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COPY NO. 21

September 12, 1952

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

OPERATIONAL MESSAGES FOR FUTURE WEAPONS TEST

Note by the Secretary

1. The attached letter from the Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force 132, has been submitted by the Executive Officer, Division of Military Application together with the following comment:

"The series of operational reports to the Chairman from the Commander, Joint Task Force 132 proposed in the attached letter has been agreed to by the Division of Military Application on behalf of the Commission."

2. The memorandum is not abstracted because of its conciseness.

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*05/24/95  
WCh...  
5/26/95  
KSA*

ROY B. SNAPP  
Secretary

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[redacted]

[REDACTED]

This document consists of 2 pages

Copy No. 21 of 23 Series AEC-A

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS  
JOINT TASK FORCE 132  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

21 August 1952

Brigadier General Kenneth E. Fields  
Director, Division of Military Application  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear General Fields:

I believe it will be mutually advantageous for coordination to be effected at this time on the matter of operational messages to be dispatched during the critical period of IVY. To keep the Atomic Energy Commission informed of the progress during the tests, CJTF 132 proposes to send the following messages to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission:

Approx M minus 9 Days: A message indicating that Official Observers should leave Washington, D.C. on M minus 5 Days (calendar date of departure will be specified at that time).

Approx M minus 5 Days: A message indicating that M-Day is expected to take place during a 5-day period beginning      November, weather permitting. A subsequent message will be dispatched if unfavorable weather requires postponement beyond this 5-Day period.

M minus 1 Day: A message stating the date and approximate hour the MIKE device will be detonated.

H Hour plus 30 minutes: A message giving the exact time the MIKE detonation took place, a general estimate as to the overall effective-

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This [REDACTED] the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of [REDACTED] in any manner to an unauthorized person [REDACTED]

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S E C R E T

ness of the experimental device,  
and a report on the safety of Task  
Force personnel.

H Hour plus 72 Hours: A summary containing an estimate as  
to the yield of the MIKE device, a  
remark as to the overall condition  
of the Eniwetok Proving Ground, a  
remark as to the degree of success  
in data recovery operations, a state-  
ment as to the implications regarding  
the safety of civilian and military  
populations in the Pacific Area  
other than Task Force personnel, and  
a preliminary estimate as to the 5-  
day period during which KING Shot is  
expected to take place.

As Required: A message reporting any major  
occurrence having significant impact  
on CJTF 132's operational mission.

It is contemplated that a similar sequence of messages will  
be dispatched during the KING Shot phase of the operation.

For your information, a similar letter has been sent to the  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, U.S. Army, proposing that the  
Executive Agent and the Joint Chiefs of Staff receive operational  
messages identical to those enumerated above.

I believe these dispatches will meet requirements for  
immediate information on the broad operational aspects in which  
the Atomic Energy Commission is interested initially. However, if  
the Atomic Energy Commission desires additional elements of infor-  
mation that can be practicably obtained and incorporated in the  
proposed dispatches we would appreciate an early indication of  
your desires in this respect.

Yours very truly,

/s/ A.R. Walk

A.R. WALK  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff