1948. Italy would be a weak nation sympathetic to the West. French North Africa would remain loyal to France. The Western Powers would have military bases in Cyrenaica. Spain would be considerably more democratic than in 1948 and it would be obtaining beneficial treatment from the Western Powers.

15. Immediately after the initiation of war, the following would be the alignments of powers:

a. Soviet Bloc: The USSR, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece.

b. The Allies (Western Bloc): The U. S., Canada, the Western Union powers, Italy, the remainder of the British Commonwealth with the exception of India, and the Western Hemisphere nations.

c. Neutral nations openly sympathetic to the Allies: Norway, Denmark, Spain, Erie, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Israel.

d. Neutral nations openly sympathetic to the USSR: China and Korea.

e. Neutral nations trying to avoid all evidence of partiality: Sweden, India, Japan and Southeast Asia.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

16. The North Atlantic Alliance would have a military force of some twenty divisions which would be occupying positions in France and Belgium on the approaches to the Rhine. There would be no military forces in Germany, Soviet or Western Bloc. The Air Force of the North Atlantic Alliance stationed in Europe would be sufficient to support the twenty division ground force in a contemplated defense of a Rhine-French-Italian border line. The naval arrangements

in Europe would be completely in the hands of the UK. It would constitute an anti-submarine force capable of defeating the Soviet submarines that might debouch from the Baltic in the area from Norway to Spain and sufficient naval forces to preclude amphibious operation from being launched against the UK. The British, with support of the U. S. would have in the UK a fighter force and air defense designed to give an effective defense against strategic bombing. The U. S. would have strategic bombers in the UK. The Allied forces would have a division and a half in Cyrenaica and a division in Kenya. There would be an Allied fleet in being in the Mediterranean, capable of putting one division ashore at any point in the Near East and of defeating any Soviet submarine effort which might debouch from the Black Sea.

17. The Soviet Bloc would have a ground force equivalent to 60% of its 1948 force. Its air force would have been expanded offensively and defensively until it is double that of the Allied Air Force quantitatively. Russia would have some 500 atomic bombs stockpiled, together with a considerable stockpile of biological and chemical weapons. Russia would have approximately 400 submarines, including 100 long-range true-submersibles. An effective fighter defense with an adequate air warning screen would be available throughout the Soviet area.

18. The hardware available to the Allies and to the Soviet Bloc would be of substantially the same character. While the quality of the weapons may differ materially and be in favor of the Allies, the range, speed and fire power of the weapons would be substantially the same.

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ASB 508/1
Advanced Study Branch
Plans Group, P&O Division, GSUSA

16 December 1948*

Brief on

PATTERN OF WAR IN THE ATOMIC WARFARE AGE

1. The study is not a war plan. It is set forth only in order to influence, in light of long range implications, the formulation of current policies and programs.

2. National policy on national security, which is now lacking, is vitally needed.

3. For purposes of this study, national policy on national security is assumed to be that set forth in "Concepts on Objectives", Appendix "A" hereto.

4. War, as suggested herein, is not predicted; but because the U. S. must ride two horses, one heading towards peace and progress and the other headed toward war preparation, an idea of the pattern of atomic warfare is needed in order to provide guidance for the appropriate military posture.

5. The time period used herein is the atomic warfare age which is defined as arriving when two or more nations have available to them a significant quantity of atomic weapons, together with suitable means of delivery.

6. An enemy would probably need 100 to 200 or more atomic weapons to have a significant quantity as defined above. Intelligence indicates this might take 10 to 20 years, and, hence, 1964 has been selected as the year in which it is assumed a war would start.

SIGNIFICANT MAJOR TRENDS WHICH WILL AFFECT
MATERIALLY THE CHARACTER OF A FUTURE WAR

7. Significant major trends which would have material affect on the pattern of war should be analyzed.

* Amended 28 March 49

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8. The expansion of democracy in every aspect of control of human life will result in more emphasis on human relations in war.

9. There is a trend towards a formal supra-national community accompanied by an extension of regional alliances; all of which is restricting more and more the freedom of nations for independent action and is making for a more rational approach to war.

10. Neutrality will be more attractive to minor nations.

11. The war objectives of antagonists will tend to become more limited than in past wars with more emphasis being given to a military posture which might allow long-range political objectives to be obtained gradually by non-military means.

