

AEC 483/35

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November 28, 1952

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SECURITY AND PUBLIC REPORTING ASPECTS
OF 1952 PACIFIC TESTS

Note by the Secretary

The attached report on the above subject, compiled by a staff group, is circulated by request of the General Manager for the information of the Commission.

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ROY B. SNAPP
Secretary

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BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/OC
H.L. Hoppe 11/22/85
REVIEWED BY DATE
J. Diet 1/22/86
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By: P.M. Sweetman 6/11/86

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PROVISIONS AND PURPOSE OF THE PUBLIC REPORTING
AND SECURITY OF INFORMATION PLANS
FOR THE 1952 PACIFIC TESTS

1. The security of information program and the public reporting program for the tests dovetailed in objectives and rationale. The public reporting program could not be wholly successful unless the security of information program were followed to the letter.

Public Reporting Program

2. The aim of the public reporting program was to hold to a bare minimum official announcements on the tests. It was decided after extensive study by the Psychological Strategy Board and the National Security Council to acknowledge (1) in advance, only that a test series would occur in the autumn months; (2) afterwards, that the tests had been completed; that they included experiments contributing to thermonuclear weapons research; that executives were pleased with the results; that DOD and AEC commended the task force; and that the United States was conducting weapons development only because of Soviet intransigence in the matter of armament control, and stood ready to enter into effective, enforceable control agreements.

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3. The purpose of this limited public reporting was to gain advantage for the United States in the field of psychological strategy. It was calculated that if there was no breach in the security of information arrangements, the announcements decided upon would avoid unwarranted optimism at home or abroad about U.S. possession of deliverable thermonuclear weapons and consequent rearmament let-down, would minimize alarm among allies and neutrals, and would leave room for wide uncertainty and speculation in hostile circles on the status of fusion and fission weapons development by the United States.

4. The public reporting program, including the texts of official statements to be issued, was worked out, in the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the National Security Council on the basis of recommendations from the Psychological Strategy Board. After approval by the President, all agencies concerned were notified of the plan by the NSC. (See AEC 483/20)

Security Program

5. From a security standpoint, the more important items to be protected were:

- a. Information which revealed the state of our development and subsequent production and stockpiling in the thermonuclear field;
- b. The specific time of bursts;
- c. Nuclear particulars concerning the bursts including weapon details, fireball, blast and other nuclear phenomena which could lead to interpretation of yield and materials used;
- d. Explosion effects.

6. The purposes of classifying the above tests were as follows:

- a. To keep information revealing the status of the thermonuclear program from reaching the USSR

[REDACTED]

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since such information would be of assistance to the Soviets in making decisions on their course of policy and action in foreign relations and military affairs.

b. The specific time of the tests, and particularly of Mike was held classified because if the USSR had this data, it would help their long-range detection program. It would help the USSR to determine when and where to send airplanes with the expectation of picking up nuclear particles. It would aid the USSR in determining the time bracket within which they should examine carefully their seismographic and sound recording records to check for size of a nuclear detonation. Knowing when to look and thereby pinning it to a specific part of their curves which cover the explosion, they would then be able to analyze the specific proportions for estimation of the intensity of the burst.

c. Information was classified as to explosion phenomena and effects (size of column, height of cloud, fireball size, general destruction) because these would assist in estimating yield. A reasonably good estimate of yield would be of assistance to the USSR in determining safeguards against such a weapon and in evaluating the status of the U.S. program.

Measures Taken to Achieve Objectives

7. Public Reporting - It was agreed in the NSC and approved by the President that all the public announcements should be made by the Atomic Energy Commission.

8. The AEC notified all concerned divisions and offices and the Task Force that responsibility for official public statements from the Executive Branch would be taken in Washington; and that no statement or comment should issue from any other source. The Commission conveyed the NSC plan for public reporting to the Joint Committee with a request that any public statements by members or staff not go beyond the content of the preliminary and concluding official announcements.

9. In Washington the responsibility for coordinating issuance by AEC of official statements was placed on the Division of Information Services.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

10. The Department of Defense and the Department of State instructed public information and other officers in Washington to make no statements and offer no comments to press or radio.

11. Security of Information - Under an agreement between the Department of Defense and AEC, contained in a letter of April 27, 1951, from the MLC (AEC 334/6) and the Commission's reply of May 11, 1951 (see AEC 334/7) the Joint Chiefs of Staff would establish joint task forces as required to conduct the operation of tests beyond the continental limits of the United States. The Joint Task Force Commander would be specifically charged with acting as an agent for the Atomic Energy Commission for the exercise of such functions on behalf of the Commission as the latter might deem necessary.

12. For the Pacific tests of 1952, the JCS designated the Chief of Staff of the Army as its Executive Agent for the Joint Task Force. The Commander of the Task Force was to be supplied by the Army. The Chief of Staff of the Army designated Major General P. W. Clarkson as Joint Task Force Commander and authorized General Clarkson to activate and assume command of Joint Task Force 132 on or about July 1, 1951.

