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ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTS ENIWETOK ATOLL

OPERATION SANDSTONE

1948

This document consists of 147 pages. No. 15
of 15 copies, Series 15A

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW 291	
REVIEW DATE: <u>12-15-97</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
THORITY: <input type="checkbox"/> ACC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ADC <input type="checkbox"/> ADD	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>P. L. HUMER</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
REVIEW DATE: <u>6/30/98</u>	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
THORITY: ADD	4. COORDINATE WITH:
NAME: <u>PATRICIA GODIN</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY):

*per DSWA
11/6/57 by AFSWP*

REPORT TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

By

LT. GENERAL J. E. HULL, U. S. ARMY, COMMANDER

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

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VOLUME ONE
ANNEX I — PART I

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INTRODUCTION

This annex contains the operational reports of agencies of Joint Task Force Seven. In general these reports are complete as submitted to the Commander of the Task Force. However, there have been some deletions in order to keep the classification "secret" or lower, to obviate an excess of duplication between different reports and to eliminate unnecessary detail. The unabridged reports will be found in the records of Joint Task Force Seven, in custody of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

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Section III J-3 Section, Hq JTF-7
Section IV J-4 Section, Hq JTF-7
Section V Echelons of Hq JTF-7
 V Oahu Echelon (SANDPIPER)
 V-a Washington Echelon (FLASHING)

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J-1 REPORT - OPERATION SANDSTONE

1. INTRODUCTION:

a. Immediately following the establishment of an office in Washington by Lt Gen Hull in late September 1947, a small planning group was organized, growing later into Headquarters Joint Task Force Seven. On 3 October, Lt Col Peter Schmick, U.S. Army, was designated Assistant Chief of Staff J-1 of this original planning group.

b. Immediate steps were taken to determine the scope of J-1's responsibilities, the problems to be faced, determination of personnel requirements, establishment of policies and procedure, and the most effective means of accomplishing the overall J-1 mission. Concurrent with the development of these subjects, the J-1 staff was planned and requests were made to the three services for qualified personnel.

c. In approaching the overall personnel and administrative problem of the JTF, it was found that records of previous J-1 experience on a Joint Task Force level were almost non-existent. The history of Operation CROSSROADS furnished practically no material from our point of view. Other joint operation material which could be used to furnish an experience table and short cuts in personnel planning was similarly lacking. Consequently J-1 planning resolved itself to established policies and solving and handling Personnel and Administrative matters on the basis of plain common sense. Three objectives were then established as principal goals for the J-1 section:

- (1) Initiation of an adequate personnel procurement program to insure the success of the JTF-7 mission.

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started early in the JIF planning phase. On 27 October, Commander
J.S.C. Gabbert, U.S. Navy, became a member of the J-1 Section and was
charged with the procurement of Navy and Marine Corps personnel and

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liaison with the various agencies of the Department of the Navy including the Marine Corps. Because of the divergence of Naval operations and procedures from those often common to the Army and Air Force; a qualified J-1 Navy officer proved essential. Although additional staff personnel would have been desirable at later stages of the operation, this small compact J-1 staff assisted by two enlisted stenographers and one civilian stenographer, carried out the entire J-1 function throughout Operation SANDSTONE. An organization chart is attached as Incl 1.

3. THE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN:

a. Formulation of an outline for a Personnel and Administration Plan was initiated on 3 October 1947. Although considerable confusion existed at that early date due to the uncertainty of the scope, mission and duration of the Joint Task Force, it was nevertheless apparent that a sound personnel and administrative plan for the JTF was vital. Bearing in mind the objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the solution to a sound plan depended upon finding the answers to two main questions: (1) What policies on personnel and administration were necessary from the Headquarters Joint Task Force Seven viewpoint; (2) What methods should be used to operate the policies.

b. With reference to both of the above questions as previously mentioned, there was very little for the Ass't Chief of Staff, J-1, to go on. The personnel and administration plan adopted by the Joint Task Force was thus in effect "created." This plan was published as Annex I to Field Order #1 early in November.

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c. With reference to the second question, it was decided insofar as practicable to use existing regulations of the services and, most important, to use existing permanent organizations and facilities to carry out the personnel and administration plan. It is considered that this use of permanent organizations was the most important item of the entire Annex. Under this plan the Army Task Group, for example, was attached to USARPAC for personnel administration, the Air Task Group to the Pacific Air Command, and the Navy Task Group to CincPac. Fortunately for our operation, the headquarters of these three major commands were all located on the Island of Oahu, T.H. Other units of the Joint Task Force were similarly attached to permanent organizations.

d. The above arrangements permitted the J-1 and AG Sections of Headquarters JTF-7 to remain reasonably small. As a corollary it avoided the necessity of establishing, what would have been even at best, a large, unwieldy and inefficient joint personnel administrative set-up. It had the advantage of relieving Hq JTF-7 of many personnel and administrative headaches peculiar to each service. It had the advantage also of placing personnel procedures in the hands of those most familiar with them, that is, existing permanent organizations such as the three mentioned above. As a result, the savings in the burdensome work load for the J-1 Section were tremendous.

e. After the plan was drawn up it was submitted to each service for concurrence. The three Departments concurred with minor exceptions. Some of the subjects covered in the plan were also coordinated with Headquarters, Marine Corps.

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4. PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT:

a. General: It was recognized that the procurement of personnel would be a difficult one in view of the shortages in the services, the fact that personnel would be needed on short notice, the time necessary for security clearances, the substantial number of highly specialized individuals required, and changes in operational plans. The program of procurement was therefore initiated at the earliest possible moment, and continued to the time of the tests. It was further recognized that the mere initiation of personnel requests would not satisfactorily accomplish the job. The procurement program must contain energetic and systematic follow-up and check-up measures to insure that the individuals required actually reported on the job. The personnel procurement program can be roughly divided into three phases, as follows:

- (1) Phase I (Prior to 15 Oct): Planning of personnel requirements. Each staff section was requested to submit their staff and operation personnel requirements showing number, grade, service, when and where, and how long required, together with any pertinent shipping instructions, special equipment requirements and any other information effecting procurement. With a few exceptions this planning required no major adjustments during later phases of the procurement program. Resurvey of personnel requirements was made at intervals during these later

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phases to insure that operational plans could be carried out.

- (2) Phase II (15 Oct to 10 Nov): Assembly and review of requirements, determination of service from which personnel were to be procured, coordination with staff section chiefs for further information and submitting personnel requests to the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as to certain non-service agencies. While this program was completed for initial requirements by approximately 10 November, it continued until shortly before the actual test period but on an ever decreasing scale.
- (3) Phase III (10 Nov to March): This phase consisted of follow-up on requests made, initiation of additional requests, selection of personnel, arrangements for specialized examinations and clearances, replacement of personnel withdrawn for security and other reasons, check on non-arrival of personnel as scheduled, and in general a detailed follow through on each personnel procurement action.

b. The above phasing proved quite successful.

c. Difficulties:

There were certain major difficulties which, although surmounted, made the work of procurement burdensome, the writing of orders

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had to be security cleared which required special arrangements to be made for such clearances in many cases long before the personnel had to report for duty with the JTF.

- (3) The dates and places for staging personnel for overseas shipment were frequently indefinite and constantly changing.
- (4) The specialized nature of many of the personnel required, made necessary a large volume of requests by name, examination of records, and additional personal liaison with procuring agencies.

d. Follow-up: Having in mind that failure to secure personnel, properly qualified and available when and where required, would seriously impair the success of the JTF operation, a plan providing for complete detailed follow-up was instituted effective with initial procurements. The follow-up system included the following measures:

- (1) A progress chart showing all stages on all personnel procurement requests in detail was instituted and

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posted daily by recording each action taken.

- (2) All procurement requests were made in writing and one copy was placed in three day suspense. Automatic action and follow-up was thus assured every three days. This procedure was followed until each request had been filled.
- (3) A running list of "things-to-do," was maintained on a day-to-day basis, as further insurance that certain action would be taken which might not readily be indicated from a perusal of the progress chart or the suspense file.

e. Summary: Conclusions drawn from our experience with the procurement program are as follows:

- (1) Plans for personnel requirements can and should be drawn up by all agencies concerned at a very early stage in the general planning phase. Changes in such requirements can be accomplished with little difficulty. If requirements are not planned and requests not placed early in the organizational phase of the JTF, serious procurement failure is possible and even probable.
- (2) Requirements for personnel security clearances must be known early and the time required for such clearances must be considered in the procurement program.

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- (3) Continuous resurvey of personnel needs based upon changes in operational plans must be made.
- (4) A detailed, step-by-step, follow-up procedure of each action taken is probably the most important item in any procurement program. This is especially important in those cases where the time factor is short. A detailed follow-up procedure is mandatory in order to preclude delays which might result in major failures.

5. SPECIAL STAFF MATTERS AND APPENDICES:

a. About 10 October, J-1 submitted a general plan outlining briefly the duties of the various Staff sections of USARPAC, also commanded by General Hull, in connection with Joint Task Force activities and requiring those sections to submit appropriate plans covering their participation in the JTF. This general plan was disapproved on the basis that such action would endanger the security of the JTF Project and that it was accordingly premature. About five weeks later, however, necessary directives were issued to USARPAC, more or less in conformity with the above mentioned general plan. This delay did not prove particularly harmful. The Chaplain, Inspector General, Civilian Personnel Officer, Special Service Officer, Exchange Officer, Troop Information and Education Officer and Judge Advocate General USARPAC were alerted 20 November, placed on additional duty with the Joint Task Force (Forward) and instructed to submit plans. The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-1, left Washington for Oahu on 24 November with the specific purpose

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personally discuss matters with the USARPAC staff chiefs but to actively influence their activities.

b. Special Staff plans for the Joint Task operations and roll-up were issued as appendices to Annex I, Field Order 1 and 2. These appendices included: Information and Education, Judge Advocate, Inspector General, Special Service Officer, Army Exchange and Civilian Personnel.

6. STRENGTH ACCOUNTING:

a. The remarks in paragraph 5 above apply also, generally, to the establishment of a strength accounting system for the Task Force. Before a reporting system could be established it was necessary for J-1 to take a very active part in the matter, including personally making contacts and necessary arrangements with the Navy and Air Force headquarters on Oahu. Under the system finally established, all strength reports were submitted to the G-1 Section, USARPAC. Each Task Group Commander submitted strength reports for all personnel assigned to that

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Task Group. The AG, Headquarters Joint Task Force Seven submitted to G-1, USARPAC, strength reports for all headquarters personnel. Exceptions to this rule were as follows:

- (1) The Commanding General, Pacific Air Command, reported all Air Force personnel overseas who were a part of the Task Force, including personnel of Task Group 7.4.
- (2) The Commander, Task Group 7.4, reported only Task Group 7.4 personnel located in the continental U.S.

All reports were consolidated by G-1, USARPAC, then submitted to J-1 for further distribution to CJTF-7 and to J-4 and J-3. This strength accounting system was extended to include all Task Groups, as they were formed. Initial monthly reports were submitted for Task Groups 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 as of 31 December 1947. The reports were broken down as follows: By unit, by officer, by enlisted by color, by civil service civilians, by other civilians and by locations. Initial reports from Task Groups 7.1, 7.5 and 7.6 were obtained as of 29 February. Rosters were also obtained monthly from all Task Groups, beginning 29 February. These were used for strength accounting checks.

b. Inclosure 2 indicates the maximum strength of the JTF which was attained at the end of March. This enclosure gives a breakdown of the strength by Task Groups and is indicative of the complex organization of the JTF.

7. LEAVES OF ABSENCE AND DELAY ENROUTE:

a. Although the leave regulations of the Armed Forces were based upon the same Leave Act, these regulations varied considerably.

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As an example, the Navy Department and the Marine Corps do not normally permit granting of leave to personnel on a TAD status. Since no one was assigned to JTF-7 but all were on a temporary duty basis except for PACFLT personnel whose permanent organizations were attached to JTF, that policy affected a large number of Navy and Marine personnel. It was accordingly decided, that for morale reasons a uniform leave policy applicable to all service personnel of the JTF should be established in so far as was practicable. It was also considered desirable from a command viewpoint that the JTF and its major comparts have authority to grant leaves and delays enroute to their personnel as a gesture of appreciation for services well performed. It was realized that some Task Force personnel would lose accrued leave because of the timing phase of operation Sandstone. A delay enroute granted personnel on relief from the Task Force, would save them from losing the accrued leave in many cases since such delay could be granted in the release orders. It would not be necessary for the individual to proceed to his home station, request leave and take his chances on getting the request approved. Such procedures would be time consuming, an important factor to those released in our forward areas in June. A delay enroute has an additional advantage in that it permits the individual to spend his leave at such places as he may elect, enroute to his permanent station. Cost of travel to the extent represented by official travel is charged to the government. These two items, for personnel stationed on the East Coast desiring leave on the West Coast, could prove prohibitive.

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AFSWP, for other than inefficiency or disciplinary reasons, could be granted leave or delay enroute, not to exceed thirty days, if accrued enroute to their permanent stations.

AIF Force and all Task Group Commanders were delegated authority to issue leave or delay enroute orders.

- (4) Requests for leaves or delays for all Navy and Marine Corps Officers on TAD status with JTF 7 would be forwarded to Commander Joint Task Force Seven by radio or other expeditious means for clearance with BuPers or Hqts Marine Corps (info CINCPAC when appropriate).
- (5) Leaves, or delays to count as leave, for Naval and Marine Corps personnel permanently assigned to CINCPAC

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and on other than a TAD status with JTF 7 would be granted in accordance with applicable regulations and policies as determined by Commander-in-Chief, Pac Fleet.

8. ORDERS - FISCAL ASPECT:

a. Initially all individuals of the staff were placed on temporary duty or temporary additional duty, Office of Lt Gen Hull or P & O Division, GSUSA. It was essential almost immediately for some of the staff to travel in connection with official business. It was also essential to order some officers not yet connected with the Task Force to Washington for conferences. Since the Task Force had no funds and since most other commands had little or no travel funds, the issuance of travel orders at that time, while absolutely essential, was at the same time almost impossible. At first various agencies of the three services were called upon to issue orders required, with the promise that travel money would be reimbursed. Our promises wore thin in a hurry. As an emergency measure, the Finance Officer, USA, complied with our request to set up a temporary allotment by "borrowing" other funds available to him. This allotment was used by all three services until the AEC transferred funds to the Task Force and actual allotments could then be set up for each service. An emergency travel and per diem allotment should have been established at the very first. This would have avoided a great deal of trouble and would have saved a lot of time.

9. ORDERS - SECURITY ASPECTS:

Due to security restrictions, the issuance of restricted orders

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on individuals proved unwieldy, inefficient, cumbersome and inadequate. The use of code names, of Joint Task Force Seven, or the purpose or mission in our orders was not permitted. Also general destinations only such as "Hawaii and/or other Pacific Ocean Areas" could be used in travel orders. We were initially not permitted even to indicate in the orders who the individual was to report to. The possibility of "losing" people, of never getting them to their ultimate destination using such orders, was great. What should have been a very simple process: ordering people

from "here" to "there" became a most highly complicated and cumbersome procedure. This could in the main have been avoided by issuing Secret orders. It was felt, however, that the use of Secret orders would result in a multitude of security leaks. Secret orders would also have been inconvenient to the individual. The solution as far as J-1 was concerned, was to issue a press release and declassify the Task Force project. Since this was impossible for obvious reasons, J-1 found other solutions. One solution was to issue Secret orders, with Restricted extracts, for air travel to destination west of Hawaii showing destination Kwajalein, a normal ATC and NATS terminal. This procedure avoided delay at Oahu for additional orders on air priorities since the individuals traveled as "through" passengers. The use of Restricted extracts simplified reimbursement procedures for the individuals. Ultimate unit and APO destination were also shown in the Secret orders. As a result of certain downgrading, 20 December 1947, Restricted orders carrying complete information, could be used in most cases. By use of the above and other methods, J-1 was in one way or another, able to get individuals where

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they were supposed to go and working for the unit they were supposed to work for.

10. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES FINANCIAL AGREEMENT:

a. In order to insure the success of the tests, it was essential that many highly skilled civilian scientists be procured by AEC for the project. In order to insure their procurement in large numbers, it was essential that the financial inducements offered to them be adequate. At the same time it was felt necessary that the serious morale problem caused by large differences in existing civilian pay scales in Crossroads should be avoided. A uniform pay schedule for all types of civilians engaged in Sandstone was accordingly established. The agreements finally arrived at in this matter are contained in Staff Memo No. 16.

b. It should be noted that at the time of issuance of Staff Memo 16, the Navy permitted the payment of \$4.00 per day to civilian employees when ashore and \$2.00 per day when afloat. As a result of repeated requests by this headquarters on the Navy Department, the Navy finally increased the per diem rates to correspond to those of the Army.

c. By means of the agreement mentioned above, J-1 was able to establish on the department level as uniform a civilian pay scale as was possible under the law and in accordance with regulations. However, it was discovered that some local regulations conflicted with this agreement. For instance, USARPAC authorized a \$7.00 a day per diem but deducted two-fifths of this amount each time government quarters are occupied. This two-fifths deduction was subsequently changed, as a result of J-1 action to one-fifth, this conforming with the JTF policy. Also, the Pacific

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b. Here again it was necessary for J-1 to affect changes in local policies and procedures. For instance, orders issued by USARPAC in November and December 1947 placing personnel on duty with JTF-7 were so worded that per diem was not payable in most instances. This policy was applied by USARPAC as a general rule to all of their personnel because of lack of sufficient travel funds. The Pacific Air Command had a similar policy. J-1 was able, however, with the concurrences of

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USARPAC and the Pacific Air Command to get all orders issued by them amended to permit per diem payments in all cases allowable under Army and Air Force regulations. About 40 officers were affected.

12. LIQUOR POLICY:

It was decided for obvious reasons that the sale of liquor to personnel of the JTF in the forward areas would be authorized. The provisions of the liquor policy were published in a Confidential limited distribution letter written substantially as below:

"ENIWETOK:

a. Procurement -- The Island Commander Eniwetok is authorized to make cash purchases of such quantities of liquor as deemed appropriate from stocks made available to Iscom Kwajalein by CinCPac.

b. Method of Handling --

- (1) Iscom Eniwetok is authorized to designate one or more individuals to handle the procurement and sale of liquor on the Eniwetok Atoll.
- (2) An operating fund to be known as a Locker Fund for individual purchases of liquor may be established by advance collections of monies from authorized personnel desiring to purchase liquor, such funds to be collected in advance and properly accounted for by the individual responsible to Iscom Eniwetok for the Locker Fund. Money so advanced by personnel desiring to purchase liquor to be refunded by the individual responsible for the Locker Fund when personnel are duly relieved

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from duties at Eniwetok.

- (3) Such Locker Funds as are established are to be separate and apart from the accounts of Officer's and Enlisted Men's Clubs located on the Island. Individuals concerned with such Locker Funds will not be connected with the administration of Officer's and Enlisted Men's Clubs.

- (4) Purchases of liquor will be by the bottle only. Liquor will not be dispensed and sold by the drink. Liquor will be consumed at Officer's and Enlisted Men's Clubs, with facilities to be provided for serving set-ups such as ice, soda, etc.

c. Individuals authorized to purchase liquor -- Sale of liquor is authorized to all commissioned officers and warrant officers (Army, Air Force and Navy), Army and Air Force enlisted men of the first three grades, Chief Petty Officers, and to appropriate civilians connected with Joint Task Force Seven, in quantities as available and under such rationing procedures as the Island Commander may prescribe. No liquor will be sold to minors.

d. Regulations -- Iscom Eniwetok will prescribe such measures as are necessary to regulate and control the procedures outlined above provided such measures are not contrary to existing regulations.

KWAJALEIN:

- a. Joint Task Force personnel will conform with established procedures on the Island.
- b. ComServPac will supply the liquor and ship it to the Navy

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Officers Mess at Kwajalein."

13. APO ESTABLISHMENT:

a. Initial planning for efficient mail service in the forward areas was confronted with many difficulties but all these difficulties were resolved in time. It was decided that for shore based personnel a new APO would be established. It was considered that the use of an established APO would, because of increased volume of mail, much of it showing new unit designations, give away the location of the Task Force operation, the possible scope of the operation and even the general time of the tests. An unused APO unit available at USARPAC was therefore activated. This APO had no printed forms, however such as Money Orders, showing the APO designation. Procurement of these forms from the Postal Department normally takes about 60 days. By energetic action, however, J-1 secured the printed forms in less than a week and just in time to set-up APO 187 on 15 Nov 47 for shore based personnel at Kwajalein and Eniwetok. Afloat personnel used Navy postal designations. On 1 December shore based personnel at Kwajalein used Navy 824. Initially, delivery of some mail was delayed and occasionally some went astray. This was caused mainly by the secret classification of the geographical location of the APO. For instance, mail pouches were permitted to be marked only "APO 187." Some pouches went to Guam and were held in postal installations there since the geographical location of APO 187 was unknown there. Also in this connection, since only the Navy had a Courier Transfer officer at Kwajalein, courier mail went by NATS. Many difficulties were

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thus experienced since Navy regulations require geographical locations to be shown and Navy Postal personnel refused to accept mail not so marked. Accordingly, as much courier mail as possible was dispatched by Joint Task Force personnel going forward. This difficulty disappeared about 20 December when APO geographical locations were unclassified.

b. On 1 Feb 48, APO 187-1 was established at Kwajalein for JTF personnel other than Navy. This action was necessary in order to handle mail of Task Group 7.4 which was scheduled to arrive there in increments shortly after that date.

14. PERSONAL EMERGENCY MESSAGES:

a. Since no commercial facilities for transmitting personal messages were available in the forward areas, the following procedures were established by J-1 with the concurrence of the Chief Signal Officer, U.S. Army, and with the concurrence of commercial cable companies.

b. Personal telegrams originating in the ZI addressed to individuals at APO 187 would be transmitted by commercial radio companies to the Chief, Army Communications Service Division, Office Chief Signal Officer, Room 5D-263, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D.C. for transmission to APO 958. The Signal Officer, USARPAC, APO 958, would transmit these telegrams by secure electrical signal channels, or airmail, as deemed appropriate, to destination.

c. Personal emergency messages originated by JTF personnel outside the continental U.S. would be transmitted by restricted Signal channels to the Chief, Army Communications Service Division, Office Chief Signal Officer, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D.C. and

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forwarded to addressee by airmail unless collect commercial telegram delivery was indicated in the message. All JTF personnel were informed that use of this facility was to be limited to emergencies only, in order not to overburden Task Force signal channels.

d. The Navy has its own system for personnel afloat, whereby messages are transmitted by the ship to San Francisco, where they are then sent to addressees by commercial means.

e. As indicated above, it was necessary, before the above procedures could be placed in effect, to get the concurrence of Western Union Headquarters (New York). The principal question raised by them was whether such messages were taxable, the matter being resolved by our concurring in their applying the tax. The other radio companies were notified accordingly by The Adjutant General.

15. CONTINGENCY FUND:

A contingency fund, to provide for the entertainment of VIP's, was established from AEC funds in the amount of \$400. This project was not handled by J-1 but is mentioned in this report for the possible benefit of the J-1 of a future Joint Task Force.

16. ORIENTATION:

a. In order to inform as many of the JTF personnel as possible as to their connection with Operation Sandstone, three orientation lectures were prepared. They were entitled: "Why Are We Here?", "Something About The Atom" and "Atomic Energy and National Defense."

b. Copies of these lectures were sent to Task Groups 7.2, 7.3,

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7.4 and 7.7; the first lecture to be given by Task Group personnel. The second lecture given by Col Karlstad, HUSARPAC, and the third given by Maj Brose, HUSARPAC, were delivered in the forward areas to Task Group 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.7 personnel.

c. In addition to the above, copies of the summary of the World War II Battle for Eniwetok Island were given to all Task Groups.

d. The Atomic bomb films listed below were also furnished to Task Groups 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.7:

"Tale of Two Cities"

"Operation Crossroads"

"The Atom Strikes"

17. PROMOTION OF EM:

a. In order to minimize the possibility of injustice being done to enlisted men participating in the JTF operation, and at the same time to provide the Task Force Commander with an instrument for rewarding those who rendered outstanding service, a request was initiated to the Army and Air Force Depts that action be taken by them to formulate a policy which would permit promotion of those men who, had they been retained in their parent organizations, would be entitled to promotion. It was pointed out that extended periods of Detached Service for enlisted men was not peculiar to the JTF operation, that such duty had frequently been required of enlisted men in the past and would again be required in the future. It was mentioned that the participating enlisted men, selected for their special ability, are punished for such participation by being denied adequate opportunities for promotion.

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morale stimulant provided by promotions the time and energy consumed by
this one project was considered well spent.

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18. MOVIE AND EXCHANGE AND SPECIAL SERVICES FUNDING:

a. The following agreement was made by the USARPAC Central Welfare Fund with the Army Central Welfare Fund effective 1 December 1947:

- (1) The Army Central Welfare Fund agreed to underwrite the project to the amount of \$20,000, this figure contingent upon several stipulations:
 - a. That the USARPAC Exchange profits in the area of the operation be utilized for the payment of non-appropriated expenses connected with the project.
 - b. That the cost for 16mm movies shown in the area of the operation be chargeable against the Post Exchange profits.
 - c. That Island Welfare Funds be established on the basis of \$1.00 per month per man, 75¢ to go to the Island Fund, and 25¢ to be retained by the USARPAC Central Welfare Fund, to pay for miscellaneous out-of-pocket expenses.
 - d. That if the profits of the Post Exchange in the area were greater than the non-appropriated expenses, that the surplus would revert to the Army Central Welfare Fund. If the profits were insufficient to cover the expenses, the Army

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Central Welfare Fund would make up the difference to the amount of \$20,000.

b. This agreement was initiated in Washington, and referred to USARPAC for approval. This plan was accepted by the Commanding General Joint Task Force Seven, and by the USARPAC Army Exchange Board.

19. PASSPORTS:

a. Having in mind the very substantial civilian contingent of the Task Force, the variety of agencies furnishing civilian personnel, their dispersion throughout the country, and in many cases their movement upon very short notice, it was decided to establish, if possible, a procedure whereby they might travel from the U.S. and from Hawaii, and return, without being required to secure formal passports. To this end a series of discussions were entered into with the Chief, Passport Division, Department of State, and a workable arrangement was made.

b. The general provisions of the agreement were as follows:

- (1) Civilian employees of the armed services, and contract employees, were to be exempt from the requirements for obtaining passports providing they had identification cards and travel orders issued by one of the armed services.
- (2) Each civilian had to present evidence of U.S. citizenship at the time of applying for identification card, this evidence to be in the form of birth or baptismal certificates, affidavits of birth in the U.S., or naturalization papers. The fact of sighting of such

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evidence of citizenship was entered on the identification cards so that the above mentioned papers did not have to be carried by the individual.

- (3) Each Identification Card was to contain the following: Photograph, fingerprint, name and signature of the individual date of birth, weight, height, color of hair and eyes, fact of U.S. citizenship, and signature of the validating officer.
- (4) Lists of such persons showing age and name and address of next of kin were furnished weekly to the Passport Division, Department of State. For those traveling from the U.S. a copy of these lists was furnished to the Collector of Customs, San Francisco, and for those departing from Hawaii, a copy to the Collector of Customs, Honolulu.

20. IDENTIFICATION CARDS:

a. The following policies and procedures for issuing identification cards were established:

- (1) To expedite issuance, the War Department Card was issued to Army and Air Force civilian employees, and the Navy card to civilian employees of the Navy, as a general rule.
- (2) Because of the wide geographical dispersion of the civilians concerned, arrangements were made for the issuance of identification cards by the Army or Navy

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agency located nearest to the place of residence or employment of the individual concerned.

- (3) To further expedite issuance of these cards to AEC employees stationed in the vicinity of Los Alamos, cards were issued to them by this Headquarters.
- (4) Essentially, the information put on these cards was identical to that required by the Dept of State as mentioned above.
- (5) Since these cards were required to be in possession of the individual on his return to the U.S., or to Hawaii as applicable, and since it was anticipated that the JTF to all intents and purposes would be dissolved prior to or concurrently with such return but one identification card problem remained. That problem was how to obtain and then destroy the card after it had served its purpose. This problem was solved as follows:
 - a. Invitational Travel Orders issued to all civilians who had been issued a Navy Identification Card contained a statement that such card must be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations upon return of the individual to the continental U.S.
 - b. The Dept of the Army authorized the member of the scientific staff at Los Alamos, with whom issuance

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ments should be followed in future JTF operations. The utilization of existing Identification Cards of the armed service resulted in a considerable saving in time and effort. The issuance of a special Joint Task Force Identification Card did not prove necessary or even desirable.

21. CIVILIAN TRAVEL ORDERS:

a. In the case of civil service civilian employees of the Armed Forces, travel orders were generally issued by the service or agency employing the individual concerned. As an example of this the Navy Research Laboratory, The Naval Ordnance Laboratory and the Aberdeen Proving Grounds issued travel orders to their own civil service employees. In the case of contract civilian employees, under contract to one of the Armed Services, the service to which such individual was under contract, in general, wrote the orders. In the case of Atomic Energy Commission civilian employees, whether contract or civil service, the invitational travel orders were issued by the Department of the Army.

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b. It was recognized from the very beginning that authorization must be obtained from the Navy Department for Sandstone civilian employees, whether contract or civil service, to travel via Naval aircraft and Naval vessels. One way to accomplish such authorization was to request Navy orders for each civilian in addition to his Army Orders. Such procedure would mean that the majority of civilians connected with Operation Sandstone would necessarily have two sets of travel orders, one set from the Army Department and the other from the Navy Department solely for the purpose of authorizing travel via Naval aircraft and Naval vessel. Obviously, such procedure, would prove very cumbersome and it was therefore decided to initiate a request that Commander JTF-7 be granted permission to authorize travel via Naval aircraft and Naval Vessels, such authorization to be incorporated in travel orders issued to all civilians who were to be employed in connection with Operation Sandstone. A letter dated 14 January 1948 addressed to Chief of Naval Operations, requesting the above mentioned authorization, was answered on 11 February in the affirmative. After obtaining this authorization from the Chief of Naval Operations, invitational travel orders were issued by the Army Department to all civilians connected with Operation Sandstone other than civil service employees of the Navy Department. As an example, Army invitational travel orders were issued to contract employees of the Navy Department under the above mentioned authority.

c. In addition to the provisions normally contained in invitational travel orders issued to civil service and contract employees, the orders issued to Sandstone civilian personnel contained the following:

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- (1) The statement that "Personal Photographic equipment and supplies are prohibited West of Hawaii."
- (2) The statement providing for disposition of the identification card upon completion of operation Sandstone.

d. The invitational travel orders issued by Army Department con-

tained the provisions stated in "c" above and in addition contained:

- (1) Statements providing for the issuance of an identification Card, designation of the issuing authority of such card and a statement requiring entry thereon of the fact of U.S. citizenship.
- (2) The authority to wear, and to purchase items of uniform at Army Post Exchanges and QM sales facilities.

e. Since a large number of agencies issued these orders, the actual form of such orders was usually peculiar to the issuing agency.

f. The same classification difficulties were experienced with invitational type orders as were encountered in military orders, previously mentioned in this report. Another difficulty was caused by the fact that invitational travel orders to civilians often had to be amended, rescinded, and reissued because of changes in plans. Our original program of having such orders issued well in advance had to be dropped because of these changes. Plans were frequently changed on such short notice that orders could not be sent to the individual at his home station but had to be forwarded to him after he had already commenced travel. This always resulted in additional burdensome work and often

primarily concerned, to report.

- (2) Establishment of a Task Force Decorations Board consisting of a Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force Seven, AG recorder, Director, Civilian

c. The above letter also authorized award of a Joint
Force Seven Certificate of Achievement to any military member of the

Efficiency and Fitness Reports in addition to those contained in letter this headquarters 201.61, 20 Jan 48, Subject: "Efficiency and Fitness Reports." It contains certain instructions on submission of recommendations for Medals, Awards and Decorations. It contains instructions on the return of War Department Identification Cards (Form 65) and Navy or Marine Corps Standard Identification Cards. It provides for the roll-up of the postal system (APO 187 and its branches) and finally provides for the disposition of Joint Task Force Seven records. This Annex was complete and proved very useful.

b. Appendices (1 to 5) to Annex I contained brief but complete roll-up instructions on Information and Education, Judge Advocate General, Post Exchange, Inspector General, and Special Service matters.

25. DISPOSITION OF RECORDS:

a. The question of disposition of records was resolved in

the same manner as most other administrative were solved; that is, in accordance with the regulations of the armed service primarily concerned. Special instructions were issued only when the regulations were inadequate from the JTF point of view.

b. With the above as the policy, instructions were issued by J-2 that Atomic Energy Commission Restricted Data was to be returned by the holder to the issuing authority, with the Atomic Energy Commission as eventual destination. It was further decided that histories and operational and special reports not containing scientific or technical information would be transferred to AFSWP. Such reports which contained scientific or technical information would be transmitted to Commander, Task Group 7.1 for screening prior to dissemination. Since Headquarters Joint Task Force Seven records included completely documented operational and special reports and histories of the Task Groups there was no need for storing the remainder of the Task Group records with the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, since this would only clutter up the files. Furthermore, it was felt that most of the Task Group records should be retained by them when the Task Groups "changed hats." As an example, the Air Task Group was furnished almost entirely from the 8th Air Force. When this Task Group returns to the U.S. their records should naturally accompany them. Instructions were therefore issued to the effect that except as indicated above Task Groups would dispose of their records in accordance with the regulations of the armed service primarily concerned.

c. The above policy provided a simple, easy to operate solution to what could have become a complex problem.