12. Civilian control, at the expense of military control, will become more dominant in the conduct of war by the U. S. Government.

13. The potency of military offensive power that can be stockpiled before a war will tend to place greater emphasis than in past wars on a counter-offensive against the offensive power in being of an enemy.

14. Logistic support means will become more vulnerable and will be higher priority targets than in past wars.

ASSUMPTIONS WITH REGARD TO A WAR IN 1964

15. The USSR is assumed to be the enemy.

16. A war between the U. S. and Allies (ALLIES) and the USSR and her Allies (SOVIET BLOC) is assumed to start in 1964 after the international conflict over extension of communism has reached an impasse.

17. The war is assumed to start after the ALLIES, bonded together under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter after failure of the Security Council to agree, issued an ultimatum that the USSR get out of Iran.

18. There would be no strategic surprise in the initiation of such a war as warning indications could be noted six to twelve months or longer in advance.

19. Tactical surprise on the initiation of war, comparable to that achieved at Pearl Harbor, will be striven

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for by the enemy and is apt to be successful to some extent.

20. Appendix "B" includes more detailed assumptions.

WAR OBJECTIVES OF THE OPPOSING POWERS

21. Allied objectives would be to force acceptance of these armistice terms:

- a. Cessation of hostilities.
- b. Acceptance, without Soviet veto, of peace settlement to be determined by the UN.
- c. Enemy withdrawal from territory occupied after war started.
- d. Destruction of all atomic, biological and chemical weapons, strategic bombers and submarines, together with safe access for Allied inspectors to observe compliance with terms.

22. Soviet Bloc minimum war objectives would be to:

- a. Force Western European nations, less UK, to adopt communistic governments which would support the Soviet Bloc.
- b. Eliminate Allied domination of the Near East.
- c. After the above have been achieved, create militarily, at least, a war stalemate and cause UN recognition of the new communistic governments.
- d. Create conditions, without forcing communism on the U. S. or the UK, which would allow the USSR to exploit in her interests Western Europe, Africa and the Near East and thus probably cause the U. S. and UK to conform ultimately to the Soviet concept of world order.
- e. Cessation of hostilities.

23. Assumed objectives differ radically from World War II in that:

- a. Allies would attempt only to reduce enemy military power and prevent material gains from occupation which would be materially less than unconditional surrender.

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b. The Soviet Bloc would have less extensive territorial demands than did Hitler and they would be playing up to social unrest.

CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY
CAUSE ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS

24. It is difficult but necessary to forecast the military, political and economic conditions which would probably cause acceptance of armistice terms.

25. Conditions for Allied victory. It would be necessary to:

a. Reduce enemy's offensive capabilities so that only insignificant destructive attacks could be launched against Allied home territory.

b. Reduce enemy's defensive capabilities so that Allied strategic air forces could penetrate successfully, without undue losses to all critical areas of enemy territory.

c. Prevent enemy from obtaining popular support for governments in captured territory or support from neutral nations.

d. Reduce enemy's war economy to a point where he could not regain initiative or air supremacy.

e. Prevent enemy from obtaining war support from captured territory.

26. Conditions for Soviet Bloc victory. The Soviet Bloc might expect Allied surrender on their terms when:

a. No Allied forces would remain in the European continent, in the Near East or in Asia.

b. The UK had been neutralized as an effective Allied military base and reduced to a starvation economy.

c. Relatively strong governments with at least moderate popular support had been established in captured territory and these nations were contributing substantial war support to the Soviet Bloc.

d. Neutral nations were imploring Allies to accept.

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e. U. S. war potential had been so reduced that it would take Allies at least two years free of destructive air attack to regain the military initiative and Soviet aerial supremacy was on the increase.

27. Conditions somewhere between those forecast for Allied or Soviet Bloc victory might induce a war stalemate lasting for years.

THE GENERAL PATTERN OF WAR

28. The Soviet Bloc would attempt to extend throughout Europe and the Near East, to neutralize the ABC air potential of the Allies, and to undermine the support of the Allies.