13. By letter of August 20, 1952 (see Appendix "A") the Commission requested General Clarkson to accept a designation as its special representative in the Eniwetok area effective with the operational phase of the tests, August 21, 1952. The Commission authorized General Clarkson, upon acceptance of the designation, to act for the Commission in all matters which concerned the successful execution of Task Force Operation Plan 2-52, as amended. General Clarkson by letter of August 20, 1952, (General Orders Number 11) (See Appendix "B") assumed the

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authority of special representative of the Atomic Energy Commission.

14. The security plan for the operation was established by Operation Plan 2-52, Joint Task Force 132. There was day-to-day liaison between the Commission's Division of Security and the Task Force's security personnel. AEC commented on the operation plan by letter of May 20, 1952, and no exception to the security aspects of the plan was taken. Annex J of the Plan set up classification criteria among which were:

a. Proposed exact time (month, day and year of tests) is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION.

b. Number of devices to be tested is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION.

c. Type of weapons (including any description) is SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION - RESTRICTED DATA.

15. A detailed classification guide was issued.

16. The Plan specifically stated that there would be no censorship of personal mail. The plan was implemented by a series of Security Letters. Security Letter #6, JTF-132, (7 September 1952) required that each Task Force member read, and certify in writing to his Task Group Commander that he had read, the JTF Security Letters and the Security Regulations of his own Service. The text of this letter is attached as Appendix "C".

17. According to the report of November 14, 1952, from Clarkson, Commander, JTF-132, (copy attached as Appendix "D") instructions "covering unauthorized dissemination of information were included in my Security Letters." These letters plus the pertinent Service and AEC security regulations were required reading for all members of the Joint Task Force. By letter of

[REDACTED]

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October 27, 1952 (Appendix "E") Headquarters, JTF-132, specifically instructed the Commanders of the Task Groups as to items which could be said or written about the operation. The letter included a list of items on which discussions were specifically prohibited. The report of November 14 from Clarkson discussed the manner in which security instructions were given to members of the Task Force. Further detail is expected in later reports.

Personnel Clearance Requirements

18. The Task Force advises that approximately 11,000 individuals participated in the test operations and that approximately 8,000 individuals were in such proximity during the test as to afford them an opportunity to view the detonation of the thermonuclear device. The JTF-132 regulations provided that all personnel present at the time of the tests be either "Q" cleared or cleared in accordance with the appropriate clearance requirements of the Department of Defense. The regulations provided that all civilians and all military personnel who were to receive Restricted Data from AEC contractors were to be "Q" cleared. All others were required by JTF-132 security regulations to have a military clearance with a minimum requirement of a National Agency check. (Many may have had Secret or Top Secret clearance based on limited or full background investigation by the military.)

Appropriateness in Achieving Objectives
of the Public Reporting and Security
Measures Taken

19. Public Reporting - The two official statements (before and after the operation) were carefully considered and appear to have been appropriate in achieving the objectives established for psychological strategy purposes. They conveyed much less information than had been issued through statements, press conferences, and pictures following the two previous Pacific tests.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Full success of the program for very limited public reporting depended upon there being no revelations other than through the official statements.

20. Security of Information - The measures prescribed for maintaining security of classified information were based upon experience in the previous tests, and on general military and AEC experience in confining such information to authorized personnel. They had proved effective on the previous occasions, and it was calculated that they would be adequate to the requirements and the circumstances of the 1952 series.

21. There was concern, as the time of the tests approached, that some collateral activities necessary for safety reasons might give pointers on the time of tests. These included stopping or rerouting of flights through the Eniwetok area for some hours; and rerouting of surface craft just after the shot.

22. There was concern, also, that dispatch of returnees before the conclusion of the tests might give a tip on the time of the shots, or increase the chance of imprudent talk about the time or character of the shot. It appears that 227 persons who saw the first shot could have reached the San Francisco-Los Angeles area before November 8, and that 125 Holmes & Narver personnel left Eniwetok by sea on October 27, 1952, to arrive San Francisco November 1.

23. A failure in observance of instructions brought about dispatch in the clear of a message (Appendix "F") from one of the ships giving the exact time of one shot. As relayed, this message was carried on at least three frequencies. The circumstances of dispatch are recounted in Appendix "G".

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24. Inquiry to the AEC and Department of Defense by TIME-LIFE correspondents on the day of one shot indicated knowledge of the exact time.

25. An undetermined number of personal letters were dispatched disclosing information in violation of the security instructions. Some 13 letters occasioned publication of news stories, an abstract of the content of 10 of which is attached as Appendix "H".

26. Whether anything might have been done to avoid the risks resulting from stopping or rerouting of flights or rerouting of surface craft, the staff is unable to say. There is no indication up to now that these actions led to any breaks in security.