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26. ENTRY ON PERSONNEL RECORDS OF PARTICIPATION IN ATOMIC BOMB

TESTS:

a. The three Departments were queried in February as to entries to be made in personnel records, showing participation in Operation Sandstone. Notification was obtained in March from Air Force and Army Departments that they were issuing instructions regarding the following entries under Item 28 WDAGO Form 66 and Item 29, WDAGO Form 20: (See DA Cir 88, 1948)

- (1) Under dates - The inclusive dates during which the individual was assigned, attached or placed on temporary duty with JTF-7 or a subordinate organization, assigned or attached thereto.
- (2) Under duties - "Atomic Bomb Test" (Operation Sandstone) in addition to any specific assigned duty.
- (3) Under organization - "Joint Task Force Seven" to include any subordinate organization assigned or attached thereto.

b. The Navy issued somewhat similar instructions.


GENERAL COMMENTS

27. FIELD ORDER NO. 1 -- RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GENERAL STAFF

WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIAL STAFF:

In writing the Field Order, normal staff procedures were departed from in setting up the General and Special Staffs. The Communica-

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Section 1

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
Before any procurement of personnel can be started initial con-
tacts had to be established with a limited number of authoritative mem-
bers of the armed services and other agencies. These contacts increased
greatly in numbers as time went on. After about three weeks of opera-
tions, Project Officers were designated by each service as centralized
coordinators and trouble shooters. These Project Officers should have
been designated at the very outset. They can be very useful if their
instructions are proper. Their instructions should define their

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responsibilities with respect to the Task Force. In some cases, because of lack of definite responsibilities, some Project Officers were of little or no value.

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ORGANIZATION CHART J-1 SECTION, HJTF-7



STRENGTH REPORT
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

by Task Groups

	OFFICERS		ENLISTED MEN (W)		ENLISTED MEN (N)		CIV (CIV SER)		CIV (OTHER)	TOTAL		GRAND TOTAL	REMARKS	
	Army	Navy	AF	Army	Navy	AF	AEC	Other		Army	Navy			AF
Hq JTF 7	49	40	17	39	11	5		14		88	51	22	175	
Hq AF, JTF 7	1	1	18			15				1	1	33	35	
TG 7.1	37	6	2	45	14		7	50	95	82	20	2	256	
TG 7.2	90	6	2	1303	37	20			4	1393	43	22	1462	
TG 7.3		417			5163						5911		5911	
TG 7.4			254			1399						1654	1654	
TG 7.5	26	16	3	142	100	12				168	116	15	299	
TG 7.6	32	24	12	4	20		4	1	2*	36	44	12	99	*USPHS
TG 7.7			1								1	1	2	In addition 3 Offs & 100 EM attachd fr 7.2
TOTALS	235	511	309	1533	5345	1451	11	65	101	1768	6187	1761	9893	

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time of peace was, in itself, a formidable task. Yet still a greater challenge to efforts of the security planners was to be found in the remoteness of the site selected for the tests. The Eniwetok proving ground was located 4500 miles from the American mainland. This circumstance was to complicate and increase the burden placed on the J-2 Section, particularly as it related to providing the necessary physical security during movement of the fissionable material, weapon components and highly classified scientific equipment from the California coastline to the mid-Pacific operational area. Additionally, the urgent requirements for mounting the operation concurrently with planning presented exceptional problems in establishing the requisite initial security control measures both in the Zone of the Interior and in the forward areas. In essence, the J-2 mission was to safeguard for the period of the operation, at a time when the international situation was tense, the integrity of history's greatest secret.

In the accomplishment of this mission, a comprehensive positive intelligence plan providing for the world-wide collection of intelligence information concerning the activities of unfriendly powers as related to Operation Sandstone was deemed a prime requirement. Would penetration of our security screen by submarine, surface vessels or aircraft be attempted? Would conventional methods of espionage and sabotage be employed? The establishment of channels designed to tap all intelligence resources of the government was therefore undertaken in order to procure information that would assist the J-2 staff in keeping the Commander of the Joint Task Force appropriately informed.

Of not lesser importance was the preparation of a comprehensive counterintelligence plan (embracing all elements of physical, personnel and information security control) designed to screen the operation from hostile penetration or infiltration by forces intent on espionage, sabotage or the outright seizure of fissionable material and its related equipment.

The preparation of these plans received the early consideration of the Joint Proof Test Committee, whose recommendations relative to the overall mission of the Task Force and its initial organization were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 October 1947. For example, certain of the specific J-2 objectives assigned therein were as follows:

- a. ". Implement a detailed program to insure appropriate security clearance of personnel assigned or attached to the

Joint Task Force, as well as for any organization whose contemplated connection with the operation necessitates access to classified information with the operation necessitates access to classified information."

b. ".Maintain physical security of all phases of the operation, to include the guarding of weapons."

c. ".Supervise the implementation of a comprehensive security indoctrination and security training program for all personnel participating in the operation, to include instruction relative to the security classification of all aspects of the operation, general security lectures, security posters and execution of security pledges."

2. Organization.

The J-2 Section of the Joint Task Force was established on 3 October 1947, the date upon which Colonel Thomas J. Sands, GSC (FA), USA, was assigned to duty in Washington as ACoFS, J-2. Immediate action was initiated to obtain J-2 staff officer personnel with prior experience on Operation CROSSROADS. Commander Forrest R. Biard, USN, of the Technical Intelligence Section, Office of Naval Intelligence and Major John B. Gulley, USA, of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, were two such officers selected for duty with the Joint Task Force.

Following the issuance of initial instructions by the Commander of Joint Task Force Seven, Colonel Sands began a thorough survey and study of pertinent Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, conference minutes

of the JTF positive intelligence plan. Formulation and supervision of all JTF security control (counterintelligence) policies and procedures.

Personnel Security Branch

Formulation and execution of the JTF personnel security clearance program and related matters.

Physical Security Branch

Establishment and supervision of all physical security control measures for JTF operations.

JTF information security control policies and procedures and the JTF security training program.

In addition, a small liaison unit from the Office of Security and Intelligence of the Atomic Energy Commission was deemed necessary in

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order to insure that JTF intelligence and counterintelligence planning, policies and operations were closely coordinated with comparable AEC activities in these fields.

At a later date, to more positively provide against the compromise of classified information during the course of its transmission over the JTF communications system, a Communications Security Branch was activated.

J-2 officer personnel, their assigned duties and dates of reporting for duty with JTF-7 are tabulated below:

J-2 Section

Executive Branch

Colonel Thomas J. Sands, USA	AC of S, J-2	3 Oct 47
Colonel Elder Patteson, USAF	Deputy AC of S, J-2	9 Oct 47
Commander Forrest R. Biard, USN	Executive Officer	22 Oct 47
Mr. William E. Moran, Jr.	Chief, AEC Security Liaison Unit	10 Oct 47
Mr. William T. Riley	AEC Security Liaison Unit	27 Feb 48
Mr. Rufus W. Shivers	AEC Security Liaison Unit	25 Feb 48

Personnel Security Branch

Major John B. Gulley, USA	Chief	1 Oct 47
Captain Lloyd D. Roberts, USA	Ass't Chief (Rear)	15 Oct 47
Captain James D. Ramsey, USA	Ass't Chief (Forward)	9 Dec 47
Captain Robert J. Downey, USAF	Member	9 Dec 47

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Physical Security Branch

Lt. Col. Philip R. Cibotti, Jr., USA	Chief	15 Oct 47
Lt. Donald Cefaratti, Jr., USN	Ass't Chief	3 Nov 47

Information Security Branch

Major Herbert J. O'Connor, USA	Chief	9 Dec 47
Captain Albert P. Haynes, USAF	Ass't Chief	27 Nov 47

Communications Security Branch

Commander Paul L. Joachim, USN	Chief	5 Mar 48
Lt. Comdr. Rosser L. Fulford, USN	Ass't Chief	6 Mar 48
1st Lt. Harry T. Danilson, USAF	Member	6 Mar 48
Mr. Cecil Corry, Jr.	Member	6 Mar 48

Concurrently with the organization of the J-2 Section of the Joint Task Force in Washington, and subsequent thereto as J-2 responsibilities became more extensive, J-2 echelons were established at Oahu, Kwajalein, Eniwetok and in Washington to function in advance or upon departure of the main headquarters.

J-2 officers manning these staffs, their designated positions and dates of assignment are as follows:

Rear Echelon, Washington D.C.

Major John B. Gulley, USA	Deputy AC of S, J-2 (Rear)	15 Feb 48
Captain Lloyd D. Roberts, USA	Chief Personnel Security Branch (Rear)	15 Feb 48
Captain Robert J. Downey, USAF	Assistant Chief	15 Feb 48

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the item will not be removed from the "RESTRICTED DATA" classification without authority of the Atomic Energy Commission."

Section II

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The mutual responsibility of the Joint Task Force Commander and the Commission for the successful accomplishment of the operation's objectives further affirmed the necessity for a close liaison between the two organizations.

Mr. William E. Moran, Jr., as Chief of the Joint Task Force Security Liaison Unit was the representative of Rear Admiral John Gingrich, Director of Security and Intelligence for the Commission. J-2 plans and projects wherein AEC approval or concurrence were required or desirable were normally processed via Mr. Moran's unit. Through him also, the AEC Security and Intelligence Branch transmitted its requests to the J-2 Section of the Task Force.

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CHAPTER II

Intelligence Planning and Operations

1. Initial Estimate of the Situation

a. The Potential Enemy

Throughout the planning phases of Operation SANDSTONE in the fall of 1947, the march of events in the world followed a familiar pattern. The United States continued to uphold the cause of democracy and to work for a just and lasting peace. These aims, in conjunction with maintaining our national security, might be said to have constituted our postwar grand strategy. Russia, on the other hand, was seeking to extend her sphere of influence beyond the territorial gains agreed upon at the Yalta conference. Indeed, she had been on the strategic offensive for some time, whereas the United States and Great Britain had been on the strategic defensive. Recently, however, we had assumed the strategic initiative in Turkey and Greece.

Although reduced from a wartime peak of 10,000,000 to an approximate strength of 2,600,000 men, the Soviet Army had become the world's most powerful military force. Russia's navy on 1 October 1947, was estimated to comprise 600,000 men. In its complement of combat vessels at that time were 252 to 274 submarines of which 50 (ex-German) displaced 719 to 769 tons while surfaced and were fitted with schnorkel. Russia's Far Eastern Fleet was believed to have its main base at Vladivostok and to be comprised of the following principal ships; 2 heavy cruisers, 15 to 17 destroyers and 102 to 108 submarines. The Russian Air Force was known to have in operation B-29's built from U.S. models

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which landed in Russia during the recent war.

In atomic research, there were several indications that the Soviets were feverishly exploiting all sources of uranium available to them, and that they had assigned top priority to the development of the atomic bomb. Since only minor local deposits were available within the Soviet Union, uranium areas in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Saxony were being ruthlessly worked during 1946 and 1947. The use of German slave labor with considerable wastage of human life was reliably reported. The recent heavy importations of calcium by Russia from German chemical works could well indicate that the Soviets were on the way to building atomic piles. However, the fact that they had available, after exporting all of Europe's supply, only relatively limited quantities of uranium had interesting implications.

If the U.S.S.R. was to have more than a few bombs, she would be forced to examine the probable efficiency of all available processes for making atomic explosives and to choose the most efficient one. In her efforts to collect scientific intelligence, the determination of those processes which had proved most efficient during the American developmental period would conceivably be an assignment of the greatest urgency. Indeed, the conduct of large scale experiments by the United States at a mid-ocean proving ground would seem to have provided unfriendly powers an uncommon opportunity for observation and for the procurement of photographic, documentary and even laboratory evidence

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which would be useful in shortening the road to the ultimate answer.

b. Capabilities of the Potential Enemy

(1) Acts of War. There was no intelligence available to J-2 which indicated with any degree of probability that Russia, her satellites or any other power would undertake at this time an attack in force against elements of the Task Force. Military undertakings likely to result presently in a formal state of war would most probably be avoided. Notwithstanding the state of political unrest in the world, current American leadership in the field of atomic armaments seemed to offer a powerful deterrent to nations who would otherwise be uninhibited in pursuing tactics of aggression.

(2) Acts Short of War. Undertakings of a clandestine nature calculated to obtain needed scientific or engineering intelligence information for a competing power or to ascertain the true state of American progress in the development of atomic weapons merited high place in the scale of relative probability. On a not greatly lower level of likelihood would be the operations of an unfriendly nation designed to retard development of atomic weapons by the sabotage of key experiments and operations undertaken at great cost to our Government.

In order of their relative probability, lines of action open to an unfriendly power were estimated by J-2 to be as follows:

(a) Reconnaissance

Observations in the operational area conducted by:

1. Submarines with or without small landing parties.
2. Surface vessels.
3. Aircraft.

Such reconnaissance missions could be expected to attempt the collection of information by visual observation, photography or other methods of instrumentation and/or by the theft of classified materiel.

(b) Espionage

Injection into the Joint Task Force of agents with missions of visual observation, photography, the theft or seizure of significant documents, fissionable materials or weapon components; interrogation of Task Force personnel by agents outside the JTF-7 operational area; the accumulation of intelligence from gossip, personal letters and other sources.

(c) Sabotage

Destruction or crippling of critical scientific apparatus or installations by saboteurs; sinking major JTF ships by sabotage methods which would delay indefinitely or force the abandonment of the costly and long planned experimentation.

(d) Conventional Methods of Collecting Intelligence

Monitoring of Task Force radio communications; analysis of newspaper or other public media releases of comments dealing with Task Force operations; monitoring of amateur radio stations, if any, in the forward areas.

2. The Situation During the Operation

a. The International Situation

From 8 March 1948, the date on which General Hull transferred his headquarters to the USS Mt. McKinley at Pearl Harbor, up to the conclusion of the tests, international tension could, in no sense, be said to have lessened. Evidences of the Russian expansionist policy continued to be publicly reported from Finland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Germany and Austria. Within the Western Hemisphere and in uncomfortable proximity to the Panama Canal, the seat of government of Columbia was attacked by revolutionary forces in an uprising abetted and intensified by Communist elements.

However, hostile military activity of sufficient strength and purpose to interfere with the Eniwetok tests did not materialize. The proving ground was constructed, the weapons and the necessary experimental apparatus transported from the mainland to the test sites without interference. The program of experimentation was carried out as scheduled and with no delay or hindrance.

b. The Submarine Situation

Instrument contacts by naval ships of the Task Force and visual sightings by observers on shore and in patrol aircraft were frequently reported to J-2 during the course of the operation. A summary of these incidents is presented below:

:	:	:	: Contact	: ine	Speed 0	:	:
:20 Feb:	0415	:284°, 31 miles	: DE Sonar	: Submerged Submar-		: Probable	:
:	:	:	: Contact	: ine	Speed 7 knots	:	:
:20 Feb:	0751	:280°, 30 miles	: DE Sonar	: Submerged Submar-		: Probable	:
:	:	:	: Contact	: ine		:	:
:22 Feb:	0610	:3 to 6 miles NE	: Shore	: Submarine on Sur-		: Doubtful	:
:	:	: of Parry Island	: Observer	: face		:	:
:24 Feb:	1149	:097°, 17 miles	: DE Sonar	: Submerged Submar-		: Probable	:
:	:	:	: Contact	: ine		:	:
: 3 Mar:	0120	:220°, 20 miles	: Aircraft	: Sub awash; schnor-		: Positive	:
:	:	:	: Visual	: kel up		:	:
:17 Mar:	0901	:East Deep Ent-	: LSM	: Radar contact with		: Doubtful	:
:	:	:rance, 6 miles	: Radar	: unidentified object		:	:
:23 Mar:	2213	:100°, 31 miles	: Aircraft	: Blip; range 20		: Doubtful	:
:	:	:	: Radar	: miles		:	:
:24 Mar:	1357	:Lat. 11 - 20 N	: Aircraft	: Schnorkel		: Doubtful	:
:	:	:Long. 161-40 E	: Radar	:		:	:
:28 Mar:	1929	:147°, 26 miles	: DE Sonar	: 1 minute		: Doubtful	:
:	:	:	: Contact	:		:	:
:	:	:	:	:		:	:
:	:	:	:	:		:	:

All of these reports concerned incidents taking place well within the limits of the Task Force operational area. Indeed, there appeared to be some probability that a determined effort was being made by an unidentified foreign power to reconnoiter the Eniwetok proving ground and to observe the installations located therein.

Systematic and thorough ground and aerial (L-5) security sweeps of the entire atoll disclosed no evidence of landing parties.

c. The Air Situation

There was no evidence of intrusions of foreign aircraft into the

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operational area during the course of the operation.

d. The Surface Situation

Eniwetok Atoll and its territorial waters were declared closed on 1 December 1947. The "Danger Area" of 150 x 200 nautical miles with Eniwetok as the center was announced by the State Department in letters to to the Ambassadors and Ministers of foreign countries, dispatched prior to the press release of 30 December 1947 and became effective 31 January 1948. Unfriendly powers could thereafter be expected to have planned their reconnaissance missions on the assumption that the presence of scouting surface ships within these areas would be promptly detected by our widely disposed patrols.

No verified reports were received at Joint Task Force Headquarters revealing the presence of any foreign surface vessels within the danger area during Operation SANDSTONE.

e. Espionage

No evidence was developed during Operation SANDSTONE indicating that any "AEA Restricted Data" or classified military information under Task Force control was obtained by a foreign power or unauthorized person.

f. Sabotage

The entire operation, from its inception to its completion, was free of any incidents of sabotage.

3. Final Estimate of the Situation

From the foregoing paragraphs, there may be adduced sufficient facts to support a conclusion that submarine reconnaissance of the atomic energy

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the period of the operation. It is conceivably possible that submarine crew members or passengers may have been able to study the more prominent structures comprising the test installations, such as the zero and photographic towers and the housing for timing and other stations. Periscope photographs may have been obtained. However, it is most improbable that observations of this type were productive of any serviceable intelligence information which would be classified "AEA Restricted Data" within the contemplation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. It is believed that the unusually effective defensive measures undertaken by the Naval Task Group (TG 7.3) and by the shore-based echelons of the Joint Security Group (TG 7.5) were successful to a marked degree in keeping submarine intruders at a safe distance or, at least, to reduce their inshore sorties to a minimum.

There has been no evidence thus far disclosed that classified information, either photographic, documentary or material, has been successfully carried away from operational sites, supporting laboratories or headquarters by unauthorized individuals.

The presence of hostile agents within the Joint Task Force itself was an ever-present possibility. However, the rigid screening imposed by the Joint Task Force personnel clearance standards, the formidable nature of travel security controls, the compartmentalization of information and the constant high state of security discipline point to the likelihood that the "take home" yield of information to such operatives

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was small indeed. It is beyond question, that if any retardation effort was attempted, it resulted in complete failure.

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CHAPTER III

Counterintelligence Plans and Operations

The international setting for Operation SANDSTONE as outlined in Chapter II demonstrated to the J-2 planners the urgent necessity for constructing a security screen of the most rigid nature for the projected atomic energy tests. In the event of the loss or compromise of atomic secrets, it would be difficult to overestimate the gravity of the consequences. For these reasons, the most effective possible security controls, checks and safeguards were designed to insure the maximum security for all classified aspects of the operation. Yet, notwithstanding this necessary emphasis on the protective function, counterintelligence plans were so formulated as to result in a minimum of interference with scientific and related activities.

For convenience of treatment, the J-2 counterintelligence program is considered in this portion of the J-2 report under the following headings:

A. Security Control of Personnel: Measures taken to insure that only loyal and trustworthy personnel participated in this operation are herein considered. Procedures adopted to obtain the Atomic Energy Commission's security clearance (based on a complete investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice) for all individuals expected to have access to "Atomic Energy Act Restricted Data" are likewise detailed in this section. Here also the various area and travel control plans established to insure that personnel had entree

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to only as such classified information as was required by the nature of their duties are described.

B. Security Control of Documents, Photographs and Materiel: This section deals with the physical security program or the plan for guarding AEA Restricted Data and other classified physical matter. The subject embraces steps taken for the protection of documents (both printed and photographic), fixed installations (both afloat and ashore) and all classified matter while in transit.

C. Security Control of Information: Here the J-2 program for the prevention of leakage of classified information is surveyed. In addition to a description of the mechanics and criteria of classification, this section contains an account of the security training program together with an appraisal of its effectiveness. Attention is also given to newspaper releases and press coverage of the tests.

D. Security Control of Communications: The J-2 security plans embraced a program of surveillance of JTF-7 communications which is discussed in this part of the operational report.

Security Control of Personnel

1. The Mission of the Personnel Security Branch, J-2 Section

The necessity for mounting Operation SANDSTONE concurrently with the planning of its security aspects created problems of particular urgency to the Personnel Security Branch of J-2. For example, it was essential that newly reporting personnel be assigned immediately for

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duty in the Task Force and before the necessary background investigations and personnel security clearances could be completed. In this connection, it should be noted that an average minimum period of sixty (60) days was required for the accomplishment of a complete background investigation and granting of a "Q" type security clearance. The activation of new organizations of the Armed Forces for service with the Task Force during the planning stages resulted in an intermittent flow of clearance requests that varied in number from day to day. As the necessity for new units became evident, the requisitioning of personnel was stepped up, thus causing, in numerous instances, abrupt increases in the number of requests for loyalty clearances. Due to the demands of the President's Loyalty Program, the investigative load upon the FBI was abnormally heavy in the fall of 1947 and the Joint Task Force was required to share top priority with other agencies seeking early action in personnel security clearance requests.

Under these circumstances, the Personnel Security Branch was faced with the necessity of assuring that:

- a. All personnel assigned to or associated with the Task Force:
 1. Understood the urgent need for safeguarding classified information.
 2. Furnished adequate identifying data (including fingerprints and personal history statements) on which subsequent investigations and clearance decisions would be based.

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2. were denied access to Restricted Data until the necessary clearances had been granted.

b. Maximum cooperation was afforded the FBI and the AEC (Office of Intelligence and Security) for the purpose of obtaining needed clearances in sufficient time to meet critical operational dates.

c. Personnel whose background investigations disclosed evidence of disloyalty or other derogatory information were separated from the Task Force or assigned to non-sensitive duties.

"Knowing who we had and where they were at all times" is the way in which one observer expressed the essence of the Personnel Security Branch job.

2. Indoctrination Procedures.

All personnel reporting for duty with the Task Force for the first time were required to read the penal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and agree in writing not to divulge operational classified information. To establish positive identification of individuals and to afford a basis for background investigation and character appraisal, fingerprints, photographs and personal history statements were obtained from each individual.

3. Personnel Security Clearances

a. Policy. It was essential that operating echelons of the Task Force were not denied the use of assigned personnel during the period required for background investigation. New arrivals were permitted,

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wherever possible, to proceed to their duty stations subject to the condition that access to AEA Restricted Data would not be permitted until an AEC clearance, based on a full background investigation by the FBI, was granted. Where use of AEA Restricted Data was considered necessary from the outset, an emergency or interim clearance by the Atomic Energy Commission was sought.

All personnel who, because of their duties, could be reasonably expected to need access to AEA Restricted Data were required to have "Q" clearances. Organization commanders were charged with the responsibility of determining which personnel required knowledge of such data in the discharge of their duties.

All personnel who would not have access to AEA Restricted Data but who would be assigned or attached to the Task Force subsequent to 1 February 1948, required "P" approval. This type of clearance was based upon a name file and fingerprint check by the FBI. To insure that all personnel stationed in the forward areas were either "Q" cleared or "P" approved, monthly rosters from each of the Task Groups were required.

As the operation progressed, certain collateral tests were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the names of personnel connected therewith who required the use of AEA Restricted Data were transmitted to J-2 for "Q" clearances. Also, the personnel of civilian and service laboratories which became associated with the operation for the purpose of processing scientific film and test and instrumentation reports required clearance where access to AEA Restricted Data was necessary.

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initiated. Of these, 1868 had been granted, 218 were outstanding and 72 had been cancelled.

Of the 218 outstanding requests, approximately 150 already had been granted emergency clearances. The balance of the pending cases were miscellaneous personnel who were able to perform their duties without "Q" clearances and whose investigations were continued since they might require ultimate access to AEA Restricted Data. Because

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the investigative phase of the clearance process consumed an average two (2) months time, personnel assigned to the Task Force after 15 February 1948 were a matter of particular concern to J-2. Some time was likewise required for the evaluation phase of the clearance process. This evaluation was accomplished following receipt of the FBI report by the Personnel Security Branch of the Office of Intelligence and Security of the AEC and was necessary before the clearance required under the Act could be given. In view of these understandable factors of delay, it was nonetheless necessary, in order to meet the critical operational dates, to obtain emergency clearances for all those who could not accomplish their mission without access to AEA Restricted Data. Through the end of February, 1948, only 206 requests had been made for such clearances. By the middle of April a total of 990 emergency clearances had been initiated; 791 had been granted; 24 were not granted or were withdrawn and 17 were still pending.

c. "P" Approval Program. The "P" approval program, although not required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, was established by J-2 for the purpose of insuring a security check by the FBI of all non-"Q" cleared personnel who were required by their duties to be in the forward areas after 1 February 1948. This security check consisted of an FBI fingerprint and name file search. The total of such cases processed to the FBI by the Personnel Security Branch reached a total of 11,810 on 14 May 1948. On that date, 11,281 had been granted.

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A careful analysis of clearance statistics supports the conclusion that all personnel who actually required access to AEA Restricted Data to perform their mission during Operation SANDSTONE had a "Q" clearance. Personnel clearance target dates were met.

d. Disposition of Derogatory Cases. All assigning agencies had been requested by CJTF-7 in October, 1947, to screen the personnel records of individuals being considered for duty with the Joint Task Force in order to eliminate poor security risks before actual assignment to JTF-7. Nonetheless, a moderate number of derogatory cases were developed during the course of investigation initiated by J-2.

1. "Q" Clearances. In 68% of the "Q" type investigations initiated by the Joint Task Force, the AEC granted full clearance without comment. In approximately 30% of the cases, the clearance was given but J-2's attention was invited to derogatory information contained in the report of investigation. For the balance of 2%, "Q" clearance was withheld pending J-2 recommendations.

As a result of these processes of review of evaluation of "Q" investigations, 28 individuals were removed from the Task Force as security risks. Of these, 20 were separated for reasons of character and 8 removed because of Communist affiliations.

2. "P" Approvals. 10 individuals were denied clearance as a result of derogatory information contained in

Most highly guarded of operational secrets were to be concentrated in that type of "inner sanctum" called the Exclusion Area. There were to be "outer sanctums" called the Restricted Area and Danger Areas, where less classified material or information could be witnessed.

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The movement of individuals into such areas or zones was to be the subject of the closest controls. Entrance thereto would be based on the time-proven security principles that:

1. Individuals were to be given access to only so much information as was needed for the accomplishment of their mission.
2. Of these, only individuals whose trustworthiness had been established by proper investigation were to be permitted entry.

These controls could be efficiently administered, it was felt, at travel "gateways" located between the mainland and the operational (danger) area and at the entrances to the smaller control zones, namely the "Restricted" and "Exclusion" areas.

Travel control was to become a highly effective device in the overall J-2 plan for the control of personnel.

b. Gateways. Under the Commander of the Joint Security Group (TG 7.5), travel control units were established at Fort Shafter, Oahu (Hickam Field and John Rodgers Airport) all westbound service and aircraft were met by JTF-7 security representatives. Personnel with destinations in the forward areas were required to show proper travel authority, identification and clearance status. Effective 1 February 1948, personnel for whom "Q" clearances or "P" approvals had not been obtained or initiated were not allowed to proceed beyond Oahu.

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At Kwajalein, M.I., all incoming planes were boarded by JTF-7 security personnel. Travel orders and identification papers were examined. Moreover, aircraft passenger manifests were checked against security briefing.

On arrival at Eniwetok, a similar procedure was followed. In addition, all baggage was checked for personal photographic equipment, firearms and explosives.

Communication between J-2 Rear (Washington), the Oahu, Kwajalein and Eniwetok gateways was continuous and highly effective. J-2 radio dispatches showing the names, clearance status and service of an authorized traveller preceded his arrival at each of these points. As a result, the occasional unannounced arrival became the object of the closest scrutiny and examination.

While 20% of the Joint Task Force strength arrived in the operational area by airlift, the balance of 80% was transported in United States naval vessels and Army transports. Morning reports and musters, as well as carefully controlled shore leave, provided adequate movement controls of water-borne personnel. These personnel were carefully screened again when they went ashore on any island of the Eniwetok Atoll, except Eniwetok Island itself.

c. Control Areas.

1. The four major ships of the Naval Task Group (TG 7.3) presented sizable security problems. In addition to carrying the Headquarters of the Task Force, certain items bearing the highest classification.

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of AEA Restricted Data as well as the forward area scientific and photographic laboratories were located thereon.

Personnel boarding such ships were meticulously checked for identification and orders at the quarterdeck. Their names, mission, time of arrival and departure were entered in the J-2 entry register and thereafter moved under escort while they remained aboard. Entry into "Restricted Areas" aboard ship was had only by black or green badge holders (all "Q" cleared) whose names appeared on J-2 prepared entry lists or those who were in possession of properly authenticated J-2 access permits. Entry into "Exclusive Areas" aboard ship was allowed only to green badge holders (all "Q" cleared) whose names appeared on J-2 prepared entry lists or who were in possession of properly authenticated J-2 access permits.

2. Ashore. The three target islands of Engebi, Aomon and Runit in the Eniwetok Atoll were the focal points of attention by the shore based echelons of TG 7.5. In addition to being "Restricted Areas" themselves, the Zero Tower "Exclusion Areas" were located thereon.

Personnel arriving by water at these islands were "funnelled" through pier head control points where their credentials or travel orders were examined. Here also their names, mission, times of arrival and departure were logged. Those arriving by aircraft were taxied to airstrip control stations where the same procedure was followed. Traffic by L-5 aircraft and helicopters proved to be substantial indeed. To prevent unauthorized ingress into the target islands by air borne arrivals, TG 7.5 representatives at the Eniwetok L-5 terminal

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carefully scrutinized identification credentials before take-off was permitted.

Thus, by a series of successive and thorough security checks at the entranceways of progressively more exclusive security zones, and with proportionately finer gradations of screening, all personnel who were proceeding toward the heart of the operational area were subjected to the closest scrutiny.

d. Musters. At scheduled, although unannounced times, all personnel ashore and afloat were mustered for sight identification and physical count. In addition to the obvious advantage of protecting personnel against physical harm, it provided J-2 the opportunity to check for the presence of unaccounted for or unidentified stragglers and wanderers.

e. Physical Security Checks. All islands in Eniwetok Atoll were subjected to frequent security sweeps at unannounced times by TG 7.5 personnel carried by boat or liaison aircraft.

Thus, a fitting climax was provided for a carefully integrated personnel security control plan designed to prevent the entry of hostile agents to the inner recesses of a mid-ocean laboratory where the nation's most closely held secret was being tested.

5. Termination Procedures.

All personnel departing from the operational area, were required to refresh their memories as to the punitive provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the Espionage Act, and the penalties for making a false official statement. Certificates were required to the effect

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that an individual did not carry any AEA Restricted Data or other classified material unless authorized in writing by competent authority. A departure security briefing, in which the continuing obligation of secrecy was emphasized, was also given by TG 7.5 personnel.

B. The Security Control of Material, Photography and Documents

1. Mission of Physical Security Branch. The primary mission assigned to this Branch of the J-2 Section was to insure the physical security control of AEA Restricted Data during all phases of the Task Force operations. However, this was not its sole task. The protection of military classified matter of certain categories was also made part of its overall responsibility. Not only was it necessary that those areas in which AEA Restricted Data was concentrated be safeguarded, but detailed plans for the surveillance of the environs and approaches to such locations had to be formulated by this Branch. To prevent the penetration of such zones by unauthorized individuals, travel control machinery had to be designed. In addition, for highly classified materiel and documentation being shipped from the mainland to the proving ground or being returned from the theater to laboratories in the United States, a rapid and secure courier system was required and, in order to discharge efficiently this latter function, accounting procedures for documents and photography were devised. Finally, the JTF-7 individual identification badge became a necessary and important security control tool and its manufacture and issuance was made an assignment of the Physical Security Branch.

2. Evolution of Task Group 7.5.

a. Planning. Preparations for the movement of fissionable

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materials, weapon components and related equipment from the Pacific Coast to the Marshall Islands were, of necessity, made in considerable detail. Accomplishment of the other elements of the physical security mission involved the establishment of echelons or control points at Washington, D. C., Long Beach, California, Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H., Kwajalein, M. I., and Eniwetok, M. I. Detachments were also required aboard the 4 major ships of the Naval Task Group (TG 7.3). Thus, security protection was required at points extending over a distance of 7,000 miles. From 15 October 1947 to 29 February 1948, the major effort of this Branch was devoted, therefore, to planning and organization. During that time, a carefully selected group of 50 officers and 220 enlisted men from the Armed Forces, as well as 37 Special Agents of the Army and Air Force Counter Intelligence Corps was assembled. As the special requirements of the several missions assigned to physical security were integrated into an overall plan, it became increasingly evident that an autonomous operations unit would be necessary to deal with all of its far flung assignments. Thus, an organization to be known as the Joint Security Group and numerically designated as Task Group 7.5 was activated. Lt. Col. Philip R. Cibotti, Jr., USA, was designated Commander of the Task Group and Lt. Donald Cefaratti, USN, its Executive Officer. The planning work of the Physical Security Branch of the J-2 Section was largely completed by 29 February 1948 at which time its operational unit, the Joint Security Group, took over its main functions.

b. Organization.