29. The Allies would probably decide on the following basic undertakings in the war:

a. First undertaking - Neutralize the enemy's offensive capabilities against the Allies.

b. Second undertaking - A political, social and economic warfare campaign, coordinated with military strategy in order to convince the enemy to accept the Allied terms.

c. Third undertaking - Prevent any successful exploitation of enemy territorial gains.

d. Fourth undertaking - An aerial offensive to gain the military posture and the degree of aerial supremacy which would probably cause the enemy to accept the Allied terms.

e. Fifth undertaking - If the enemy should not accept the armistice terms after the above four undertakings have been achieved, maintain ever-increasing military, political, social and economic pressure on the enemy until he accepts the terms.

30. The purpose of military force in war is not to destroy the will of the enemy to resist. Rather, the purpose is to create in the mind of the enemy the idea that he will accept the terms that the Allies propose.

31. Military intelligence would probably not give adequate warning of the character of the initial enemy attack although political intelligence as to intentions would be available.

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32. The major undertakings were listed in order of importance and also in chronological order, except for the second, the political, etc. campaigns, which would be the primary undertaking of the war and would precede the war as well as be carried on after the war.

FIRST UNDERTAKING - NEUTRALIZATION
OF THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE

33. The enemy would attempt, and probably achieve, tactical surprise in an all-out effort to neutralize the Allied ABC air power in being.

34. The enemy would attempt an initial knockout blow against Allied air power in being, employing such tactics as A-bombs against concentration of bombers or missiles on above ground bases, ABC anti-personnel weapons to destroy bomber crews and assembly personnel, vertical envelopment, sabotage and destruction of critical underground facilities, missile or torpedo attack against aircraft carriers, etc. without regard as to conventional ideas of military costs.

35. The enemy potential would probably not support an initial attack against the industry as a whole or the population of the Allies in addition to the blows against Allied ABC air power in being, although psychological and political means combined with sabotage and subversion would be employed to undermine support of the Allies.

36. The initial Allied strategy must provide a counter to the forecast initial enemy attack.

37. The Allies would launch a counter-offensive against the enemy ABC air offensive forces in being, utilizing Allied ABC air power against aircraft and missile bases, storage areas, logistic bottlenecks, etc.

38. Allied airborne raids of a suicide character would be required against enemy targets relatively invulnerable to bombardment.

39. The Allied counter-offensive must succeed, regardless of cost. It would be an air battle, greater than any battle of history.

40. Defensive measures should include as near to 100% protection as may be possible for a portion of the economy and counter-offensive forces in being, combined with a degree

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of active defense to the remainder with effective utilization of passive defense.

41. A "Military Offensive Complex" (MOC), completely separate from the normal economy and having military forces set aside for the sole purposes of its defense, may be needed in order to provide as near to 100% protection as possible to the Allied counter-offensive means.

42. Active defense should be sufficient to limit materially an enemy attack against industry as a whole or the population. Passive defense should include civil defense and dispersion of critical industries.

43. The first Allied undertaking, if successful, would take from three months to a year or longer.

SECOND UNDERTAKING - THE POLITICAL,
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CAMPAIGNS OF THE WAR



44. This would be the major undertaking of the war, and would be a continuation of a peacetime campaign modified and intensified for war purposes.

45. The campaigns themselves will be the accommodation of words to acts and vice versa with the objective of convincing the enemy to accept the armistice terms; these terms would have been previously set forth to the world.

46. The Allied political, social and economic campaigns designed to achieve acceptance of the Allied terms would emphasize the spirit rather than the form of democracy and would promote universal adherence to democratic principles in government.

47. Efforts would be made to keep the UN active during the war with all enemy and neutral nations participating in order to provide a forum in which armistice terms and peace settlements may be approached rationally by the antagonists.

48. The campaigns would not oppose communism per se but would foster the idea that the Allied democracies can co-exist progressively with governments or any type of ideology including communism provided that international conflicts would be solved peacefully and that nations would not exploit other nations.

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49. The Allies should develop and demonstrate the themes that the Soviet Bloc cannot win militarily and that Allied weapons will be used humanely against vital targets of a military character.

50. Neutrals should be encouraged to exert their influence on the enemy to convince him to trust the Allies and to accept the Allied terms.

51. The peoples in areas occupied by the enemy should be encouraged and prepared to make the necessary sacrifices and to support the military and subversive operations that would be designed to make the enemy expend more of his own resources in occupation than he gains from indigenous sources and to cause the enemy strategic position in occupied areas to deteriorate continuously.