27. The question of timing of returnees before conclusion of tests, and adequacy of briefing requires further study. To date, there is no concrete indication of security breaches by returnees.

28. The dispatch of personal letters disclosing information in violation of the security instructions and the publication of the text of, excerpts from, or summaries of the contents of 13 letters raises questions as to whether extra measures should not have been taken for this Operation. The following might have been done:

a. Censorship of personal mail, and/or;

b. Issuance of an advisory to press and radio stating the sensitive information on tests which should be kept from hostile intelligence, and requesting that no such information, however obtained, be published or broadcast.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

29. A delay in disclosures by letter made by members of the Task Force would have been assured by censorship of personal mail. Throughout the history of the overseas testing operations at Eniwetok Atoll, beginning with Operation SANDSTONE in 1948, Operation GREENHOUSE in 1951, and in the Operation IVY test, there was no censorship of personal mail. However, in all of these operations, as in previous cases, personnel were advised of their security responsibility by means of security briefings and instructed to exercise personal censorship of mail. Until Operation IVY, it appeared that this voluntary censorship program had been satisfactory. In May 1952 a representative of the Office of Classification informally suggested to a representative of the Division of Security that the possibility of utilizing censorship of the IVY operation be considered. It was felt that the establishment of such a program, particularly since it was not utilized in previous operations, would direct attention to Operation IVY as being particularly significant. It was also felt from past experience that the planned security programs, i.e., personnel security clearance, appropriate physical security measures, and security indoctrination measures were sufficient to accomplish the JTF-132 security mission.

30. The question of an advisory to news media was not considered in developing the information plan, mainly because it was felt by the Division of Information Services that on the basis of past experience the measures under way were adequate, and placing such a proposal before the press would bring on a useless renewal of the acrimony over Government security of information measures. It was felt, additionally, that such a request would underline the importance of the tests and might give hints to

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hostile intelligence that this test differed from preceding ones.

Evaluation of Present Status of Security and Public Reporting Programs

31. Security: The effect of the known public breaches of security appears to be as follows:

a. The violations appear to be in direct disregard of specific briefings and memoranda which among other things prohibited discussion or writing concerning the burst itself. Breaches of security objectives were included as follows:

(1) Specific reference to time of test may aid USSR in operating its sampling collecting program, if it has one;

(2) Specific reference to the device as having been a hydrogen bomb adds confirmation to whatever additional information the USSR might be able to gather. As far as we know the breaches of security do not indicate in any way stockpile status but they do imply that this was the first full scale thermonuclear test.

b. Specific reference to fireball and blast column dimensions although somewhat in conflict, do individually and collectively confirm that the shot was not an ordinary atomic detonation in the past sense. Since most of the guessing as to dimensions was by amateurs, probably little specific help is given to the enemy in determining yield. The approximate yield is, however, compromised, within a reasonably large range.

c. It is believed that the following may be compromised, insofar as knowledge to the public and to enemy intelligence is concerned:

(1) That a detonation took place at the time and location stated in the letters;

(2) That it was a thermonuclear and not a normal fission detonation;

(3) That this was our first such detonation.

32. It is believed that security aspects of the test which are still left to protect are:

a. Energy yield of the experiment;

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- b. Whether we detonated a device or a bomb;
 - c. Specific nuclear composition and technical design details;
 - d. Instrumental results, such as blast, transit times, alpha and gamma measurements, etc.;
 - e. Specific crater dimensions and damage versus distance information;
 - f. The exact state of our thermonuclear program and of our thermonuclear stockpile.

33. Public Reporting: Full success of the low-key reporting program adopted for reasons of psychological strategy depend upon there being no public utterances from Task Force or official sources. The existence of a psychological strategy plan for the public reporting on the tests was not established until the NSC letter of September 17. It was before that letter was received that Acting Chairman Durham, of JCC, who had no knowledge of the public reporting program for the tests made a statement to the Durham newspaper which indicated that the tests would be extraordinary in nature and would open "the gravest era in the history of the world." This occurrence somewhat reduced the effectiveness of the limited reporting planned. There was some loss to the low-key reporting plan from the eye witness letters from members of the Task Force following the Mike shot. However, this was somewhat remedied in the United States, and we believe abroad (though it is too early to tell) by the anti-climactic nature of the AEC official statement. If further official statements or unauthorized disclosures are avoided it is believed that most of the objectives of the psychological strategy program can be attained.

34. Action Taken to Investigate Breaches of Security: The Commission, by letter of November 10, 1952, requested the FBI

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[REDACTED]

to conduct an investigation to determine the identity of the sources of information of the article in the Los Angeles EXAMINER and the AP and UP releases at Lima, Ohio, and to determine whether a violation of Federal law is involved. By letters of November 15 and November 21, additional press dispatches were reported to the FBI for further investigative consideration.