1. The Staff. By 1 April 1948, when full deployment of the

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Task Group 7.5 was achieved, the headquarters thereof was made up of 5 sections; the Executive Section, the Personnel and Administration Section, the Operations Section, the Supply Section and the Identification Section. The organization and functions of these sections were as follows:

- a. Executive Section This unit consisted of the Task Group Commander and his Executive Officer. It exercised the function of command within the limits of its mission and supervised the accomplishment of the implementing objectives assigned subordinate units.
- b. Personnel and Administration Section The Personnel and Administrative Section consisted of 1 officer and 1 enlisted clerk. It was responsible for all personnel accounting, including morning and special muster reports, and the maintenance of daily location charts of Joint Security Group personnel.
- c. Operations Section Two officers and 4 CIC Special Agents made up this segment of the staff. The Section was in turn supported by 2 subordinate units.
 1. The Photo Security Unit which audited, inventoried and shipped photographic film, prints and equipment for the Task Force.

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2. The Courier Service which scheduled and dispatched armed and "Q" cleared couriers to and from the mainland carrying AEA Restricted Data and military classified official communications.

Other functions of the Operations Section were:

1. Air and water travel control.
 2. Security sweeps of Eniwetok Atoll.
 3. Security inspections of installations where AEA Restricted Data was stored.
 4. The conduct of investigations involving security violations.
 5. Preparation of entry lists for Exclusion and Restricted Areas.
 6. Preparation and consolidation of periodic operational reports.
- d. Supply Section The Supply Section consisted of 1 officer and 1 enlisted man. It requisitioned weapons and ammunition and supervised the maintenance and replacement of TO&E equipment.
- e. Identification Section This Section was manned by 2 CIC Special Agents and 1 enlisted man. Its work consisted in the photography of individuals and the manufacture, assembly and issuance of identification badges.
2. Operational Units When complete deployment of all security

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elements of Task Group 7.5 was accomplished, the following alignment of units resulted:

- a. Ship Security Groups Joint Security Group personnel had been assigned, with carefully defined missions, aboard the USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), the USS Curtiss (AV-4), the USS Albemarle (AV-5) and the USS Bairoko (CVE-115).
- b. Island Security Groups Special purpose security control units had also been stationed on the Zero Islands of Engebi, Aomon and Runit, as well as on nearby Parry Island, in the Eniwetok Atoll.
- c. Travel Control Groups Screening detachments were in operation at Oahu, T. H., Kwajalein, M. I., and Eniwetok Island, M. I.
- d. Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Unit. For the protection of particular items of AEA Restricted Data, AFSWP personnel had been assigned to the Joint Security Group.

c. Command Channels. Task Group 7.5 operated under the immediate staff direction of the A.C. of S, J-2. The command of security elements of the Joint Security Group afloat was exercised through the commanding officers of the ships upon which such security personnel were embarked. The command of Task Group 7.5 personnel at Eniwetok and Kwajalein was exercised through the island commanders, CTG 7.2 and CTG 7.7 respectively.

3. The Deployment of Task Group 7.5

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a. Assembly of Personnel. The size of the Joint Security Group was based on a need for an adequate guard over AEA Restricted Data aboard the 4 major ships and on the major operational islands of Engebi, Aomon, Runit and Parry in the Eniwetok Atoll. In addition, personnel was needed to perform courier and travel control duties. Based on these requirements, personnel were requested from the Armed Forces as indicated below:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>S/A</u>
Army	Military Police Company	6	100	
Army	CIC Officers (For special assignments)	6		
Army	CIC Detachment (369th)	5		15
Army (USARPAC)	CIC Detachment (401st)	3		11
Army	AFSWP Unit (For special assignment)	12	20	
Marine Corps	Detachment (For USS Mt. McKinley)	1	3	
Marine Corps	Detachment (For USS Curtiss)	5	24	
Marine Corps	Detachment (For USS Albemarle)	5	24	
Marine Corps	Detachment (For USS Bairoko)	1	1	
Marine Corps	Detachment (For Shore duties)	3	48	
Air Force	CIC Detachment (700-X)	3		11
TOTAL		50	220	37

b. Deployment of the Ship Security Groups. On 31 January 1948, the Executive Officer of the Joint Security Group and the CIC officers selected to be JTF security officers aboard the 4 major ships of the Naval Task Group proceeded by air from Washington, D. C., to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard at Long Beach, California. By 3 February, each of the officers assigned to ships had reported to the commanding or executive

ried material reached these workrooms and storage areas, Marine guards were posted, entrances thereto were limited and the "Exclusion" and "Restricted" areas afloat established.

Throughout the month of February, Task Force photographers engaged in documentary film work were present in the shipyard. All photographs were taken in the presence of a Marine officer. Before and after exposure, film was audited and inventoried by a Task Group 7.5 representative

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who also prepared it for shipment. Thereafter, it was couriered by "Q" cleared Task Group 7.5 personnel to an approved laboratory for development.

c. Deployment of Island Security Groups. Advance elements of Task Group 7.5 reached the forward area on 28 November 1947, when the first troops landed at Eniwetok Atoll. The first security office was opened and staffed by 1 officer and 2 Special Agents of the 401st CIC Detachment. On 13 December 1947, this group was relieved by 2 officers and 2 Special Agents of the same organization. The relieving unit had been assigned the following missions:

1. Protection of technical installations as constructed.
2. Conduct of a detailed security survey of the atoll.
3. Continuance of the "Q" clearance and "P" approval personnel security clearance program.
4. Establishment of rigid air and water travel controls.
5. Continuance of the personnel security indoctrination program.

The group that arrived on 13 December 1947, served as a nucleus upon which the build-up of the Eniwetok Atoll security organization was based. On 8 January 1948, 6 Special Agents of the 700-X CIC Detachment reported to the atoll for duty followed by 9 Special Agents of the 401st CIC Detachment on 12 January and 2 officers with 33 enlisted men of the Provisional Military Police Company on 24 January 1948.

During January 1948, a further deployment was effected when Resident CIC Agents were assigned to Engebi, Acomon, Runit and Parry Islands, to

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be later reinforced by elements of the MP Company. Further organization of zero island garrisons was effected on 26 February, when the Provisional Marine Detachment arrived at Eniwetok. The final security establishment at Engebi Island was made up of 3 officers, 36 enlisted men and 2 CIC Special Agents; at Aomon Island of 2 officers, 38 enlisted men and 1 CIC Special Agent; and at Runit Island of 2 officers 38 enlisted men and 1 CIC Special Agent; and at Parry Island of 1 officer, 13 enlisted men and 1 CIC Special Agent. Additionally, 10 Marines were required for security functions at Eniwetok Island. They furnished the road patrol and the guards for certain storage areas.

By 8 February 1948, when the Commander of Task Group 7.5 assumed command of the forward security elements, all of the missions assigned to the advanced echelon of Task Group 7.5 had been accomplished.

d. Deployment of Travel Control Groups.

1. Oahu. On 18 December 1947, Major John B. Gulley, USA, 1st Lieutenant Henry S. Plandowski, USA, and 2nd Lieutenant Rudolph G. Kellman, USA, proceeded to Oahu, T. H. One of their primary missions was the establishment of an air travel control system at John Rodgers and Hickam Field to screen all personnel moving by air to the forward areas. All arrangements were made and the controls were placed in effect by 12 January 1948.
2. Kwajalein. Captain Richard Potter, USA, was ordered, on or about 15 December, to proceed to Kwajalein for the purpose of setting up security controls over

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special items of AEA Restricted Data. They were initially assigned to "Exclusion Areas" aboard the 4 major ships and, upon the arrival of the Naval Task Group in the forward area, 6 officers and the 20 enlisted men of the AFSWP Unit were assigned the responsibility of guarding the special "Exclusion Area" on Eniwetok Island.

4. The Security of Material.

a. Restricted Areas. In order to reduce to a minimum the possibility of access by unauthorized personnel to classified material, certain areas aboard ship and on shore were designated "Restricted Areas". After specified dates, no personnel were permitted to enter such areas except green and black badge holders, individuals whose names appeared on permanent entry lists furnished by J-2 or on access permits.

1. Aboard Ship. Each of the 4 major ships had offices,

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shops or laboratories that were declared "Restricted Areas". Most of these areas were established in February, 1948, when these vessels were berthed at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard and were being prepared for the accomplishment of their scientific missions as floating laboratories in the forward area.

In a larger sense, each of the 4 major vessels was a "Restricted Area" in itself. As required by J-2, Marine sentries were posted at the ship gangways for the purpose of checking arrivals and departures. Green or black badge holders and those whose names appeared on the permanent ship entry lists were allowed to board or debark freely. All others, except for ship's personnel who were controlled by the ship's Officer of the Deck, were required to register the time of their arrival or departure. In addition, visitors were required to be accompanied at all times while aboard ship by the person visited.

2. On Shore. With the approach of X, Y and Z test days, each of the zero islands was declared a "Restricted Area". On 29 March, Engebi Island was so designated. Aomon and Runit were restricted on 19 April, as well as Parry Island, the site of the firing control station.

Since zero island "Restricted Areas" enclosed a variety of scientific and support activities spread out

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maintained hourly jeep patrols for observation of the entire area and for the inspection of sentry posts and stations. In addition, the following guard posts were established:

- a. Port Control Point. The sergeant of the guard and 2 enlisted men were stationed at the Port Control Point over a 24 hour period. Incoming traffic from the water was stopped here, registered and checked for badges and access permit or entry list authorizations.
- b. Air Control Posts. At the air strips (For small planes of the L-5 type), 1 sentry was stationed from 0700 to 1900 hours. His duties were the same as those of sentries at Port Control Points.
- c. Zero Towers. At least 1 guard was stationed at each of the tower areas over a 24 hour period.
- d. Timer and Blast Stations. 1 guard each was stationed at these installations during the non-working hours of 1800 to 0600.

The disposition of guard stations at Parry Island, site of the firing control station, was similar in many

respects. A Port Control Post of 10 hours, an Air Control Post of 12 hours, a Control Tower Post of 24 hours and a Warehouse Post of 24 hours were operated in the same manner as similar stations on the Zero Islands.

b. Exclusion Areas. Certain areas aboard ship and ashore in which AEA Restricted Data was located were designated "Exclusion Areas". After specified dates, the only personnel authorized to enter an "Exclusion Area" were those black and green badge holders whose names appeared on the permanent entry lists furnished by J-2 or the holders of access permits signed by the Test or Scientific Director and countersigned by a designated J-2 officer. Entry registers were maintained by Task Group 7.5 personnel indicating the identity of authorized badge holders who entered, their badge numbers and the times of their entry and departure.

1. Aboard Ships. Each of the 4 larger naval vessels had one or more "Exclusion Areas". Most of these areas were established during February when the ships were being prepared for their operational missions at Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

2. On Shore. Immediately before the first equipment and material classified as AEA Restricted Data came ashore (prior to X, Y and Z days) the compounds surrounding the zero towers on the target islands were declared "Exclusion Areas". At Engebi Island, the tower area was announced as an "Exclusion Area" on 23 March, at

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Aomon Island on 19 April and at Runit Island on 6 May. The compound was enclosed by concertina wire and lighted at night by flood lights. On 20 March, a special stockade of the Alcatraz type was constructed at Eniwetok Island for the storage of AEC Restricted Data of the highest classification.

c. The Danger Area.

1. Off Shore. Eniwetok Atoll and the territorial waters surrounding the atoll had been declared a "Closed Area". The term "territorial waters" was considered to include that area within 3 nautical miles of the outer shoreline of the atoll. Detailed instructions relative to the maintenance of aerial and surface surveillance over the "Danger Area" outside the "Closed Area" had been issued by CJTF-7 to CTG 7.3 who, in coordination with CTG 7.2 and CTG 7.5 was assigned the responsibility for denying unauthorized entry into the "Closed Area".
2. Atoll Security. All islands of the atoll outside of Eniwetok Island were subjected to weekly inspections or security sweeps by Joint Security Group personnel. The larger islands were inspected by landing parties from boats. The smaller islands, without appreciable vegetation, were visually inspected by helicopter or L-5 aircraft. These sweeps were frequently conducted to discover any unauthorized personnel or any evidences of recent habitation.

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atoll were inspected by Joint Security Group personnel from Eniwetok Island.

5. The Security Control of Photography. In order that there would be no leakage of information from photographic sources to unauthorized personnel or agencies, all photography relating to Operation SANDSTONE was subjected to rigid security controls.

a. Personal Photography. For purposes of simplifying the task of administering such controls, personal photography in the operational area was prohibited. This injunction contemplated not only the making of photographs with privately owned equipment but with cameras issued to members of all government agencies who had not been designated as official photographers or photographic scientists by the Commander of Joint Task Force Seven. The possession of photographic equipment or supplies by other than official photographers or scientists within the operational area was strictly forbidden.

b. Official Photography.

1. Importance of Controls. From the raw materials to the finished product it was imperative that all photographic

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materials within the operational area be maintained under the highest degree of control. It was early appreciated that photography constituted the best grade of intelligence report and that workable but adequate security controls in this field were particularly necessary.

2. Accounting for Film.

a. General. All official film for JTF-7 was supplied by the office of the Santa Fe Directed Operations, AEC. It was shipped by that office to the Central JTF-7 Distributing Point at Bolling Field, Washington, D. C., where it was serialized and recorded in the Master Film Accounting Log before distribution. It was then delivered by JTF-7 official couriers to the official photographer or camera crew chief in the forward areas who recorded its receipt in a Field Issue Log and inventoried by a TG 7.5 representative. The exposed film was turned over by the photographer or camera crew chief to a TG 7.5 representative who, after effecting a thorough inventory of the film against the Field Issue Log, couriered it to Headquarters TG 7.5. Thereafter, it was committed to the custody of courier teams set up by Headquarters TG 7.5 which carried it to the United States. The books and

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film supplies of official photographers or camera crew chiefs were audited and inventoried periodically by the TG 7.5 representatives.

- b. Special Cases. For a limited amount of priority scientific work, film was processed in the forward area laboratory where TG 7.5 monitors were present to control the use of printing paper and film. Thereafter, it was reviewed by the AEC Classification Officer of TG 7.1 in order that it might be given its appropriate security classification.
- 3. AFSWP Photographic Classification Panel. Upon request of the A.C. of S, J-2 in November, 1947, a panel of 3 officers under Lt. Col. W. R. Smith, Jr., CE, was designated by AFSWP to review and assign military security classifications to JTF-7 official photography after review by AEC indicated that the photography did not contain AEA Restricted Data. The AFSWP panel will function both in Washington (still photography) and on the West Coast (motion pictures) until all JTF-7 official photography has been appropriately processed and classified according to the post-SANDSTONE military security classifications.

6. The Security of Documents.

- a. Documents Bearing Military Classifications. Periodic physical surveys were made in the forward areas, both aboard ships and

on shore, to appraise observance of Army Regulations 380-5 and Navy Regulations Article 76. The minor violations reported were thoroughly investigated and prompt, corrective action initiated.

b. Documents Containing AEA Restricted Data. The handling of documents containing AEA Restricted Data was in conformity with AEC regulations GM-2, GM-19, GM-37 and GM-39, except as modified by JTF-7 directives. Special emphasis was given to the matter of document accountability.

1. Control Officers. Each JTF-7 Task Group Commander appointed a Restricted Data Control officer who established an accountability system governing control of AEA Restricted Data within the Task Group concerned.
2. Accountability. All persons reporting for duty were required to register all AEA Restricted Data in their possession with the appropriate Task Group Restricted Data Control Officer. Before leaving the forward area or a ship AEA Restricted Data originated at the operational sites was required to be turned in to the Control officers. Transmittals to the mainland were not permitted without approval by the Scientific Director. Transfer of documents between persons required notification to the appropriate Control officer.

c. Post Operation Summary. As of the date of this report, no documents containing AEA Restricted Data or other classified information are unaccounted for.

7. The Courier Service.

a. Mission. The courier service of the Task Force was organized to accomplish the safe delivery of AEA Restricted Data and other classified matter from the mainland to the forward area and return.

b. Composition. Only J-2 approved personnel were authorized to act as couriers. Insofar as possible, officers, enlisted men and CIC Special Agents of Task Group 7.5 were used for this purpose. Beginning in mid-January 1948, a semi-weekly scheduled courier service was placed in operation from Washington, D. C., to Fairfield-Suisun Air Base, California, and/or Los Angeles, California, Oahu, T. H., Kwajalein, M. I., and Eniwetok, M. I.

c. Briefing. Special attention was given to the matter of pre-departure instructions. All courier teams were orally briefed by a J-2 or Task Group 7.5 representative before take-off. Furthermore, they were required to read the special instructions for couriers and to execute a courier agreement.

d. Storage at Air Terminals. Special depositories for JTF-7 classified material were established at the Fairfield-Suisun Air Base and at Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H., at the former station, a 3-combination safe was set aside in the vault at the passenger terminal. Each courier was required to change the combination before using the safe. A "Q" cleared officer of the Air Base was in charge of the vault.

8. Special Projects.

a. Identification Badges.

1. Mission. The Identification Section, Hq., Joint Security Group was assigned the task of preparing and

issuing various types of badges to certain personnel of JTF-7 in accordance with the clearances they had received and the areas they were entitled to enter by virtue of their duties.

2. Types of Badges. The following type badges were distributed:
 1. Green Portrait Badge. Issued to a very limited number of personnel who had "Q" clearances and who were required by their duties to have access to "Restricted Areas" and "Exclusion Areas". The bulk of these badges were issued to the scientific personnel of Task Group 7.1. In case of the military personnel, only those persons specifically authorized by CJTF-7 were issued a green badge, except for those individuals who were part of the scientific group, in which case CTG 7.1 was to judge the necessity therefor.
 2. Black Portrait Badges. Issued to all officers of the J-2 Section, Joint Security Group and certain civilian security personnel of AEC who were required to have access to any area in connection with their official duties. A "Q" clearance was a prerequisite.
 3. Red Portrait Badges. Issued to all personnel who had a "Q" clearance but whose duties did not require that they have access to "Exclusion Areas".


on the zero Islands up until final evacuation on the test target dates. Additionally, it was charged with the

Army Signal Corps at Guam, a Task Group 7.5 representative was stationed at that island. A "Restricted Area" was set up about the operational site and special guards were provided for the equipment contained therein.

d. Interpreters. A standby staff of qualified linguists who were experienced interrogators in Russian, Polish, German, French, etc., was earmarked for eventualities that might develop during the operation.

C. Security Control of Information

The decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that formal censorship of outgoing personal mail and other communications from members of the



through and skillful security indoctrination. To S-2, it was imperative that a maximum effort be expended to develop in every member of

the Task Force a keen sense of individual responsibility for the safeguarding of classified information.

Reliance on voluntary censorship likewise heightened the importance of classifying military and scientific information in gradations proportional to their varying degrees of value to a potential enemy. The protection of certain categories of knowledge by encasing them in relatively high military security classifications was necessary to lessen the risk of their discussion in outgoing personal correspondence.

These were the basic problems confronting the Information Security Branch. In the paragraphs that follow are discussed the methods selected to effect their solution.

1. Security Education

a. Objectives. To develop a sense of individual responsibility for the safeguarding of classified information, the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, was charged with the responsibility for supervising "the implementation of a comprehensive security indoctrination and security training program for all personnel participating in the operation, to include instruction relative to the security classification of all aspects of the operation, general security lectures, security posters and execution of security pledges."

b. Media. The following methods of accomplishing the indoctrination of Task Force personnel were used:

1. Lectures, panel discussions, "on the spot" briefing and individual instruction
2. Motion Pictures
3. Leaflets

Individual briefings of newly assigned personnel and of persons passing through the air gateways of Kwajalein and Eniwetok were continuous. The motion picture "Tale of Two Cities" (Army - Navy Screen Magazine #74) and General Hull's sound color talk on security were shown a sufficient number of times to be seen by every member of the Task Force in the forward area. By 15 March, J-2 surveys disclosed that leaflets, brochures and posters had been thoroughly spread throughout every unit in the forward area and in the supporting headquarters at Oahu and Kwajalein. Small type posters were affixed at appropriate places on jeeps, airplanes and small boats. Air terminals, post offices, theaters, clubs and similar installations through which large numbers of individuals passed, were selected for the larger type posters. Because of the peculiar vulnerability of telephone circuits, telephone security posters were secured to walls and bulkheads close to each instrument. Brochures were made available to all personnel engaged in the handling, processing and storage of official communications.

d. Departure Briefing. Personnel being separated from the Task Force, both civilian and military, were reminded of their continuing obligation to safeguard military information even after return

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to their home station or community. They were also instructed to report to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any inquiries by suspicious strangers concerning Operation SANDSTONE. These briefings were made the responsibility of the commanding officers of the units and ships.

2. Estimate of the Leakage Situation

a. Personal Correspondence. In the absence of formal censorship, there was no opportunity to conduct an overall evaluation of the extent to which Operation SANDSTONE was discussed in private letters. However, security officers in all ships and units received numerous inquiries from conscientious correspondents who appeared anxious to apply correctly JTF-7 information security regulations. Such questions were so numerous and widespread as to justify the conclusion that the seeds of the indoctrination effort had fallen on fertile ground. Incoming travellers from the mainland reported that the public and the military establishment were, so far as they knew, in complete ignorance of the nature of the test.

b. Press. See paragraph 5, c below.

c. Telephones. The ship-to-shore telephone service (AN-TRC) at Eniwetok Atoll and the internal telephone systems of the major ships and islands were sources of particular concern to J-2. Although close listening units of an unfriendly power could be expected to intercept conversations (only if special equipment were used), the opportunities for intercept by unauthorized listeners within the Task Force itself were great. It is considered improbable that any significant intelligence

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was compromised through these channels. Arrangements were made with the JTF-7 Communications Section for monitoring ship-to-shore traffic and reports from this source were essentially negative.

d. Security Violations. Because of infringements of security regulations vary widely in their gravity, only the relatively more serious offenses are considered herein. This operation had a normal run of minor infractions of Army Regulations 380-5 and Article 76 of Navy Regulations. The only significant violations which were of administrative nature and actually did not compromise classified information, follow:

1. The case of REINHOLD TAJOBURG, PFC, USA (RA 12280756).

On 18 February 1948, the subject soldier, while a patient at the 147th General Hospital, Oahu, T.H. stated in a private conversation reported by Staff Sergeant JACK (NMI) DIGMON, RA 6894803, a fellow patient, that he had taken pictures at Eniwetok Atoll with a small pocket size camera and film he had smuggled into the operational area. Subsequent investigation disclosed that TAJOBURG had taken pictures on Aomon Island, Eniwetok Atoll, at an un-stated date prior to 5 February 1948. It was determined that the film did not contain classified material of any nature. The subject admitted that he had been briefed as to the pertinent security regulations prior to his departure for Eniwetok. Trial by Special Court appointed by the Commanding

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Data classification. As in all military operations, task force military security classifications were susceptible of adjustment as changing conditions required. At the outset, it was the considered judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Operations technical secrets would be best protected by concealment of the following facts:

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1. That Joint Task Force 7 would participate in atomic energy tests;
2. That Joint Task Force 7 would construct a proving ground for such tests;
3. The location of the proving ground;

The decision of the State Department to notify the United Nations Security Council that the United States had closed Eniwetok Atoll for the conduct of atomic test was the first event that necessitated adjustments in the original SANDSTONE military classification criteria. A further change of classification criteria was found unnecessary until completion of the operation itself. Effective at 1200, 18 May 1948, West Longitude Time, the post-SANDSTONE military security classification forms were placed in effect. Only significant details relative to a particular test such as the date, time and exact location within the operational area and estimates of the efficiency or strength of weapons tested remained secret. The detailed composition of the Task Force, the internal organization of Task Groups and the movement directives for troop units and ships were continued as restricted.

b. Downgrading. Throughout the operation, all classified matter was kept constantly under review and downgraded as classification criteria were changed. A Documents Review Board composed of members of the J-2, J-3 and AG Sections was established to downgrade, regrade, or recommend the destruction of documents or materials originated by Joint Task Force Seven Headquarters. The headquarters files were systematically apportioned and reviewed by the board and all downgraded documents were appropriately marked.

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to his Restricted Data Control Officer. If transmittal was required in order to permit completion of the work on the mainland, a transmittal request approved by an appropriate group leader was necessary.

5. Press

a. Policy The release to the public of information relative to the scientific and technical aspects of the operation was, from the outset, the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission. It was anticipated that, from time to time, the release of information on the military participation in the tests might be advisable in view of the

were to be made only with the approval of the Secretary of the Defense in each case. Subsequently Mr. Forrestal delegated to the Commander of Joint Task Force Seven the authority to affirm, deny, or refuse comment on inquiries by the press relative to the military aspects of the operation. The proposed release of information by either the Secretary of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission was to be mutually coordinated. In addition, the concurrence of the Secretary of State was required in the latter case. In view of these agreements and more particularly because the over-all security of the operation was the direct responsibility of the Task Force Commander, his opinion was sought on all proposed releases by any of the interested government agencies.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 coordinated with the staff Public Relations Officer in formulating proposed Task Force policy on the public releases for the approval of CJTF-7. J-2's primary interest was to preserve the integrity of existing categories of military classified information. Particular attention was given to the screening out of any proposed newspaper release, the target dates for particular tests and the general time of tests. Such information, if available to a foreign power, would greatly ease the difficulties in arranging for clandestine observations. From a military viewpoint, it was likewise deemed desirable to deny a potential aggressor any intelligence that would be informative as to the nature of the tests. (i.e. whether underwater, air-dropped, guided missile, etc.) Obviously, his entire thinking at strategic levels would be hampered by the lack of reliable in-

proving ground and construction thereof by a

Task Force under Lieutenant General John E. Hull had been started. Technical operations of the proving ground were to further the peaceful as well as military applications of the atomic energy. Security restrictions would apply. The area was to be closed. Eniwetok was the best site as it involved removal of fewest natives. (AEC Press Release - 1 December 1947)

1. The United Nations Security Council has decided that the United States had closed Eniwetok Atoll. (State Department - 2 December 1947)

2. The Armed Forces were to assist the Atomic Energy

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Commission in conducting the tests. The Joint Task Force organization with principal commander and staff officers were announced. The Scientific Director and the Test Director were also identified. Relations between the Los Alamos Laboratory, AEC and the Armed Forces were discussed. (AEC Press Release - 22 December 1947)

4. Natives had been removed from Eniwetok to Ujelang. Choice was made by natives who appeared fully satisfied. (Navy Press Release - 23 December 1947)
5. A test of an atomic weapon had taken place at Eniwetok. The date of the test was not announced for security reasons. A classified report was being made to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Public issuance of further information was not permitted under the Atomic Energy Act. (AEC Press Release - 19 April 1948)

c. Press Intelligence. The Information Security Branch of the J-2 Section maintained a comprehensive clipping service throughout the course of the operation. This service covered news, editorials and columnist comment in the American Press, radio commentators in the United States and Hawaiian newspapers. It was considered essential to follow carefully the state of public information in order to;

1. Appraise the adequacy of the JTF-7 counterintelligence (particularly information security) measures.

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2. Ascertain sources of information leakage, if any.
3. Adjust classification grades when and if the state of public information so indicated.

For the purposes of summary, press coverage may be divided into: Articles repeating or amplifying official releases; articles speculating as to the time of the test and articles dealing with conjectures as to the nature of the experiments. The first group dealing with authorized information are of no moment here.

Newspaper discussion centering on the exact time of the tests did not succeed in approximating the dates of the test. The most revealing statements on this point appeared during the first week of April. The New York Herald Tribune, through its Washington correspondent, reported on 6 April that "important new developments in atomic weapons will be demonstrated soon to members of the Congressional Atomic Energy Committee who have been invited to fly out to the new proving ground at Eniwetok for the occasion." No specific time was mentioned.

However, on 2 and 3 April, the Washington Post, the Washington Star, the Baltimore Sun and the Dallas Morning News all carried an Associated Press report from Honolulu stating "that initial phases of atomic test may have been under way at Eniwetok for two weeks." All quoted the Honolulu Advertiser whose Staff Writer Buck Buchwach had, on 30 March 1948, reported the prior departure (7 March 1948) of the USS Mt. McKinley and the other vessels from Oahu while 4 Russian merchant vessels were docked at Honolulu. In none of these reportings was there a sufficiently close approximation of test time,

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specifically X day, to afford a hostile power any advantage in observing or "instrumenting" the experiments.

Newspaper speculation as to the nature of the test likewise fell considerably short of the mark. Conjectures of press and radio commentators concerned themselves mainly with deep water tests and guided missile experiments. Ned Brooks in his "Three Star Extra" over the National Broadcasting Company on 2 January thought that the deep water test at Eniwetok was intended to show what will happen to surface ships and submarines. He considered that it would be necessary to assemble a ghost fleet of obsolete ships just as at Bikini. Dr. Frank Thone, Science Service writer of the Washington Daily News in an article dated 28 January in that paper, surmised that "Test Charlie" would be a deep water explosion with the latest type former German submarines as submerged targets. On 27 March, United Press writer Joseph L. Myler expressed the opinion in the New York World Telegram that the Eniwetok test would be a "a pretty deep shot - - - anything from 2000 feet to a mile below the surface."

The Associated Press ventured a somewhat different view. In dispatches date-lined at Honolulu on 7 April, appearing in the Washington Star, Washington Times Herald and Baltimore Sun, their reporter expressed the belief that guided-missile experiments were included in the Eniwetok series. The presence of Brig. General David A. D. Ogden at the proving ground would afford the necessary expert supervision if guided-missile launching sites were to be developed.

Still another theory was offered by the same articles. The expected arrival of Brig. General Roger M. Ramey, commanding a B-29

are not made a part of this report but are discussed in detail in a special TOP SECRET report, copies of which are filed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; the Army Security Agency, Washington, D.C., and the Chief of Naval Operations, (OP-20-K) Washington, D.C.

2. In addition, the Communications Security Branch performed such other functions concerned with communication security as were feasible with the limited personnel and equipment available. The fact that the personnel of the Communications Security Branch were divided into three units which were based at Kwajalein, Eniwetok, and on the USS Mount McKinley, permitted the maintenance of continuous close supervision

were carefully prepared and checked in order to minimize the actual time of transmission, the power used, and the amount of revealing information contained therein. Although the frequency on which these time signals were broadcast was monitored by stations at both Guam and Hawaii, these signals could not be read by the monitoring stations.

5. Plain language voice transmission incident to the final evacuation of each "shot" island were carefully edited and a special check-off list was devised to permit the transmission of the required infor-

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mation and, at the same time, minimize the time of transmission and the amount of revealing information transmitted.

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PART IV

ROLL-UP

A. GENERAL

Annex D - Security, to F. O. No. 2, Headquarters, JTF-7 prescribed the basic procedures governing the return of all J-2 Section and TG 7.5 personnel and their equipment to home station and the execution of appropriate personnel security termination forms by all individuals upon their relief from duty with JTF-7, as well as the approved methods for the accounting and transmittal

of documents and material containing classified matter to appropriate repositories.

B. PERSONNEL SECURITY TERMINATION PROCEDURES

Task Group Commanders and the Chiefs of the General and Special Staff Sections, Headquarters, JTF-7, were responsible that the personnel under their control possessing a "Q" clearance, before being relieved from duty with JTF-7, complied with the following security termination procedure:

1. Returned all documents and material containing AEA "Restricted Data" to the appropriate Restricted Data Control Officer.

2. Executed a Security Termination Statement.

In addition, Task Group Commanders, and the Chiefs of the General and Special Staff Sections, Headquarters, JTF-7, were to insure that all "Q" cleared and "P" approved personnel under their control, upon being relieved from duty with JTF-7, had executed the JTF-7

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Security Agreement.

The execution of the above stated policy was supervised by TG 7.5 representatives aboard ship and at travel control points who insured that the procedures were accomplished and that clearance slips were furnished individuals as they complied with the requirements. In the case of those persons who, in the performance of additional work with JTF-7, required continued access to AEA "Restricted Data", and interim clearance was given which indicated that they were authorized to delay in the accomplishment of the final termination requirements until they had completed their mission with JTF-7.

C. PHASE-OUT OF TG 7.5 PERSONNEL

It was the policy of J-2 to relieve individuals and units of TG 7.5 and return them to their proper duty stations as soon as their services with JTF-7 were no longer required. Pursuant thereto, units of TG 7.5 were relieved from duty with JTF-7, as indicated below:

TG 7.5	O	EM	SA	Mode of Trans.	Date of Relief
369th CIC Detachment	5	--	15	air (couriers)	15 May thru 13 June 1948
401st CIC Detachment	3	--	11	air (couriers)	15 May thru 19 May 1948
700-X CIC Detachment	3	--	11	air (couriers)	15 May thru 7 June 1948

In addition to making any necessary scheduled courier trips from the forward area to the Zone of the Interior, provision was made for the transmittal of photographic film to appropriate laboratories after the arrival of the 4 major naval vessels at Oakland, California and until complete photographic coverage of roll-up activities had

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been obtained.

E. DISPOSITION OF DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL CONTAINING AEA "RESTRICTED DATA"

Task Group Commanders and the Chiefs of the General and Special Staff Sections, Headquarters, JTF-7 were required to insure that all documents and material containing AEA "Restricted Data" held by them was returned to the appropriate Restricted Data Control Officer for transmittal to the office of origin by an approved JTF-7 courier.

F. TG 7.5 EQUIPMENT

Equipment of the units of TG 7.5 was returned in accordance with instructions of the S-4, Island Command, Eniwetok. Each unit was required to crate its own equipment and deliver it to S-4 for shipment whereupon S-4 accepted the responsibility for its return to the Zone of the Interior.

G. "Q" CLEARANCE DATA

The J-2 Section, prior to the dissolution of JTF-7, prepared a final consolidated roster of all personnel, assigned or associated with JTF-7, who received a "Q" clearance during Operation SANDSTONE. Copies of this roster were furnished on 15 June 1948 to all appropriate agencies such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, AFSWP and the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

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program as required by the mission assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Staff were embraced in the completed J-2 plan and implemented during the operation.