52. Allied agreement should be sought to a policy of equality in the sharing of war costs to the end that the Allies less affected by the war will grant aid during and after the war to the more affected Allies until a condition is reached after the war when the relative standards of living and economic conditions amongst the Allies are comparable to the relative pre-war status of the Allies in these respects. Allied campaigns would emphasize this policy in sustaining resistance to occupation and in gaining support of neutrals.

53. The Allies should endeavor to cause the enemy masses to bring pressure to bear on their leaders in order to cause acceptance of the Allied terms.

54. Covert and overt operations would be directed so as to convince the enemy elites to accept the terms, or to weaken their leadership and their opposition to the Allies, or to bring into power covertly from indigenous sources leaders amenable to acceptance of Allied terms. The Allies should design subversive "hardware" for these purposes.

55. A major share of these campaigns would be in direct support of Allied military operations with the objective ultimately of convincing the enemy leaders, military as well as civil, and the enemy masses of the ultimate overwhelming superiority of Allied air power and the futility of land or other military operations in face of the increasing Allied air superiority.

56. Campaigns in the Allied homefronts would be necessary in order to develop and secure popular support

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to counter enemy campaigns and to condition the peoples for the expected enemy attacks.

57. Success of the Allies in establishing popularly supported indigenous governments in territories that the Allies occupied for military operations would be a material factor in gaining the trust and confidence of the rest of the world, including the enemy, in the Allied intentions.

58. The character and tempo of the political, social and economic campaigns would change with Allied military progress and the demonstrated military prowess backing up threats of inevitable greater military hurt would be utilized to convince the enemy to surrender.

59. The major problem, after Allied air superiority had been achieved, would be to convince the enemy leaders to trust the Allies to carry out only the terms that the Allies had proposed.

60. When enemy acceptance of Allied terms appears likely, emphasis would have to be given to convincing the enemy leaders and masses to acceptance of Allied inspectors and their safe conduct in enemy territory under penalty of immediate, retaliatory, and destructive air blows if the terms are violated or the inspectors are attacked.

61. Concepts with regard to political, psychological, economic, subversive and other similar methods of warfare should be studied in order to devise techniques that might accomplish the purposes outlined above for this undertaking.

THIRD UNDERTAKING - PREVENT EXPLOITATION
OF ENEMY TERRITORIAL GAINS

62. It is vital to the Allied cause to prevent the enemy from maintaining control of Western Europe and the Near East and from increasing his war potential by occupation and to cause the enemy strategic position in occupied areas to deteriorate continuously, because otherwise the enemy would be in position to achieve his limited objectives and thus victory in the war.

63. The Allies could prevent exploitation of enemy territorial gains by the obvious method of preventing the enemy from occupying such areas and, when that method fails, by conducting internal and external operations against the enemy in occupied areas which would deny gain to the enemy and cause his strategic position to deteriorate.

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64. In defending Western Europe, the Allies would probably have to face an initial military superiority of the Soviet Bloc.

65. It is to be hoped that the expected enemy campaign to overthrow internally the French, German and Italian governments would fail; and, thus, the enemy would be forced to launch a land and air campaign across Germany with the objective of eliminating Allied military forces on the continent.

66. The Allies initial move would probably be to defend the Rhine - Alps - French and Italian border line - which would have to be done in face of initial enemy superiority on land and in the air based in part on ABC weapons.

67. While the initial primary role of Allied long range strategic bombardment forces would be to launch the counter-offensive described in the first undertaking, the second mission of these forces would be to check enemy progress of the land battle of Western Europe.

68. The Allies would initiate immediately an air battle with the objective of eliminating the initial enemy air superiority over the land battle area of Western Europe. Short-range trans-sonic or super-sonic Allied aircraft would attack all air bases utilized by the enemy to support the land battle. A-weapons capable of destroying all aircraft on the ground and denying enemy use of the base for protracted periods would be used in lightning attacks. The Allies should be able to eliminate enemy air superiority in this area.

69. The above air battle would be a major contribution to the battle for overall air superiority (fourth Allied undertaking), because the battle for Western Europe would provide the Allies with a great opportunity to defeat, under conditions favorable to the Allies, a great portion of the enemy air power in being which would have to be accomplished before Allied victory could be achieved.

70. In spite of the prospect of early elimination of initial enemy air superiority, Allied land forces may be forced to withdraw from the Rhine, but they should be able to stabilize a position before being driven back to the Atlantic.