35. The FBI referred the matter to the Department of Justice's Criminal Division for a decision as to the action to be taken. On November 19, 1952, the FBI advised that the Department had requested that the investigations and the prosecutive consideration be handled as follows:

a. Navy personnel will be investigated by the Navy under Naval regulations. When investigation is completed, Navy will furnish the Department of Justice the reports, and the Department of Justice will consider whether the subjects (letter-writers) should be court-martialed or prosecuted in Federal Court. ONI will be requested to obtain, in any violation case, information as to what specific instructions regarding security regulations were given by security officers or commanders of vessels to the writers involved, and specifically what was the understanding of the writers concerning such security regulations;

b. FBI will contact Los Angeles EXAMINER and make inquiry relative to the November 8 article. If source is Navy personnel, Navy will handle in accordance with (a). If source is civilian, FBI will handle.

c. FBI will interview Dr. F. A. Rohrman, University of Colorado professor to ascertain whether he has been cleared for "restricted data" or has been furnished security information pertaining to the tests. The FBI has been advised that according to our records Dr. Rohrman does not have a "Q" clearance. However, it is possible that he may have a military clearance granting him access to "Restricted Data" within the Department of Defense, granted in accordance with the AEC-DOD agreement.

d. Re Lloyd R. Marconett, Modesto, California, author of a letter published in the "Parisian" newspaper at Paris, Tennessee, and later carried by UP dispatch dated November 14, 1952, FBI will obtain the letter and present the facts to the Department of Justice, unless Marconett is subject to court-martial. However, if Marconett is at sea, Navy will interview Marconett and furnish a report for the Department of Justice.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "A"

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 20, 1952

Dear General Clarkson:

By letter of April 27, 1951, the Military Liaison Committee advised the Atomic Energy Commission that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the organization for military participation in future atomic weapons tests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically charged the Task Force Commander with acting as an agent for the Commission for the exercise of such functions on behalf of the Commission as the latter deemed necessary. The Commission has advised the Department of Defense of its intention to designate you as their special representative in the Eniwetok area effective with the start of the operational phase of IVY and has agreed with the Department of Defense on August 21, 1952, as the start of this phase.

Accordingly, you are requested to accept this designation, together with full authority to act for the Commission in all matters which concern the successful execution of Task Force Operation Plan 2-52, as amended. This authority is operational in nature and not intended to transfer to you any of the continuing administrative responsibilities of the Field Manager, Eniwetok, or the normal responsibilities for the technical direction of the J-Division, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The Commission desires that command channels to AEC contractors now in effect at the site be left in effect and used as far as practicable. Should operation necessity require expenditure of AEC funds beyond those available to the Field Manager, Eniwetok, it will be necessary for you to consult the Commission.

The effective date of your authority, if accepted, will be August 21, 1952. Operational uncertainties make it impossible to state now the exact date for termination of this authority. We expect, however, that it will coincide with the termination of the operational phase of Operation IVY.

Authority to fire up to two shots and to expend specific amounts of fissionable material has been requested from the President and will be communicated to you when received. The number and type of models, including spares, are being determined by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory with Commission approval.

As Commission representative, you are responsible for, and the designated custodian of, the atomic devices and their components which will be transported overseas for this operation. Mr. Carroll L. Tyler, Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, will be directed to make necessary transfers of material into your custody. To assist you in the technical accountability aspects, however, Mr. Tyler has established a Source and Fissionable Material Accountability Station at the Pacific Proving Grounds which will be responsible to you for

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accountability and proper maintenance of accountability records for all nuclear components, both enroute to and from, and in, the Pacific Proving Grounds.

The Commission recognizes your responsibility as Task Force Commander to make decisions and take proper action in emergency situations where the health and safety of Task Force personnel or property are concerned, or where the National interest must be protected. You are authorized under such circumstances to make emergency disposal of fissionable materials, if required. If you do make such disposal, the Commission should be notified at the earliest practicable opportunity. You are requested to keep the Commission informed of any significant developments which arise in the course of the Operation.

You may be assured of our full support in your undertaking and our sincere wishes for your success.

Sincerely yours,

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

T. Keith Glennan
Acting Chairman

Major General P.W. Clarkson, USA
Commander, Joint Task Force 132
Washington 25, D.C.

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "B"

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE 132
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 11)

20 August 1952

ASSUMPTION OF AUTHORITY

By authority of the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I hereby assume authority as special representative of the Atomic Energy Commission in the Eniwetok area effective 21 August 1952 with full authority to act for the Commission in all matters which concern the successful conduct of OPERATION IVY.