2. Personnel procured from the Armed Forces, both for the J-2 Section and for the Joint Security Group (TG 7.5) were uniformly of high calibre and possessed the requisite technical qualifications for duties to which they were assigned. Equipment and supplies for security troops, such as automatic weapons, floodlights and concertina wire, as well as special investigative equipment, proved adequate for all phases of the operation. Although it was difficult to anticipate

* Consolidated for both the J-2 Section, Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven and Task Group 7.5 (Joint Security Group), Joint Task Force Seven.

sufficient intelligence and counterintelligence personnel and equipment were available to satisfy all requirements.

B. Intelligence Planning and Operations

1. The positive intelligence information collection program, established by the Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U. S. Army, upon request of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, utilized the intelligence information collection resources of all appropriate governmental agencies to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, and insured the constant flow of intelligence information relative to Operation SANDSTONE to the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven. CJTF-7 also received timely intelligence information pertaining to the operational area in the Marshall Islands from the Task Groups of JTF-7.

2. Evaluation of all positive intelligence reports relative to Operation SANDSTONE leads to the conclusion that unidentified submarines operated within the Danger Area, but outside the Closed Area, surrounding the Eniwetok Atoll up to as late as March, 1948. It is highly doubtful that such underwater vessels obtained any significant information relative to the atomic energy proving ground.

3. Analysis of all information available to J-2, both from internal and external sources, indicate that no unidentified surface vessels or aircraft operated within the Danger Area and that there

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were no incidents involving espionage, sabotage, or subversion in connection with the operations of the Task Force.

C. Counterintelligence Planning and Operations

1. Security Control of Personnel

a. The extensive personnel security clearance program established for Operation SANDSTONE required that all individuals assigned to or associated with JTF-7 receive an appropriate clearance by the 13,000 individuals were so cleared, of whom more than 1800 received a "Q" clearance which was based upon a full background investigation by the FBI and approved by the Atomic Energy Commission. Of the overall total screened, only 38 persons were denied clearance and access to the project; of these, approximately one third had Communist affiliations, the remainder being removed for character reasons.

b. The "Q" clearance process, which is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, is time consuming and, in order to meet deadlines for the early use of key personnel, resort was made to emergency "Q" clearances with successful results. In general, delays in "Q" clearing members of Joint Task Force Seven were beyond Task Force Control.

c. The personnel security clearances for individuals assigned to collateral projects were, for convenience, processed through the J-2 Section of Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven, and caused some

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administrative difficulties since the clearance requests were initiated late in the operation.

2. Security Control of Material, Photographs and Documents

a. The basic security regulations and detailed physical security control measures for the safeguarding of AEA Restricted Data and classified military material, photography and documents, established by J-2 and implemented by TG 7.5, both on ships and at shore installations, were uniformly effective.

b. The physical security control measures established and maintained for the safeguarding of fissionable material, weapon components and associated equipment during the operation were completely successful. Details relative to these measures, due to their extremely high security classification, are not made a part of this report, but are on file at the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. (Office of the Test Director for Operation SANDSTONE.)

c. That no evidence of espionage, sabotage or subversion, or the inadvertent loss of AEA Restricted Data or classified military matter was noted throughout Operation SANDSTONE, was primarily due to the security discipline and intensive efforts of all JTF-7 personnel. Extremely thorough travel control procedures at successive screening points on the routes to Eniwetok, rigid physical security control measures at all installations and the effective courier system operated by TG 7.5 contributed to this remarkable record.

d. Policies and procedures promulgated by J-2 for the security control of JTF-2 official photography achieved excellent re-

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sults. Personal photography was prohibited west of Hawaii throughout the operation. Only one major violation of this prohibition was noted, and the offender, upon trial by a special courts martial, was sentenced to 4 months hard labor and a two-thirds forfeiture of pay and allowances for a like period. Several minor violations were reported, investigated and appropriate disciplinary action effected.

e. Upon J-2 request, AFSWP has nominated 3 officers to serve as the Photographic Classification Panel which will assign appropriate military security classifications, based on post-SANDSTONE classification criteria, to official photography deemed by the AEC not to contain AEA Restricted Data. This Board will continue to function under AFSWP after dissolution of JTF-7.

3. Security Control of Information

a. Security control procedures established for the safeguarding of information, both of AEA Restricted Data and military security categories, appeared to be highly effective.

b. The relatively few compromises of information security, after thorough investigation, were determined to be of minor character. The limited number of major security leakages of classified military information were from sources not under JTF-7 jurisdiction. No violations of AEA Restricted Data information were noted during the operation.

c. Due to the extremely well conceived JTF-7 security training program which included thorough security indoctrination of all personnel and security lectures, posters, films and training literature, the highest security discipline was noted throughout Operation SANDSTONE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

d. Personnel of JTF-7 cooperated well in exercising voluntary censorship of their personal communications. No evidence exists that classified information of vital nature leaked to the general public through personal communications.

e. Only a local cover plan was utilized in Hawaii to screen the movement of initial construction troops from Oahu to the forward areas, although an approved, overall cover plan for the entire operation was formulated by J-2 in Washington by early October, 1947. The master cover plan was not implemented since an official press release relative to the operation was anticipated momentarily.

f. J-2 constantly endeavored to downgrade the military security classifications of JTF-7 matters. The original planning phase classifications were downgraded substantially in December, 1947. The post-SANDSTONE military security classifications recommended by J-2, were approved by the JCS and AFSWP on 15 May 1948. The JTF-7 Documents Classification Board accomplished downgrading of JTF-7-issued documents after careful review as appropriate.

g. The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 coordinated with the staff Public Relations Officer in formulating proposed Task Force policy on public releases for the approval of CJTF-7. J-2's primary interest was to preserve the integrity of existing categories of military classified information. Particular attention was given to screening out of any proposed newspaper release, the target dates for particular tests, the general time of the tests and any fact revealing the nature

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of the tests. Analysis of representative samplings of American newspaper reports discloses that the press neither approximated the exact dates of the tests nor surmised their exact nature.

4. Security Control of Communications

a. Communications security control policies and procedures produced effective results. It is believed highly unlikely that advance information concerning the dates of the various tests was obtained by foreign communications intelligence analysts. Reports from monitoring agencies and the Army Security Agency, arranged by J-2, consistently indicated that no significant leakages of classified information relative to Operation SANDSTONE occurred.

b. The in-the-clear time signals constituted a definite menace to the security of the time of the tests, however, they were accepted as a calculated security risk which was far outweighed by the personnel safety factors and the scientific test requirements involved. Monitoring stations at Guam and Hawaii were unable to read these signals.

c. VHF circuits were widely used and were monitored within JTF-7 on a spot-check basis for the purpose of maintaining the security standards of information passed thereon. The limited range and irregular, sporadic skip features of this type of circuit furnished a reasonable degree of security.

D. Roll-Up

1. The redeployment of TG 7.5 operational and J-2 staff personnel

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
small group was retained in Oahu to complete this report, and another group in Washington to turn over personnel security clearances and other J-2 records to AFSWP by 15 June 1948.

E. Final Summation

The intelligence and counterintelligence policies and procedures established and implemented by JTF-7 effectively safeguarded all aspects of Operation SANDSTONE, an operation of vital importance to the national security.

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**JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
FINAL STAFF ORGANIZATION, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SECTION**



* COMMANDER TASK GROUP 75
** 9 DECEMBER 47 TO 8 MARCH 48


INCLOSURE I

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WEEKLY STATUS OF "Q" CLEARANCES (CUMULATIVE)

INITIAL TARGET DATE
15 APRIL 1948
X DAY



SOURCES: J-2 WEEKLY STATUS REPORTS, PERSONNEL SECURITY BRANCH STATUS REPORTS

KEY :-

- TOTAL CLEARANCES REQUESTED (INCLUDING EMERGENCY CLEARANCES) ————*
- TOTAL CLEARANCES GRANTED (INCLUDING EMERGENCY CLEARANCES) - - - - -
- TOTAL EMERGENCY CLEARANCES GRANTED ————

Inclosure #2

SECRET

SECRET


**THE SUBMARINE SITUATION
IN THE**

ENIWETOK AREA

(LAT. 14° 18' N, LONG. 169° 40' E TO LAT. 14° 45' N, LONG. 169° 15' E TO LAT. 14° 45' N, LONG. 167° 15' E.)

**DURING
OPERATION SANDSTONE
1 DECEMBER 1947 TO 1 JUNE 1948**

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Inclosure #3

LEGEND

SOURCES :-

- SOMAR CONTACT
- RADAR CONTACT
- SHORE OBSERVATION
- AIR OBSERVATION

EVALUATIONS :-

- POSITIVE
- PROBABLE
- DOUBTFUL

DATES :-

- FEBRUARY
- MARCH


TIME IS EXPRESSED AS DATE TIME

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WEEKLY STATUS OF "P" APPROVALS (CUMULATIVE)

INITIAL TARGET DATE
16 APRIL 1948
X DAY



SOURCES: J-2 WEEKLY STATUS REPORTS, PERSONNEL SECURITY BRANCH STATUS REPORTS

Inclosure #4

KEY:

TOTAL "P" APPROVALS REQUESTED

TOTAL "P" APPROVALS GRANTED

Section II

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J-3 SECTION, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

PHASE I

Planning and Organization

Background: By approval of JCS 1795/1 on 10 September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the organization of a Joint Task Group to provide Armed Forces participation in the proof-testing of certain types of atomic weapons. On 30 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated Lt. Gen. John E. Hull the Commander of this Joint Task Group, with Major General William E. Kepner and Rear Admiral William E. Parsons as his deputies. The directive to General Hull provided that, pending the actual organization of the Joint Task Group, he and the two deputies, together with a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), would serve as a special committee, to be known as the Joint Proof-Test Committee, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The directive further provided that the Joint Proof-Test Committee would draft the necessary policy for: (a) the organization of the Task Group (later referred to as the Joint Task Force in order to conform to standard Army-Navy terminology); (b) the participation of the several components of the Armed Forces; and (c) the recommended action on all aspects of the tests of concern to the Armed Forces.

The J-3 Section, of what was to become Joint Task Force Seven, was activated on October 9, 1947, with the arrival in Washington of Lt. Col. J. K. Woolnough, United States Army, the first member to be assigned to the Section.

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The first task to be accomplished was the preparation of the Joint Proof-Test Committee paper for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The stated purpose of the draft of this paper was to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the policies and outline plan for the organization and operation of the Joint Task Force to conduct proof-tests of atomic weapons. In addition, General Hull directed that the paper would specifically cover the estimated over-all cost of the project over the normal operating expenditures to the services concerned. A preliminary estimate indicated an expenditure of 20 million dollars. Two other vital matters which had to be resolved prior to submission of the paper to the Joint Chiefs were the selection of a suitable test site and the question of relationships and responsibility as between the Task Force Commander and the Directors of AEC activities. With regard to the first matter, ENIGMETOK was selected on the advice of the AEC that it was the only site which would permit full realization of the objectives of the tests. The latter point, which had been raised in a letter dated 7 October 1947, from Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was resolved by adopting Mr. Lilienthal's suggestion that the Test Director would be responsible only to General Hull and not to the JTF-7 Staff.

The various appendices to the JCS paper were prepared by the several general and special staff sections, while J-3 and the Chief of Staff collaborated in writing the draft of the basic paper and assembling it, together with the appendices. The completed draft was reviewed at a conference on the afternoon of 10 October, which was attended by

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the Joint Proof-Test Committee, including Dr. Darol K. Froman as the Atomic Energy Commission representative. A number of amendments were made before the paper was approved by the Joint Proof-Test Committee on 13 October. The next day it was approved by the Planners of the Army, Navy and Air Force, after which it was published as JCS 1795/6. A last minute addition to the paper after its approval by the Planners was a paragraph on the disposition of the surplus property on Eniwetok which had already been sold to the Chinese. This point had previously been overlooked in preparation of the paper, but was most important to the overall security of the project. The solution proposed to the Joint Chiefs involved working out a plan with the Foreign Liquidation Commission either to return this property to American control, to expedite its removal by the Chinese, or to move it to another location.

On 18 October 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations made in JCS 1795/6 with one amendment. The amendment involved the deletion of the line indicating that one of the Deputy Commanders (Admiral Parsons) commanded the Naval Task Group, since Admiral Denebrink had been designated as Naval Task Group Commander by the Chief of Naval Operations in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 16 October 1947, (JCS 1795/7). This change, without a corresponding change in the Air Task Group command channel, resulted in an unbalanced organization which continued to cause some confusion even in later phases of the operation, as General Kepner, on the Air Force side, remained both Deputy Commander and Commander, Air Forces.

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Initial JCS action on the paper was not completed until the 4th of November when the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved General Eisenhower's recommendation that the Chief of Staff, United States Army, be designated as the Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Joint Task Force (JCS 1795/8) and Captain James S. Russell, USN, was designated Test Director for the AEC by JCS 1795/9. Final JCS action on the paper was dependent on AEC concurrence, which was not received until 6 January 1948, due principally to the necessity of coming to a mutually satisfactory agreement as to the responsibility for allowable exposure to radiations. This matter was resolved when the AEC agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this responsibility must remain a function of command.

Upon completion of JTF Staff action on JCS 1795/6, which had received number one priority for preparation, the J-3 Section began to work in to normal J-3 duties. Major General John DeF. Barker, United States Air Force (then Brigadier General), who had been selected as the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3, arrived on 14 October 1947. Two clerk-stenographers, Sgt. Ford and PFC Ganley, arrived on the same day. The new number one priority task assigned the Section at this time was the establishment of service tests desired by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. These were in addition to the tests to be conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission, and required the approval of the Joint Proof-Test Committee. JCS 1795/6 provided that these tests would not interfere with the Atomic Energy Commission tests.

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The urgency attached to this project was occasioned by the necessity of procuring the necessary materials and allocating shipping space to them for their movement to the site. However, as later events developed, it was impossible to firm-up any requirements by 1 November 1947 (which had been established as the deadline date in JCS 1795/6). The delay in firming these requirements was mainly due to three factors: (1) the high security classification of the information desired; (2) the lack of adequate direct liaison between the Joint Task Force and the service agencies concerned, which resulted in the unfamiliarity of the services with the purpose of the test; and (3) the complete lack of technical knowledge of nuclear physics on the part of the Joint Task Force staff. However, at a meeting on October 21, which was attended by all interested agencies, a great deal of progress was accomplished in eliminating duplicating requirements and tests not considered feasible.

Upon the departure of General Hull and his party on a reconnaissance to Eniwetok, work on preparation of a plan to cover the entire operation of the Joint Task Force through the actual test days was initiated by the J-3 Section. It was decided to use the form of an Army Field Order with the necessary Annexes, each Annex to be prepared by the Staff Section having primary interest. A draft of the proposed Field Order, together with four of its Annexes, was prepared and ready for approval upon General Hull's return to Washington on 1 November 1947. With certain changes, it was approved, published, and distributed by the Adjutant General on 14 November 1947. Although frequent later

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changes were necessary, this Field Order gave the first general directive to subordinate units of the Task Force, and proved invaluable in tying together the activities of the various staff sections.

A frank appraisal of the first month of J-3 operations, which might be termed the Planning and Organization Phase, would indicate several changes which might have contributed to the smooth accomplishment of the Section's mission. It is recognized that, due to the high security classification given SANDSTONE at its inception, and the necessity for rapid action to get the project under way, a certain amount of confusion was inevitable. However, in future tasks of this nature, it is strongly recommended that every effort be made to assemble a full J-3 Section, or Planning and Requirements Committee, with representatives from all three services, at the earliest practicable moment. This would result in all members of the Section being thoroughly briefed in the reasons back of the all important early decisions on policy which affect the remainder of the operation. However, the greatest handicap to operations was, and will probably remain in future tests, the high security classification assigned to the operation.

PHASE II

Preparation for the Move Forward

At the beginning of November, the remaining immediate problems to be solved were principally operational and began to shape up as definite cases. Service test requirements in particular became less nebulous,

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for inclusion the proposed Annex C to the Field Order. By 6 November, the Joint Proof-Test Committee had given full approval to three tests to be conducted by the Army and one each by the Navy and Air Force. Conditional approval had been given by the AEC Test Director and J-3 for the conduct of six other tests. (These tests were later approved by the Joint Proof-Test Committee on 15 December 1947, and Annex C was ready for publication.) The AEC Test Director was given responsibility for technical policies and direction of all service tests in order to insure complete coordination and no interference with the primary mission of the Task Force, which was to support the conduct of the AEC tests. Administrative responsibility for each service test was assigned to the appropriate Task Group.

During November work was also initiated on the Evacuation and Re-entry Plans (proposed Annexes G and H to the Field Order). However, these plans could not be completed during this month as they were completely dependent on the Scientific Operations Plan, which was not yet ready. It would have been a great aid to the J-3 Section to have had a Scientific Staff member at this time.

As the part to be played by the military components of Joint Task Force in the forthcoming tests became more concrete in form, it was possible for the various commanders and staff sections to begin firming-up their troop, as well as materiel requirements. All troop unit

requirements were forwarded through J-3, after compilation by the using

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agency. J-3 then forwarded requests for fulfillment of these requirements to the appropriate service (Army, Navy or Air Force) for necessary action. (In the case of requirements for individuals, J-1 was the responsible JTF staff agency.) In some cases it was necessary for J-1 to procure personnel with specific qualifications which were then used to fill units which were activated at the request of J-3, so close coordination between J-1 and J-3 was essential. Since SANDSTONE had been assigned number two priority of all projects then underway by the three services, requests for activation or assignments of units were, in general, filled promptly and satisfactorily. It is believed that the successful accomplishment of the Task Force mission could only have been assured by such an assignment of a very high operation priority. As approved requirements for units were returned through J-3, the Troop List (proposed Annex B to the Field Order) began to take shape. However, it was impossible to complete Annex B during November due to some delay in filling the Air Task Group requirements from the Air Force, where a conflict developed with the 55 Group Program, the number one priority Air Force project.

Admiral Denebrink, who had been designated as Commander of the Naval Task Group, arrived in Washington early in November and while there assumed command of all vessels assigned to CJTF-7. When he returned to Oahu, his Air Officer, Captain Quackenbush, remained in Washington, and took over additional duty as the Navy member of the J-3 Section, JTF Headquarters.

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Allocation of space to the various staff sections on the USS Mt. McKinley (AGC-7), which had been nominated as the headquarters ship for the Joint Task Force by CNO, had been assigned as a J-3 responsibility and in turn was passed to the Navy member of the Section. Captain Quackenbush also took over coordination of the helicopter requirements, and (on 12 December), attended a test at Aberdeen Proving Grounds on control of a drone tank by helicopter which proved this operation feasible.

In a discussion with J-3 on approval of the draft of the Security Annex prepared by J-2 (proposed Annex D to the Field Order) General Hull established the policy which remained in effect throughout the duration of the operation that, in order to maintain a sharp line of demarcation between staff and command responsibilities, staff officers would not also command.

A matter which was to continue to be a problem for several months first came up during November. Whereas at Eniwetok the Task Force was more or less starting from scratch with the movement of the 1220th Provisional Engineer Battalion from Oahu to the Atoll, a completely different situation existed at Kwajalein, where a Naval base already existed and through which both the Air Transport Command and Naval Air Transport Service operated. The support to be rendered SANDSTONE by these agencies required their augmentation, inasmuch as the entire Air Task Group was to be superimposed on the island garrison. This augmentation included stevedores, laundry facilities and air-sea

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Barker, and other staff section heads, thus giving J-3 its first firm basis on which to base the all important Evacuation and Re-entry Plans.

After a conference with General Kepner, Captain Russell and Dr. Graves, it was decided to base the drone airplanes of the Air Task Group

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at Kwajalein, with landings to be made at Eniwetok after each test. The general question of air-sea rescue responsibilities was also discussed as CinCPac has overall ASR responsibilities in the area. An agreement was finally reached between CinCPac and CJTF-7 in early January and was further amended by an on the spot agreement between CTG 7.4 and CTG 7.7 after arrival of the Air Task Group at Kwajalein. It is believed that a much quicker agreement could have been reached had senior officers of the operational headquarters concerned met for an early conference on this matter, their agreement then being forwarded for the necessary higher level approval.

The problem of moving the natives from the Eniwetok Atoll was turned over to CinCPac by directive of the Secretary of Defense. This had been a particularly delicate matter before the Bikini tests. It was undertaken by CinCPac as Civil Administrator for the Pacific area, rather than by the Task Force Commander, whose cognizance in this matter was limited to the Eniwetok Atoll only.

On the 25th of November, Lt. Col. Woolnough departed from Washington for Oahu to set up the J-3 (Forward) echelon there. It had been hoped that the Troop List would be complete by this time, but again it was necessary to set back the deadline date, as the Air Force list was not yet firmed for the reasons before stated.

PHASE III

Movement to the Forward Area

The first weeks in Oahu were more or less on a hand to mouth

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basis as far as J-3 activities were concerned. Previous to the arrival of Lt. Col. Woolnough, J-3 functions were handled by Lt. Col. Huston, who was acting in a dual capacity as a deputy J-1 and J-3. Little actual planning could be accomplished since the decision had been to center this phase of J-3 activities in Washington as long as the AEC scientific staff remained there. However, there were a number of operational details which logically fell to J-3 to work out, and coordination of plans with the local commanders, particularly CinCPac; CG, 7th Air Force and CG, PacDiv, ATC took up a great deal of time.

Immediate and close liaison was set up with the Navy Task Group Headquarters (TG 7.3). Admiral Denebrink (CTG 7.3) housed his staff in CinCPac Headquarters at Pearl, and the physical proximity of this location to Fort Shafter greatly aided close coordination. With respect to the Air Forces, it was not possible to establish such close liaison, as Headquarters, Air Forces, JTF-7 was in Washington and the Air Task Group was being set up from the 8th Air Force at Fort Worth. The Army Task Group (TG 7.2) was already operating in the forward area under Major Hussey, commanding the 1220th Provisional Engineer Battalion. This Task Group passed to the command of Brigadier General D. A. D. Ogden upon his arrival with the detachment of the 2d ESB on 19 December. The physical distance separating these four Task Group Headquarters from JTF-7 Headquarters and Task Group 7.1 made close coordination difficult. This difficulty was further complicated by having two major echelons of the Task Force Headquarters, with the

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operational planning going on in one echelon while the Task Force Commander was usually present at the other echelon. Operational planning had, for the most part, to be carried out in Washington where Task Group 7.1 was located. This Task Group determined the requirements upon which operational planning was based. In an attempt to keep each other adequately informed, a series of informal memoranda were exchanged between General Barker and Lt. Col. Woolnough. These memoranda were in addition to official messages and served a very useful purpose in filling in the background of decisions made by the Task Force Commander on one end and the trends in future planning at the other.

In December, the announcement was made by the United States representative in the Security Council of the United Nations that the Eniwetok Atoll and its territorial waters were closed areas under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement to the United Nations Charter, and subsequently, on December 30th, the area surrounding the Atoll was declared a Danger Area. The general subject of our rights and responsibilities with regard to our Strategic Trusteeships had first come up in Washington during the preparation of the Joint Proof-Test Committee paper for the JCS, and in mid-December a draft order to CTG 7.3 had been prepared by J-3 concerning the conduct of a patrol of the Danger Area and Closed Area. This order was distributed as Operations Order No. 1 on 29 December. However, the sudden declaration of the Closed Area necessitated an urgent addition to the Island Commander's letter

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of instructions reference his responsibilities in enforcing the Closed Area, since adequate Naval Forces were not yet available to establish the off-shore patrol. This addition was prepared by J-3 and dispatched in a radio message due to the urgency of the matter and J-4 took necessary action to provide the garrison with their TC/E arms and ammunition in accordance with General Hull's decision. During the period of operation in two echelons, action was completed on the Troop List, the Evacuation Plan and the Re-entry Plan by General Barker, and the resultant plans were published as Annexes B, G and H to Field Order No. 1.

An illness contracted by Captain Quackenbush in December resulted in J-3 again being without a Navy member until 25 January, at which time Captain C. H. Duerfeldt was transferred from the J-4 Section and immediately departed for Terminal Island to complete arrangements for space allocation on the Command Ship. Action on this matter had been held up by General Barker pending assignment of a Navy member to the J-3 Section.

At the end of December, a study was initiated by J-3 in Washington on the Roll-up Plan. The resultant draft plan was forwarded to Cahu on 7 January, where it was at first taken over as a J-4 matter. However, prior to the end of the month, Lt. Col. L. J. Lincoln was designated Deputy Chief of Staff for Roll-up, and J-3 participated in future work on the plan only as a member of the Roll-up Board which was appointed to coordinate this planning under the supervision of Lt. Col. Lincoln.

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Due to the small size of the J-3 Section, which was engaged in more immediate operational planning at this time, this split in planning enabled Field Order No. 2 to be completed at a much earlier date than would otherwise have been possible.

A new draft of the Scientific Operation Plan was brought to Washington by Dr. Froman in mid-January and, after conferences there, was revised and the re-write carried to Fort Shafter by General McCormack, Captain Russell, and Dr. Froman at the end of the month. General Hull went forward with the party from Oahu, and during the course of the trip to Kwajalein and Eniwetok, the re-written plan was gone over in detail. Upon returning to Oahu, a conference was held and, with certain minor changes, the Scientific Operation Plan (which was given the short title SCOP), was approved by General Hull. This detailed review of the Scientific Plan was of great value to the military staff.

On a trip through Oahu late in January, General Kepner brought with him a letter from Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, strongly urging the support of JTF-7 for a project for long range detection of the shots; the project to be conducted under the auspices of the Air Forces. This was a last minute addition to the military requirements, and it was General Hull's decision that, since his directive from the JCS was for support of the AEC tests, only such support as could be given the Air Force project without detriment to the primary purpose of the operation could be accepted.

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He agreed to certain minor constructions on the Eniwetok Atoll, and also concurred in Admiral Denebrink's assuming operational control of the additional small ships involved. This decision was embodied in General Hull's reply to Mr. Lilienthal, which was hand carried by General Kepner on his return to Washington, and remained the basis for JTF-7 support of the project throughout the remainder of Operation SANDSTONE. A more satisfactory solution of this matter would have been to have the JCS direct the Task Force to assume responsibility for this operation.

After approval of the SCOP in early February, the Chief of Staff decided to have each staff section prepare a check list of the various actions it would be necessary for them to perform during the course of each test, these check lists (later designated MCL's) to be monitored by J-3. The J-3 MCL was compiled from the Operations Plans of all the Task Groups as well as from JTF Field Order No. 1. After initial review of the other staff sections' and the various Task Groups' MCL's, the original decision was altered to relieve J-3 of further responsibility for monitoring, but the J-3 MCL itself was built up to provide a complete scenario of the operation for the ready reference of the Task Force Commander. From this MCL grew the card index system of checking J-3 actions taken or to be taken which will be described in a later section.

During the latter part of his stay in Washington, General Barker acted as Chief of Staff in addition to being J-3, as General Ferenbaugh,

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the Chief of Staff, had departed for Oahu. Lt. Col. K. L. Reaves, USA, who had reported for duty in Washington, was sent immediately to Oahu, reporting in early February.

Control of normal air traffic through Kwajalein was the subject of many conferences both in Oahu and Washington. The solution to this problem was not agreed to until after General Barker's arrival in Oahu at the end of February, and involved stoppage of all traffic during the hours of 0001 to 0800 daily for both April and May. This solution was adopted as it seemed to best fit the needs of security, since stoppage of all traffic during test periods only might have given away the time of the shots, which remained TOP SECRET throughout the operation. The hours selected for closure were determined by requirements for the drone plane operations from Kwajalein.

The limited maintenance and aircraft parking area at Kwajalein could not handle the requirements of TG 7.4 and any large number of B-29's being staged through that place. Accordingly, it was necessary to make special arrangements with Headquarters, U. S. Air Forces to limit the staging of aircraft through Kwajalein.

PHASE IV

Operations in Forward Areas

Headquarters, JTF-7 opened aboard the USS Mt. McKinley (AGC-7) at Pearl Harbor, T. H., effective 0900, 8 March 1948. All members of the J-3 Section (4 Officers and 2 Enlisted Men) were aboard, and for the first time, the Air Force Headquarters, Naval Task Group

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Headquarters, and JTF-7 were set up in the same location. Headquarters, Task Group 7.1 was established on the USS Albemarle and Headquarters, Task Group 7.6 on the Bairoko. The USS Mt. McKinley sailed at 1500 the same date in convoy with the USS Bairoko (CVE-115), USS Curtiss (AV-4), and the USS Albemarle (AV-5) escorted by 5 DD's and with continuous air patrol. A zig-zag course was followed, and the ships were darkened at night. This procedure was directed by the tense international situation at the time and the previous sighting of unidentified submarines in the vicinity of Eniwetok.

During the period March 10 to 12, while enroute to Eniwetok, a command post exercise was held aboard the AGC-7. The purpose of this CPX was to test internal communications, to familiarize the Commanders and Staff with communication facilities available, and to bring out typical situations that might be encountered during the tests. The CPX was set up by Staff Memorandum No. 33, which was prepared by the J-3 Section during the period General Barker was in Oahu. The consensus of opinion seemed to be that the CPX as carried out would have been better had actual times been used rather than following a condensed schedule with "maneuver time".

Following the CPX, a study was made of Field Order No. 1 and Annexes by J-3 and necessary changes were effected to bring the Field Order up to date with current decisions.

The USS Mt. McKinley arrived at Eniwetok Lagoon on 16 March, 1948, and a series of conferences were immediately initiated with the

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scientific staff, from whom J-3 had been more or less isolated on the trip down as the scientific personnel were all aboard the other three ships. As a result of these conferences, there were many revisions to the Evacuation, Emergency Evacuation, and Re-entry Plans and the J-3 Check List (MCL).

General Barker inspected installations and activities of J-3 interest, including a test of the drone tank operations on Engebi Island and drone aircraft operations at both Kwajalein and Eniwetok Islands, soon after arrival of the AGC-7 at Eniwetok. During the later operation, a decision was made to fly the drone aircraft from Eniwetok instead of Kwajalein during Peter X-Ray Day test. It had first been planned to operate all aircraft from Kwajalein where more extensive maintenance facilities were available for electronic and other maintenance work. It also reduced the rehabilitation of housing at Eniwetok. The drone aircraft were to be landed at Eniwetok after each operation because radio chemists needed to remove the contaminated film samples were not available for Kwajalein. The objection to this scheme of maneuver was that good drone operating weather had to prevail at both Kwajalein and Eniwetok to permit proceeding with the test.

Accordingly, on Peter X-Ray Day, tests were made to determine the feasibility of flying the drones manually to Eniwetok the afternoon before each test after final checking-out of all electronic equipment. The drones could then be taken off and landed at Eniwetok. This did prove feasible and this plan of operation was adopted for X, Y and Z Days.

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Red and white alert plans for emergency and for search for unauthorized personnel were formulated and disseminated by Operations Order No. 6, and a white alert (search) was held prior to X-Ray Day to insure that no unauthorized personnel were ashore. However, no further alerts were held because of the interruption caused to the accomplishment of operational tasks.

A breakdown of the Standby Force to remain on Eniwetok and Parry Islands during the actual tests was determined and disseminated to all Task Groups but was subject to many changes. The Island Commander was eventually charged with preparation of the roster for this force, with J-3 authorizing additions as required. The importance of this roster was in the execution of the Emergency Evacuation Plan if this became necessary. A change in the decision reference emergency evacuation was made to provide for evacuation by water transportation rather than by aircraft in view of the large number of personnel involved. This decision was later again modified, prior to Peter X-Ray Day, to provide for the evacuation of all except JTF-7 Air Forces personnel by water, and all JTF-7 Air Forces personnel by air. This latter change was necessitated by insufficient transportation of either type to effect complete evacuation of all personnel ashore in case of emergency.

The Evacuation Plan was also modified, for both security and operational purposes, to provide for an alternate plan to permit the four major vessels (AGC-7, AV-4, AV-5 and CVE-115) to remain inside Eniwetok Lagoon during Peter X-Ray Day, instead of sortieing from the

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Lagoon with the remainder of the ships. This modification was later extended to X-Ray, Yoke and Zebra Days, as control and communications were greatly simplified when the big ships remained in the Lagoon.

The Peter X-Ray test began on 4 April 1948 (PX minus 4 day) with the dispatch of a message by J-3 announcing the weather briefing conference to be held on PX minus 3 day at 1500. The purpose of this conference, as set forth in JTF Operation Order No. 5, was to determine, based on forecasted weather conditions and the state of readiness of all Task Groups concerned, whether the Evacuation Plan was to be executed. (The decision for PX Day was to be affirmative regardless of conditions.) Later experience indicated that the real determining factor in a decision three days before the target date was the state of readiness, as the weather could not be predicted with sufficient accuracy for a firm decision until the minus one day conference.

Operations during the Peter X-Ray Test period were carried out in a realistic manner. Detailed plans were executed precisely and in accordance with approved time schedules. Peter X-Ray Day was a full dress rehearsal with no omissions except the firing of the actual shot, which was simulated at H Hour by the firing of flash bulbs in order to aid orientation of cameras. From the J-3 viewpoint, the MCL was an invaluable aid in checking required actions and following the overall operations. A card index system was used, with a card for each item on the MCL. Actions taken were also entered on the cards, so at the end of the test, a complete record was available in

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have been expected. The re-entry was not handicapped by radiological conditions and was accomplished with greater speed than anticipated.

The week following the first shot was utilized by J-3 principally in Post-Sandstone planning. The first requirement was to attempt to

the draft JCS paper as prepared by J-5, which provided for later determination of the necessity for filling each crater. CinCPac concurred in this paper two days later, and General Wedemeyer was asked by radio to present it for appropriate JCS action.