71. If Allied withdrawal from the Rhine is forced,

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an extensive base on the Atlantic and Channel Coasts, with previously prepared positions, should be held by the Allies in order to provide a base for Allied operations into occupied areas, to contribute to the air defense of the UK, and to reduce the enemy Atlantic submarine threat, and to provide Allied air bases for the continuing reduction of enemy air power.

72. The U. S. should provide an expeditionary force, immediately upon the initiation of war if not prior to the war, to participate in the ground defense of Western Europe in order to sustain Allied resistance and morale.

73. Resistance movements should be well organized by the Allies before any withdrawal.

74. If withdrawal is necessary, instead of a "scorched earth" policy, the Allies should use ABC weapons which can deny areas and interfere with communications, with a very minimum of destruction, in order to prevent the enemy from benefitting from the resources of captured areas. Internal attacks by resistance forces should be supported by selective air attack and airborne raids.

75. A threat of a "breakout" from the Allied continental base should be maintained continuously in order to strain the enemy and to attract enemy air forces into close range of Allied air power.

76. The peoples of occupied countries should be made fully aware of Allied operations on their behalf, of the general Allied strategy, and of the Allied intentions to liberate them ultimately.

77. Allied areas occupied by the enemy would be liberated ultimately by over-running types of land campaigns, more similar to the liberation of Brittany than to the assault of the Siegfried line in World War II, shortly prior to surrender of the enemy.

78. In the Near East, the enemy would probably occupy readily the oil areas near the Arabian Gulf, perhaps by-passing Turkey if the latter remains neutral, and then would attempt to occupy or neutralize bases for Allied air power in Egypt.

79. The Allies would probably not be able to defend any Near East areas, except Egypt in the event that moderate

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ground and substantial air and naval forces were in that area prior to enemy attack.

80. The Allies could neutralize enemy oil production in the Near East by air attack, airborne raids, and sabotage utilizing selective ABC type weapons.

81. Until overwhelming Allied air superiority could be achieved late in the war, the Allies probably could not exploit Near East oil resources even if they succeeded in capturing the areas.

82. In the Far East, air attacks on transportation, key heavy industries, and enemy air and sub bases should neutralize enemy exploitation of this area. The enemy would probably not attempt to occupy Japan.

FOURTH UNDERTAKING - AERIAL SUPREMACY
OVER THE ENEMY

83. Because Allied success in their first three undertakings would have stopped the enemy and wrested the initiative from him, the Allies should next attain aerial superiority over the Soviet Bloc territory to such an extent that the enemy's air defense would deteriorate continuously, and the enemy could not produce the air power necessary to regain the initiative on any substantial front.

84. The objective would be Soviet air power; the forces in being, the defense, the bases and storage areas, and the vital communications in direct support of Soviet air power and the weapons used.

85. Allied success would depend on having bases within 2,500 miles of critical targets and success in the first three undertakings should provide such bases in the UK, on the continent and possibly in the Near East.

86. Water or ice bases, used for launching and landing aircraft, would be relatively invulnerable to atomic attack.

87. Advanced bases would be less vulnerable to ABC attack if they were used only as a stage base for aircraft which were permanently based in rear, well protected areas.

88. When a base must be seized in enemy defended territory, local Allied air superiority over the selected area should be achieved by atomic attack against all enemy air bases outside of the target area which the enemy would

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use for air support, and the target area should be softened up by a lethal ABC attack which would cripple the defense but would not destroy the essential facilities.

90. A lightning vertical envelopment followed up immediately by air transported forces or amphibious attack would be employed in order to seize the area. Fighter, AA, ground and tactical air defense units would be prepared for counter attack with defense against surface attack relying heavily on the denial effects of ABC weapons.

91. Because of enemy capability for ABC air attack against extended air and ground LOC in support of major combat forces, advanced bases should not be located more than 150 to 200 miles from a sea LOC base, except for limited periods of two to three weeks.

92. If seaplane bombers, fighters and tactical aircraft become available, a mobile base could be established in protected waters with air, naval and land units combined to seize, defend and operate a staging base.

93. Allied air attacks would fan out from advanced bases in ever-deepening penetration attacks against the enemy air force, defensive bases, logistic support means, and the industrial complex in support of the enemy air force. When the climax is reached, the enemy air defense should deteriorate rapidly as did that of Germany following the climax of the air battle in the spring of 1944.