/s/

P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, United States Army
Commander

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "C"

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE 132
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECURITY LETTER)
NUMBER 6)

7 September 1951

SECURITY INDOCTRINATION

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this letter is to prescribe certain matter to be utilized in the security indoctrination of all personnel assigned to JTF-132 and to require individual certificates that the documents have been read and understood.
2. GENERAL. JTF-132 will publish security policy in Security Letters. In addition, all personnel will be governed, in general, by respective service, or AEC, security regulations.
3. PROCEDURE. Each individual presently assigned to duty with JTF-132 or subordinate elements thereof will be required to read, or have read to him, all JTF-132 Security Letters as well as their respective service, or AEC, security regulations. The service regulations are referenced below.
4. CERTIFICATE. A certificate (see Incl. #1) will be executed by each individual and forwarded to the appropriate Group Intelligence Officer. Certificates for personnel of Headquarters, JTF-132 will be forwarded to the AC/S, J-2.
5. REFERENCES.
 - a. For all personnel - JTF-132 Security Letters.
 - b. For U.S. Army personnel - AR 380-5 and Changes.
 - c. For USN personnel - USN Security Manual for Classified Matter, 1951. Chapters 1 thru 15.
 - d. For USAF personnel - AFR 205-1 and Changes there-to - Sections 1 thru V and VII.
6. This indoctrination will be repeated every 6 months with the first certificate to be accomplished by 10 October 1951.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL CLARKSON:

/s/ H.M. Page

H.M. PAGE
Lt. Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
Scty. Certificate



C E R T I F I C A T E

(Date)

I, _____, hereby certify that I have this date (read) (have had read to me) the documents checked below. I further certify I understand the subject matter contained therein.

- _____ JTF-132 Security Letters (published as of the above date).
- _____ AR 380-5 and Changes (Army personnel)
- _____ AFR 205-1 and Changes (AF personnel)
- _____ USN Security Manual (Navy personnel)
- _____ GM Bulletins (AEC employees)

(Witness)

Name, Rank, Serial Number

INCLOSURE #1



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "D"

14 November 1952

REF NR: 1854

SECRET ACTION TO MR. GORDON DEAN, INFO TO GENERAL COLLINS
THROUGH PARTRIDGE
FROM: CLARKSON, JTF 132

Reference your message DTG 132220Z.

The preliminary investigations made with the limited information available indicate several pertinent items:

A. The personnel who are known to have written letters realized that at least a technical security violation was involved, sufficient in one case to send an injunction of secrecy to the addressee of the letter. Personnel seemed to feel that disclosures were to trusted members of family who would not talk.

B. One person writing a letter stated he believed that in spite of the security instructions he was not if any injuring the United States by the disclosure of the information in view of the many articles in the press by well known individuals such as Dr. Ralph Lapp and Stewart Alsop.

C. One person concerned here indicated his information relative to the nature of the test came from articles in magazines and clippings sent from the States.

D. Statement by one person implicated in disclosures indicates that newsmen have incorporated their own speculation in paraphrase of letters. Instructions concerning unauthorized dissemination of information included in my Security Letters. These plus respective Service and AEC Security Regulations which also cover subject matter are required reading for all repeat all members of Joint Task Force. All task Group Commanders issued written instructions to subordinate units requiring all individuals read or have read to them both above items every 6

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months. Letters and messages this Headquarters specifying non-classified information, i.e., weather, names of friends, sports, etc., and prohibiting disclosures of classified information were implemented by Task Groups as follows:

Scientific Task Group

(1) Security acknowledgement form containing pertinent extracts from Atomic Energy Act, Internal Security Act of 1950 and Title 18, US Codes, were signed by all Q cleared personnel.

(2) A mimeographed circular to all personnel dated 28 July 1952, Instruction for Personal Mail Censorship, listed 16 items that were not to be included in personal letters, as an act of self-censorship. This was distributed to all TG 132.1 personnel at Los Alamos prior to departure for forward area and re-distributed upon arrival at Eniwetok.

(3) "Security Indoctrination for IVY", a 9 page condensation of the most pertinent parts of Service and AEC regulations stresses personal responsibility relative to dissemination of classified information, refers to a list of subject matter to be avoided in personal correspondence, and describes radio and telephone discipline. This was sent by mail to all participating personnel of TG 132.1, in the ZI and Eniwetok through project directors. All TG 132.1 personnel signed a certificate indicating that they were familiar with the contents of this letter.

(4) Personnel departing the forward area are required to sign statements acknowledging their responsibility to safeguard classified information.

(5) Arrival and departure lectures are given to all personnel upon arrival at Parry Island, stressing the necessity and means of preserving security, giving advice, and offering assistance with security problems.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(6) Scripps Project personnel aboard USMV Horizon were indoctrinated by means of 3 Letters, 2 Security Lectures and a posted bulletin.

(7) Holmes and Narver personnel were indoctrinated by Arrival Lectures, Terminations Lectures, Security Termination Statements and Bulletins, Task Force letters, and thru certificates to be signed by all personnel. Special lectures were given to all clerical personnel upon arrival. Comments cautioning against improper discussion appear daily in the H and N News Sheet, "Breeze".