The problem then remaining was what steps were necessary to remove from the various service test structures any evidence of the blast which might be considered AEA Restricted Data under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act. As a result of a conference held on 23 April, General Hull approved a directive to General Ogden to move all the

to proceed with the Evacuation Plan. The four big ships were to remain inside the Lagoon as on X-Ray Day.

Here it is appropriate to mention the conditions which had to prevail if the test was to produce the best results with maximum safety to personnel and equipment.

First, the winds at all altitudes had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the chances of a "fall-out" of radioactive particles from the atomic cloud on the ships and Parry and Eniwetok Islands. This is covered more completely in the report of the Radiologist so it suffices to say here that light, variable winds which made forecasting more difficult and winds with a northerly component presented unfavorable conditions for firing.

Second, clouds which interfered with the visual direction of drone aircraft through the atomic cloud made firing conditions unfavorable. Additionally, too large a percentage of cloud cover

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interfered with aerial photography but as the latter was not an absolute essential to scientific recording, this risk could be taken.

Third, rain showers, which could be predicted as "few and scattered", could be accepted, while a prediction of "heavy showers", was less acceptable due to possible interference with surface photography essential to scientific recording. Furthermore, it was essential that the drone aircraft be kept away from all showers so that their filters would not be wet.

The necessity for accurate weather forecasting is obvious. It was noticeable that during periods of "normal" trade wind conditions, weather forecasts could be made with a high degree of certainty but during periods of little weather movement, forecasts were very uncertain. This is covered in more detail in the report of the Meteorologist.

It was desirable to wait for the very latest weather information in order to obtain the most accurate forecast. However, other considerations made mandatory the establishment of certain deadlines beyond which decisions to proceed with or postpone the tests could not be delayed. The principle factor was the extent to which operations and preparations had proceeded. For instance, if the decision to postpone was reached prior to the take-off of drone aircraft from Kwajalein, succeeding delays of 24 hours could be accepted for an indefinite period. However, if the decision to delay were reached after the drone aircraft had landed at Eniwetok, no more than two such delays could be

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accepted; any further delay would have to be for a minimum period of 48 hours due to fatigue of air crews. After the drone aircraft had been dispatched from Eniwetok, any postponement had to be for at least 48 hours in order that all electronic equipment might be readjusted. Film had to be replaced after it had been in cameras more than 48 hours. After certain scientific mechanisms had been started at H minus 30 minutes, any stopping of the scheduled firing required at least 24 hours for readjustment and if the stop was ordered after H minus 15 minutes even longer delay was necessitated.

It was advisable therefore, to order a 24 hour postponement of the firing prior to noon on the day before the scheduled shot and essential that it be ordered prior to the take-off of the drones from Eniwetok. Any postponement after that time must be for at least 48 hours or more.

To return to Yoke Day operations, general weather conditions were forecasted as improving for the succeeding two or three days but still uncertain for Yoke Day. Therefore, at the 1100 meeting on Y minus one day, a 24 hour postponement was ordered.

The decision to delay proved to be correct. Weather conditions were ideal and all operations proceeded without a hitch.

With minor changes necessitated by operational requirements, Zebra Day test proceeded according to the original plan without incident. Weather forecasts were uncertain up to the last twelve hours, but actual conditions prevailing at the time of firing were excellent.

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After the Yoke and Zebra Day operations, it was determined that there was no need to fill in the craters on these two Zero Islands. These decisions greatly simplified the Post-Sandstone requirements.

With the conclusion of the Zebra Day operations, the work of the J-3 Section was concluded except for minor details. Lt. Col. Woolnough had returned to Fort Shafter on Yoke plus one day and Lt. Col. Reaves returned on Zebra plus one. They were relieved from the J-3 Section but continued with JTF-7 to assist in closing up details. Captain Duerfeldt was relieved about Zebra plus five and returned to Washington. General Barker returned to Fort Shafter at the time of transfer of Headquarters, JTF-7 to that place and remained there for about ten days.

The X-Ray, Yoke and Zebra operations all followed the same general patterns. They are briefed below:

X - 3 Days - Meeting of all commanders and principle staff officers to determine if all preparations were sufficiently advanced to permit proceeding according to schedule. Upon receiving CJTF-7 decision to proceed, orders were issued to execute the Evacuation Plan.

X - 2 Days - Movements within and into the Atoll were restricted to last minute essentials; search of all islands except Eniwetok and Parry to insure that all had been evacuated.

X - 1 Day - Evacuation Day - A personnel muster to insure accurate check of all personnel; last minute preparations of all scientific equipment; complete evacuation of Eniwetok Atoll except

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for the personnel, aircraft and ships essential to the test.

X Day - Test Day. Thereafter re-entry was closely controlled by Headquarters, JTF-7 (J-3) in accordance with the recommendations of the Radiologist. This centralized control was released by stages in accordance with the results of the Radiological survey.

The records of J-3 operations consist of:

Field Orders No. 1 and 2 with Annexes
Operations Orders Nos. 1 - 8, incl
J-3 Check Sheets
Dispatches

These are filed with the permanent records of Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven.

PHASE V

Conclusions

As a result of Operation SANDSTONE, certain lessons were learned which may be summarized in the following conclusions:

1. Future tests should be combined tests by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Forces. The latter should be given more advance notice and, together with AEC, jointly plan all details including type, time and phases of the tests. Atomic tests are expensive and infrequent. Maximum results should be obtained in the fields of effect upon materials and structures, decontamination, detection, military logistics, tactics, etc., as well as in the construction and contents of the weapon itself.

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2. In future operations of this nature, it would be well to assemble the complete J-3 staff earlier. The initial effort of J-3 must be the determination of requirements. In this operation, J-4 staff was the first to be organized and of necessity had to determine most of the requirements.

3. Operations and staff procedure would be simplified by the adoption of a uniform organization with respect to Army, Navy and Air Force Task Groups in accordance with the principles of unified command. It would also be desirable not to have one individual fill two vacancies as shown on the organization chart, particularly when the assignments are on different levels.

4. In preparing future tests, means must be provided to obliterate craters, structures, etc., the examination of which after a test will disclose restricted data.

5. The photographic personnel of JTF-7 were assigned to the different Task Groups for documentary coverage with the Staff Photographer coordinating the efforts of all. A better organization would have been the formation of a Photo Task Group whose commander would have command authority to organize the photographic work and carry it out.

6. The operation of the Security Group was not thoroughly understood by all concerned. This group consisted of specially picked individuals to be used for the security of AEA Restricted Data material. It did not, nor should it, function as a group, but

should be established in close physical proximity to each other and the Task Force Staff from the very beginning of the operation. Liaison should then be maintained by means of frequent trips between each planning echelon and its main headquarters.

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essentially experimental, any SOP must be such as to permit rapid changes in operational plans.

11. The operations plan would have been a more suitable vehicle for a task of the nature of Operation SANDSTONE than the Field Order. (In effect the annexes to Field Order No. 1 developed into operations plans in this operation. The form used in the operational annexes (G & H) proved to be convenient and easily understood. Many changes had to be made and so each item was numbered for easy reference.) However, the JTF Operations Plan should be worded in general enough terms to permit flexibility of operational details without necessitating changes in the JTF Operations Plan. J-3 must be constantly on the alert to prevent the very exact detailed planning necessary in the Task Groups from appearing in the JTF Plan.

12. A requirement for liaison aircraft was not initially

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established and last-minute efforts had to be taken to obtain a sufficient number. These proved invaluable to meet the need for rapid transportation. On one day alone, 108 personnel and 900 pounds of freight were carried. A generous number of liaison aircraft or helicopters for short-range transportation is a must when operating in an area such as Eniwetok.

13. The disposition of naval vessels and personnel not required on the day of firing was determined by an analysis of the predicted drift (surface and air) of radiologically active particles. This predicted drift was called the Radex. It is important that the possibilities of contamination (probable areas of contamination, times that a "fall-out" will occur and degree of danger) be thoroughly understood prior to drawing up evacuation and re-entry plans. An early briefing of principal commanders and staff officers is desirable. Because the radex can never be a certainty, the plans must be flexible and re-entry into areas of possible contamination must be centrally controlled in the Task Force Headquarters.

14. The three services use somewhat different techniques and language. Operations plans and orders issued by a joint headquarters must avoid "canned" language and should be in the form of general directives. Operational details must be left to the commanders of the service unit involved. The original operational plans issued for SANDSTONE contained details and restrictions which later were rescinded in view of operating experiences. The submission and review of the

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operational plans of subordinate commands insured close coordination.
This method of staff operation permits a much smaller staff.

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J-4 Report - Operation Sandstone

I. Initial Organization

Washington Echelon: The J-4 Section was activated in the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. during the early part of October. The office initially consisted of Rear Admiral Wellings, USN, Col. J. A. Morris from Supply Division, Air Force, Lt Col Herrick, who came from Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army, Lt Col. Gillivan, from Logistics Division, Department of the Army, and Lt Col Brown, from Planning Division, OCT, Department of the Army. Capt. Duerfeldt, USN, from Bureau of Personnel, US Navy, and Capt. Jackson, of the Water Division, OCT, Department of the Army, joined later during October. Since R Adm Wellings expected to divide his time between the Washington and Oahu headquarters Capt Duerfeldt was given duty as Acting J-4 when R Adm Wellings was absent from Washington. The fact that key members of the staff were from important Washington planning assignments, facilitated early work. The officers concerned had ready contacts and were able to use their influence to expedite task force business. Lt Col Brown performed the duties of Transportation Officer, JTF 7 in addition to his J-4 duties.

Oahu Echelon: The initial organization of the Oahu Echelon of J-4 commenced on 18 October 1947 on the return of Rear Admiral Wellings from Washington, D.C. On 23 October, Lt Col Keith assumed duties at Ft. Shafter as a Deputy J-4. The limited size of the J-4 echelon continued until mid-December when additional personnel reported.

The initial duties of the Oahu Echelon consisted mainly of the rapid determination, location, assembly, preparation, and loading out

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of necessary items including equipment and supplies for the initiation of operations in the forward area at the earliest possible date.

II Planning Stage - Through Date of Approval of Joint Proof-Test Committee Report, JCS 1795/6.

The first task facing the staff was to prepare a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, setting forth the basic principles which would govern service and AEC participation in the tests. General Hull desired that each section of the paper be coordinated with the section of the Army, Navy, or Air Force concerned, in order that there would be no delay to the paper when it was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was realized by all that the basic policies approved by the JCS would have to be converted into detailed agreements between the Services as the operation progressed from the planning to operational stage. This section of the report will discuss decisions made at this time and some of the reasoning behind them.

Decision to use Eniwetok rather than Kwajalein (Roi-Namur): Two sites were considered for the tests - Eniwetok Atoll and Kwajalein (Roi-Namur). An analysis indicated that the logistic effort and that the overall cost would be slightly less (approximately \$70,000) at Roi-Namur. This base was closer to Oahu, and also to the Navy base at Kwajalein. However, these logistic considerations were sufficiently minor to be overruled because Eniwetok was more suitable from other standpoints. (In practice the Eniwetok site worked out well from a logistic viewpoint.)

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until after the departure of the natives. The LST 857 arrived at Eniwetok on 18 Dec. and effected the evacuation on 19 and 20 Dec. 1947. It is to be noted that survey and construction had been initiated at Engebi on 3 Dec. and at Runit on 9 Dec. 1947.

Estimate of cost of Armed Force participation in the Project: The estimate of cost of the Armed Forces participation in the project was arrived at during the first two weeks after orders were issued to the Joint Task Force Commander. In preliminary discussion between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of National Defense, it had been developed that participation by the Services would involve certain

... pay of certain expert technicians whose services were specifically
required for the operation.

Exclusion of certain expense was also stated:

- a. Pay of personnel normally assigned to the Services. Overseas pay of these people.
- b. Fuel costs.
- c. Normal maintenance and upkeep of service equipment.

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d. Supplies normally required for support of those troops engaged in the operation.

The compilation of the special costs involved, and the negotiation of the terms of the fiscal agreement with AEC, was handled by the Budget and Fiscal Section of the Joint Staff. However, the J-4 Section assisted in the development of the estimates of itemized costs.

Allocation of Costs between the AEC and the Armed Forces: Considerable difficulty arose over the decision as to what expenditures for the operation would be chargeable to funds to be made available by the AEC. These difficulties were increased by the high security classification placed on the Operation which limited the discussion to a very small group in each Department. In theory authorization of expenditures for an Operation of this nature would be approved by the heads of all Technical Services and Bureaus in each Department. The time available and the secrecy of the Operation did not permit such action. In general the Fiscal Agreement, which was released 20 October, was based on the following: "..... any materials furnished for base construction or for base maintenance and operation will be a proper charge to allotted funds. Equipment, in contrast to material, will not be charged unless purchase is required for use on this operation or for replenishment of active stock. Every effort will be made to obtain the equipment from excess stocks which will not require replacement." The military agreed to pay for normal operating expenses such as subsistence, clothing, pay and allowances (including overseas differential), recreation costs, operational expenditures of ships and aircraft, etc. There were also numerous special projects that developed as the Operation progressed. After receiving the necessary concurrences

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within the Joint Task Force they were forwarded to the AEC for final approval as a charge to the transferred funds.

Planned breakdown of service responsibilities at Eniwetok and Kwajalein: It was necessary to make broad agreements between Services at an early date (10 October 1947) as to what the supply responsibilities of the Services would be. These agreements were as follows:

Rations - Navy

Fuel and Lubricants - Navy

Ship's stores for personnel ashore and afloat - Navy (The Army later took over responsibility for Ships Store (Post Exchange) ashore).

Construction material for rehabilitation, maintenance, and house-keeping - using Service.

Equipment for construction of test site - Army

General maintenance supplies - using Service

Spare parts - Service supplying the equipment

Air Force Technical Supply - Air Force

Ammunition and Arms - using Service

Marine spare parts - using Service

Normal agreements for reimbursement for supplies and services furnished were followed. For example the Army reimbursed the Navy for all rations furnished. It was determined at an early date that the Army Task Group Commander would also be the Island Commander, Eniwetok. The Navy was responsible for the Marshall Islands, and exercised command of the established base at Kwajalein. The two Island Commanders were assigned responsibility on their respective islands for all normal base functions,

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25 February - Movement of major vessels to Eniwetok.

15 March - Completion of major service construction on Zero Islands paving the way for intensive scientific installation.

Troop list: A troop basis was written for inclusion in the JCS paper. It was at first planned to use two Army engineer construction companies to form the backbone of the Eniwetok construction force augmented by a composite engineer company for general support. Due to lack of availability of these units it was decided to substitute part of the Second Engineer Special Brigade. A portion of a construction battalion was furnished by Oahu to complete the engineering force. A small number of supply troops were also furnished from Oahu. A small Navy detachment

3 - LST
4 - LCI
1 - LSM
1 - APA

1 - IW
1 - AO
1 - LSD
3 - DD

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III. Supply, Movement and Construction Phase.

Preparation of plans and determination of supplies required: The Logistic and Supply Section at Washington had the following major problems to solve:

- a. Determination of requirements for supplies and equipment for operational (scientific) construction and for housekeeping construction and maintenance at Eniwetok, Kwajalein, and other atolls.
- b. Determination of personnel requirements for construction.
- c. Determination of requirements for shipping and airlift.
- d. Determination of service or agency to be responsible for meeting above requirements.
- e. Fiscal arrangements.

The J-4 Section's primary mission was to meet the requirements for supplies, equipment, and materials for the construction as these requirements were established by the AEC, Engineer, Communications Officer, and the Task Group Commanders.

The Engineer was responsible for determining the requirements for supplies, materials, equipment, and personnel necessary to carry out the

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construction and supervising the construction.

The Communications Officer was responsible for determining the requirements for supplies, equipment, materials and personnel necessary to meet the complex communications problems involved in the operation and supervising the installation of the signal facilities.

The Fiscal Officer was primarily responsible for determining the procedures necessary to insure that the terms of JCS 1795/6 and the fiscal agreement were carried out.

The requirement for operational construction, which consisted principally of erection of zero towers, timing stations, photo towers, and instrument shelters, was placed on the Joint Task Force by the Atomic Energy Commission. Part of these requirements were initially drawn up by the AEC based on known factors. As a result of a reconnaissance by the AEC representatives who accompanied the Joint Task Force Commander on his first trip to Eniwetok in October, it was determined that additional construction (viz., foundations for photo tower and survey beacon on coral heads in lagoon, and causeway between Biijiri, and Aoman) would be necessary to meet test requirements in view of the physical peculiarities of the atoll. Due to the peculiar nature of the operational construction, it was decided that the services of civilian contractors would be utilized in these special projects and that the contracts would be administered by Western Ocean Division, Corps of Engineers, USA, with the exception of foundations on the coral heads and the causeway, which would be administered by the Public Works Department, CINCPACFLT. The agency administering contracts, in general, assumed responsibility for procurement

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Army, Navy and civilians. It was believed that materials for one standard 1,000 man semi-permanent camp and 3 - 200 man temporary camps, plus the installations already at Eniwetok, would meet this requirement for accommodations.

In order not to interfere with permanent construction which the Navy had under way at Kwajalein, it was decided that construction of a tent camp would most efficiently meet the requirement for the Air Task Group, which would consist of a planned 2,000 personnel. It was estimated that approximately 200 construction engineers, in addition to the services of certain Navy administered contractor personnel already at Kwajalein, would meet the personnel requirements for erection of this camp.

Based on these conclusions, bills of material and requirements for personnel were drawn up for the construction. After the on-the-site reconnaissance, these lists were amended to reflect the actual conditions of the facilities at Eniwetok and Kwajalein. Miscellaneous construction requirements were placed on the Joint Task Force up until approximately 1 April 1948.

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Preparation of Troop Basis for Eniwetok: The responsibilities of the services were primarily set forth in the Joint Proof-Test Committee report JCS 1795/6. Based on these broad responsibilities it was necessary to prepare a troop basis and obtain the necessary men to accomplish the responsibilities listed. In obtaining this personnel the J-1 Section coordinated the procurement of individual officers and men, and the J-4 Section handled the obtaining of Units required for the job. As a general rule, each Task Group Commander specified the troop units he desired to accomplish his task. CTG 7.2 was the primary Task Group Commander requiring Units to accomplish his job. The others formed provisional organizations from consolidating individual personnel. Since CTG 7.2 responsibilities covered primarily Army troops, the main task of furnishing Units devolved to the Army. Troops were needed to accomplish the major tasks at Eniwetok as follows:

- a. Engineer troops for base rehabilitation and test site construction.
- b. Communication troops to man signal installations.
- c. Port troops to handle cargo at Eniwetok.

In addition to the main tasks indicated, additional troops were required to discharge the following responsibilities on the beach:

- a. Air Force Base Unit to handle air cargo
- b. Supply agencies to man a supply installation for each of the 7 Army technical services
- c. Laundry
- d. Bakery

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- e. Medical Detachment
- f. Ordnance Maintenance

The troops required to set up the initial base organization at Eniwetok, and to supply the housekeeping facilities listed in the preceding par. were supplied by the CG, USARPAC. This echelon of approximately 500 personnel were moved to Eniwetok on 15 November by LST's. The bulk of the Engineer, Communications, and Port troops were furnished from the U.S. and moved to Eniwetok during the month of Dec. These troops consisted essentially of the following personnel:

	OFF	EM
532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Reg.	47	340
Provisional Communications Det.	2	100
461 Amphibious Truck Det.	2	26
854th Port Co	6	212

The total number of personnel (including civilians) based ashore at Eniwetok during the peak period was about 2,300.

In obtaining Army troops it was necessary to secure the concurrence of the Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army, and the Organization and Training Division, Department of the Army. In addition when any Technical Service was affected, the concurrence of the Chief of Technical Service was necessary. All troops requested were obtained but there was some delay encountered in processing the requirement for units through the prescribed channels.

Determination of Rehabilitation Items: The initial planning for accommodations for personnel at Eniwetok contemplated sufficient materials

(5) Determination of location, materials required, and man hours necessary to provide hospital facilities.

(6) Determination of requirements for recreation facilities and VIP quarters.

Upon completion of this reconnaissance, the original list of materials was reviewed, and amended to satisfy the actual requirements. The list of priority for accomplishment of these tasks, and the man hours required, is as follows:

51 Primary signal facilities with power (Homer, Air Ground, Point to Point.)

b. Repair of landing strips (to include the other airfield on

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Atoll.) (Est. 70 man days.)

2. Establishment of water, electrical, refrigeration, and hospital facilities for initial force. (Est. 429 man days.)

3. Establishment of messing and housing installations for initial force with minimum recreational facilities, and road repair (Latrines and messes only to be screened and painting to be limited to that essential for prevention maintenance.) (Est. 542 man days.)

4. Establishment of cable distribution system, telephone central and air-ground route control. (Signal personnel only.)

5. Establishment VIP accommodations for 15 personnel. (Est. 108 man days.)

6. Construction of Point to Point radio teletype channel #1 to Fort Shafter and Signal Center. (Signal personnel only.)

7. Development of recreational facilities for initial force. (Est. 63 man days.)

8. Enlargement of electricity, refrigeration, water and hospitalization facilities to accommodate 2300 personnel. (Est. 238 man days.)

9. Installations of 2 BC-610's with doublet antennae to Kwajalein (1 to Navy Kwajalein, other to AACS Kwajalein). (Signal personnel only.)

10. Enlarging housing and messing facilities to meet 2300 man requirement. (1679 man days.)

11. Completion of VIP accommodation. (179 man days.)

12. Painting of all facilities and general clean up. (1375 man days.)

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Estimated Total Man Days - 4809

It was later found that the requirements for material so determined were adequate for the mission, and that the work schedule by man days was feasible.

Logistics involved in initial movement to Eniwetok: In early October 1947, the 18th Engineer Construction Company was alerted for movement as the advance detachment to prepare Eniwetok for the reception and housing of a larger body of troops to come from the ZI, and to commence operational construction. In order to provide the additional equipment necessary for this job, the TO & E of the 18th Engineer Construction Company was supplemented by a list of equipment, prepared by Colonel Tulley, JTF-7 Engineer. About 20 October 1947, it was decided to expand this advance detachment to battalion size in order to provide a more balanced organization, utilizing the 18th Engineer Construction Company as the construction unit, with Signal, Supply, Ordnance Maintenance, Laundry, Stevedore, Water Distillation, Refrigeration, Mess and Personnel teams added to form the 1220th Provisional Engineer Battalion (Topographic Construction.) (The words Topo-Const were added solely as a security measure in order to screen the movement by linking this new unit with other recently expanded units operating throughout the Pacific on topographic missions.) All units of the 1220th Provisional Battalion were organized under cellular TO & E's of the 500 series, including equipment and personnel. The organization of this unit was as follows:

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<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>		<u>T/O&E</u>
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	
Hqs, 1220th Prov Engr Bn (Topo Const) Composed of:	10	55	
1 Bn Hq (AD) less	(3)	(16)	5-500 26 Jul 44 w/7 changes
1 Major, line 5			"
1 Mess tm (AG)		(8)	"
1 Supply tm (BA) less		(11)	"
1 Lt, line 6			
1 Pvt, line 34			
1 Pvt, line 56			
1 Medical Det (IA) Augmented by 1 Capt/Lt SSN 3100 and 1 tec 4 SSN 264	(3)	(9)	8-500 18 Jan 45 w/1 change
1 Army Postal Unit, Type E	(1)	(9)	12-605 18 Sep 45
Attached Chaplain w/enlisted ass't	(1)	(1)	
Attached CIC	(2)	(1)	
1219th Signal Service Platoon composed of:	8	72	11-500 22 Sep 44 w/A changes
1 Depot tm (CA)	(1)	(8)	"
1 Message Center tm (DB), augmented by 1 Capt SSN 9606	(4)	(12)	"
1 3-position switchboard tm (GD)	(1)	(33)	"
1 Radio teletype tm (EP)	(2)	(19)	"

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<u>ORGANIZATION (Contd)</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>		<u>T/O&E</u>
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	
1218th Composite Service Platoon composed of:	3	65	
1 Ord Supply tm (CA)	(1)	(17)	9-500 14 Oct 44 w/1 change
1 Ord Auto Maint tm (DA)	(1)	(28)	"
1 QM Supply tm (BA)	(1)	(20)	10-500 10 Jan 45
* 1217th Composite Service Platoon composed of:	2	38	
1 QM Bakery Det (Bf)		(6)	10-500 10 Jan 45
1 QM Laundry Det (EA)	(1)	(13)	"
1 Trans Stevedore Sec (CA)	(1)	(19)	55-500 29 Sep 44 w/3 changes
18th Engineer Construction Company, augmented by:	4	183	5-77 23 Dec 43 w/3 changes
1 Engr Refrig Maint tm (DG)		(3)	5-500 26 Jul 44 w/7 changes
1 Engr Water Distillation tm (CC)		(5)	"
Provisional AACS Detachment 145th AACS Squadron (Note 1)	1	25	T/A 1-36 2 Jul 46

* Negro enlisted personnel

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for Enlwetok.

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these supply agencies. Later, separate Special Service, Medical and P.C. account numbers were issued.

With the exception of the Engineer heavy equipment authorized initially for 18th Engineer Construction Company, and the TO & E equipment of that unit, all Class II, IV, and V supplies and equipment for the 1220th Provisional Engineer Battalion were packed and crated by the Army or Navy agency furnishing them and, they delivered directly to the Navy for loading. Supply Officers of the 1220th Provisional Engineer supervised the conditioning, packing and crating, and delivery of all equipment and supplies, for loading aboard the 4 LST's and LC1MAV1 allotted for the movement forward. All equipment on LST's was to have been loaded through the bow doors, at Iroquois Point in order to insure expeditious discharge, and loading plans were submitted to Pearl Harbor agencies responsible for loading. In general, the policy was to place as much wheeled equipment as possible aboard LST's, and to combat load the vehicles to facilitate discharge. The loading plan listed equipment to be loaded on each LST and priority within each LST, with a view toward priority of discharge. Due to a late decision to utilize much of the main deck space of the LST's

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for small boats (2 LCM's and 2 LCVP's each LST) the loading plans could not be closely followed, and the accompanying rush of loading, resulted in some LST's being loaded in a manner which did not permit efficient unloading with the facilities available at Eniwetok. It must be emphasized here that a careful plan for loading should be made and followed, particularly in the movement of the initial echelon, as discharge facilities are then at a minimum. As was to be expected, in view of the speed of the movement and relatively unknown problems to be encountered on the Atoll, many items of equipment that were taken were unnecessary, and in some cases an oversupply of expendables and spare parts were taken. A few items of an engineering nature that are of little or no value on terrain of the type encountered are as follows:

Rooters

Sheeps foot rollers

Earth augers

Wagon drills

Items of value in many varied uses, were the 336 steel pontoons, which were carried in strings on the side of each LST and in the Comstock (LSD-19) on the initial movement. Upon arrival these pontoons were utilized as landing docks for small boats, gas tanks, oil storage and food lockers. A later shipment of pontoons steam cleaned and painted white were utilized throughout the atoll for fresh water storage. Additional pontoons painted red were shipped in for gasoline and diesel storage tanks.

In the movement of troops and equipment of 1220th Provisional Battalion to Eniwetok, the 3 LST's and one CLMAV1, accompanied by one LSD,

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During the period of preparation for the experiments, it was obviously impossible, for security reasons, to permit representatives of China to enter the area and remove the property, even if such removal could have been completed prior to the actual performance of the experiments. The Chief of Naval Operations, therefore, early in November, 1947, arranged with the Foreign Liquidation Commission cancellation of the sales of Navy Surplus Property located on Eniwetok Atoll.

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Early in December, 1947, the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet instructed the Commander of the Service Force to take necessary action to transfer to the Island Commander at Eniwetok custody of the property. On 13 December, 1947, implementing instructions were issued in a dispatch, Sandpiper #237, which directed the Island Commander Eniwetok to assume custodial responsibility of the Navy Surplus Property on Eniwetok, to make maximum practicable employment of this surplus to support the operations, to maintain careful records of any property so utilized but to make no transfer of accountability or inventory.

Action to supply certain special requirements: A requirement for a special welding job in connection with test construction at Eniwetok was met by Navy welders whose qualifications had been checked at Navy Yard Pearl as arranged for by J-4.

A requirement for buoys to support the seaward end of surface cables was met at the recommendation of J-4 by the use of 2 X 6 pontoon assemblies anchored in place by the use of four 1000 lb anchors for each assembly. This obviated the shipment and handling of large expensive buoys of the battleship type.

An urgent requirement for 115-P Simplex cable developed when rubber covered cable proved unsatisfactory during the late phases of cable laying at Eniwetok. J-4 arranged for the release at Pearl of 250,000 feet of the necessary cable from another operation and shipment in time to prevent any delay of the Sandstone time schedule.

Early in January a requirement arose for six L-5 airplanes to augment

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the two L-4 airplanes which had been found very useful for rapid transportation between islands of Eniwetok atoll on which landing strips of 600 feet, minimum length, were constructed. These L-5 aircraft were needed as soon as possible and prior to the arrival of the Naval Task Group when six L-5 airplanes in the Bairoko CVE-115 would become available. J-4 upon investigation found that the following were available: One L-5 property of ATC and one OY-1 property of the Navy at Kwajalein, and four OY-1s property of the Navy at Oahu. The L-5 at Kwajalein was shipped to Eniwetok and the Navy OY-1s after release by CinCPacFlt as excess were transferred by ComAirPac to Sandstone use on a non-reimbursement basis. Spare parts required for the OY-1 aircraft pending the arrival of the Bairoko were determined by a representative of CTG 7.2 and those available supplied by ComAirPac on a cash reimbursement basis. The Air Force assumed custody and responsibility for the OY-1 aircraft and the spare parts supplied.

Logistic support of detection personnel: Certain logistic support was furnished the Air Force and the Naval Research Laboratory from Oahu and ZI in support of their detection program. This help was furnished mainly during January and February. Personnel and supplies were moved on task force surface lift, and within the Task Force Air allocation.

Logistical and Construction Phase at Kwajalein: In order not to interfere with permanent construction which the Navy had underway at Kwajalein, it was decided that construction of a tent camp would most efficiently meet the requirement of the Air Task Group of approximately 2,000 personnel. Since the Air Task Group was scheduled to arrive at Kwajalein the latter part of February 1948 and would shortly thereafter start their training

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It was originally planned to send quartermaster laundry units and operating personnel from Oahu to augment the laundry facilities at Kwajalein. However, in view of the AEC approval for expenditures of \$75,000.00 to improve the Navy laundry, this plan was not implemented. Due to delays in completion of laundry construction the Navy laundry was

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Wake detachment was to be billeted and messed by Pan American installations already at Wake. On this basis, supplies and equipment were assembled on Oahu for shipment to Kwajalein where they would be trans-shipped under CTG 7.7 supervision.

Prior to shipment of supplies from Oahu, the Rongerik and Majuro detachment commanders assisted by CTG 7.7 made an on the ground reconnaissance and returned to Oahu to verify that all items required had been furnished. It is considered particularly important for small station of an isolated nature, that early and thorough advance reconnaissance be made for logistic purposes.

Pan American requested the Joint Task Force to furnish Cleaverbrook distillation units to augment their facilities at Wake to handle the increased demand for water resulting from a population increase of some thirty (30) personnel. One of these units was shipped from Kwajalein aboard the AG 138 which moved the detachment's technical equipment to

Wake. CTG 7.7 was directed to assist in establishing the Rongerik and Majuro units ashore and was made responsible for supplying the Majuro detachment. CTG 7.3 assumed responsibility for resupply of the Rongerik detachment after it was in place.

Preparation of Air Force Troop Basis for Kwajalein: Personnel required for the Air Task Group depended largely upon the number and types of aircraft to be utilized and the activity of those aircraft.

The aircraft to be employed as determined by the Commander, Air Forces, JTF-7, were:

- 24 B-17's Drones and mothers
- 2 F-13's Photographic
- 2 C-54's Adapted for photographic use
- 8 B-29's VLR weather recon.
- 10 C-54's Transports
- 4 C-47's Inter-island transports

50 Aircraft

Based on the overall picture thus presented, preliminary estimates indicate a requirement for approximately 2,500 officers and men. However, discussions between the Commander, Air Forces, JTF-7 and the Chief of Staff, Air Transport Command, resulted in an understanding whereby the latter command assumed responsibility for air transportation, both over regular routes to Kwajalein and inter-island within the Marshalls. Additionally, ATC would supply to the Air Task Group from station on Guam, the eight B29's required for VLR Weather Reconnaissance, as well as the air

total personnel required in the Air Task Group from the 81st Air Division approximately 1,500 officers and men. The Strategic Air Command, directed by Headquarters USAF to organize, man and train the Air Task Group, was requested to submit a recommended Table of Distribution with an accompanying Table of Equipment. Deadline for this was set at 1 December 1947, which date was met, the actual development of the Tables being accomplished by the Staff of the Eighth Air Force under General Ramey. It may be observed that the actual strength of the Air Task Group on site was approximately 1,600 officers and men.

Planning and Execution of Supply of Class I (rations), Class III (Petroleum products other than aviation) and Class IIIa (Petroleum products, aviation):

Class I (rations)

Storage for dry provisions was adequate and reefers were present but inoperable at Eniwetok, the reefer units having been removed from most of the reefers. Refrigeration units were carried with the initial movement of ships and troops, and they were put into operation shortly after their arrival.

There was some water storage available (about 12,000 gallons usable) and additional steel bolted tanks were erected by the Navy Utilities team on arrival. There were no distillation units operable, the Navy security detachment consisting of the Island Commander and nine men had to depend on a collection of rain for their water supply. The stills were put in place and in

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obtained by estimating the personnel strength from the movement directives of the Army and Air Force and the expected ship movements of the Navy Task Group. Prior to arrival of the operational groups, the Navy reefer ships from Oakland delivered their cargoes to Kwajalein and the FS 370 and 211

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made shuttle trips to Kwajalein to obtain a proportionate share of these cargoes for Eniwetok. The actual strength figures were submitted to the Oahu echelon and G-1 USARPAC who collaborated in estimating future strengths of the forward area. Listed below are the population figures for Kwajalein and for Eniwetok.

