


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MEMO ROUTE SLIP Form ERDA-93 (1-75) ERDAM 0240		See me about this. Note and return.	For concurrence. For signature.	For action. For information.
TO (Name and unit) Bill Bair	INITIALS	REMARKS For your information.		
	DATE			
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	REMARKS		
	DATE			
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	REMARKS		
	DATE			
FROM (Name and unit) T. F. McCraw	REMARKS			
				
PHONE NO.	DATE 9/8/78			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

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
findings and recommendations by the Officer in Charge is followed by short summaries and recommendations covered in each of the annexes. The recommendations brought forward to the summary section are done so only after thorough discussions by the team. Ideas brought up for consideration, but not thought to be substantive remain in the body of the annex.

4. The next anticipated visit of the team will be from 5-13 December 1978.

RSAIT

SUBJECT: 5th Radiation Safety Audit and Inspection Team Visit
to Enewetak Atoll

5. The point of contact for all future inquiries remains the same.



Encl
as

DARRELL W. McINDOE
Colonel, USAF, MC
Officer in Charge

DISTRIBUTION:

Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
Commander, FCDNA
Commander, JTG
Inspection Team Members (7)

DNA Radiation Safety Audit and
Inspection Team

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ENCLOSURE

SUMMARY

The fifth visit by the Radiation Safety Audit and Inspection Team (RSAIT) was accomplished from 1-3 August 1978. The size of the team was reduced from ten to seven. The areas of interest were divided into three major portions: training and indoctrination, operational safety, and records keeping.

The mobilization phase has been completed and the operational cleanup phase is now at full effort. Previous Audit and Inspection activities were divided into six or seven general areas. Planned during this visit was to look at the operation as a whole entity and observe and comment on those aspects of environmental, radiological and occupational safety as they apply to all phases of the operation. Particular emphasis was paid to the chain of events from debris or earth removal through dumping, stockpiling or crater containment.

Considerable activity has taken place over the last four months in the areas of safety programs. The current Commander, Joint Task Group (JTG) and the element commanders are safety conscious. No significant changes have occurred in the environmental protection program. Indoctrination and training in this area still needs improvement. Radiological and occupational hazards were reviewed during the debris and ground removal operations. Radiation hazards appeared to be minimal as previously noted on all our RSAIT visits. Resuspension does not even appear to be significant at the area of maximum dirt agitation and potential for

resuspension, i.e., batch plant operation. Occupational hazards abound and have been mentioned in the appropriate annex.

CONCLUSIONS

The RSAIT arrived at three conclusions of note. First, resuspension of plutonium has not been a problem and does not now appear to be a problem even at the batch plant operation. Second, the bulk haul of contaminated soil is efficient and safe, and does not require any extraordinary degree of radiation protection. Third, occupational hazards still are the predominant problem during this cleanup operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There is no need for personnel to wear surgical face masks at Enjebi.
2. Respiratory protection against plutonium is only logical at the time earth is physically being moved about, but not during water transit.
3. Continued command emphasis on occupational safety and health is essential for the completion of this operational program.

SUMMARY - ANNEX A: TRAINING & INDOCTRINATION

Arrival orientation and indoctrination still leaves much to be desired. This has been mentioned on each of the previous visits and the basic format is essentially the same. The audience is fatigued and retains little of the presented material.

Recommendation:

Audio-visual aids should be used to the maximum possible. A more dynamic approach at a more favorable time in a more favorable location are essential for lasting impact of this most important aspect of the new arrivals' education and training.

Field Radiation Support Team Training: This program appears to be quite satisfactory. The new change in format is felt to be beneficial and no recommendations are made.

SUMMARY - ANNEX B-1: ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY

Environmental safety continues to be a significant problem on the Atoll and should be included for review by the Atoll Safety Committee at the time of their deliberations each month.

exists. It should then be removed at that site. The bulk haul operation is progressing smoothly with no significant problems.

Analysis of air sample data indicates that the average air concentration of ²³⁹Pu on the bulk haul operation is approximately 1/5000 MPC and approximately 1/500 of the action level.

program. Most notable was the need for better and more
of injury reports. These do not appear to be reviewed on a timely
basis nor are they being coordinated through all elements on the
Atoll.

SUMMARY - ANNEX C: RADIATION RECORDS

The recordkeeping function of RADCON is being handled adequately. There was no difficulty in locating or retrieving any of the records. SP6 Ruyter has done an outstanding job in organizing the file system.