(8) No Scientific Task Group personnel are known to have been involved in unauthorized disclosures of information.

Army Task Group

(1) Letter, 2 January 1952, Headquarters Army Task Group, to all members of Army Task Group clearly outlines proper course for individuals to safeguard information.

(2) Incoming Security Briefing to all persons assigned states that self censorship will be followed in accordance with Task Force Security Letters and Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

(3) Incoming ship captains are briefed on compliance with CINCPAC Serial O20, which requires thorough security indoctrination of all persons aboard.

(4) Letter, subject, Security Requirements, dated 25 June 1952, Headquarters, Army Task Group, given all incoming personnel, thoroughly covers security and requires subordinate commanders to comply with reading of Task Force Security Letters and Service Security Regulations with re-reading every 6 months.

(5) Talks to all personnel of this Task Group aboard USNS Collins immediately before and immediately after MIKE SHOT enumerated security requirements.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(6) No investigations of disclosures or leaks have indicated Army Task Group personnel involved.

Naval Task Group

(1) The basis of implementing instructions regarding unauthorized dissemination of information for this Task Group is Naval Task Group Operations Plan dated 6 June 1952, distributed to all Commanding Officers.

(2) The plan included what could and what would not be discussed in personal letters or notes. One of the items that would not be discussed is as follows:

"Results of any Tests Conducted."

(3) AEC Restricted Data and classified information would be handled in accordance with existing AEC and US Navy Security Regulations, pertinent copies of which were included in the Operation Plan.

(4) Commanding Officers were instructed to hold briefings for all Task Group personnel immediately upon assignment and periodically thereafter.

(5) Instructed Commanding Officers to warn personnel against revealing information amongst friends and acquaintances not attached to the Joint Task Force and discussing matters often revealed in News Articles.

(6) Commanding Officers instructed as to the importance of conducting Security Briefings periodically.

(7) Task Force Letters and messages during the period 27 October 1952 thru 11 November 1952 were passed to all members of Naval Task Group.

(8) Investigations of security violations (letter writing) involving seamen from 3 US Navy Ships, reveal the following:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(A) Vernon Leroy Cary, DK 3, from USS Kakhill, Author of Lima, Ohio News Press release. Confession made and admits being fully briefed on security before offense. Cary offered in extenuation of his confession that he was affected by the Lapp-Alsop Article in the Saturday Evening Post.

(B) Andrew Butlers, Fireman from USS Rendtva, Author of Ft. Dodge, Iowa Press release. Confession made and admits being fully briefed before offense. Incidentally this individual was below deck at time of detonation.

(C) Melvin Lee Johnson, Seaman from USS Curtiss, Author of Michigan City, Indiana Press release. Investigation pending due to the absence of Curtiss from this area at this time. Will supplement comments as soon as investigation received.

Air Force Task Group - TG 132.4

(1) Security instructions and indoctrination of personnel of this Task Group began during the build-up stage at Kirtland AFB and included

(1) Security Briefing by the Task Force Commander to all personnel;

(2) Implementation Security talks by Security Officer to all personnel prior to their departure for the forward area;

(3) All personnel undergoing written security examination with a required passing mark;

(4) Consolidated folder of all JTF 132 Security Letters and Task Group Security Memos published up to that date disseminated to all Unit Commanders for assistance in Security Indoctrination to all personnel;

(5) Final Security Lecture by the Security Officer to all personnel immediately prior to departure for forward area.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2) Enroute security briefings included a Security Lecture to all personnel while awaiting shipment at Camp Stoneman.

(3) Action taken while in operational Area included:

(1) Widespread dissemination of Security Posters throughout Task Group Areas;

(2) Commanders attempting to keep all personnel security conscious by constant reminder at all meetings of personnel;

(3) Immediate compliance with all JTF 132 Security Memos upon receipt.

(4) The following additional precautions were taken:

(1) Spot radio announcements on security topics;

(2) Theatre announcements at each performance revealing what could be revealed in letters back to ZI;

(3) Base newspaper and plan of the day setting forth latest information on Task Force Security requirements with explanation thereto;

(4) Copy of Task Force Letter, on dissemination of information given distribution to all members of each group and copies placed on all bulletin boards.

(5) All personnel departing the forward area given security briefing and required to sign Security Certificate certifying non-disclosure of security information and a Security Termination Statement.

(6) All lectures and briefings emphasized unauthorized dissemination of classified information both oral and written.

(7) There has been no evidence of any leaks or breaches of security in Task Group 132.4. All task groups have complied with security instructions put out by the Joint Task Force, the Atomic Energy Commission and the 3 Services. In conclusion desire to remind AEC that there has never been any censorship of mail of either military or civilian personnel. Other than that conducted by the person himself. Clarkson.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "E"

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE 132
Washington 25, D. C.