Population Eniwetok (Ashore and Afloat)

<u>1 Dec</u>	<u>1 Jan</u>	<u>1 Feb</u>	<u>1 Mar</u>	<u>1 Apr</u>	<u>1 May</u>
1125	3847	4004	7043	8012	7714

Population Kwajalein

<u>1 Dec</u>	<u>1 Jan</u>	<u>1 Feb</u>	<u>1 Mar</u>	<u>1 Apr</u>	<u>1 May</u>
320	333	355	1135	1669	1988

Below are listed the food tonnages shipped to the forward area during the construction phase of the operation. It should be born in mind that these tonnages are large due to the fact that stock levels were being built up to provide for the operational groups arriving 15 March and that this supply was further augmented by ships loading to capacity before departing the West Coast or Pearl Harbor for the forward area.

Tabulation of Dry, Chill, and Freeze Provisions Shipped to JTF-7

From NSC Pearl

<u>Departed</u>	<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Dry Provisions M/Tons</u>	<u>Chill Cargo M/Tons</u>	<u>Freeze Cargo M/Tons</u>
November 1947				
11-18-47	USAT Coastal Crusader	545	74	97
11-26-47	USAT FS 254	142	- -	- -
11-28-47	USAT FS 370	- -	7	27
		<u>687</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>124</u>

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Tabulation of Dry, Chill, and Freeze Provisions Shipped to JTF-7

From NSC Pearl (Cont'd)

<u>Departed</u>	<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Dry Provisions M/Tons</u>	<u>Chill Cargo M/Tons</u>	<u>Freeze Cargo M/Tons</u>
December 1947				
12-27-47	Faribault AKA 179	4	118	83
January 1948				
1-23-48	USAT FS 211	78	--	--
February 1948				
2-20-48	Faribault AKA 179	20	99	40
2-20-48	LST 611	47	--	--
		<u>67</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>40</u>
March 1948				
None				

Tabulation of Dry, Chill, and Freeze Provisions Shipped to JTF-7

From West Coast

<u>Departed</u>	<u>Vessel</u>	<u>Dry Provisions M/Tons</u>	<u>Chill Cargo M/Tons</u>	<u>Freeze Cargo M/Tons</u>
January 1948				
1-17-48	Graffias AF 29	91	231	124
1-25-48	Latona AF 35	1	123	238
		<u>92</u>	<u>354</u>	<u>360</u>
February 1948				
2-16-48	Kerstin AF 35	361.8	906	381.7
March 1948				
3-16-48	Alstede AF 48	--	22	--

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<u>Departed</u>	<u>Vessel</u>	<u>M/Tons</u>	<u>M/Tons</u>	<u>M/Tons</u>
March 1948 (Cont'd)				
3-20-48	Arequipa AF 31	<u>463</u>	<u>700</u>	<u>233</u>
		463	722	233
April 1948				
4-9-48	Latona AF 35	432	497	198

Class III (petroleum products other than aviation)

On 7 November a ComServPac representative departed Pearl Harbor for Eniwetok under orders to survey the tank farm at Eniwetok. Results of this survey were as follows:

Ten of the one thousand barrel Avgas or Mogas storage tanks were found to be in fair condition and no immediate repairs other than to lines and valves needed for use. Two one thousand barrel diesel storage tanks were in good condition as were four 150 barrel storage tanks previously used for storage of avlubes.

The pumping system was found to be in fair condition but some pumps were in need of repairs due to deterioration, mostly rusting. It was recommended that a hose be floated to an anchorage for the purpose of unloading petroleum products from the tankers to the shore tanks. This suggestion was later discarded, the problem being finally solved by rigging an LCM with a 150 bbl tank and using it for transfer of petroleum

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from ship to shore.

One YOG (YOG 64) was ordered to Eniwetok to provide afloat fuel storage for the atoll.

After a survey of the afloat and ashore storage facilities at Kwajalein, it was determined that the following construction was necessary to augment the existing fuel storage: Two 1,000 barrel diesel tanks, to be completed by 1 December, three 1,000 barrel Mogas tanks to be completed by 1 January and one 10,000 barrel Avgas tank also to be completed by 1 January. The extra capacity was part of the regular station development program. Its construction was expedited to meet Sandstone requirements. The afloat storage consisting of the YOGN 85, YOGN 53 and the YON 182 was considered adequate.

Petroleum products were procured and shipped from Pearl Harbor by ComServPac, requirements being submitted by CTG 7.2, CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.4 to J-4 Oahu Echelon and to ComServPac by J-4. The original estimate of packaged lubes submitted to J-4 for a three month period was used as a planning base, the total amount shipped being twice this estimate. This estimate was adequate, small shortages being later shipped as deck cargo on the tankers carrying bulk fuel.

In the initial movement of the construction and rehabilitation groups to Eniwetok, the ships carried extra fuel for their use. An AOG arrived shortly after this group with Mogas and diesel to fill up the storage tanks ashore. There was no afloat black oil storage, the ships remaining in the forward area were supplied from the AKA's that carried enough fuel

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to make a round trip from Pearl to the forward area and have enough remaining to supply the small amounts needed by the remaining ships. During the early stages of the operation the Eniwetok DE's made occasional trips to Kwajalein to refuel. After the arrival of the Pasig (AW-3), it was used to make shuttle trips to Kwajalein to obtain black oil for the patrol ships.

The supply of diesel was at no time a problem either at Kwajalein or Eniwetok. Two LST's made shuttle trips between Pearl Harbor and the forward area, fueling to capacity before leaving Pearl Harbor and transferring diesel to the ashore tanks when beached at Eniwetok as needed. The normal supply of diesel to Kwajalein was increased to meet the estimated needs of Sandstone.

One AOG load of Mogas was delivered to Eniwetok on 28 November, and this 250,000 gallons plus 70,000 gallons aboard the YOG on arrival, was planned to last the complete operation, but it became necessary later to deliver another load. The increased consumption was due to extra construction and motor vehicles for personnel transportation.

Class IIIa (petroleum products, aviation)

There was no difficulty in meeting the Avgas requirements during the operation. Although the Air Task Group requirements were increased from one to two million gallons the Navy was able to furnish the additional amount without any difficulty. The following types of Avgas were used in the operation:

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115/145	octane, low aromatic	- Seaplanes and large helicopters
115/145	" high "	- Landplanes
73	"	- L-4 and L-5 liason planes
80	"	- Helicopters (small)

As only relatively small quantities of 73 and 80 octane Avgas were required, shipments were made in drums.

Supply of tax free beer, cigarettes, and liquor: At the beginning of the operation, USARPAC did not have authority to purchase tax free beer and cigarettes on the open market for sale in its Post Exchange, and the Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, did not have sufficient stocks on hand to furnish these items for sale to Army and Air Force troops. It was determined by USARPAC, that although there was no authority to purchase tax free beer and cigarettes on the open market, there was no prohibition against the sale of such items if they could be procured from Navy sources. Early in January 1948, ComServPac agreed to sell tax free beer and cigarettes to the Army exchange and took steps to provide the items at Kwajalein and Eniwetok.

In mid-November 1947, ComServPac was requested to make available tax free liquor for sale to authorized personnel of the Joint Task Force. The policy for sale of liquor was established and ComServPac requisitioned approximately 1300 cases for delivery to Iscom Kwajalein for JTF use.

Army and Navy supply channels: The Chief of Staff, USA, was designated the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out Operation

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Sandstone. Although it did not necessarily follow that such action was inherent in the appointment, the Army assumed primary responsibility for procurement of supplies and equipment necessary for the construction in the forward areas. It was realized that the Navy would be called upon to furnish a large proportion of the materials and equipment to be used since certain items required were standard equipment in the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed that where practicable surplus property would be utilized to the fullest. Accordingly, after the list of supplies, equipment, and material had been drawn up, the lists were presented to the USARPAC Technical Services and ComServPac Pearl Harbor for screening against availabilities. The Navy had available at Iroquois Point a large amount of Advance Base equipment and materials which had been recovered from bases in the forward areas. Approximately one million dollars worth was used in the operation including many critical items which would have required about one year lead time to obtain if they were to be procured in an open market. Requisitions for those items which it had been determined were not available on Oahu were forwarded to Washington for necessary procurement action. Although the Department of the Army had established two operational projects, BF-1-OP and AFS-1-OP for procurement of items required, the policy was established that requisitions for construction and maintenance items would be first placed on the Oahu services, and if not available, they were then submitted

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to the ZI for procurement.

In accordance with JCS 1795/6 the Army was primarily responsible for furnishing Class 2, 4 and 5 supplies and the Navy was responsible for furnishing all Class 1 (rations) and Class 3 (POL) supplies. All requisitions for supplies other than those submitted by CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.7 were forwarded to the J-4 Section, Oahu Echelon for procurement action. (CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.7 procured their supplies and equipment through normal Navy supply channels.)

Execution of the Army supply responsibility: The Army supply responsibility as assigned by the JCS and augmented by detail agreements included the following major phases:

1. Initial supply and resupply of clothing and individual items to Army troops participating in the operation.
2. Supply of tools and equipment required by Army troops to carry out their assigned missions.
3. Supply of construction material for the test site construction.
4. Supply of material for shore communication facilities.
5. Supply of Army items desired by the Navy and Air Force.

Army troops were mounted from Oahu or the U.S. with complete TO & E equipment, and a 30-day supply of expendable items. The TO & E was modified and augmented by equipment considered necessary for its mission.

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tion on the Commanding General, USARPAC.
Major construction materials were supplied from the U.S. Additional equipment required by troops mounting from the U.S. was also supplied from the U.S. The plans for technical construction at the site were prepared in the U.S. by the Task Force Engineer based on the requirements of the Atomic Energy Commission. Due to the urgency of the situation, requirements were computed in Washington by the Staff Engineer, in coordination with General Ogden and his staff; arrangements for supply were made simultaneously.

The procedure for furnishing supplies required from the Army from U.S. sources, was by means of an "Operational Project." The title "AFS-1-OP" was used to designate supplies for Kwajalein, and "BP-1-OP" was used for those furnished to Eniwetok. The so-called "Operational Project" is a directive prepared by the Logistics Division of the Army to a Technical Service directing that designated supplies be laid down at a designated Port of Embarkation, by a deadline date. Such projects are given top priority by the supply agencies. Supply priority assigned to this project was 1-A-1. This means that only the Greek and Turkish aid programs had a higher priority.

Requisitions from Eniwetok or Kwajalein which could not be filled by USARPAC were extracted to the Washington Echelon of JTF-7. Required items were then placed on a Supplement to AFS-1-OP and supply action completed.

It should be noted that the supply system for Sandstone outlined



the requirements of the time schedule for Sandstone.

Execution of the Air Force supply responsibility: The personnel and equipment needs of the Air Task Group did not harmonize with any standard Air Force TO & E. Accordingly, as we have seen, a Table of Equipment was developed which listed such material as was required from the Army and Air Force depot systems. All items of personal and unit essential equipment were to be taken from home stations by the troops involved.

That section of the T/E covering Army Technical Service material was forwarded on 31 October 1947 to SS & P, General Staff and assigned operational project number AFS-1-OP with a deadline date at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California of 15 January 1948.

The Air Force section was forwarded through Hq. USAF to Hq. Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Ohio with the same destination and deadline date. The Air Materiel Command assigned Air Force Special Project

it should further be noted that Air Materiel Command largely developed the itemized listings of maintenance spare parts to be included; this was done on the basis of established consumption rates as modified by the experience and recommendation of Staff Officers of the Eighth Air Force. With respect to both Technical Service and Air Force items of equipment, ninety days maintenance spares were included. This was planned in order

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to eliminate the necessity for any routine resupply.

Photographic supply requirements were accorded separate and unique handling. The Air Force carried complete responsibility for the photographic mission, and this in turn had been delegated to the 311th Reconnaissance^{Wing}, commanded by Colonel Paul T. Cullen (later the 311th Air Division, Reconnaissance, commanded by Brig. Gen. Paul T. Cullen). General Cullen was also assigned as Staff Photographer, Joint Task Force Seven. The plan established here contemplated that the 311th Air Division would meet the responsibilities of the Operation with Equipment and personnel drawn from the Division's subordinate organizations and components. Due to the unusual and extraordinary requirements, both personnel and equipment were to be augmented as necessary by special authorization. Special lists of equipment were developed by General Cullen's Staff; for those items not available in Air Force stock or by borrowing from the Army or Navy, special authorization was granted to make procurement against AEC funds. All photographic equipment and supplies were to be assembled in the Zone of Interior by the 311th Air Division, and transported by air lift to the forward area. Records and accountability were to be carried at MacDill, Andrews and Bolling Air Force Bases. Thus the photographic supply responsibility remained entirely within the Z 1 and was handled through normal Air Force channels.

The participation of Air Transport Command did not involve any special logistical arrangement, since this command would operate through normal supply channels. It may here be noted that the eight B-29 VLR aircraft, although furnished by Air Transport Command, were integrated--with their

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Depot, Hickam Field, T.H.

Use of civilian contractors for certain phases of the scientific construction: Certain phases of the scientific construction, due to its complexity and the need for highly trained technicians which were not readily available in the armed services, had to be carried out with civilian contractor personnel. A large majority of this construction was performed by Morrison Knudsen - Peter Kiewit under the overall supervision of the Western Ocean Division, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, who assumed primary responsibility for procurement of supplies and equipment not furnished by the contractor.

CinCPac Fleet administered the contract for construction of the coral head photo and survey beacon towers and causeway between Aoman and Blijiri; the work being performed by the Hawaiian Dredging Co. Ltd. CinCPac Fleet assumed primary responsibility for procurement of supplies and equipment not furnished by the contractor.

The J-4 Section effected close and continuous liaison with appropriate representatives of the contractors to insure that all items required for the construction were furnished in sufficient quantities and time to meet the deadline set by the AEC representatives. J-4 monitored the contracts

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throughout October 1947, was primarily concerned with the preparation of the study which later became JCS 1795/6 and which delineated responsibilities of participating agencies in the operation. Upon approval, therefore, there was promptly developed the Logistics Annex E to Field Order No. 1.

This Annex fixed logistical channels and responsibilities of the three Services, and was supported by detailed appendices covering the Engineer, Medical, Fiscal and Transportation functions. Air Force Logistics were set forth in Annex E to Field Order No. 1 of the Commander Air Forces.

In the actual operation, no difficulties were encountered with the plan as originally established and it is considered a satisfactory pattern for any future similar tests.

IV Operations at the Site

Air Force Logistic Problems at Kwajalein: No major difficulties were encountered by the Air Task Group at Kwajalein in executing the supply plan as originally established, and no changes to these plans were

required. That there will arise some problems can, of course, be expected in carrying out any program of action.

Certain minor shortages of Air Force Special Project supplies existed after the main water movement of troops and supplies from Oakland,

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California, in February, 1947. Therefore in March a listing was drawn up of those still existing shortages which were considered to represent vital and essential requirements; these were forwarded to Air Materiel Command for handling on an emergency request basis.

There was no shortage of any essential supplies, and logistic support of the Air Task Group was always adequate.

Supply of Class I (rations), III (petroleum products other than aviation) and Class IIIa (petroleum products, aviation): Supply of Classes I, III, and IIIa during this phase of the operation was largely a problem of maintaining schedules of shipments already set up in the initial phase.

Class I (food)

With the arrival of the Naval Task Group, the increased reefer capacity due to the presence of the larger ships, made it practicable for the Navy reefers from Oakland to unload a share of provisions for Kwajalein at Kwajalein, then proceed to Eniwetok to unload the remaining supplies to TG 7.3 vessels. CTG 7.3 then supervised the further distribution to the various islands of the Atoll and the smaller ships. All ships departing from the West Coast and Pearl Harbor for the forward area were loaded to capacity with fresh and frozen provisions to further augment supply in the forward area.

The supply of food to Eniwetok and Kwajalein was at all times adequate and it is felt that the supply of ice cream and liquid refreshments contributed materially to the morale of the personnel in the forward area.

Class III and IIIa

After the arrival of the main Naval Task Group the requirements for

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March to 1 April. On 10 April the Mispillion arrived for duty as station tanker. This relieved the larger ships from the duty of refueling and left them more free for movement as CTG 7.3 desired. Approximate average consumption rates for ships while present in the Eniwetok area are listed below. Listings are in gallons per day per ship.

NAVY SPECIAL FUEL OIL CONSUMPTION RATES

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>
DE-696, 697, 698, 699, 700	1412	1418	3432	3881	6100	5200
DDR-875, 876, 877		5282	4583	7800	8200	8140
LSD 19	1765	1300	1300	1280	1370	1405
AW 3			3405	3100	1700	1980
APA 222			2200	- -	2200	2200
AKA (89, 93)	2050	1250	- -	2150	2150	2150

The arrival of the main Task Group did not materially affect the usage rates of diesel afloat and the supply from the LST's occasionally augmented from Kwajalein was adequate. Consumption ashore increased due to the increase in numbers of personnel ashore and subsequent longer operation of auxiliaries but was absorbed in the normal supply. Approximate average consumption rates for various type ships using diesel at Eniwetok and for Eniwetok ashore are listed below. Listings are in gallons per day per ship.

	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
LST's & ARL	625	833	869	666	800	707
AVP 39			622	784	833	909

DIESEL CONSUMPTION RATE ASHORE AT ENIWETOK

	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>
	1000	1250	1457	2000	2222	1250

It was determined during this phase of the operation that the original estimate for Mogas was not sufficient, Mogas consumption increasing sharply during February and March. Mogas was also desired for use in the liaison aircraft when the supply of 73 octane Avgas was exhausted. During the early phase of the operation it was estimated that the 550 drums of Avgas would be sufficient for the complete operation, but the usage rates increased so rapidly after the construction and rehabilitation period that additional shipment was required. Listed below are the approximate average usage rates at Eniwetok of Mogas ashore and of 73 octane Avgas in L-4 and L-5 aircraft. Listings are in gallons per day.

MOGAS CONSUMPTION RATES ASHORE AT ENIWETOK

	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>
	999	2222	3870	3073	2800	2150

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AVGAS USAGE RATES BY L-4 AND L-5 AIRCRAFT

<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCE</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>
19.7	252	348	411	534

The increased requirements for Avgas, which had been made known on 26 February by the Air Force were met by increased frequency of shipments of Avgas to Kwajalein.

Listed below is the tanker schedule for the delivery of bulk petroleum products to Eniwetok.

SCHEDULE OF BULK PETROLEUM SHIPMENTS TO ENIWETOK

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Arrived Eniwetok</u>	<u>Avgas</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Diesel</u>	<u>Mogas</u>
Chewaucan (AOG)	28 Nov	- -	- -	16,000	- -
Nemasket (AOG)	1 Dec	- -	- -	- -	6,000
Ashtabula (AO)	18 Jan	- -	15,000	15,000	- -
Agawam (AOG)	28 Jan	14,000	- -	- -	- -
Newmasket (AOG)	1 Mar	6,000	- -	- -	- -
Ashtabula (AO)	14 Mar	- -	66,000	7,000	- -
Misphillion (AO)	8 Apr	2,000	68,000	15,000	- -
Chehalis (AOG)	1 May	- -	- -	- -	6,000

All figures are given in barrels (42 gallons equal one barrel).

Icaroscope Installation: Shortly after arrival of JTF Main Headquarters in the forward area, J-4 received information that on request of Rear Admiral Parsons the Bureau of Ships had furnished 15 icarusopes and stands for use during the operation and that this equipment had been loaded partly in CVE-115 and partly in AGC-7. These instruments had given good results at Bikini.

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J-4, after obtaining the requirements of CTG 7.1, issued instructions for the allocation and installation of the available instruments. Allocation was, as follows: 8 to AGC-7, 2 to AV-4, 3 to AV-5, and 2 to CVE-115. Installation was accomplished by CTG 7.3 by 6 April 1948. In addition to the physical installation CTG 7.3 designated officers in the ships concerned to receive instruction from the BuShips representative in CVE-115 and be responsible for the readiness of the assigned installations.

Preparation for Post-Sandstone permanent garrison: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in approving the requirement for a permanent garrison force at Eniwetok, directed that this be controlled by CINCPAC, supported as necessary by the three Armed Services. Since the troops on Eniwetok during the operation were very largely furnished by the Department of the Army, and since presumably this would also be true in any future similar operations, it was determined that the permanent garrison would largely consist of Army troops to be provided and administered by USARPAC.

General Ogden's Staff drew up a proposed Table of Distribution with supporting Table of Equipment. Strength of the garrison force was set at fifty-seven officers and men which was approved as adequate by the Joint Task Force Staff. USARPAC recommended that facilities to be provided should include dependents' quarters. This was approved as a matter of policy by CINCPAC, and plans were then developed to provide family quarters for six officers and for six enlisted men, or a total of twelve quarters. These were to be completely furnished and equipped, since the tour of duty was established at six months and it would manifestly be

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undesireable to move out personal furniture for so brief a period.

AEC agreed that funds which they had allocated to the Services could be utilized for special procurement of those requirements which were not available in existing depot stocks.

Field Order No. 2 served as a basis for roll up and for establishment of the Post-Sandstone permanent garrison facilities. Subsequent actions did not require major revision of its provisions.

The development of the final list of equipment and supplies for the permanent garrison was accomplished by the staff which would assume responsibility upon departure from Eniwetok of troops of the Joint Task Force. It was recommended to USARPAC that this list be established on a Table of Allowance basis, since a T/A would not require changes with every variation in number of personnel assigned.

V Disposition of Property in Roll-Up

Air Force property: Decisions as to disposition of property in the rollup came, obviously, from the agency having procurement and supply responsibility for each type property. In the case of Air Force property, these instructions were coordinated with Hq. U.S. Air Force, DC/S Materiel.

All TO & E and T/A property taken by troops from home station to forward area was to be returned to station with the troops. Other Air Force property was to be returned to Sacramento Air Depot, Sacramento, California and any further redistribution required was to be accomplished from that point. While this material had been drawn from all of the Air Force area depots and specialized depots in the United States, it was

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considered that a very large proportion could, on an item by item analysis, be placed in stock at Sacramento rather than be returned to point of origin. This would result in a most important freight saving.

As an exception to this policy, the Pacific Air Command requested, and was granted by Hq. USAF, authority to withdraw any Air Force property which was required in that area of the Pacific coming under its jurisdiction. This area included Kwajalein and Oahu; therefore any equipment or supplies required by the ATC's 1535th Base Unit on Kwajalein or by the Pacific Air Depot at Hickam Field were subject to withdrawal.

In January 1948, five L-5 aircraft had been shipped by the Department of the Navy to Eniwetok for the operation, and transferred to the Department of the Air Force on a non-reimbursable basis. Additionally, the Air Force in March 1948 shipped to Eniwetok six more L-5 aircraft, together with a liaison plane operating detachment. These eleven aircraft were required to provide intra-atoll transportation between Eniwetok Island and the islands of Engebi, Aoman, and Runit. In the latter stages of the operation it became obvious that the Permanent Garrison Force, Eniwetok, would require two liaison aircraft in its equipment authorization. The Pacific Air Command approved this requirement and directed that two L-5's were to be left in place; with two additional L-5's to be surveyed for condition and the components thereof placed in stock as maintenance spare parts. The remaining seven L-5's were to be shipped to Pacific Air Depot, Hickam Field.

All photographic material had been brought out by elements of the

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311th Air Division, Recon, under the supervision of the Staff Photographer, and its return to the Zone of the Interior was accomplished by the same means. An exception is noted in that, with respect to certain items of AEC-owned photographic equipment, AEC representatives stated a requirement for delivery of these items to their custody on 18 May 1948 aboard the USS CURTISS.

AEC property: For the support of Sandstone many items of property had necessarily, in accordance with the fiscal agreement, been charged by the armed services to AEC funds and hence became the property of AEC. The determination of the items of property in this category from documents and records and the notification of accountable officers of the items in their custody was a duty performed by the Advisory Audit team of the Fiscal Section. Determination of the disposition of this property was somewhat slowed by late receipt of records and delayed assignment of an AEC property representative in the forward area.

J-4 participated in conferences concerning this property and promulgated the instructions for information guidance and compliance of task groups concerned in accordance with the expressed requests of the AEC representative. Instructions which were promulgated in addition to those contained in Appendix 5 to Annex E of Field Order No. 2 were, as follows:

a. Except as hereinafter noted, all property procured by the Armed Services chargeable to AEC funds, when no longer required for Sandstone shall be shipped to: "Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California, Attn: Code 500." There shall be plainly marked on the containers for such

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property and on accompanying shipping documents "Hold for AEC."

b. In the case of AEC property for which some doubt exists as to the advisability of shipping to Oakland, the circumstances shall be reported to Commander, Task Group 7.1, (Attn: Mr. Harry S. Allen) for a decision as to its disposition. Examples of such items are:

1. Property considered necessary for the Post-Sandstone garrison.
2. Property requiring such extensive repairs or overhaul as to make return to continental U.S. uneconomical.
3. Highly specialized or delicate instruments, the nature of which requires special handling or attention prior to storage or delivery to AEC (such as photographic equipment).

c. No contaminated material shall be shipped back to the Zone of the Interior except as authorized by Commander Task Unit 7.1.1 (The Scientific Director, Joint Task Force Seven).

d. Accountable property officers shall report by written certificate to Commander Task Group 7.1, (Attention: Mr. Harry S. Allen), any items lost, expended, unaccounted for or determined to be of no further value. Such certificates shall include a description of the circumstances attending each case of loss, expenditure, etc.

Army property: Army property on hand at the conclusion of the operation was disposed of as follows:

a. Items required by the Post-Sandstone garrison and included in the TO & E for that force were left at Eniwetok.

b. Items of equipment on the Table of Equipment of a unit accompanied the unit to its home station in the U.S. or Oahu.

c. Items of equipment excess to the T/E of a unit or furnished under an operational project were returned to depots in the U.S. unless authority for shipment to Oahu was approved by the Chief of the Technical Service responsible for the equipment.

d. Expendable supplies (rations, spare parts, etc.) were returned to Oahu depots.

Navy property: Appendix 5 of Annex E to Field Order No. 2 contained instructions for disposition of Navy property and indicated that this property would be screened prior to disposal. Pursuant to a Chief of Naval Operations letter of 9 February 1948 directing disposition of Navy property, Rear Admiral A.J. Wellings was designated as the Navy representative for the screening of property items. He was assisted by other naval officers within the JTF organization concerned with property matters.

Property screening activity was primarily concerned with Navy owned equipment in use ashore at Eniwetok, Kwajalein, Rongerik, ~~Majuro~~, and Wake. Post-Sandstone needs were considered as well as the condition and availability of the equipment itself. Decisions having been reached as to disposal of items, accountable property officers having custody of the items were notified by letter via appropriate task group commanders of the action to be taken. Copies of these letters were sent to CinCPac and ComServPac for information.

VI Conclusions and Recommendations

In general, it is considered that the logistical support afforded Joint Task Force Seven by the three Departments of Army, Air Force and Navy was satisfactorily planned and very well executed. No instance is known of failure or prejudice to the operation through any shortage of

execution.

Extremely high security classification severely restricts dissemination of information to the operating level; it is intended to restrict knowledge

to a few highly placed and highly trusted officials. For an operation of this magnitude cannot be planned and directed in all its ramifications and

details by the top staff alone.

It is necessary first to determine the troops which will be required. This is not a great problem when the operation is of a normal and routine character, and when the capabilities of standard TO & E organizations can be readily and accurately assessed. However, Operation Sandstone was of a most unusual and peculiar nature; the accurate evaluation of the capabilities of TO & E units was not susceptible to final determination at high staff level. Thus, General Ogden and his Staff, after having been acquainted with the problem, made a careful analysis of the work and functions to be performed by Engineer troops at Eniwetok and from this developed the troop basis and the materiel requirements. In the case of the Air Force, no standard TO & E existed which met the situation, and a provisional organization had to be especially constructed, equipped and supplied;

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the detailed and complex computations involved were largely handled by General Ramey's Eighth Air Force Staff.

The important point to be observed here is that even in the initial planning stages for an unusual operation such as this, there are required consultations, surveys and computations which involve a considerable number of people and preferably at the operating level. High security results in inadequate background information for many people who must determine exact data on personnel or materiel requirements.

The extraordinarily short time between planning and implementation involved extremely hurried compilation of materiel lists which could not be subjected to careful and studied review. Movement of these supplies on such short notice created an emergency situation in many elements of the depot system; normal work was displaced and left undone, or overtime was involved, and in the latter case in many instances funds were not initially available.

The two factors of security and lack of adequate time served to compound the difficulties imposed on the Service supply systems. Security very measurably slowed the dissemination of instructions to the working level, and thereby lopped off some of the precious time available in which to accomplish the job.

In the case of Sandstone, there was an additional complexity over normal supply operations in that certain procurement and certain supplies were to be paid for out of AEC funds. In order to keep the bookkeeping straight it was almost imperative that immediate, detailed, and explicit instructions be developed, issued, and made available to the lowest

Section IV

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efficient implementation of these plans, and will further afford the time necessary to issue and circulate adequate directives while continuing to maintain adequate security measures.

It is recommended that:

a. The three Armed Services issue simultaneous, clear-cut, and parallel instructions to subordinate agencies, as to their respective responsibilities. It is imperative that these directives be thoroughly coordinated by the services prior to issuance.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the three services to establish a joint Army-Navy-Air Force property issuance and accountability procedure for joint operations.

The designation of task force liaison officers at primary supply points is an excellent means of avoiding delays and difficulties in

Section IV

operation makes it necessary to limit knowledge of it to a small number of personnel for security reasons. In the Sandstone Operation the liaison officers assigned played an important part in its success. A wider use of this method of coordination would have been beneficial to efficiency.

For any future operation of a similar nature it is strongly recommended that consideration be given to the use of one or more Navy APL's for berthing and messing construction personnel. These craft can provide water, light, power, refrigeration, galley, bakery, laundry, barber shop, tailor shop, officer and enlisted men's quarters plus administrative office space for a composite group of 500 men. Their use will eliminate shore construction which is costly in manpower, equipment, material, time and money, and is of a temporary nature, and is of no value after the operation is completed.

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A N N E X 3

D - DIRECTIVE FROM WAR DEPARTMENT TO U S ARMY, PACIFIC

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Plans and Operation Division
Washington 25, D. C.

P&O 000.9 (26 Nov 47)

26 November 1947

SUBJECT: Army Participation in Atomic Energy Activities

TO: Commanding General, U. S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed establishment of a Joint Task Force to participate with the Atomic Energy Commission in operations to proof-test atomic weapons during the spring of 1948. Lieutenant General J. E. Hull has been designated as Commander of this Joint Task Force with Major General William E. Kepner and Rear Admiral William S. Parsons as Deputies. The code name in connection with this operation will be established by separate memorandum.

2. The Chief of Staff desires that you give all practicable assistance to expedite organization of the Joint Task Force and facilitate its operations. It is desired that you render requested logistic support to the Joint Task Force to include the furnishing of troops, supplies and equipment within your capabilities. This support will be in addition to your present mission. Supply priority 1-A-1 has been assigned to the supply of the Joint Task Force. This same priority will hold in the replacement from the Zone of Interior of material supplied by your command when such supply action results in a critical shortage of any item in your command. Requirements for this operation will take precedence

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over all other requirements. Funding procedures will be issued later.

3. The Atomic Energy Commission, with Joint Chiefs of Staff concurrence, has established a policy for security classification in the planning phase for the proof-test operations. For the present, the following security policy will govern:

Unclassified - that routine testing operations will be carried out as a normal and necessary part of a program dealing with research, development and production of atomic weapons; and that a proving ground is being established in the Pacific area for the foregoing function;

Secret - The location of the test site and the general time of conducting tests, as well as any information which will relate studies and preparation to a particular test;

Top Secret - The target date for a particular test.

4. Requests for necessary clearance should be initiated for all personnel with responsibilities requiring access to restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Congress). Clearances will be obtained through the Joint Task Force.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY:

/s/ A. C. WEDEMEYER

A. C. WEDEMEYER
Lt. General, GSC
Director of Plans & Operations

COPIES FURNISHED:
AFSWP
Joint Task Force

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ANNEX 3

E - DIRECTIVE FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO NAVAL BUREAUS

Op-36B/cmf

Serial: 0082P36

23 October 1947

File: (SC) A23

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From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

The Chief of the Bureau of Supply and Accounts.

The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

The Chief of Naval Research.

Subject: Naval Participation in Proof-testing of Atomic Weapons.

1. On Saturday, 18 October 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved an overall directive for Armed Forces participation in atomic weapon tests to be conducted in the Pacific. SANDSTONE is the code name assigned to the operation.

2. Eniwetok Atoll has been selected as the site for the tests.

3. A Joint Task Force has been organized to provide Armed Force participation. Lieutenant General J. E. Hull, USA, has been designated Joint Task Force Commander; General W. E. Kepner, USAF, as Deputy for the Air Force; and Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink, USN, will be designated

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to command the Naval Task Group of the Joint Task Force. SWITCHMAN is the code name assigned to the Joint Task Force.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, has been directed by the Chief of Naval Operations to furnish naval support. All vessels and personnel, except as specifically directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, will be provided from within the Pacific Fleet. It is expected that the Naval Task Group will consist of approximately 25 ships and craft and four helicopters, and that approximately 4500 Navy personnel will participate.

5. Addressees are requested to furnish support and assistance as may be requested by the Joint Task Force Commander and as may be practicable. The Joint Task Force Commander is authorized to deal directly with interested agencies of the Navy Department for this purpose.