Recommendations:

The two microwave ovens that are present on the Atoll must be registered with RADCON so periodic safety checks can be done. In order for RADCON to do the required safety check on the microwave ovens, it will be necessary for them to get the proper instrumentation.

INTRODUCTION

One full year has passed since the first RSAIT visit. Mobilization has been completed and all aspects of the cleanup operation are in full swing. Lagoon dumping of appropriate materials and crater entombment of radiological contaminated materials are ongoing procedures. A cohesiveness to the operation is now apparent.

There has been a change of command in the JTG and multiple changes of command in the supportive elements. These new faces appear to have brought a high degree of enthusiasm and dedication with them that manifests itself at the lowest echelons. A "can-do" attitude pervades this operation.

The JTG is well aware of the present concern by the Congress and public at large of the safety and welfare of personnel associated with this operation and are cognizant of the special concern about radiation hazards. The RSAIT visits and recommendations have been well received and executed to the fullest extent possible. EAI's, SOPs, documentation and records are a dynamic process and have been accomplished with clarity and relevance. The RCC has fulfilled its function as intended and has become an extremely important managerial tool. The JTG Occupational Safety and Health Committee should gain the same status and utilization. Command emphasis on safety education and compliance with all safety regulations is essential for an effective safety program in all areas of concern.

Overall safety program are apparent everywhere, but still there is a need for strong endorsement and support by the JTG Commander and element commanders for all safety programs. A rise in the number of accidents which have occurred over the last three months attests to the need for continued surveillance.

peculiar to the Atoll. Since the first visit of the Radiation Safety Audit and Inspection Team in August 1977, continuing recommendations have been made to include audio/visual aids to improve the impact of the inbriefing and use of the Pau Hana Club when arriving numbers can accomodated.

B. Findings. The indoctrination briefing has not changed substantially. The important information in the briefing still does not come across. Moreover, the first impression created in the minds of the new arrivals detracts from the professionalism of the personnel associated with the cleanup project.

C. Recommendation.

Incorporate slides, filmstrips, charts, videotapes and/or films into the indoctrination briefing.


II. FRST TRAINING

A. Discussion. The Program of Instruction for arriving FRST personnel combines a forty hour didactic training phase and two weeks of on-the-job training (OJT). During the last visit of the Radiation Safety Audit and Inspection Team visit, a need to improve the attitude of some of the members of the departing team, and presumably the effectiveness of the OJT experience, was highlighted. In addition,

The lesson plans for the didactic phase of the training are nearly completed. CPT Myers and SP6 Ruyter deserve special mention for the excellent quality of the lesson plans they have written.

C. Recommendation.

No recommendations are offered.



JOHN W. DULEY
LCDR, MSC, USN
Director
Radiological Training Department
Port Hueneme

There has been no change in the environmental hazards during the past year. Orientation and inbriefings continue to emphasize the hazard from heat, humidity, the need for particular care to cuts and abrasions, the problems of heat stable toxins in the lagoon algae that are passed up the food chain to edible fish, the need for water safety are all adequately emphasized. A handout on the signs, symptoms and prevention of heat exhaustion and heat stroke are made available to all incoming personnel. Considerable improvement could be made in the indoctrination lecture about poisonous fish by utilizing visual aids.

Environmental monitoring is an active, ongoing program handled with diligence and dedication by the veterinary technician assigned to the dispensary. Water samples, food and kitchen utensil culturing is an integral part of this program. Both the camp at Lojwa and the main base island, Enewetak, are covered on a routine basis and no major problem areas have been elucidated, other than the rodent

infestation on Lojwa which is an ongoing problem but appears to be under reasonable control.

Environmental monitoring appears to be adequately handled and no recommendations are made. Environmental safety continues to be a significant problem on the Atoll and should be included for review by the Atoll Safety Committee at the time of their deliberations each month.

DARRELL W. McINDOE
Colonel, USAF, MC
Director, AFRRI

procedures. In addition, a trip was made on each bulk haul vessel to observe loading, unloading, and transport procedures. Discussions were held concerning procedures with JTG RADCON personnel, FRST senior NCOs, and with the monitors working the hot lines and bulk haul boats.