AG 380

27 October 1952

SUBJECT: Discussion of JTF 132 Activities outside the
Task Force

TO: Commander, Task Group 132.1
Commander, Task Group 132.2
Commander, Task Group 132.3
Commander, Task Group 132.4

1. Upon your return to the United States in the completion of the operations of JTF 132, you will undoubtedly be asked many questions by friends, relatives, and members of the press as to where you were, what you were doing, what you saw, etc. By the time you return, an official announcement will probably have been made to the press telling the public that the JTF has conducted atomic tests at Eniwetok. Any other statements in the press is pure speculation and must not be accepted by you as authorizing you to make similar or related statements.

2. The following is a guide to assist you in determining what you may or may not say or write in regard to yourself or the JTF:

A. You are authorized to state only the following:

1. That you were assigned to JTF 132, which conducted atomic tests at the Pacific Proving Grounds at Eniwetok Atoll.

2. Your method of transportation, your itinerary to and from Eniwetok, but not your movements within the atoll during the operations.

3. That you witnessed an atomic test, but not how many.

4. How long you were away.

5. Names of friends in the Task Force.

6. Unofficial activities, such as recreation, vacation travel, church services, messing, etc.

7. Climatic conditions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. You are prohibited from discussing anything not included in paragraph 2A, and specifically must not discuss the following:

1. Code name of the operation.
2. Preparations for the tests.
3. Number or types of tests.
4. Physical characteristics of the tests, including size of the flash, size of the cloud, damage, precautions for protection of personnel, equipment of facilities.
5. Date or time of any test.
6. Numbers of ships, planes, or types of equipment, either mobile or stationary, used for the tests.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL CLARKSON:

/s/ ROBERT L. BRYANT, JR.
/t/ ROBERT L. BRYANT, JR.
Asst Adj Gen

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ D. K. Baxter

D. K. BAXTER
1st Lt AGC

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "F"

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

31 OCT 1952

D317

OP 312222Z

FM ADMIN CINCPACFLT

INFO CNO

OP 311920Z

FM CTG ONE THREE TWO PNT ONE ENIWETOK

TO JEPHQ/WEARESDIV WASH DC HQ USAF ATTN DR ROCD MR ALLEN MR

OLMSTEAD

INFO ZEN/CO 1960TH AACS HQ KWAJALEIN ATOLL PAS DIRPROGRAM SEVEN
FOR MAJ HORMATS

JWPAG/CG SMAMA MCCCELLAN AFB PASS TO OIC TEAM

JAPYC/CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN PASS OIC TEAM FOUR ZERO SIX

JHPHM/CO 1957TH AACS HQ HICKAM AFB OAHU TH PASS TO OIC TEAM ONE
ZERO THREE FOR MAJ DEETU

NAVY GRNC

F R GRANT CITE ECHO NAN THREE PD MIKE DETONATED AT APPROXIMATELY
1915 ZEBRA

DIST: 03/36/-COG

CNO/OOD

237/WW//GJ

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "G"