6. The Washington Headquarters of the Task Force are in the National Defense Building. Addressees concerned should establish liaison with the Naval Deputy, Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, USN, Room 3834, Extension 4824, Navy Department, or with the Joint Task Force Chief of Staff, Brigadier General, C. B. Ferenbaugh, Room 5B326, National Defense Building (Pentagon), Extension 5927.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have established military security classifications for certain phases of the operation as follows:
Secret - the location of the test site and the general time of conducting tests as well as any information which will relate studies and preparation to a particular test.

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Top Secret - the target date for a particular test.

The classification of the code names mentioned in paragraph 1 and 3 is RESTRICTED. The meaning of the code names is SECRET.

8. Release of information regarding the tests will be made only with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in each case. Accordingly, no release concerning the operation will emanate directly or indirectly from the Army, Navy or Air Force. Information concerning this operation shall be disseminated only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties.

9. The primary purpose of the tests is the proof-testing of atomic weapons. The technical aspects will be the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Armed Forces will determine data on aspects which bear on military application of the weapons to an extent which will not seriously interfere with the primary purpose of the tests. Addressees concerned are requested to furnish to the Joint Task Force Commander, as soon as practicable, a list of their test requirements in the form of projects desired for inclusion in the tests.

10. The Chief of Naval Operations has assigned this operation priority over all Naval tasks in the Pacific other than the support of occupational forces in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, has been authorized to cancel or reduce the scope of training or fleet exercises as may be required.

cc: Lt Gen Hull

/s/ C. W. Nimitz
C. W. NIMITZ

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A N N E X 4

ALERT ORDER TO MAJOR GENERAL DECKER FROM GENERAL HULL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PLANS AND OPERATION DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

16 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL DECKER

SUBJECT: Alert Orders

1. You will prepare and mount for overseas movement on or about 10 November 1947 the units in the initial echelon of a Joint Task Force under my command, to move from Oahu to a forward base. Movement orders will be issued by your Headquarters in accordance with the following:

a. Security:

(1) The initial overall security classification of Joint Task Force operations are as follows:

SECRET - The location of the operational site used by, and the general time for the operations of the Joint Task Force, as well as any information which will relate studies and preparation to a specific operation.

TOP SECRET - The target date for a specific operation.

(2) Classification of Movement Orders, Shipping Orders, etc.

(a) All movement orders, shipping orders and similar instructions issued in connection with operations of the Joint Task Force

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exact locations west of HAWAII are not used therewith.

(c) Movement orders for units, ships and aircraft, and for all individuals connected with the operation will include a paragraph as follows:

"Personal photographic equipment and supplies are prohibited west of HAWAII."

(3) Destination of Movements.

(a) The specific destination of movements of personnel and materiel connected with the operations of the Joint Task Force west of HAWAII is classified "SECRET." All units and individuals will be cautioned that their specific location or destination is classified

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"SECRET" and that, in communications and conversations, they are authorized to state only that they are or were "somewhere in the Pacific." Personnel will be further cautioned that information relative to their activities in connection with this operation is also classified "SECRET." Violations of this provision are punishable under appropriate service regulations.

(4) Censorship. Commanding officers of units, ships and aircraft concerned with the operations of the Joint Task Force will inform their personnel that:

(a) Formal censorship of personal mail and communications is not to be effected; however, all personnel will exercise voluntary censorship.

(b) Specifically, personnel will refrain from mentioning any information in personal written communications and conversations concerning their activities in connection with the operation that has not been published in the press or announced by commercial broadcasting companies as an official governmental release.

(5) Detailed security regulations of Joint Task Force will be furnished later.

b. Troops:

(1) Army - 1220th Provisional Engr Bn with attachments as given in General Order 97, Hq AGFPAS, with any amendments.

(2) Air Force (to be attached to your command for the movement only and to be provided by 7th Air Force), with any modification

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of equipment list determined desirable by CG 7th AF.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>T/OE</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG.</u>
1 Air Cargo Resupply Detachment	1-470	1	20	21

(Cols 11&19)

(3) AACS totalling approximately 1 Off and 25 EM will report to Sig Serv AGFPAC on or about 1 November for shipment with advanced party. Equipment to accompany will be as determined by Lt Col Bubolski, Cmdg 71st AACS Gp.

(4) Navy Shore Based (to be attached to your command for the movement only and to be provided by CinCPac) aggregate strength approximating 91, and with equipment as determined by CinCPac.

c. Equipment:

(1) Army units will be equipped with T/OE equipment except as follows:

(a) Chemical. Delete all chemical equipment except Mask, gas service, M2A2 Ammonia M2-IVa1, T/OE 5-500 for Refrigeration Maintenance Team.

(b) Engineer. Delete all camouflage equipment.

(c) Medical. Delete kit, first aid, gas casualty.

(d) Ordnance. Units will take individual weapons only, except for 18th Engr Const Co which will also have 5 light and 2 heavy 30 Cal MG's. All weapons (except for minimum for guard purposes) may be boxed.

(e) Quartermaster. Delete all protective clothing

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(2) The following equipment, in addition to T/OE will
be taken:

(a) engineer.

- 1 ea Lab. Soil Testing Set No. 1
- 2 ea Grader, Rd. Mtrzd. D-12
- 4 ea Mixer, Concrete, 14 cu. ft.
- 2 ea Auger, Earth, Skd, mtd.
- 2 ea Ditching Machine, crawler
- 2 ea Roller, Tandem 2 axle, 5-8 ton.
- 2 ea Crane, Trk., mtd., $\frac{1}{2}$ yd., w/blk. atch.
- 2 ea Shovel, crawler, $\frac{3}{4}$ yd., w/dragline atch.
- 1 ea Rooter, cable operated, 3 tooth
- 1 ea Distributor, asphalt, trk., mtd., 800 gal.
- 4 ea Distributor, water, trk., mtd., 750 gal.
- 3 ea Crusher, 25 cu. yd., primary and secondary
units
- 5 ea Wagon Drills
- 6 ea 3000 gal/day distillation unit
- 1 ea 6000 gal/day distillation unit
- 13 ea Trucks, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, Dump (includes T/OE)
- 1 ea Shop "B"-Av. Bn. supplemented by tractor eqpmt
- 2 ea D-8 Tractors
- 1 ea Derrick. Stiff Leg, 3 O/T

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- 2 ea Welders, arc, trailer mtd.
- 1 ea Crans, 8-10 T, revolving 3/4 yd.
- 1 ea Crane, non-revolving, pneumatic tired,
tractor operate, 40,000 lbs.
- 3 ea Floodlighting set, 5 kw., trailer mtd.
(Onan Co.)
- 3 ea Generator set, protable 15 kw., 3 ph.,
60 cycle.
- 3 ea Compressor, air, trailer mtd., pneumatic
tires, Diesel engine, 315 cfm.
- 3 ea Pump centrifugal. 400 gal. pm, 4 in dis-
charge
- 2 ea Trucks, fire, crash Cl. 125 complete
- 2 ea Cheep's foot roller or wobbler
- 1 ea 8 yard scraper

(b) Ordnance.

- 6 ea Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, DUKW
- 5 ea Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 4 x 4 (Signal will provide
substitute)
- 3 ea Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 4 x 4, w/winch
- 1 ea Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, Signal Repair
- 2 ea Tractor, truck, Auto Car
- 1 ea Sedan, light
- 1 ea Shop (engineer equipped) General Purpose
trk. mtd.

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- 1 ea Wrecker, 4 ton
- 2 ea Truck, 2½ ton, 6 x 6, w/winch
- 4 ea Truck, ½ ton, 4 x 4
- 2 ea Truck, 1½ ton, 6 x 6, personnel carriers

(c) Quartermaster.

Mattresses and pillows for entire initial force.

3 ea truck, fork lift, gasoline, 4000 lb. cap.,
108" lift.

Heavy tentage to accommodate entire initial
force.

Beds, steel, for entire initial force (Navy
will supply).

(d) Signal.

12 ea SCR 608

20 ea SCR 610

30 ea SCR 536

10 ea SCR 649-G

10 ea SCR 300

6 ea SCX radio receiver w/speakers

1 ea Rhombic transmitting antenna, single
curtain 1500-ft. w/terminating resistance.

2 ea Receiving Rhombics complete w/transmis-
sion lines

1 ea BC 399 w/teletype keying equipment

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1 ea Teletype receiver, dual diversity
1 ea Teletypewriter set, AM/TGC 1
1 ea Sig tot Universal
3 ea Teletype machine, Model 15
2 ea Teletype machine, Model 19
2 ea Type reperforators, No. 14 TR
5 ea Battery Charger, 1½ Kw
1 ea Pole digger
1 ea Cable plow
4 ea Frequency meter set, TL 122-SCR 211
20 ea Power Unit PE-95

(e) Medical. One G-7 Naval Hosp Unit (to be supplied by Navy)

(f) In addition to the above, deletions and substitutions and additions within local availability of equipment and shipping space limitations, may be made at the request or with the concurrence of the Joint Task Force Commander.

(g) Vehicles (as far as loading will permit) will be shipped on wheels, processed for overseas shipment.

(h) Special lists of equipment and supplies (Sig and Engr) to be force loaded with advance Detachment will be transmitted separately.

d. Supply:

(1) Units will be mounted by responsible Oahu Service as

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shown below with the following levels:

- Class I - 60 days B rations (any items such as flour which may reasonably be expected to deteriorate or become contaminated in 60 days or less will be excluded).
 - 7 days 10-1 rations.
 - 5 days C rations.
 - 3 days K rations.
 - Class II & IV (AGFPAC responsibility) - 60 days (to include construction materials for rehabilitation and construction of minimum living facilities.)
 - Class III (Navy responsibility) - 60 days in drums
 - Class V - Guard ammunition only
(Responsibility of service furnishing personnel)
 - Army Exchange - 60 days
and Special Service for entire force (AGFPAC responsibility)
- (2) Resupply responsibility will be as follows:
- Class I - Navy
 - Class II & IV - Army for Army units and Air Force units for common items.

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Navy for Navy units
Air Force for Air Force non-
common items.

Class III - Navy

(3) Local availability of supplies and additional equipment will be reported to the Joint Task Force by radio as soon as determined. In determining availability, Navy and Air Force sources will be considered.

(4) An operational project will be prepared by the Joint Task Force to cover equipment not available locally. Immediately upon receipt of notification of the approval of this project, shortages will be requisitioned from San Francisco Port of Embarkation by the most expeditious means possible.

e. Construction:

Minimum field type facilities for establishment of the initial force will be constructed. Details of additional base construction to be furnished later.

f. Transportation:

The following lift will be made available, with on berth date at Pearl of 1 November:

3 LST's by ComSerPac

1 CL-MA-VI to be made available by AGFPAC if required.

All vessels will be stowed for beach discharge or discharge to lighters with ships gear at destination. Sufficient lighterage will be furnished

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by Comserpac and Agfpac according to local availabilities, and carried with initial echelon to permit discharge of all equipment at destination. By judicious loading of heavy lifts on LST's, it is estimated that two LCM's and six DUKW's will suffice for this purpose.

g. Evacuation:

(1) Evacuation will be initially to Kwajalein and thence to Oahu.

(2) A 15-day evacuation policy will be followed.

h. Fiscal: To be announced later.

i. Marking:

Shipping designators and marking instructions for resupply and follow-up shipments will be furnished later. Equipment accompanying the initial force-marked. Marking for initial force will be as follows:

XX (in green at least 4" high)

TAF (in red at least 2" high)

Unit Designation (consignee)

Special markings to assist in identification of contents.

All the above will be placed on at least one side and one end of every box or crate. In addition, a list of contents will be placed inside each box or crate and an identical list on the outside.

2. Beginning 15 November the ATC will provide air transportation from Blockhouse to the forward base and return. Flights will be made

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as necessary to support the operation with frequency estimated as twice weekly.

/s/ J. E. Hull
J. E. HULL
Lieutenant General, USA

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A N N E X 5

A - TRANSMITTAL OF ALERT ORDERS OF GENERAL DECKER TO ADMIRAL DENFELD

25 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL DENFELD

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force Coordination in the Hawaiian Area.

On the matter of the operation which I have recently discussed with you, I have attached hereto a copy of the alert order to Gen Decker setting forth responsibilities of AGFPAC relative to the initial force of the Joint Task Force. Reference is made to certain matters therein affecting your command which are in accordance with understanding reached with Admiral Wellings. Further delineations of responsibility between the services may be necessary from time to time.

I have established here at Fort Shafter a nucleus advanced echelon staff of the Joint Task Force which will, for the time being, coordinate Joint matters in the Hawaiian area. In my absence Lt Col L J Lincoln (Fort Shafter Ex 795) will be in charge of this office and will act in the capacity of a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Task Force. Admiral Wellings has temporarily designated Commander J H Taylor to work with Col Lincoln.

In order to discharge properly his responsibilities, and maintain the necessary documentary file, Col Lincoln should have a copy of all directives and instructions received or issued by the Air, Ground and Navy Commands in this area which relate to this operation. I would greatly appreciate action on your part to furnish to Col Lincoln such copies

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received or issued by your Hq and suggest that he can contact Cmdr Taylor or other officer to be designated by you for this purpose.

Incl
Cy of memo to Gen Decker
fr Gen Hull, 16 Oct 47
(omitted--See Annex 4)

J. E. HULL
Lt Gen, USA

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ANNEX 5

B - REQUESTS OF JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER ON CINCPAC

30 October 1947

SUBJECT: Services, Supplies and Personnel to be Furnished by CINCPAC
to JTF.

To: Commander in Chief, Pacific, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

1. There is summarized in the following paragraphs the aid it is anticipated will be furnished to the JTF by CINCPAC agencies in connection with the initial steps in preparing for operation SANDSTONE. This, of course, is only a partial list and must be supplemented and modified as mutually agreed in connection with the development of further plans. Additional requests will be kept to a minimum.

2. The following have already been transmitted to CINCPAC in inclosure to letter from CGJTF of 25 October as required at FLATCAR.

a. Par. 1, b (4) Approximately 91 men with equipment as determined by CINCPAC to be readied for movement to site.

b. Par. 1, d (1) Initial supply of Class III items - 60 days in drums.

c. Par. 1, d (2) Resupply responsibility, Class I Navy, Class II and IV Navy for Navy units, Class III Navy.

d. Par. 1, f Navy will supply 3 LST's plus lighterage.

e. Par. 1, c (2) (3) 1 G-7 Naval Hospital Unit.

f. Par. 1, c (2) (c) Beds, steel for initial force and follow up.

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3. In addition to above, it is requested that the following be accepted as a CINCPAC responsibility:

a. Operations and services.

- (1) Loading in Oahu of initial force and equipment including covered and open dock-side storage where required.
- (2) Movement to FLATCAR of initial force including messing of troops while afloat (AGFPAC to furnish 1 CLMAV1).
- (3) Unloading ships at destination.
- (4) Small boat operations at FLATCAR.
- (5) Rehabilitation and maintenance of equipment for water distillation, power, and refrigeration for 2500 men at FLATCAR and 2000 at BLOCKHOUSE.
- (6) Ship shuttle service between BLOCKHOUSE and FLATCAR (Army to furnish 1 FS Reefer and 1 FS Dry Cargo).
- (7) Air shuttle service by FEBY where visits to islands of ATOLL not having airfields are required (until adequate small boat services is in operation at FLATCAR).
- (8) Spraying FLATCAR with DDT.
- (9) Letting contract for sheet pile project on causeway at FLATCAR.

- b. (1) Eleven (11) electronics personnel (included in 2 a above).
- (2) Fifty (50) men for work required in 3 a (5) above.

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- (3) One (1) G-5 Hospital Unit (for BLOCKHOUSE).
- (4) Materials which are Army or Air Force responsibility to provide, but which are unavailable from the stocks of these services, provided such items are available from Navy stocks.
- (5) One (1) LSD with two (2) LCT's and small craft.

4. As a result of the recent visit to FLATCAR, Ensign Ellis is making a check on availabilities from Navy stocks of items needed for rehabilitation. If available, these items could be economically used to substitute or supplement items now on the lists for AGFPAC. Request such items as are available be shipped in first shipment to FLATCAR.

5. Further particulars with reference to the above will be handled by Lt Col Lincoln, Deputy Chief of Staff, JTF, Ft. Shafter 795.

6. Confirmation of your ability to meet this request would be appreciated.

/s/ J. E. HULL
Lt Gen, USA
Commanding .

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A N N E X 6

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR WILLIAM J A HUSSEY, USA

30 October 1947

1. You are designated as CO, 1220th Provisional Engineer Battalion (Topo Construction). In addition, you are designated as Island Commander of Flatcar upon arrival thereat and until such time as the CG, 2nd Engineer Amphibian Brigade arrives at Flatcar and takes over command.

2. As Island Commander and commander of such troops as are placed under your control, you are responsible for establishing on the island of Flatcar a base capable of supporting by 29 December a total force of approximately 2300 personnel. In addition, you will undertake such specific activities on islands outside of Flatcar proper as are directed by Headquarters Joint Task Force.

3. As Island Commander you are responsible for coordinating the activities of all personnel ashore at Flatcar. You will be responsible for all their activities except as follows:

a. Administrative control of the AACS Detachment will be the responsibility of CO, AACS, Blockhouse. Operational control of the AACS Detachment will be in accordance with AAF Letter 20-21 of 4 June 1947.

b. Operational and administrative control of the Air Cargo and Resupply Detachment will be the responsibility of the CO, ATC, Blockhouse.

c. Administration of Naval personnel on shore at Flatcar will be the responsibility of Iscom Blockhouse, except billeting, messing, transportation, recreation and hospitalization, which will be provided

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by you.

4. In the re-establishment of the Flatcar base, the execution of tasks will be undertaken in a priority as given in Inclosure 1. These priorities will be applied so as to obtain maximum effective use of available skilled personnel.

5. In the execution of your mission you will report directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force, Fort Shafter, T. H. Channels of communications will be as follows:

a. Classified cable correspondence will be addressed "from Flatcar signed Hussey to Sandpiper for Lincoln."

b. For the time being unclassified cable correspondence is not authorized.

c. Letter correspondence will be addressed personally to "Lt Col L. J. Lincoln, Office Chief of Staff, Headquarters, AGFPAC, APO 958."

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Incl. 1 to Annex 6

PRIORITY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT

1. a. Reconstruction of dock and unloading ramps. Establishment of primary signal facilities with power (Homer, Air Ground, Point to Point).
- b. Repair of landing strips (to include the other airfield on Atoll). (Est. 70 man days).
2. Establishment of water, electrical, refrigeration, and hospital facilities for initial force. (Est. 429 man days).
3. Establishment of messing and housing installations for initial force with minimum recreational facilities, and road repair (Latrines and messes only to be screened and painting to be limited to that essential for prevention maintenance). (Est. 542 man days).
4. Establishment of cable distribution system, telephone central and air-ground route control. (Signal personnel only).
5. Establishment VIP accommodations for 15 personnel. (Est 108 man days).
6. Construction of Point to Point radio teletype channel #1 to Fort Shafter and Signal Center. (Signal personnel only).
7. Development of recreational facilities for initial force (Est. 63 man days).
8. Enlargement of electricity, refrigeration, water and hospitalization facilities to accommodate 2300 personnel. (Est. 238 man days).
9. Installation of 2 BC-610's with doublet antennas to BLOCKHOUSE (1

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to Navy BLOCKHOUSE, other to AACS BLOCKHOUSE). (Signal personnel only).

10. Enlarging housing and messing facilities to meet 2300 man requirement. (1679 man days).

11. Completion of VIP accommodation. (179 man days).

12. Painting of all facilities and general clean up. (1375 man days).

Estimated Total Man Days - 4809

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ANNEX 7

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION TO MAJOR H. K. HARRIS, USA

21 November 1947

1. Effective 20 November 1947 you are designated as Joint Control and Liaison Officer at BLOCKHOUSE.

2. You will report on arrival to the Island Commander (ISCOM) at BLOCKHOUSE who is responsible to the Joint Task Force Commander (General J. E. Hull) for such matters at Blockhouse as relate to operation SANDSTONE. You will receive instructions from the Joint Task Force Staff. This staff is now at two locations -- JTF (Main) in Washington, and JTF (Fwd) at Fort Shafter, T. H., APO 958.

3. Your mission in connection with Joint Task Force operations is to maintain close liaison with ISCOM BLOCKHOUSE, Commanding Officer, ATC, BLOCKHOUSE, and their appropriate staff and operating agencies, in order to expedite the orderly flow of personnel, equipment and supplies staged through BLOCKHOUSE enroute to or from APO 187 at FLATCAR. You are authorized to deal directly with appropriate staff and operating agencies of the foregoing commanders in connection with these matters, to make such requests and recommendations as you consider necessary in the interests of efficiency, and to control priority of shipments to FLATCAR in accordance with instructions from the Joint Staff. You will keep ISCOM BLOCKHOUSE and CO, ATC, BLOCKHOUSE, informed of important matters.

4. In accomplishing your mission it is essential that you closely and effectively coordinate all your activities with ISCOM BLOCKHOUSE

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and CO, ATC, at that station. The successful accomplishment of your mission depends in large measure on the harmonious relationship you establish with these commanders, who will cooperate with you on Joint Task Force movements of personnel and supplies.

5. Specifically, you will

a. Maintain contact with ISCOM, FLATCAR, to determine the requirements of personnel and supplies that may be expected to be staged through BLOCKHOUSE.

b. Make arrangements with ISCOM and ATC Commander at BLOCKHOUSE to insure expeditious movement of personnel, equipment and supplies to FLATCAR.

c. Set up necessary procedures in coordination with ISCOM, BLOCKHOUSE, and the ATC Commander, BLOCKHOUSE, to carry out security instructions for the reception of personnel at BLOCKHOUSE destined for further shipment to FLATCAR.

d. Be responsible for screening all personnel other than those attached to units of the Joint Task Force, arriving at BLOCKHOUSE with destination FLATCAR, in order to determine that all such personnel are properly cleared to proceed. In case any person is found not to be properly cleared, he shall not be permitted to proceed pending further instructions from JTF Headquarters.

e. Make arrangements with commanders concerned for the provision of appropriate accommodations and messing facilities for personnel cleared for transportation by air to FLATCAR, and for the assignment of accommodations provided. Particular attention will be paid to the

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reception and care of VIP's scheduled for further transportation to and from FLATCAR.

f. Make arrangements with ISCOM and ATC Commander, BLOCKHOUSE, for the provision and allocation of storage space for supplies and equipment received at BLOCKHOUSE, for further shipment to FLATCAR, and for its security while at BLOCKHOUSE. Such supplies will have shipping designations and distinctive markings as prescribed by JTF.

6. You will arrange to use existing communications facilities. Direct communication to FLATCAR and to JTF (Fwd) at Fort Shafter only is authorized. On occasions where communications to JTF (Main) is necessary, messages will be transmitted to JTF (Fwd) for relay to Washington. All JTF couriers destined for FLATCAR will clear through your office at BLOCKHOUSE prior to proceeding to their destination.

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JOINT CONTROL AND LIAISON OFFICER
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, KWAJALEIN, M.I.

CHAPTER ONE - MISSION

1. The mission of the Joint Control and Liaison Officer at Kwajalein was outlined in a letter of Instructions (annex I) to Major H. K. Harris, CMP, from the Joint Task Force Commander. The effective date of subject letter was 20 November, and, in general, directed that the Joint Control and Liaison Officer at Kwajalein would:

a. Establish and maintain close liaison with the Island Commander, Kwajalein, the Island Commander, Eniwetok, and the Commanding Officer, 1535th AFBU, ATS, Kwajalein.

b. Be responsible for the screening and clearing of all persons proceeding by air through Kwajalein to Eniwetok.

c. Expedite the orderly flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies by air from Kwajalein to Eniwetok.

d. Be responsible for obtaining adequate storage space from the Navy and ATC for the safe and proper storage of equipment and supplies airlifted to Kwajalein for trans-shipment to Eniwetok.

e. Insure that adequate quarters and messing facilities were made available for personnel transiently at Kwajalein.

f. Control priorities of shipment of personnel and equipment from Kwajalein to Eniwetok.

g. Be especially attentive to VIP's arriving at Kwajalein in connection with operation SANDSTONE.

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2. To carry out the security portion of this mission, the Joint Control and Liaison Officer was initially assisted by two (2) CIC Special Agents, B. P. Scurlock and R. O. Lorio, both of the 7th Air Force CIC Detachment.

CHAPTER TWO - ACTION TO EXECUTE MISSION

1. General

a. The Joint Control and Liaison Officer departed via air with the acting Army Task Group Commander (Iscom Eniwetok, Major W. A. Hussey) at 0145, 18 November 47. Immediately upon arrival at Kwajalein official visits were made to the Island Commander and the ATC Commander.

b. Since it was apparent from the very first that the bulk of personnel, equipment, and supplies would arrive by ATC aircraft, office space for liaison work and traffic control was obtained in the ATC terminal, and remained in that location throughout the operation.

c. Almost daily during the initial months of operation SANDSTONE personal conferences were held between Iscom Kwajalein and the ATC Commander in order to insure complete coordination on matters of joint concern. In this manner a friendly, harmonious relationship was established between the Joint Control and Liaison Officer, those Commanders, and their respective staffs.

d. Initially, aircraft (C-47s) were sent to Eniwetok only on the basis of necessity due to the limited number available. However, about 1 January 48, at the direction of the CJTF an aircraft was ordered to remain at Eniwetok at all times, and another to be dispatched daily

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This arrangement was resorted to in order to keep the backlog of personnel, equipment, and supplies at Kwajalein to an absolute minimum.

2. Security

a. Security traffic control was one of the major responsibilities of the Joint Control and Liaison Officer. Stationed at Kwajalein, the aerial gateway to the atomic proving grounds at Eniwetok, it was of utmost importance that all persons preceding through the gateway be screened and cleared beyond any doubt as to the competency of his orders and the type of clearance which he did (or did not) have. This was accomplished by:

- (1) Prior notifications, by radio, of arrivals from JTF (Rear) Oahu.
- (2) Thorough examination of orders.
- (3) Careful questioning to determine type of clearance granted or pending.
- (4) Warnings reference the possession of any photographic equipment or unauthorized classified documents.
- (5) Detention at Kwajalein of any person whose status could not be determined locally as outlined in sub-pars (1), (2), and (3), above.

b. Due to the fact that the CIC personnel assigned to Kwajalein for the express purpose of carrying out this traffic control security

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mission were a part of TG 7.5, located at Eniwetok, considerable administrative difficulties, and differences of opinion as to command channels were presented, and never completely solved to the satisfaction of all concerned. Although the 700-X CIC Detachment was placed by the Iscom Kwajalein under the "command" of the Joint Control and Liaison Officer, such assignment was never effected through the publication of a recognizable competent written order. Despite this difficulty, however, the security control at Kwajalein was effective, and caused the least possible interference with the operation.

3. Control of Air Priorities

a. Control of air priorities for both personnel and cargo moving from Kwajalein to Eniwetok continually presented perplexing problems, and required the utmost attention to detail and exceptionally close liaison with the Traffic and Operations sections of ATC. Until the arrival of ATG 7.4, the Joint Control and Liaison Officer had almost complete dispatch control of C-47 aircraft assigned to the 1535th AFBU for the operation.

b. Some of the outstanding problems presented by this particular phase of Liaison operations were:

- (1) The arrival at all hours of the day and night of C-54 aircraft, ATC and NATS, carrying personnel and/or cargo which rated top priority, and regarding which no message had been received informing of arrival.
- (2) In order to set-up high priority personnel and cargo

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for C-47 flights which departed at 0800 daily it is absolutely essential that they be screened and segregated immediately upon arrival.

- (3) The greatest number of C-47 aircraft assigned to the project was four (4), which number was obtained in February. Due to the vast differences in the capacity of C-47s and C-54s and due to mechanical maintenance difficulties inherent in sustained operation of such a limited number of aircraft, it was a constant problem to prevent backlogs which might have hampered the progress of the operation.

CHAPTER THREE - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Joint task force liaison work in a situation where a small land mass is utilized as a "gateway" or "funnel" in support of the operational area presented particular problems, recommendations concerning which are as follows:

a. The grade of an officer selected to perform liaison work representing a high level headquarters should be considered with the following thoughts in mind.

- (1) The grade and service of the officer commanding the post, base, or station to which subject officer is to be attached.
- (2) The grades of officers commanding organizations mentioned thereat with whom the liaison officer must work.
- (3) The grade of the Liaison Officer should be carefully considered.

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proportioned to the size of the contemplated task.

b. Whenever practicable the Liaison Officer should be permitted to make a reconnaissance of the area where he will work, in order to acquaint himself with local conditions and, in general, to make an "estimate of the situation."

c. Detailed plans for the assurance of speedy and unfailing delivery of messages informing of the arrival of personnel, equipment, and supplies should be completed at the earliest practicable date.

d. Aircraft utilized in the shuttle service should be, as nearly as possible, compatible in carrying capacity with aircraft moving personnel and materiel from rear areas to staging area.

e. While it may be considered necessary to assign additional duties to a liaison officer other than those applicable to liaison work in the initial stages of a joint operation, (due to lack of personnel, etc.) it is believed that the effectiveness of a liaison officer's work would be greatly enhanced if he were shorn at the earliest possible time of all duties not strictly appertaining to liaison. It is also believed that, since a liaison officer is a Special Staff Officer of a very special nature, he should have no "command" function other than that which he exercises as CO of the Liaison Detachment. Having command jurisdiction over units other than those assigned by JTF Hq presents the rather peculiar situation of being a staff officer and answering directly to the Joint Task Force Commander and/or Chief of Staff, and the possibility of a command responsibility to a commander of an

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meshed in a chain of two command and staff channels which made independent

It is recommended that the Liaison Officer not be assigned any security control responsibilities.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

1. Pursuant to Section II, General Orders No. 8, Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven, dated 9 February 1948, Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven (Rear) was established at Washington 25, D. C., at 2400Z, 15 February 1948 coincident with the establishment of Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven at Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H., same hour and date. In accordance with arrangements made with the

Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff United States Army, Joint Task Force Seven (Rear) was attached as a section to Control Branch, Plans and Operations Division, GSUSA, National Defense Building, Washington 25, D. C. The administration of the office and personnel of Joint Task Force Seven (Rear) remained the responsibility of Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven.

2. Organization.

a. The Rear Echelon was organized as follows:

Military personnel:

Commanding Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis J. Herrick

Adjutant General Section

Lieutenant Colonel John F. Taylor

Pfc John A. Winn, Chief Clerk

Pfc Joe B. Chacon, Clerk

J-4

Lieutenant Colonel John S. Tudor

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Air Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Gove C. Celio, Jr.

Fiscal Officer

Lieutenant Colonel William C. Workinger

J-2

Major John B. Gulley, Deputy AC of S

Captain Lloyd D. Roberts, Chief, Personnel

Security Branch

Captain Robert J. Downey, Assistant Chief of

Personnel Security Branch

Staff Sergeant Ray J. Muirhead, AEC Liaison

Agent

Sergeant Catherine M. Romano, WAC

Transportation Section

Captain Kenneth E. Jackson

Engineer Section

Captain Earl B. Fauber

b. Lt. Col. Curtis J. Herrick assumed command 16 February 1948. Lt. Col. A.W. Toups, FD, was detailed to this Office by Office Chief of Finance as Fiscal Officer on 15 March 1948 due to the prolonged illness of Lt. Col. W. C. Workinger, FD. On 30 April 1948, Lt. Colonel Taylor of the AG Section was relieved by Major Dwight T. Hamersley, S/Sgt F. B. Anderson, and Pfc R. L. Cornett relieved Pfc John A. Winn and Pfc J. B. Chacon. Those relieved then departed to report for duty with Headquarters in the operational area.

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c. The varied tasks imposed on the officers of Joint Task Force Seven (Rear) confirmed the necessity for pooling of clerical assistance as originally planned, in order to effect maximum production with a limited force.

3. Mission.

a. From the date of activation, responsibility for all decisions on operational and logistical matters was taken over by Headquarters of the Task Force at Fort Shafter, and the mission of the Rear Echelon became one of continuing the processing of supplies and support of operations in accordance with Joint Task Force Seven policies.

b. In order to cover the varied responsibilities confronting the Rear Echelon, Colonel Herrick assigned additional related responsibilities to each representative member of the organization. In order to provide within the skeleton framework of personnel remaining behind, a medium for the assignment of actions relating to staff sections not physically represented, for example: In addition to his primary duties as Engineer Officer, Captain Fauber maintained sufficient records to act promptly on J-3 matters; Colonel Taylor on J-1 matters, etc., and in cases where a specific workload was imposed for which no prior arrangements had been established, each individual was made proportionately responsible for such contributions to final action as his particular scope of operations would permit. This established a direct control over all Rear

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Echelon actions which by virtue of inter-related responsibility proved effective in that each officer acquired a basic knowledge of current problems and the development of rapidly changing procedures consistent with the daily situation, thus reducing the expenditure of time which would have been required to maintain a desired state of orientation. Brief Staff Meetings held three times weekly sufficed to coordinate actions and assure compliance with matters of policy.

4. Coordination and Liaison.

It became apparent in the very early stages of Rear Echelon operation that liaison with various agencies within the Zone of the Interior in any way concerned with Joint Task Force Seven operation was extremely important. As a result direct liaison channels were established with the following:

State Department

Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, Los Alamos, and

West Coast Branches

Secretary of Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Navy Department

Department of the Air Force

Intelligence Division

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

Naval Research Laboratory

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Naval Ordnance Laboratory

Chiefs of Department of the Army General Staff Sections
concerned with problems of specific nature relating to
Task Force operations

Department of the Army Technical Services and any sub-
ordinate agencies of the above where direction was
involved.