III. OBSERVATIONS

A. It is felt that the requirement for surgical masks on Enjebi in areas other than soil moving operations is an unnecessary burden on the workers and detracts from the credibility of the remainder of the program. All areas, except the plow experiment,

7
is stated, the requirement for standard masks should
excessive. In addition, the requirement for standard masks should

be at the discretion of the FRST member present based on an evaluation
of air sample measurements and the condition of the soil. However,
as long as this command decision remains in effect, all personnel
should wear masks. Several engineers were observed to don masks
as the inspection team approached and individuals in the soil moving
operation were seen to wear surgical masks instead of full face
respirators as required. Personnel in the field must learn to comply
with command decisions whether they agree or not.

B. In general, the FRST operation is excellent. The morale
of individual members seems high and their attitude toward their
jobs is excellent. The probable cause of this is the stabilization
of missions which has occurred since the operation has gone into
full swing. In general, FRST personnel are assigned to a job on
a continuing basis now and have a chance to learn the peculiarities
of their individual mission and to build a rapport with the personnel
they are supporting. The availability of SOPs, EAI's and specific
instructions for the job being done at the job site is a vast
improvement over what has been observed in the past. The general
and specific job knowledge of FRST members in the field is excellent.

positive, or a hazard is perceived to exist by the PCSI member present, then everyone should acquire respiratory protection immediately.

Our recommendation not to require respiratory protection during the actual hauling operation is based on analyses of 89 air samples collected between 26 March and 28 July 1978. The results of these analyses allow us to conclude that there has not been a radiological inhalation hazard due to ^{239}Pu during this period. The average air concentration determined from these samples is $6.9 \times 10^{-15} \mu\text{Ci/cc}$, whereas the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) for insoluble

plutonium for occupational radiation workers is $4 \times 10^{-11} \mu\text{Ci/cc}$.

This indicates that the average air concentration on the bulk haul to date has been less than 1/5000 of the MPC and five hundred times lower than the action level.

D. The current bioassay program has been reviewed and still appears to be adequate for all field conditions observed during our inspection. A review of all returned analyses on urine samples show no reason to suspect significant internal exposure to date.

E. The Field Radiological Survey Team Operation Data Reports for various islands have also been reviewed for the period January-July 1978. These reports generally give a complete picture of operations and followup actions are typically noted. Laboratory results are generally not noted if they are negative although positive results are noted. This policy is probably adequate although the casual reviewer might think that the case is still pending, whereas, in fact, negative results have been obtained.

F. When the team visited the Enjebi soil excision operation it was noted that the air sampler was non-operational, although the operation was still ongoing. FCRR SOP 608-01 requires at least one air sampler at an earth moving operation. Although the operation should have been halted by SOP, it is felt that the masks being worn by all personnel provided sufficient protection so that the operation could be continued. Investigation indicates that of the 85 air samplers provided, only 27 are operational, two (2) down for maintenance, 14 requiring parts, 24 requiring engines, and 18 salvaged. It is

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Research Associate (Physicist)
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
DOE Representative

RONALD E. SCHAFFER
CPT, CE, USA
Physicist-in-Charge, Reactor
AFRI

ANNEX 3-C: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

I. The following elements of the OSH program were reviewed:

program description, standards and instructions, accident reports, inspection activities, safety related training activities, hazards review, and Safety Committee activities. During this review, discussions were held with the following individuals: MAJ Lloyd Colio (JTG Safety Officer), A.J. Bennett (H&N Safety Officer), Maj Thrash (USAF Element Commanding Officer), Sgt Smith (USAF Element Safety Officer), CDR Coulapides (USN Element Commander), Chief Waller (USN Element), LCDR Rhamey (USN Element Deputy Commander), MAJ Birchfield (Acting Commander, USA Element and Safety Officer), 1LT MacVeigh (USA Element Operations Officer), and Dick Powell (Eberline contractor).

II. Overall, the safety program appears to be satisfactory. A number of Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and Service administrative requirements do not appear to be met. These are discussed in detail below. However, the basic elements of a safety program are actively being pursued within the staffing limitations existing on the Atoll. Of paramount importance is the concern and priority given to safety by the Atoll and Service element commanders. This was reflected both in the knowledge evidenced by by the Service element commanders of the safety program requirements and applicable safety standards and instructions and in the large improvement in the safety conditions of the work environment on the Atoll. Also to be commended is the thoroughness of the medical

detachment in documenting all instances of medical treatment. This serves as the primary source of information on accidents, particularly minor accidents and injuries which do not result in lost time but serve as important indicators of areas of activity possibly needing additional attention. The major recommendation here is that better and more timely use be made of these reports than is presently being done. It is recommended that a daily review of this report be made by the Atoll Safety Officer to assure that work-related reports are brought to the attention of supervisors of related operations in a timely manner. It is also recommended these accident or injuries which are not lost-time accidents but which are "non-trivial"* be investigated and reviewed by the Atoll Safety Committee.