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

CTG 132.3

CNO

2 NOV 1952

1918Z/02

MURPHY

CORNELIUS

BENNETT

PAGE 1 OF 2

CTF 132
CT 132.1
COMSTSPACAREA
COMSTS
DAVID C SHANKS/TAP 180
CINCPACFLT

021144Z
Date/time group

6440

REPORT OF BREACH OF SECURITY

AT 311937Z AN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE MESSAGE DIG 311920Z DIVULGING SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION WAS TRANSMITTED IN PLAIN LANGUAGE FROM USNS DAVID C SHANKS (TAP-180) REPORTING THE TIME OF THE DETONATION OF MINES (MIKE) ON OPERATION IVY. THE MESSAGE WAS ADDRESSED FROM CTG 132.1 TO SEVERAL ADEES. TODAY THE CJTF 132 BROUGHT THIS MATTER TO MY ATTENTION. HE DESIRES THAT CTF 132.3 CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION TAKING SWORN TESTIMONY BECAUSE THE MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED FROM A SHIP UNDER MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL. MY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE MESSAGE WAS ORIGINATED BY CAPT D V GRANT USAF WHO IS ATTACHED TO TG 132.1 AND WHO WAS TEMPORARILY EMBARKED IN SHANKS. THE COMMANDER TG 132.1 IS A CIVILIAN. THE MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED ON THE REGULAR MESSAGE FORM USED BY THE SHANKS AND WAS SIGNED BY CAPT GRANT IN THE SPACE PROVIDED FOR THE SIGNATURE OF THE RELEASING OFFICER. IT WAS MARKED "SECRET SI" IN THE UPPER SPACE PROVIDED FOR INDICATING CLASSIFICATION. BY ORDER OF CAPT GRANT IT WAS DELIVERED DIRECT TO THE RADIO ROOM OF THE SHANKS BY SGT H H SNEPES USAF WHO HANDED IT TO THE CIVILIAN RADIO OFFICER ON WATCH WITH THE REQUEST TO HAVE IT SENT. THE RADIO OFFICERS OF THE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SHANKS ARE NOT CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. AFTER CERTAIN RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVING BOTH THE OTHER CIVILIAN RADIO OFFICERS OF THE SHANKS THE MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED IN THE CLEAR WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE MASTER OF THE SHANKS OR TO ANY MEMBER OF HER MILITARY DEPT. IT WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE USS LEO (AKA-60) ON 2716 KCS. LEO RELAYED IT TO THE USS RENDOVA CVE 114 ON 532 KCS. RENDOVA RELAYED IT TO NAVSTA KWAJ ON 3045 KCS. ROUTING THEREAFTER IS UNKNOWN. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE AS WRITTEN AND TRANSMITTED CONTAINED NO INDICATION OF ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. TO COMPLY WITH THE TF COMMANDERS WISHES IT IS MY INTENTION TO ORDER A BOARD OF INVESTIGATION AND DESIGNATE AS INITIAL INTERESTED PARTIES THE BEFORE MENTIONED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND THE 3 CIVILIAN RADIO OFFICERS OF THE SHANKS. BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CHARGES WHICH MAY GROW OUT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND THE FACT THAT THE INTERESTED PARTIES ARE NOT UNDER MY ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND IT IS REQUESTED THAT A LAW SPECIALIST BE ORDERED TO TEMPORARY DUTY ON MY STAFF TO ASSIST AND ADVISE ME. AIR TRANSPORTATION TO ENIWETOK AND SECURITY CERTIFICATION ACCORDANCE CINCPAC SERIAL 020 WILL BE REQUIRED FOR HIM.

01...ACT CHANGE ACT PER 203 11/3/52 SK

202..... ACT

203 ... 203T3 ... 203T ... DIV FILE ... COMSTS ... CNO OOD
ADD ... BUPERS ... JAG .. 03 (32 & 33) PER 203 11/3/52SK

CTG 132.3

001144Z

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UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "H"

ABSTRACT OF NEWS STORIES BASED ON LETTERS

The highlights of letters or text as carried in U.S wire service and/or newspaper stories are as follows:

Los Angeles Examiner - Nov. 8, 1952: hydrogen bomb detonated; vaporized into gas and dust the atoll, a half mile wide and three miles long; no dates or time; shipboard.

Lima, Ohio News - 30.4 miles from detonation on shipboard; island burned and "disappeared"; 13 seconds after shot a flame about two miles wide was shooting five miles into air and lasted about 7.2 seconds; thousands of tons of earth thrown into sky. cloud began to form 20 seconds after shot; heard explosion which made my ears ring; mushroom cloud mile wide at bottom and 20 miles at top; Captain told us it went at least 15 miles up; 15 minutes after shot time island started to burn and turned brilliant red; mile wide island burned within six hours and disappeared; time of shot October 1 (probably typographical error.)

Michigan City News Dispatch - writer identified as sailor whose ship hauled bomb from San Francisco to Marshall Islands; cruising 35 miles from test island; bomb went off at 7:15 am on November 1, 1952; blew the top of a building 18 miles away.

Salt Lake City Desert News - letter mentioned "unbelievable" beauty of explosion. (DIS does not have this story.)

Philadelphia Inquirer (United Press from Washington, Nov. 12)

1. Naval lieutenant's letter published in Charlotte, N.C., by a sister. (We do not have original clipping in DIS.)
2. Seaman Andrew I. Butters wrote parents in Ford Dodge, Iowa, he was on ship closest to detonation on Nov. 1. Island quarter of mile wide was completely destroyed.

Chicago, Associated Press, Nov. 13

1. Decatur Review - Sailor writes his ship helped evacuate the atoll and was 32 miles from shot morning of Nov. 1. Felt heat and about 2-1/2 minutes later heard rumbling.
2. Bloomington Pantagraph - Dwight, Illinois, navy man gave details but did not say what type of bomb. (Clips of Decatur and Bloomington papers not available in DIS.)

Knoxville, Tenn., United Press, Nov. 13 - Seaman Robert Walsh wrote mother that explosion Nov. 1 created ball of fire some 20 miles in circumference; aboard tanker Agawan patrolling 32 miles from blast.

Paris, Tenn., United Press, Nov. 14 - Lloyd R. Marconett, Navy navigation officer of Modesto, Calif. writes Curtis Mullen, his uncle and publisher of the Parisian, that he witnessed "the most destructive force yet made by man" and expects to see another of even greater intensity; gives Nov. 1 as date; was on duty on Shanks; dust, debris and water towered 50,000 feet in air; sound of explosion made 5,000 pound bomb sound like a fire-cracker in comparison.