5. Operations.

a. Operations in the Rear Echelon were based solely upon directives and policies originating with Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven, and directly involved representing the Task Force Commander in all matters requiring Zone of the Interior action. As the liaison channel between the Task Force Commander and the Service Agencies in Washington, D. C., the Rear Echelon was expected to be able to furnish prompt briefing on project information pertaining to all agencies of the Army, Navy and Air Force who were involved in anyway with Joint Task Force Seven. Operations for this period fall into the following general categories. All actions involving Joint Chiefs of Staff decisions and Department matters were handled through Lt. Colonel Peisinger who was assigned as liaison for Plans and Operations Division.

- (1) Immediate follow up of the movements of Headquarters elements to the operational area in terms of logistical and support problems.

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(2) Preparation for and handling of VIP observers.

b. Initially, an agreement between the Commanding General of Joint Task Force Seven and the Atomic Energy Commission set the number of observers permitted to witness each test at sixty (60), due to the limited accommodations available in the test area. These sixty spaces were allotted as follows:

(1) 15 Spaces for the Secretary of Defense, who suballotted:

- (a) 4 Spaces to the Army
- (b) 4 Spaces to the Air Force
- (c) 4 Spaces to the Navy
- (d) 3 Spaces to be retained by Secretary of Defense

(2) 30 Spaces for Atomic Energy Commission, which would include space for Members of Congress, if any desired to attend.

(3) 15 Spaces for Joint Task Force Seven, from which accommodations would be provided as follows:

- (a) 4 Spaces for Joint Chiefs of Staff
- (b) 5 Spaces for Pacific Commands (later raised to 9)
- (c) 2 Spaces for Military Liaison Committee (later raised to 4)

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(d) 2 Spaces for Armed Forces Special Weapons
Project (later increased to 5)

c. The Commanding General, Joint Task Force Seven, then called upon the agencies involved to supply the names and addresses of the individuals who would attend the tests as observers, so that proper arrangements could be made for travel and accommodations en route.

d. It was decided at this time that each agency sending observers would supply funds for defraying travel expenses and per diem of the observers while en route to and from the test.

e. As a result of a meeting of the War Council, 2 March 1948, a memorandum was dispatched to agencies involved, by the Secretary of Defense, requesting that no individuals be sent to observe these tests unless "there is some genuine technical justification for doing so." This request, coupled with the critical period of the international situation, cut down the number of observers for each test to about thirty (30).

f. It was decided that the Atomic Energy Commission would handle their own observers, arranging for their travel and accommodations as best they could, but if help were needed they would call on Joint Task Force Seven (Rear); Lt. Col. C. J. Herrick in charge.

g. The Rear Echelon's part in the picture was as follows:

- (1) Responsibilities of the Rear Echelon would be:
 - (a) Arranging for travel and accommodations for all military observers (Atomic Energy Commission, also, if necessary).

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- (b) Secure necessary travel orders for all Atomic Energy Commission observers and workers.
- (c) Arrange for the security clearance of military observers.
- (d) Confirm security clearances of observers occupying Atomic Energy Commission spaces.
- (e) Arrange for physical examination and immunizations.
- (f) Liaison between the forward area and observers.
- (g) Notification of forward areas of continually fluctuating status of observers.
- (h) Notification of observers as to time of departure.
- (i) Briefing of individuals on departure (security and trip information).

h. To accomplish this mission Colonel Herrick set up the following contacts:

- (1) Lt. Colonel Loughry, ATC, for scheduling special ATC VIP plane to take observers from Washington, D. C., to the test site.
- (2) A representative of NATS for use of Naval air transportation en route if the need arose.

- (3) Lt. Colonel Peisinger, Plans and Operations, for liaison with Army observers and operational contact.
- (4) Captain Hill, USN, for liaison with Navy observers.
- (5) Lt. Colonel Howard, for liaison with Air Force observers.
- (6) Lt. Colonel Stark, for liaison with Military Liaison Committee observers.
- (7) Major Healey, for liaison with AFSWP observers.

i. In order to maintain close contact with Atomic Energy Commission, Colonel Herrick called on Mr. L. Gettman, administrative representative, to keep the Rear Echelon informed continually of any changes in plans on observer personnel. Travel orders were issued to Atomic Energy Commission personnel through this Headquarters, so that constant close liaison was an absolute must.

j. As time for the tests drew near an invitational and informational letter was dispatched through Plans and Operations to the agency head inviting the observers whose names were submitted by that agency. This letter was accompanied by a special plane flight schedule, along with copies of the J-2 security briefing, so that each individual observer could prepare himself in advance.

k. Coordination of public information matters with Secretary of Defense, Military Liaison Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

for dissemination each Friday and took action on forward area reports

of Joint Task Force Seven received each Monday.

l. Coordination with Army, Air Force and Navy agencies concerning personnel and logistical matters involved in final roll-up in addition to preparation for reception of Task Force elements on the West Coast through the briefing of agencies responsible for compliance with Field Order No. 2

m. Coordination with respect to the administrative procedure involved in the disposition of Task Force records at the close of Operation "Sandstone."

n. Securing information as requested for General Hull on various matters of high policy, as well as routine information in connection with all phases of the Sandstone Operation and allied or related projects as required.

o. Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven (Rear) acted as communication message center for all agencies in Washington, D. C. who were interested in the operation of Joint Task Force Seven. Measures were in effect which provided prompt distribution or collection of information both in Washington and other agencies in the

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

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United States, as well as to other Joint Task Force Seven agencies in the forward area. Radio traffic was handled through the Traffic Coordination Section. Communications were also maintained by use of Joint Task Force Seven and other courier systems providing service to this area.

p. Close coordination was maintained with Plans and Operations Division. Lt. Colonel Peisinger acted as the direct contact. He was prepared at all times to assist the Task Force by using fully the complete facilities of Plans and Operations Division. This coordination assisted materially, since Plans and Operations Division acted as the agent for General Bradley, who was the Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to this operation.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT

HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN (FORWARD)

CHAPTER ONE - Organization and Mission.

1. Organization. The Forward Headquarters of Joint Task Force Seven started functioning on 20 October 1947 at Fort Shafter, T.H., and was inactivated on 15 February 1948. On this latter date the Main Headquarters, Joint Task Force Seven, opened at Fort Shafter. The total strength of the Forward Headquarters was about twelve individuals, except for the latter part of the period when it was being reinforced in order to assume the functions of the Main Headquarters. Its principle composition was as follows:

a. General Staff:

Lt Col L J Lincoln alternating with Lt Col A D Starbird
in charge as a Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force
Seven.

Lt Col M H Huston - J-1 and J-3.

Lt Col F C Weyand - J-2 (in addition to his normal duty
as G-2, USARPAC).

Lt Col J W Keith - J-4.

1st Lt L W Temple - A.G.

There were no Air or Navy officers assigned full time
initially and this was a serious deficiency.

Rear Admiral A J Wellings, J-4, JTF-7, was present at
Pearl Harbor where he was also Deputy COMSERVPAC.

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habilitation of Kwajalein as a base for the Air Task Group.

Hull personally briefed principal USARPAC staff members.

2. The above action did much to clarify the JTF-7 problems to

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the commanders themselves, to the USARPAC staff and to the Sandpiper staff. However, many obstacles and difficulties had to be overcome on the "working levels." Iscom Kwajalein was designated CTG 7.7 and issued a directive on 12 January 1948 (Annex 2). About the same time CINCPAC directed Iscom Kwajalein to report to CJTF-7. While these directives were too late to avoid giving rise to confusion, the nebulous situation regarding tasks to be performed and/or assignments of responsibility precluded earlier issuance.

3. Subsequently, the concept that logistic and administrative matters should be handled through normal service channels was partially modified. Requisitions from the project area for Army type supplies and personnel were submitted through Hq JTF-7 (Fwd) in order to insure expeditious action and to coordinate with shipping.

CHAPTER THREE - Participation of Oahu Commands.

1. All of the commands in Oahu, beginning in mid-October 1947, contributed in effort, men and materials to Sandstone. Each command received a directive from the appropriate Washington Department to render all practicable support and Sandstone was placed in high priority (See Annex 3). The late date of some of these directives did not interfere with Sandstone operations since the local commanders initiated action on their own authority.

a. USARPAC. General Hull set forth initial requirements on 16 October in a memorandum for General Decker, subject: "Alert Orders"

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(Annex 4). This memorandum included some requirements to be met by CINCPACFLT, PACDIV ATS and 7th AF. This order was not signed until 25 October, by which time items and services listed were already being made available on the basis of "staff level" requests between Sandpiper and the commands involved.

b. CINCPACFLT. Certain CINCPACFLT responsibilities were implicit in the Alert Order to General Decker and a copy was transmitted on 25 October 1947 (Annex 5). General Hull on 30 October also requested CINCPACFLT to undertake certain additional matters in accordance with JCS and JTF policies on the division of responsibilities between the Army and the Navy. In general, this request provided that the Navy would be responsible for shipping and for Class I and III supplies. This letter was transmitted by CINCPACFLT to COMSERVPAC for action. Deputy COMSERVPAC (Admiral Wellings) was also J-4 of the JTF and remained present in his office at COMSERVPAC. Admiral Wellings' presence in Oahu enabled him to concern himself with directing matters pertinent to JTF which had been made the responsibility of COMSERVPAC by CINCPACFLT instruction on General Hull's 30 October letter.

c. PACDIV ATS and 7th AIR FORCE. A copy of the Alert Order to General Decker was transmitted to each of the above commanders requesting appropriate action within his command.

2. The requests from JTF-7 (Fwd) to the several commands for personnel, materials and services were continuous and numerous. It should be realized that JTF-7 had no resources under its control in the

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Hawaiian Area until they were made available by one of the commands in accordance with requests as outlined above. The success of JTF-7 (Fwd) in meeting the target dates and fulfilling the plans and instruction of JTF-7 (Main) was entirely dependent on the generous and wholehearted support rendered by all.

CHAPTER FOUR - Operations in Oahu and Move to the Forward Area.

1. Reconnaissance and Trips of General Hull.

a. General Hull returned from Washington to Oahu on 18 October with a party including Admiral Wellings, Colonel Tulley, Colonel Cooney and Lt Col Starbird. This party set up JTF-7 (Fwd) and initiated the action in the Oahu commands. General Hull, on 23 October, conferred with Admiral Denfeld with respect to the evacuation of natives from Aoman and disposition of Navy surplus property on the Eniwetok Atoll which had been sold to the Chinese. On 24 October General Hull met with General Kepner, General Wooten and General Nowland with reference to developing details of the air participation and air support. On 25 October General Hull departed for Kwajalein. His party was aboard two special C-54's and one B-29, and included the following:

Lt. Gen J. E. Hull, Commander JTF-7	Lt Col A D Starbird, DC/S, JTF-7
RearAdm F C Denebrink, CTG 7.3	Col Lynn Barnes, Off Ch of Engr.
Maj Gen W E Kepner, DC & CAF, JTF-7	Lt Col C. Smith, AACS
RearAdm A J Wellings, J-4	Col P. Cullen, Photo Off.
Doctor D E Froman, Scientific Dir.	Col D. Tulley, Engineer
Doctor A C Graves, Asst " "	Col J P Cooney, Rad Safe Off.

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Captain J S Russell, USN, Test Dir.	Col K. Barney, PACAIRCOM	Engr.
Captain Hill, AFSWP	Lt Col D. Kennedy	Asst to
Captain C L Engleman, USN, Comm Off	Major W A Hussey	Engr (Sur)
Colonel C H Hatch, " "	Mr N Kelly, Contractors	CO, 1220th
	Rep (MKPK)	PEB
	Ensign D Ellis, 1220th	(Utilities)

At 0800, 27 October, party arrived Kwajalein and consulted with acting ISCOM (Commander Reeves) and ATC Base Commander (Lt Col Burton K. Voorhees). The commanders were instructed on security and the general nature of support expected from Kwajalein. At 1300, 27 October, the party arrived Eniwetok. Reconnaissance was limited that day to Eniwetok Island. Detailed facilities were found there to accommodate 4000 to 5000, but all had utilities removed and needed renovation. In general, it was determined that all structures occupied would need major repair and all mechanical facilities would require replacement. At 0800, 28 October, to 1200, 29 October, the party visited and inspected all outlying islands upon which structures were contemplated. Travel forward of Kwajalein was aboard ARS-25, a PBV and a C-47.

b. Other Trips. Other trips were made, though too numerous to mention. In general, at least one key officer of Hq JTF-7 made a trip each week to the project area. Admiral Dennebrink spent about half his time in the forward area. General Hull made about one trip per month.

2. Activation of 1220th Engineer Provisional Battalion (Topo Const.)

a. The first action pertinent to the organization of the 1220th was taken about 10 October when the 18th Engineer Construction Company was alerted for movement about 1 November. On 22 October USARPAC received informal instructions (in the alert Order) to activate the 1220th Engineer Provisional Battalion (Topo Const) which was to include the 18th Engineers. Its readiness date for shipment of personnel was 12 November and cargo 8 November. Total strength was 560 and it included some Navy, Air and Marine personnel. Major W J A Hussey was designated commander on 24 October 1947 and given specific instructions as to his mission of rehabilitation of facilities at Eniwetok (Annex 7).

b. The 1220th moved to Eniwetok as follows:

(1) Personnel of the 1220th EPB loaded at Iroquois Point, Pearl Harbor, T.H., at approximately 0900, 15 November 1947, and departed in convoy as the initial force under control of CTG 7.3 for Eniwetok at approximately 1430 on same date as follows:

LST 219	8 Off	111 EM (Army & AF)
		10 (Navy)
LST 611	2	128 (Army & AF)
LST 45	6	(" ")
LSD Comstock	4	89 (" ")
		42 (Navy & Marine)
TOTAL	20 Off	502 EM (all Services)

(2) On 18 November the Coastal Crusader departed for Eniwetok with a load of cargo and two Army Officers.

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- (2) Major Hussey, Acting Army Task Group Commander, departed via air for Eniwetok with his initial party as follows at 0145, 18 November:

	4 Off	2 Civ	13 EM (Army & AF)
TOTALS	<u>2</u> 6 Off	<u>2</u> 2 Civ	<u>16</u> 29 EM (All Services) (Navy)

- (3) The total cargo moving with the initial force, including T/O&E, EML and rehabilitation materials, including small boats, totaled 9100 measurement tons of all types. This was carried on the ships listed plus the LST 1135. This tonnage was considerably larger than had been anticipated and required two LST's and the Coastal Crusader be made available at a late date before sailing.

3. Development and Operation of the Kwajalein Base.

a. The original concept for development of Kwajalein as a base in support of JTF operations envisaged the services in a cooperative effort. The Island Commander, a Naval officer reporting to CINCPAC as overall Commander, was to continue to perform his prescribed Naval mission in addition to undertaking such responsibilities as would be required by the Kwajalein Island command in support of JTF-7 operations. The ISCOM's principal responsibilities to CJTF-7 involved general supervision of the construction of the base camp to be occupied by the Air

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and maintenance activities on the island required for the upkeep of the Air Task Group.

b. At the outset it was felt that the ATC Commander at Kwajalein would merely continue with his ATC functions without becoming involved to any great extent in construction and maintenance preparations for the ATG. It was originally thought that the Engineer furnished by 7th AF (Colonel Barney), functioning as a deputy to the Island Commander on matters involving construction for the JTF, would solve the problem. However, during the process of negotiating the necessary agreement with CINCPAC, 7th AF and PACDIV ATS and the ATG, it became evident that the responsibilities and interests of all agencies at Kwajalein, including the ATG, were so intertwined that any command set-up or definition of responsibilities must be prescribed in specific detail and must recognize the position peculiar to each service and command involved in joint operations at Kwajalein. It was decided to designate the 7th AF Engineer (Colonel Barney) as deputy to Iscom Kwajalein for construction of JTF facilities whereas the ATC Commander was also designated as deputy to Iscom Kwajalein for certain housekeeping functions in support of the ATG. The development and operation of Kwajalein facilities was a continuous and perplexing problem. It involved numerous conferences with all interested agencies and although the records of such conferences became a documentary basis for working arrangements, the whole matter never became clearly enough defined to permit a JTF publication giving

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a comprehensive and detailed outline of responsibilities. (Staff Memo 29, 14 January 1948, on the subject, was revoked because of disagreements with the contents.)

4. Joint Task Force Liaison Arrangements at Kwajalein.

It was realized that a need would exist throughout operations for a liaison officer to coordinate movement through Kwajalein to Eniwetok and to function as liaison between the JTF Commander and agencies in the Kwajalein area. Major H. K. Harris was designated Liaison Officer on 20 November. (Annex 7 includes his LOI and final report.)

CHAPTER FIVE - Main Problems and Solution.

1. Development and Operation of the Kwajalein Base.

Chapter Four, par 3, gives the background on this matter. While the overall responsibility for construction and rehabilitation was, in the early stages, clearly assigned to Iscom Kwajalein, details as to who would furnish the necessary resources, especially in manpower, gave rise to continuous complications. In addition, a similar problem arose in determining details of operation of facilities. The final solution involved USARPAC, PACAIRCOM, PACDIV ATS, CINCPACFLT, Army Task Group Commander (7.2) and the Air Task Group Commander. Each contributed personnel to assist in the development and operation of the Kwajalein base facilities. In addition, AEC made available \$492,500 for augmenting or improving Navy utilities and the test camp for TG 7.4 by a civilian contractor working under Navy control. The difficulties in this problem seem inevitable and unavoidable under existing laws, customs and command

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arrangements of the service.

One of the matters which resulted in confusion at Kwajalein was the status and duties of the Joint Control and Liaison Officer. By his LOI he was responsible for expediting the movements of Sandstone personnel and cargo and making the necessary security checks. However, his security responsibilities became complicated by the fact that J-2, Hq JTF-7, Forward, in the early stages furnished a detachment to assist in carrying out security functions at Kwajalein. Later however, Iscom Kwajalein made the liaison officer a part of his command (7.7.3) with responsibility for island security and for movement by air of certain cargo and personnel. In effect, the liaison officer became in many respects a subordinate of Iscom Kwajalein rather than a direct subordinate of CJTF-7. It is believed that better results would have been achieved by keeping the liaison officer on a clearcut status directly responsible to CJTF-7.

2. Security.

a. General. On 20 October 1947, Lt Col. F. C. Weyand, AC of S, G-2, USARPAC, was designated Deputy J-2 and given staff responsibility for security in the forward areas. His responsibilities in this regard were outlined in a LOI which included a requirement for immediate preparation of an initial security plan. The plan, prepared and approved 22 October 1947 was subsequently implemented with minor changes.

b. Operational Difficulties arising from Security Restrictions. Not only was security itself a serious problem, but its implementation gave rise to many serious operational problems. Many individuals in

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key positions throughout the commands knew little or nothing of the nature of existence of Operation Sandstone at the very time they were required to place its requirements in the top priority. The secret location of APO 187 caused early delays and errors in routing of mail. Individual travel orders were classified Secret and even in that classification were frequently vague about the destination. A key officer, or officers, was designated in each command on the "working level" who JTF (Fwd) could contact on pertinent matters. Others with the command generally knew little or nothing of the project. This system gave a high degree of security, but it is not recommended except as a very temporary measure. For operational effectiveness every key officer in each supporting organization should be familiar with the project by the time that organization is called on to provide substantial support. Security need not be jeopardized by such an arrangement.

c. Administrative and Physical Security in the Forward Headquarters. From the point of view of the security problem, the forward headquarters on Oahu was a headquarters within a headquarters. Its personnel in a few instances were assigned dual responsibilities as staff officers of the USARPAC command and concurrently of the JTF command. The physical location of the headquarters was within the headquarters building of USARPAC at Fort Shafter. Supporting service personnel of USARPAC, such as those handling incoming and outgoing radio messages, performed this service for JTF-7 in addition to their normal duties. To prevent widespread dissemination of information concerning Sandstone

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Release some weeks later. The cover plan was particularly effective in that it tied in with operations generally known by the officers and men

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on Oahu to be already in progress and therefore did not give rise to any unusual degree of speculation or question. Security precautions that were taken in addition to the institution of the cover plan included: a series of security lectures to all officers and men; execution of security agreements by all concerned; posting of security posters conspicuously throughout staging area; showdown inspections to disclose unauthorized photographic equipment; and local investigative agency check of all personnel assigned or attached to the unit.

e. Investigation and Clearance of Personnel. JTF Security Regulations required all assigned or attached personnel to be cleared for loyalty by investigative agencies in Washington. Personnel that would have access to ~~AEA~~ restricted data had to be thoroughly investigated by the FBI and cleared by ~~AEC~~. The implementation of this program to the extent of insuring that all personnel in the forward areas submitted in proper form the required fingerprint cards, PHS forms, pictures, security agreements, and security acknowledgements presented problems that were solved by a small CIC unit organized at Forward Hq (Oahu), to distribute the necessary forms, accomplish the fingerprinting and photography, check forms for completeness, and, in general, supervise the program.

f. Travel Control. Effective with arrival at Eniwetok of the advance detachment it was necessary to control travel into that area. Briefly, this was accomplished by establishing travel control points at Kwajalein and Eniwetok. These points were manned by CIC personnel (3 at

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Eniwetok; 2 at Kwajalein). They were responsible for checking personnel enroute to Eniwetok for proper credentials, authority to travel and compliance with security regulations, particularly with respect to carrying of unofficial photographic equipment. The officers in charge of these control points also were given the mission of surveying their respective areas and making recommendations to Deputy J-2, Oahu, as to security needs and procedures that would be required as the project progressed. Their on-the-spot observations and recommendations were invaluable to D/J-2, Oahu, in this planning. The CIC teams, in effect, served as a security reconnaissance unit, reporting to Oahu. J-2 liaison with the local office of the Collector of Customs was effective in maintaining security over movements of personnel traveling in connection with JTF operations.

3. Logistics.

a. Shipping. JCS 1795/6 stated that in general the AEC would bear the cost of transportation by other than military air or surface craft. Cargo transported on any vessel furnished by the Navy would be carried without charge to the AEC. However, should the Army furnish surface craft and by so doing require replacement of these craft by vessels other than those already in operation, AEC would defray the cost of operation. Based on this principle, the Navy furnished the majority of the shipping used in the operation; the Army's principal contribution being one round trip by each the Coastal Crusader (CIMAVI) and the LST 553 plus the FS 234 and FS 370 which were utilized in the operation of a shuttle service.

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in the forward area.

All shipping assigned to the JTF was made a part of and placed under the operational control of CTG 7.3 including the Army's vessels cited above. In addition to the vessels assigned to the Task Force, regularly scheduled Army and Navy shipping was utilized when available.

No attempt was made to restrict the movement of cargo of one service to ships of that service. Both Army and Navy shipping were used to transport cargo and personnel as the requirement arose. If practicable, a JTF representative was present to supervise the loading of all vessels which were carrying Sandstone supplies and materials. For shipping statistics see J-4 report.

b. It was realized from the beginning of this operation that large quantities of cargo and many of the officer and civilian personnel connected with the JTF would of necessity require transportation to the forward area by air. Therefore, arrangements were made whereby aircraft of both the ATC and NATS would be utilized. JCS 1795/6 specified that the ATC would be primarily responsible for movement of personnel and cargo for the Army and Air Force and NATS would be responsible for personnel and cargo of the Navy. This policy established by the JCS, was given a most flexible application in the movement of personnel and cargo from Oahu. Both ATC and NATS were used without regard to origin of personnel or cargo; the urgency of the lift and the availability of space aboard aircraft determining the air transport service to be utilized.

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The ATC established a separate channel, 19X, to handle JTF lift; assigning "CPX" as the priority suffix. NATS established no special "channel" for JTF-7 but established the procedure whereby JTF requirements would be met in a high priority. For tonnages and personnel moved see J-4 report.

c. Supply. The original plan called for Oahu to provide original supply of the initial force and materials for rehabilitation of Kwajalein. Other supply and resupply was to come from the U.S. However, it was found that Oahu had substantial quantities of required army type items and could normally provide quicker supply action; so the scheme was changed to make Oahu the principal supply point. Such items as could not be obtained in Oahu were passed on to the U.S. for supply action.

Considerable quantities of supplies were available from surplus and excess from both Army and Navy sources, otherwise it is doubtful if Oahu could have operated effectively as the main supply base.

CHAPTER SIX - Recommendations for Future Operations.

1. The elements of any JTF, insofar as practicable, should be based at a location which will permit a definite and clearcut assignment of responsibility for development and operation of the base. Such responsibility to be definite not only as regards the individual commander concerned but also as to the service primarily responsible for rendering him logistic support. In the Sandstone Operation, Eniwetok was an excellent example of following this principle while Kwajalein furnishes an example of the difficulties which arise when responsibilities

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are divided between different commanders and different services.

2. In the commands which are charged with responsibility for supporting the operation, all of the key staff and operating personnel should, by the time substantial support is required, be given a reasonably complete briefing. With proper emphasis on the importance of security, no violation should result therefrom.

3. One of the earliest requirements for an operation of this character is a suitable cover plan.

4. Key staff personnel of the main headquarters, while it is located in Washington, should be required to take one or more trips to the forward area in the early stages of the operation. This applies to planning staff agencies as well as operational staff.

5. Travel control points must be determined and manned at the earliest moment in the operations of this character to ensure initial movement control.

6. A liaison officer should be established at any key point in the movement of personnel and cargo where there is no echelon of the Joint Task Force headquarters. This liaison officer should have adequate rank and should remain directly responsible to the Joint Task Force Commander and not become subordinate to any of the commanders in the area.

7. Inasmuch as excess and surplus items will not be available in future operations, the stock levels of appropriate depots in all services should be increased to permit support of the operation therefrom. Oahu depots would not seem to be as satisfactory as West Coast depots.

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(1) The three major elements of the Joint Task Force are:

Army Task Group

Navy Task Group

Air Task Group

b. Base Area Commands.

(1) An island command will be established as a base area at Flatcar. After his arrival at Flatcar, CG of the Army Task Group will serve additionally as ISCOM Flatcar

ing the requirements imposed upon him by the Joint Task Force Commander. The Aviation Engineer Officer will function as a Deputy to Iscom Blockhouse and have charge of, and be directly responsible for, all construction, rehabilitation and administrative arrangements essential in providing for the requirements of the Joint Task Force, primarily Air, stationed at Blockhouse.

- (3) Mutual cooperation between Iscom Blockhouse and Flatcar is expected on all matters affecting the Joint Task Force. Interchange of materiel, supplies, and personnel between the two Island Commands will be carried out as mutually agreed or as directed by the Joint Task

mal channels; i.e., CINCPAC, AGFPAC, 7th AF, PacDiv ATC, and Z/I service agencies.

2. Logistics support to be provided by local commands and service agencies in the Zone of the Interior as required by the Joint Task Force.

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A N N E X 2

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN DIRECTIVE TO ISCOM KWAJALEIN

12 January 1948

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

TO: Iscom Kwajalein

1. With the concurrence of the Commander in Chief, Pacific and United States Pacific Fleet, you have been designated Commander, Joint Task Group 7.7 (Short Title CTG 7.7) as an additional duty in connection with operation SANDSTONE. As such, for all matters connected with this project, you are directly under the command of the Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, Lieutenant General J. E. Hull, and your mission is as stated in par. 3f, Field Order 1, Hq JTF Seven, dated 14 November 1947 (Copy Number 50 of which has already been furnished you), as modified by later agreements and orders of this headquarters and this letter of instructions. Applicable agreements are attached as inclosures 1, 2, and 4.

2. Generally your additional responsibilities include:

a. The preparation of facilities and installations on the Kwajalein Atoll required for the operation of all units of JTF-7 stationed thereon (to be delegated as indicated in inclosure 1).

b. The later support of TG 7.4 in accordance with the agreement stated in inclosure 2.

c. Such assistance as you are capable of rendering, with the means available to you, for the establishment and support of Air Force Weather Detachments of JTF-7 on Majuro and Rongerik.

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3. For carrying out these additional responsibilities the following JTF-7 units will be assigned to you for operational control:

a. Detachment of 926th Aviation Engineer Bn, commanded by Colonel Keith R. Barney, for construction required for TG 7.4 as indicated in inclosure 1. Copy of Colonel Barney's letter of instructions from CG, Pacific Air Command, attached as inclosure 3.

b. The Air Transport Command Base Commander at Kwajalein, Lt Col B K Voorhees, for all administrative and supply matters concerning the operations of JTF-7 only, as set forth in inclosure 4.

c. A liaison detachment from JTF-7, commanded by Major H K Harris. Copy of Major Harris's letter of instructions attached as inclosure 5.

d. Such security, photographic, and other personnel as may be attached or assigned under present agreement or by later orders.

e. Additional stevedores personnel to supplement your normal sources as mutually agreed between you and CTG 7.2.

4. In carrying out the responsibilities assigned to you by par 2a, above, and par 2a of Appendix 1 to Annex E to FO 1, Hq JTF-7 you will undertake the construction and rehabilitation in the priority indicated below:

a. First priority will be given to construction of facilities essential to the operation and facilities for VIP's. (VIP messing to be in the existing Naval Hospital mess building.)

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b. Second priority will be given to recreational facilities for officers and enlisted personnel on an equal priority. In accomplishing this, the existing ATC NCO Club, enlisted men's beer hall, and the Service Club are to be expanded in addition to the construction listed in inclosure 1.

c. Third priority will be given to construction of quarters for CTG 7.4 in an area as directed verbally by CJTF, and to miscellaneous construction and rehabilitation not covered in the first and second priorities which in your judgement is essential and required for the operation of JTF-7. Minor modifications, not entailing appreciable additional expense or labor, may be communicated directly to you by CTG 7.4 through his liaison officer with you. Changes in the above requirements involving priorities or increased labor or material costs will be acted on by this headquarters.

/s/t/ J. E. HULL
Lieutenant General
Commanding

Incls:

- 1 - Construction responsibility agreement of 29 Nov 47
- 2 - Agreement of 15 Dec 47
- 3 - LOI to Col Barney
- 4 - Revised draft agreement on responsibilities at BLKESB
- 5 - LOI to Major Harris

(Note: All inclosures omitted.
They can be found in
JTF-7 official files.)

(omitted this report)
See Annex 8

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as the overall directive for atomic weapon tests to be conducted by a Joint Task Force in the Pacific. SANDSTONE is the code name assigned to the operation.

2. Eniwetok has been selected as the site for the tests.

3. Lieutenant General J. E. Hull, U.S.A., has been designated Joint Task Force Commander, General W. E. Kepner, USAF, Deputy for the Air Force and Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, USN, as Naval Deputy on his staff.

4. In accordance with your dispatch nomination, it is desired that you designate Rear Admiral F. C. Denebrink, USN, to command the Naval Task Group, and assign an AGC as his flagship. It is understood that General Hull and the Joint Task Force Staff will be embarked in the

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same ship, rather than in a CVE as stated in reference (a).

5. Naval commitments, dates, fiscal arrangements and organization of the Joint Task Force are contained in reference (a) with the following exceptions:

(a) AGC to be provided as flagship.

(b) Only 4 helicopters will be available instead of 8.

6. You are hereby directed to furnish the naval support as outlined in Appendix A of reference (a), with such minor substitutions and modifications as you may consider desirable and practicable. All vessels and personnel, except as specifically directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, will be provided from within the Pacific Fleet.

7. This operation is assigned priority over all naval tasks in the Pacific other than support of the occupation forces in the Western Pacific. You are accordingly authorized to cancel or reduce the scope of scheduled training and fleet exercises as may be required.

Cy to:
Lt Gen Hull, USA

C. W. NIMITZ

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as follows:

- a. Command responsibility of the Task Wing (Brigadier General

Commander at Kwajalein until the arrival of General Ramey or his command representative is not known at present. The added responsibilities of the ATC Commander in connection with the Task Wing involve handling of cargo, mail and personnel arriving by air, assisting in storage of cargo, housing and messing of personnel, arranging for scheduling and maintenance of C-47 type aircraft to be used for inter-island support (see Par. b, below), inclusion of present air-sea rescue facilities in plan for inter-island ferrying and all other functions necessary to establishing this force within his capabilities.

- b. ATC is to provide four (4) C-47 type aircraft on Kwajalein

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for local inter-island ferrying. There will be installations on various islands which will require supply by aerial drop. Availability of equipment for aerial supply drops should be checked. Availability of these aircraft for this project is as follows: one (1) on 1 December, two (2) on 1 January and one (1) on 1 February. Operational control of these aircraft will remain with the ATC Commander on Kwajalein until the arrival of the Task Wing Commander. ATC will continue to provide crews and maintenance for the duration of the project.

2. As further information become available, it will be forwarded to you.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HARPER:

Cy furnished:
Gen Kepner

JOHN H. DAVIES
Colonel, Air Corps
Deputy Commander

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A N N E X 3

C - DIRECTIVE FROM DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE TO SEVENTH AIR FORCE

(Sent by radio through Sandpiper channels)

WAR SVC 134

DTG: 072025Z November 1947

The Atomic Energy Commission has requested the support of the Armed Services in the conduct of an Atomic Proof Test in the Western Pacific during the early summer of 1948. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed that the Armed Services support the AEC operation and have designated Lieut. General J. E. Hull, USA, as Task Force Commander, with Major General W. E. Kepner, USAF, and Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons, USN, as Deputy Commanders.

It is the desire of the Chief of Staff, USAF, that the Atomic Energy Commission Operation be given the whole-hearted support of the USAF.

The CG Strategic Air Command has been directed to organize a task group for assignment to this Task Force. The CGs of Air Materiel Command, Proving Ground Command and Air Transport Command have been directed to actively support the undertaking.

You may anticipate requests from the Task Force Commander for general support of this operation. It is requested that your command provide maximum support possible.

Department of the Army and Joint Task Force Commander concur.

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