It must be recognized that a number of serious accidents have been occurring on the Atoll. These can only be reduced by alert supervisory personnel, knowledgeable workers, and an aggressive safety program. This is especially true because of the hazardous environment, long working hours, and old equipment in use on this project.

III. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. The description of the Enewetak Safety Program is contained in EAI 5601 (Program for Construction Safety), EAI 5602 (Heat Injuries), EAI 5603 (Occupational Safety and Health), EAI 5604 (Report of Unsafe and Unhealthful Working Conditions) and EAI 5605 (Water Safety).

* "Non-trivial" in the sense that they were not simply due to minor lapse of attention and those that appear to have factors involved which could easily have caused a more serious accident.

B. OPLAN 600-77 calls for "...detailed procedures for coordinating the safety programs of the various services." These procedures generally meet the requirements of the OPLAN and of the various DOD instructions and directives. The primary concern regarding this set of instructions is the lack of a clear description and delineation of safety responsibilities of the Service elements with regard to various operations and various areas of the Atoll. Although this delineation seems to be clear in the minds of the Service element commanders, this should nevertheless be defined in the appropriate EAI, particularly because of the regular turnover in supervisory personnel.

IV. INSPECTION PROGRAM

EAI 5603 appears to require monthly safety inspections of all Atoll activities together with reports of each to the Atoll Safety Officer. This is being done on Enewetak and Lojwa by H&N for fire protection and for H&N activities. Infrequent inspections are being performed by other activities, but it does not appear that this requirement is being met. The Service elements in general emphasize their use of the normal chain-of-command and supervisory responsibilities to meet this end. However, the usefulness of an inspection program, particularly of ongoing activities and not just physical facilities, is well established as well as required by DOD. It is recommended that this program be reviewed, particularly with regard to the frequency requirement, and that a program appropriate to the Atoll activities be instituted.

In most cases the preliminary information collected by the medical personnel provides a sound basis for followup by the appropriate safety officer. However, the reports are not being received by the Atoll Safety Officer soon enough for a timely followup (e.g., they are received monthly). Further, reports are not being received by the Service safety officers so that a matchup with the reports forwarded up the chain-of-command is not possible. Also, to be noted, the Atoll Safety Officer is not receiving all the safety investigations conducted by the Service elements. It is recommended that:

A. The routing of the injury reports from the medical detachment be clarified so that the appropriate personnel receive them on a timely basis.

C. Accident and injury investigation findings be more widely distributed so that all Atoll personnel can benefit from these results.

VII. ATOLL SAFETY COMMITTEE

The Committee is being effectively used as an adjunct to normal operations. The Commanding Officer's daily standup briefing is being used to address immediate items of concern while the Committee appropriately serves more of a review and problem solving function. It is suggested that Committee periodically perform a comprehensive review of the safety program of all Service elements. Also, a review of the recent accident and injury experience and inspection findings should be a part of every meeting.

VIII. ATOLL SAFETY OFFICER AND ATOLL SAFETY COORDINATOR

The Atoll Safety Officer function is essentially a collateral duty of the Atoll Assistant Operations Officer. EAI 5603 indicates that the Base Support Safety Officer will act as the Assistant Atoll Safety Officer (this interpretation is supported by MAJ Toch's

instance, spotters must be used during backing movements of equipment without backup signals and front-end loaders and bulldozers without overhead protection should be restricted to operations where overhead hazards are not present. Compliance with those standards of safe

~~practice applicable to operations (e.g., personal protective equipment,~~
noise, dust, electrical, materiel handling, etc.) is mandatory.

X. SAFETY OBSERVATIONS

In general, the condition of the Atoll with regard to the safety of the operation is greatly improved since the last inspection. Only especially significant observations are presented here.

A. The arrangement for transit from the dock at Lojwa to land continues to be a problem. Because the ramp is not totally compatible with the movements of the docking platform on some occasions it is stored in the raised position. This results in the necessity to jump across a several foot gap to sloping and sometimes wet rocks.

B. The table and radial arm saws cited in the last inspection for lack of guards have been moved to Lojwa and are still without guards. These saws should be removed from service until such guards are installed.