94. Allied air bases should be located so as to maintain an attack from all quarters of the compass.

95. Small Army airborne raid forces would be utilized to destroy or neutralize vital enemy targets which would be relatively invulnerable to air attack.

96. It might take the Allies four to five years or longer to achieve the desired air supremacy over enemy territory.

**FIFTH UNDERTAKING - PRESSURE
AFTER AIR SUPREMACY IS WON**

97. Although successful prosecution of the above four undertakings by the Allies should cause the enemy to surrender, the Allies would have to be prepared to carry on if the enemy does not accept.

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98. In selection of a course of action to be followed in this undertaking, the Allies should give great weight to convincing the enemy leaders to trust the Allies to enforce only the proposed terms. Other factors which should be considered are: conditions in the affected nations which would foster post-war supra-national security; military capabilities; and costs in men and resources.

99. The first course of action available to the Allies, that of maintaining the military status quo while increasing the political, social and economic pressures, would: be most apt to convince the enemy leaders to trust the Allies; leave the affected nations in a condition best suited for post-war supra-national security; be relatively easy to accomplish militarily without prohibitive cost.

100. The second alternative, to intensify the air battle in order to reduce the enemy's economy below the minimum needed to sustain his civil economy, and at the same time, to increase the political and social pressures would be less apt to cause the enemy leaders to trust the Allies and would cause great destruction which would run counter to post-war Allied aims; although, the Allies should be able to accomplish this military campaign without prohibitive cost.

101. The third alternative, great land campaigns to occupy strategic enemy areas accompanied by increased political, social and economic pressures, would be least apt to cause the enemy leaders to trust the Allies, would result in extensive destruction and dislocation of economies both in enemy and Allied nations, and would be the most expensive and difficult military campaign to undertake; and such campaigns might not be successful.

102. The first alternative, maintenance of a military status quo while increasing the political, social and economic pressures on the enemy, would be the best available Allied course of action.

103. If some Allied territory should remain to be liberated, air and resistance attacks against the enemy occupation forces and their support means would be intensified until "over-running" types of liberation campaigns could be undertaken by relatively small mobile Army forces, as contrasted to the great Allied armies of World War II that were engaged in the "Overlord" campaign against determined and sustained enemy resistance.

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104. Adoption of these strategies should lead to enemy acceptance of the proposed Allied terms.

POST SURRENDER OPERATIONS

105. Small military forces, for inspection of enemy compliance with the terms, would be all that the Allies would need, as there would be no military government of enemy territory or other such provision which would require great occupation forces capable of dominating the enemy areas.

106. Allied inspection forces would be located on enemy air bases which would be provided with defensive forces adequate to permit immediate air evacuation in emergencies, and with small, highly mobile forces which could furnish individual protection to inspectors or missions away from the air base.

107. Allied air bases in enemy territory should be located in the vicinity of: centers of government, industries capable of producing aircraft, submarines and ABC agents; principal air and naval headquarters; and land commanders controlling major forces.

108. Success of post-surrender operations would depend on the immediate availability of overwhelming Allied air forces, located on external and protected bases, who would maintain frequent surveillance flights over the enemy areas, and would be capable of launching devastating retaliatory attacks in the event of resistance to terms or of attack on Allied inspectors.

109. Rehabilitation of Allied areas in Europe would involve considerable post-war commitments by the Western Hemisphere Allies.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

110. When considered fully and tested adequately, the political, social and economic concepts upon which this study was based, may be rejected in part or in full by the responsible authorities.

111. If, contrary to the concepts of this study, national policy should require Allied imposition of an armistice involving a non-indigenous change of the enemy

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government, separation of large areas from enemy territory or military government of the enemy territory, then great and very difficult land campaigns would probably be required in order to occupy large areas of enemy territory before the enemy could be defeated.

112. If the political, social and economic forces of the world were mobilized, in line with the philosophy of this study, to repudiate the use of military force as an instrument of national policy, such a war as depicted herein could probably be avoided.

113. Studies on war should be made in a reverse chronological order, first taking up objectives, then post-war conditions, then armistice terms, then the military campaigns in reverse order, and finally preparations for possible war.

114. The nature of a future war should be made a continuing study, which, it is predicted, will tend to confirm the concepts set forth herein.

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