C. Many deficiencies relating to electrical standards were noted. Examples are a power cord stretched as tight as a bowstring; uncovered junction boxes; covers missing from plugs; wiring fed through unprotected penetrations; etc. The humid environment further accentuates electrical problems on the Atoll. Several recent accidents have been electrically related. This problem was particularly evident on Lojwa. It is recommended that a vigorous program of electrical safety be instituted and made a continuing part of all operations.

D. The fire extinguisher program suffers from many deficiencies. The command is having difficulties with unauthorized use (e.g., water battles) of extinguishers, principally on Lojwa. Many extinguishers are not mounted, are in relatively inaccessible locations, or are in improper locations (e.g., too close to the fuel storage area). Most extinguishers had not been checked in the last month and many had been sporadically checked, if at all. Given the general lack

of fire fighting resources, the great abundance of fire extinguishers is a necessity. But they must be available (i.e., at convenient and recognized locations) and operational. It is recommended that this program be thoroughly reviewed.

E. A number of leg injuries have been related to shallow water debris removal. Protective leggings have been ordered. Given the increasing work requirements of this nature, it is recommended that this order be expedited.

F. At the time of the inspection, the DOE contractor (Eberline) could not ascertain what the current face velocities were for the hoods. Apparently they had been measured recently and found satisfactory. It is recommended that the face velocities be checked regularly and the results posted by each hood.

G. It was reported that the k-loader for air transport loading and unloading had hydraulic problems which created difficulties with vertical positioning. This apparently has been reported up the Air Force chain-of-command and a one-for-one replacement is being considered. Given the potential consequences of an accident during aircraft unloading, it is recommended that the condition of this loader be reviewed.

H. Due to a lack of proper facilities, the Naval detachment must do a lot of open air welding. The frequent rainstorms create very wet conditions which make such welding very hazardous. It is recommended that proper facilities be provided for this activity.

K. Improper footwear (e.g., sandals/flip-flops) were observed on several persons involved in activities requiring better protection (e.g., beach debris cleanup, warehousing activities, forklift driving). Although safety shoes are not apparently very available through Army supply channels, it is strongly recommended that an active program to enforce the wearing of military boots be instituted.

L. Personnel were observed during the soil screening operation on Runit working from a rather precarious footing. It is recommended that this be rectified.

M. A storage cabinet for gasoline is located immediately adjacent to an oxygen cylinder storage area at the Navy scuba shop. One of these must be relocated to maintain the proper separation distance.

N. A transfer of a small engine head from the water taxi to an LCU was observed. This was accomplished in a very hazardous fashion by having four men manhandle it from one boat to the other

individual was observed wearing protection). It is recommended that such protection be required until such time that a quantitative evaluation can be done. Even if the measurements indicate otherwise, it is strongly suggested that hearing protectors be made available for voluntary use.



LESTER A. SLABACK, JR.
Head, Radiological Safety Department
AFRRI

ANNEX C: RADIATION RECORDS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Discussions were held with LTC Dodd, CPT Myers and SP6 Ruyter concerning administrative procedures and RADCON records. The RADCON Division is in compliance with guidance and requirements specified in FCDNA OPLAN 600-77, relevant SOPs, EAIs, ARs and directive messages. No major areas of discrepancies were noted.

II. SPECIFIC COMMENTS

A. Central Enewetak Island Files. All 1977 RADCON records are located at the Central Island Files maintained by the Administrative Branch. The FRST monitoring notes and logs are the only 1978 records maintained at the Central Island Files.

B. SOPs. RADCON has published the following fourteen SOPs:

1. 608-01, 21 Jul 77: Air Particulate Sampling Procedures
2. 608-02.1, 3 Dec 77: Debris Survey Procedures
3. 608-03.1, 12 Dec 77: Decontamination of Facilities and Equipment
4. 608-04, 5 Jul 77: Hot Line Procedures
5. 608-05, 5 Jul 77: Respiratory Protection
6. 608-06, 12 Oct 77: Radioactive Source Test Procedures
7. 608-07, 12 Oct 77: Source Accountability and Control Procedures
8. 608-09, 9 Nov 77: Radiological Guidelines for Ground Zero Operations
9. 608-09, 2 Jun 78: Runit Contamination Control Area Procedures
10. 608-10, 2 Jul 78: Decontamination Laundry Procedures
11. 608-11, 17 Jul 78: Disposal of Laboratory Generated Radioactive Waste
12. 609-01, 17 Jul 78: Sample Data Records
13. 609-03, 17 Jul 78: Radiation Control Sample Identification Procedures
14. 609-04.1, 4 May 78: Bioassay Procedures

dosimetry records and logs. The official personnel dosimetry record is DD Form 1141, accomplished in accordance with AR 40-14. On 4 August 1978, RADCON received a directive from the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army assigning an administrative radiation whole body dose to those personnel assigned to Enewetak during the period of 20 June - 20 November 1977.

2. Inventory of Radioactive Sources. All radioactive sources listed on the RADCON inventory sheet were found to be correct. Quarterly inventory records are maintained and include type of source, radionuclide, source strength, location and date of calibration.


3. Listing of radioactive debris and radioactive soil for contaminated islands. These records consist of maps of each island on which annotations have been documented as to debris, level of contamination, etc.

4. Registry of Ionizing Radiation Producing Devices: Two x-ray units are located at Enewetak; one Westinghouse diagnostic x-ray unit and one S.S. White dental x-ray unit. Both units were surveyed in February 1978 by a health physicist from Tripler Army Hospital.

5. Inventory of Non-Ionizing Producing Devices. Two microwave ovens are now present on the Atoll. Neither were listed on the registry for non-ionizing producing devices and have not been leak-tested. RADCON does not have proper instrumentation to do safety checks on microwave ovens.

6. Radiological Survey Reports. Copies of the radiological safety survey reports provided by DOE are filed by island.

7. Monitoring Notes/Logs and Island Visitation Records. Each FRST operation maintains a daily monitoring log and visitation record. These are submitted on a daily basis to RADCON where a typed version of the hand written log is done, returned to the FRST team leader for signature and then returned to RADCON where it is filed. A review of the reports from Runit, Aomon and Enjebi was



14. Inspection Files. Copies of previous inspection reports
were on file.



DAVID HUNTER
Capt, USAF, BSC
Health Physicist
USAF Representative

ENEWETAK INSPECTION TEAM

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USAF	D. HUNTER, Capt, USAF, BSC	School of Aerospace Medicine Brooks AFB, Texas 78235 AV 536-3416
DOE	R.E. GOANS, Ph.D.	Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, TN 37830 (615) 483-8611 ext. 36786

ATTACHMENT 1

Refer to 1st report of the DNA Radiation Safety Audit and Inspection Team for background information on Colonel McIndoe, LCDR Duley and CPT Schaffer. Refer to 2d report, same subject, for background information on Dr. Goans.

Background information on Mr. Siaback and Capt Hunter attached.

ATTACHMENT 2

LESTER A. SLABACK, JR., C.H.P.

EMPLOYMENT

Head, Safety Department, AFRRI	1977-present
Head, Radiological Safety Department AFRRI	1971-1977
Head, Special Projects Division, RADSAFE, AFRRI	1969-1971
Health Physicist, RADSAFE, AFRRI	1965-1969
Physical Science Assistant, S&E Program, US Army	1963-1965

EDUCATION

BS (Physics) BS Math	San Jose State College, 1962
Graduate work	Iowa State University, 1962-1963
	American University, 1964-1966

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

Member, Health Physics Society
Member, American Association of Physicists in Medicine
Member, American Industrial Hygiene Association
Diplomate, American Board of Health Physics
Chairman, Continuing Education Panel, American Board of Health Physics
President, Baltimore-Washington Chapter, Health Physics Society (1974)

DAVID HUNTER, Captain, USAF, BSC

DPOB: 9 January 1945, Hamilton, Scotland

EDUCATION

BS The Medical College of Georgia; Radiology, 1972

MS Emory University; radiological Physics/Nuclear Medicine Physics, 1974

EMPLOYMENT

Instructor, Department of Radiology/Nuclear Medicine, Bowman Gray
School of Medicine, 1974-1977

Consultant, Nuclear Medicine, VA Hospital, Sailsbury North Carolina,
1974-1977

Consultant, Canberra Industries, Meridan, Connecticut, 1975-1977

Health Physicist, USAF Brooks AFB, Texas, 1977-Present

RESEARCH AREAS

Radiation physics, instrumentation, internal dosimetry, computer
applications in nuclear medicine.

PUBLICATIONS

Six publications and one book.

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Society_of Nuclear Medicine
AAPM

REPOSITORY PNNL
COLLECTION Marshall Islands
BOX No. 5686
FOLDER Enewetak Oct-Sept 1978

DOCUMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN ECI

Reviewed by P. X. Schuetz Date 4/30/97